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Resumen  
 ¿Podría dialogar José Ortega y Gasset con el pragmatismo? Esta es la pregunta general 
que esta tésis intenta explorar. ¿Y por qué nos interesa este tema? Nos interesa porque es 
innovadora, puesto que cualquier vínculo entre Ortega y el pragmatismo es poco estudiado. La 
esperanza es que nos ayudará a entender parte de la filosofía de Ortega mejor, o por lo menos 
leerla con una perspectiva nueva. También, como resultado, en la otra dirección la exploración 
de este tema nos da otra posible interpretación distinta y raramente enlazada del pragmatismo; 
una que es más historicista, viendo donde se puede imaginar que hay posibles puntos de 
conversación sobre la filosofía de la historia sobre todo.  
 Pero en cada momento es importante enfatizar que nunca se trata de un estudio de 
influencia, comparación, o contraste, en ninguna dirección—es siempre, en todo instante, 
solamente un diálogo imaginario.  
 Toda esta exploración se enfoca en una parte concreta de filosofía: la historia. Esta tésis 
estudia el historicismo de Ortega, y especialmente su máxima de que "el hombre no tiene 
naturaleza, sino que tiene historia," analizando donde hay un posible diálogo con el pragmatismo 
(y también donde quizás hay más historicismo en el pragmatismo, pero en general el enfoque es 
en la filosofía de Ortega). 
 Antes de centrarnos en el historicismo, primero es necessario que algunos puntos de 
metafísica básica como el concepto de la naturaleza, la verdad, y la realidad sean examinados 
para ver como nos lleva donde hay más diálogo posible entre la filosofía de la historia de Ortega 
y la filosofia del pragmatismo. 
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 Tres pragmatistas han sido selecionados aquí para llevar a cabo esta conversación con 
Ortega. En las primeras dos partes el diálogo es imaginado entre Ortega y los dos pragmatistas 
con quienes discutiblemente tendrían una conversación más relacionada y fluída; los 
norteamericanos John Dewey y William James. En tercer lugar, la última parte investiga un 
posible diálogo con el representante europeo más reconocido como pragmatista, Ferdinand 
Schiller. Esta conversación imaginara también nos sirve como evidencia del alcance del 
pragmatismo en Europa, puesto que todas estas figuras son relativamente contemporaneas. 
 Una perspectiva nueva sobre la máxima orteguiana de que "el hombre no tiene naturaleza 
sino que tiene historia" es que podríamos interpretar esto en un sentido anti-dualista según lineas 
pragmatistas, añadiendo porque la naturaleza es la historia; tenemos historia y no naturaleza 
porque la historia contiene la naturaleza y así no nos niega que hay naturaleza, simplemente nos 
argumenta que la noción mejor; más global y apropriada, es la historia.  
 Todo relacionado con lo humano tiene historia, y por tener historia, esto nos implica un 
fundamento temporal. Por consiguiente, de nuevo segun lineas más pragmatistas, decimos que 
nuestras historias y nociones de historia y con historia forman parte siempre de un continuo que 
va constantemente en movimiento del pasado al presente hacía el futuro. Es decir, en cada 
momento nuestra noción metafisica es un presente donde se encuentra el pasado con el futuro, 
puesto que rápidamente movemos al futuro y el presente se convierte en el pasado. 
  Pero cuando queremos estudiarnos a nosotros mismos, o nociones metafísicas y humanas 
como la verdad o la realidad, por ejemplo, lo más tangible que tenemos es el pasado. Siempre 
tenemos que tener en cuenta este principio fundamental en nuestros estudios de que todo forma 
parte de un continuo, con los puntos del pasado como lo más estudiable (incluso para los 
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pragmatistas quienes están centrados en el futuro en su instrumentalismo y funcionalismo, pero 
porque vivimos en vista al futuro, lo cual tampoco negaría Ortega porque esto no cambia el 
hecho de que el pasado es lo que podemos estudiar mejor, y más tangiblemente). Siempre 
tenemos que ver todo así como un continuo, igual como la idea de que no podemos leer páginas 
sueltas para entender un libro porque tenemos que leerlo por completo y en orden.  
 Otro punto importante más pragmatista en todo esto es el argumento de que todo es 
simplemente lo que pensamos que es; es decir, todo es como lo experimentamos ser. Esto es 
porque todo es canalizado por perspectivas individuales, ninguna siendo falsa ni verdadera ni 
absoluta, lo cual es concepto de orientación ortegiana en esta conversación imaginaria. Así 
vivimos; nuestros yoes existiendo anti-dualísticamente con y dentro de las circunstancias 
alrededor que nos da una cierta libertad limitado de escoger como nos movemos y a que 
respondemos—otra noción ortegiana. Esta interdependencia anti-dualística es clave en este 
estudio. También importante es como las nociones de la verdad, la realidad, o la historia, por 
ejemplo, son simplemente lo que pensamos que son, y nunca podemos saber cuando nuestras 
nociones coinciden con lo que realmente son—pero tampoco importa esto para los pragmatistas 
porque nos muestra e ilumina lo que pensamos y nuestras interpretaciones respectivas, lo cual es 
lo realmente importante en temas humanos. Así quizás dialogarían Ortega y estos pragmatistas. 
 En todo esto hay implicaciones importantes para el tema en concreto del estudio de la 
historia que podrían ayudar a mejorar la disciplina y su metodología. Por ejemplo, nos dice que 
la historia nunca puede ser estudiado por completo y nunca puede ser totalmente verdadera ni 
objetiva. Tambien nos dice mucho sobre los historiadores; sus perspectivas, influencias, 
inclinaciones, etcétera, igual al tiempo en que se escriben los libros de historia (quizás más que la 
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materia y los detalles de la historia en sí). De nuevo: todo forma parte de un continuo, y así, no 
hay un fin, ni un comienzo—igual al estudio de esta tésis, o por lo menos esto es un objetivo.  
 Por último, hay que terminar aquí con una nota bibliográfica breve. Por las circunstancias 
de no poder consultar varios libros en inglés, hay algunos que he podido comprar en su versión 
electrónica, que tiene dos fuentes de citación; por página y por locación. En estos casos, en el 
primer uso, esto lo indico en la nota de pie de página, y en los siguientes usos de la referencia 
sigo señalando con el estilo normal de APA sin hacer más referencia de que es un libro 
electrónico.  
 En general, también hay que notar que hay varios libros añadidos en la bibliografía que 
muestran el incremento de estudios recientes sobre los temas explorados aquí. En las notas de pie 
de página, en primera instancia de la fuente pongo un poco más de detalle con los apellidos en 
mayúsculas, y en los siguientes usos indico simplemente autor, título, y página(s). Puesto que he 
usado el título en vez del año—una decisión que he tomado porque hay varios títulos del mismo 
autor en el mismo año, y si hubiera usado el año podría resultar confuso—de la misma manera, 
he seguido este orden en la bibliografía (poner el año al final) para que también las referencias 
completas vayan en el orden de autor y título. 
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General Introduction 
I. Some Philosophy on the Importance of History and its Study 
 Why should we study history when it often seems as though history itself has shown us 
that humanity is generally most focused on being future-oriented?
1
 In fact, we often do not even 
live enough in the present, let alone consider sufficiently just how important the past really is. 
Yet every once and awhile we are reminded, nonetheless, of just how significant our "histories" 
are; for example, when we reflect on how far we have come, or a song reminds us of an 
important, influential day from adolescence, or we ponder how the day our children were born 
changed our lives forever. Still, on most days it seems we think more about what we are going to 
do this weekend, or what will be our next vacation, or even what we will do later in the day, 
etcetera, rather than what we are doing in this precise moment (any given present). 
 So if we generally often underestimate the power of influence of our own pasts, perhaps 
then we are even less 'motivated'  to study the pasts of others; as in history as an academic 
discipline. At times it may ultimately feel as though it is useless, as it is past and done with. But 
it does remain a relatively popular field of study—why? Perhaps many simply find it fun and 
entertaining, more so, than useful, per se. Maybe. But in any instance in which this were the 
case, this could not be further from the truth. History is no less important than any other 
academic discipline. 
 Some colloquial examples will help demonstrate the real world, everyday importance of 
the study of history for everyone, regardless of the extent of interest (or disinterest) in the topic. 
                                                          
1
 An example of this is precisely pragmatism, in fact.            
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Interestingly enough, when one starts to type into Google, "why is it important to study..." the 
first auto-fill that comes up, at least on one attempt, was "...history," and then "...scriptures" 
second.
2
 In other words, clearly we really do undervalue and underestimate this academic 
discipline as evidenced by the frequency with which we question it, as it is thus one of the most 
questioned areas of study in regards to why bother —even more than religion. 
 Yet history is so fundamentally human—it is us! We are history! Those alive today are 
living history, those past on are past history, and our unborn grandchildren and great 
grandchildren, etcetera, are our future history! Yet we continually underestimate its value, 
importance, influence, and power. We may live in the present, most of the time with a future 
orientation, but most tangible is where we have come from; it is the past that has led us to where 
we are today, and what can be more concretely and substantially studied. Hence we are 'living 
history,' because the past is most certainly not exactly dead. 
 In truth, any time we want to know why something happened, or how something came 
about, we must look at history (at least as one element); even if recent, it must be something in 
the past. In order to truly understand the present, and begin to contemplate the possible, potential 
future, one must study history; this must be at least part of our study. Thus, the study of history 
helps us better understand —not fully comprehend, just better understand— the present and 
potential future. 
 Often a focus of the use of the study of history is on how it helps us learn to avoid 
problems of the past in the future, to put it generally. It must be added as an essential emphasis, 
however, that of course the study of history cannot necessarily always prevent the same errors 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly enough, when typing "anti-dualism" into Google, a published summary of the first part of this paper 
appears from the second page on. 
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and problems of the past, but it can at least certainly help in that endeavor. As often cited, 
doctors require our medical histories to better treat us, applying for loans and credit require 
background checks, sport coaches study past games to work out strategies, etcetera. The past is 
very useful, and it is 'used' everyday. 
 To continue with some everyday examples, some technology, on the other hand, becomes 
obsolete when "too old," and we cannot even replace parts to fix it—we must buy what is new, 
current, and up-to-date. In other words, incompatibility can sometimes make technology 
obsolete, and can then end its existence. However, in this contrary example, this does not mean 
that it is truly dead, for what is current we could not have without what was past. For example, 
computers may not have floppy drives anymore, but if we had not had those we would not have 
what we have today, such as CD, DVD and USB drives (and it continues to develop and 
change); one led to the other since technology also builds on top of itself and requires the history 
it has, and therefore essentially is. While the example here is that of technology, really 
everything has history. 
 These are thus some general, real-world examples of history and its role, application, 
influence, and power in everyday life—as it has essentially always been 'throughout history.' So 
what of the academic discipline of history—or more specifically narrow, the philosophy of 
history? As aforementioned, when we want to know why something happened, or how we came 
to be where, who, etcetera, we are today, we must look at the past for help in finding these 
answers, as least in part. The past is part of what causes and shapes the present, as well as leads 
toward the future. 
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 History, therefore, helps us understand virtually everything, to phrase it bluntly yet 
arguably accurately. The study of history helps us understand humanity, human behavior, 
change, continuity, culture, society, identity, ethics and morality, politics—the list is virtually 
endless, and so important! The study of history, therefore, can aide in all other areas of study, as 
these concepts are so fundamental to our lives, and to humanity in general. And these concepts 
are also so hard to study and understand, and so unpredictable at times, which the study of 
history helps with, as well as the study of the philosophy of history. 
 Studying history also helps us become better critical thinkers, as we learn how to be 
better at searching for and finding patterns, environmental, social, individual contexts, and 
interrelated factors or elements in all this. History also teaches us respect through the 
preservation of the past and the heritages of our ancestors. History helps us preserve our 
memories. What parent does not want to commemorate and record every detail possible of the 
day their children were born? History therefore teaches us a little about human nature—perhaps 
not "truths" or "laws," but at least approximations to these, as it helps us at least better ponder 
humanity.
3
 History thus helps us learn more about ourselves—a major advantage indeed to the 
discipline considering that human beings are arguably often quite selfish by nature (and this is 
not always bad, per se). History, therefore, provides some lessons for the future, too. 
 Despite all this grand importance outlined here argued to be given to history as a study, 
unfortunately we must always also keep in mind that even if it is something relatively 'tangible,' 
it can never be perfected as a study. Hence where the importance of the philosophy of history 
                                                          
3
 As this is the first mention of the term "nature," it must be declared here at the start that while there are many 
different definitions, interpretations, and notions of "nature," such as biological, genetic, cultural, social, to reference 
just a few, the concluding argument that will be reached and emphasized here throughout will be that what nature 
always has is a historical character, element, or in a word, essentially nature. 
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comes in, as one example, because we can only posit that history helps, not solves, problems, 
quandaries, etcetera, which philosophizing about helps elucidate further. The philosophy of 
history, therefore, helps us improve the discipline of history itself, by posing questions and 
quandaries that lead us to better formulate how it is studied, because the academic discipline of 
history also poses a lot of problems. For example, what in history should we study? What kind of 
history should we study? Who should write and teach history? Etcetera. As the narrowed focus 
of the philosophy of history helps with, most of these questions cannot really be answered, at 
least not completely nor fully, but our asking them and pondering them helps us keep this 
limiting criteria in mind and therefore better ponder history through stronger critical thinking. 
What we can begin to establish through the philosophy of history, therefore, are what are some 
of the limitations of the study of history to prevent us from considering any possible conclusions, 
general laws or truths—these probably do not exist, though arguably again we perhaps have and 
can therefore reach approximations to them, at least. 
 Moreover, we can go a bit beyond just laying out some of the limitations. While 
philosophizing over how history can never cover all the spectrums, elements, details, or be 
entirely objective, etcetera—keeping this all in mind as part of our criteria for its' study helps us 
to be not only better historians, but it also helps us specifically to better understand that what we 
are studying is coming from this limitation; that what we are studying can perhaps teach us more 
about, for example, why it was recorded, the authors, its historical time context, rather than the 
actual contents themselves (the material recorded in and of itself), even if there is some overlap. 
 The philosophy of history, therefore, also remains undervalued as well, because this is 
neither the most popular nor commonly explored topic within the discipline of philosophy. What 
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is the use and importance of history; why is history and its study significant? What are the 
questions and quandaries we must propose, at least to improve history as an academic discipline? 
What are the limitations? What are some of the characteristics of the structure of history, and its 
study? Is history teleological? Etcetera. These are just a few more examples of some key 
questions explored within specifically the area of the philosophy of history to in part improve the 
general discipline of history, and even more generally, the study of humanity—this broader 
scope's aim is extremely important. 
 The disputed reality of all these undervalued, underappreciated, and underestimated 
arguments is one of the main motivations behind the following doctoral dissertation. What 
follows in this thesis is a narrowed exploration of one potential dialogue in all this, inspired by 
the philosopher of main focus José Ortega y Gasset's dictum that we are our histories—not 
because he was the first to say so, as by no means was he, but rather because of the way he said 
so and explored this, and because he is a philosopher who most certainly did not undervalue and 
underestimate the power of history. He is someone who in fact explored in depth history as well 
as the philosophy of history. 
 What follows will envision and analyze a potential dialogue of all that has been 
aforementioned, but in the specific area virtually unexplored of one narrowed investigation of the 
philosophy of Pragmatism and how it can possibly dialogue with Ortega's philosophy in this area 
of history and its meaning and purpose, thereby helping us hopefully better understand not just 
Ortega's philosophy, but also all the general arguments laid out here in this introduction about 
history,  its importance, and how it should be studied, as we need concrete examples at times as 
well to help clarify our points—especially of the general ones such as those just outlined here. 
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 Getting at the heart of this paper, we must begin by asking; was José Ortega y Gasset, in 
any way, a pragmatist in his historicism? This is a central question, but not answer, per se, that is 
addressed here, as what will be argued is that there is a possible conversational dialogue we can 
establish between some major pragmatist thinkers and José Ortega y Gasset's historicism, with 
the focus specifically on his polemical dictum that "man has no nature, only history." But as will 
be repeated throughout, given its great importance, it must be strongly emphasized that in no 
way is this study ever meant to draw parallels or similarities between the pragmatism in the three 
pragmatist thinkers explored here, John Dewey, William James, and Ferdinand Schiller, with 
José Ortega y Gasset.  
 The objective is to simply envision a possible, imaginary dialogue that Ortega might have 
with pragmatism and these three figures in an effort to study these topics in and of themselves 
without making any direct declarations of influence.  
 Further, another quandary addressed is the following: is pragmatism historicist in any 
ways? This is also a topic with little study. Therefore, this should also remain tenuous and the 
answers explored should also be viewed as simply again possible, imaginary dialogues on the 
topic.  
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II. An Introduction to "Pragmatism" 
 Pragmatism was a philosophical movement that originated in the United States in the 
1870s. The term "pragmatism" was first coined by Charles Sanders Peirce. As William James, 
one of the three key pragmatists explored here explains in regards to the philosophical 
movement's history,  
 The term is derived from the same Greek word [pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning 
 action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into 
 philosophy by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after pointing 
out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develop a thought's  meaning, we 
need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole 
significance. [...] To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only 
consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we 
are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.  Our conception of these effects, 
whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of  our conception of the object, so far 
as that conceptions has positive significance at all."
4
  0 
 Long considered primarily a very "American" philosophical tradition, although it was 
known and studied by some abroad, it has only recently been more recognized outside of the 
United States.  
                                                          
4
JAMES, William: Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (Works of William James), p. 21.  (Subsequently referred 
to as: Pragmatism.) 
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 As its name suggests, pragmatism stresses the "pragmatic," or the "practical," in that, 
most tersely summarized, what matters most are the "practical results" for understanding 
something and its effect, most generally speaking. In other words, "inquiries," in a general sense, 
must be tried and tested before we can reach any possible conclusions about them. But given 
how many "tries" and "tests" are often needed, sometimes there are not enough that can be 
conducted, and so results and conclusions are tenuous; simply practical, likely possibilities. 
 Pragmatism emphasizes "experience." Very broadly speaking, what we understand and 
conclude is revealed to us through experience. Experience is an ongoing, continuous process of 
interaction between an individual and his or her environment (which as well shall continually see 
in great depth can converse with Ortega's additionally central dictum that "we are ourselves and 
our circumstances;" "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia"). As Dewey explains it, "Experience occurs 
continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the 
very process of living."
5
  The subjects and objects are created and revealed in this progression 
and development. We cannot fully understand anything until we have had an experience with it. 
We should not, nor realistically can we ever hastily jump to any rash, tenuous conclusions, for 
everything needs to be discovered, explored, and learned about through specific and direct 
experience first. It is through our experience with something that we begin to possibly 
understand that something.  
 A fundamental statement that we can assume about pragmatism, therefore, although it is 
not directly stated in general in the philosophy, is that it emphasizes the importance of "history" 
both generally and literally speaking. This is a key assumption being made throughout this 
                                                          
5
 DEWEY, John: Art as Experience, p. 1. 
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dissertation; that pragmatism's use of term "experience" is used somewhat interchangeably with 
the term "history," especially when viewed in Ortega's conception of ''history." We can begin to 
study something through analyzing its experience, or past history, so in this sense pragmatism is 
therefore perhaps inherently historicist. Hence as will be elaborated in great depth, this is an area 
where we can certainly create a possible dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset given his very 
historicist focus.  
 But pragmatism is also very forward-looking, or more specifically, it is "instrumental" 
because although we are using the past to search for understanding, the main objective is to learn 
something that we can apply to the future. This is termed "functionalism." Given this forward 
focus in pragmatism, the general "historicist" feature arguably prominently inherent in 
pragmatism is rarely addressed in current scholarship. This is a central thesis being argued here, 
and one which is based largely on the research of Colin Koopman who has dedicated much 
research to this specific topic. In 2009 Koopman published Pragmatism as Transition: 
Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty, in which he expounds on a central thesis that 
pragmatism is very much founded on what he terms "transitionalism," within which he includes 
the defining concept of "temporal structures and historical shapes." Key are the concepts of 
"temporality" and "historicity" in pragmatism in his thesis. In this book he divides pragmatist 
thinking in "three waves." First is the classical, traditional pragmatism of early figures such as 
James, Dewey, and Pierce. The second wave is that of the more contemporary "neopragmatists" 
such as Richard Rorty and Ruth Putnam. And third is what Koopman himself wants to propose: 
that of "Pragmatism as transitionalism" in which time and history are central - something that is 
also key in this dissertation here.  
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 Tersely summarized, he argues, "Transitionalism emphasizes that we always find 
ourselves in the midst of historical and temporal transitions--we are in continuous flow."
6
 As he 
writes, "A renewed third wave of pragmatism is thus needful today for the continued vigor of the 
tradition itself."
7
 Indeed, given pragmatism's general focus on experience as fundamental to so 
much, this continuum is most certainly based on time and history, which these in certain ways 
can be understood as synonymous terms. As Koopman further explains in his defense of this 
position, 
 Historicism is in these three ways a central element in the pragmatist temperament. Yet 
 despite these obvious ways in which pragmatism lends itself to a historicist way of 
 thinking, this aspect of pragmatism is rarely given sufficient attention by commentators 
 and philosophers today. From the pragmatist perspective, such lack of attention can 
 hardly be dismissed as benign--for it means that pragmatists are not focusing their efforts 
 on developing a central aspect of their own philosophy. This may lead to negative 
 consequences both in terms of underdevelopment of the potentialities inherent in 
 historicism and in terms of misconstruing the kinds of philosophical and cultural criticism 
 fluid with the wider pragmatist vision. [...] It is also warranted, I believe, because a more 
 energetic approach to pragmatism's historicism will enable us to more effectively deploy 
 pragmatism for the historical, political, and philosophical uses to which we will put it in 
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 coming years. In other words, pragmatists can do their work better as pragmatists if they 
 pay more attention to the historicist themes central to their own way of thinking.
8
 
 So Koopman argues that pragmatism, in a general sense, is inherently quite historicist, 
despite the fact that it is not generally considered a historicist philosophy, nor are any of its main 
philosophers much invested in the philosophy of history, at least not directly or explicitly.  As he 
summarized it,  
 Pragmatists understand things as historically situated and temporally conditioned. [...] 
 pragmatists theorize concepts such as truth and meaning in ways that prioritize historical 
 context in our ascriptions of truth and interpretations of meaning. Another way of stating 
 this point is as a kind of sociological observation: pragmatists are often described as 
 attempting to reconstruct philosophy in light of evolutionary theory's emphasis upon 
 contingent change, and this results in a thoroughgoing philosophical historicism.
9
 
 As aforementioned, one of the fundamental reasons we can arguably consider 
pragmatism inherently quite historicist is for the emphasis placed on experience. As Koopman 
elaborates, this is because experience (which all pragmatists share a version of the anti-dualistic 
notion that 'what we think we know, what we think is real, what we think is true; what we think, 
in general, is what we experience it to be') is itself is naturally historicist in meaning and 
understanding. "Experience is not a thing, it is an event or a process," Koopman proposes. 
"Experience happens, takes place, is temporally shot through. Experience is not a presence with 
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its own substantial identity--it is rather wholly constituted by its relations to past and future."
10
 
Experience is conceptualized as always being a continuum, and as we shall see this is basically 
the same as history (history is not just the past, just as experience is not just the past or the 
present; both are past, present, and future—this is a key argument that will be reiterated 
throughout). 
 Again, although Koopman notes in his writings on this topic that not enough scholarship 
has been dedicated to this and the study of the historicism inherent in pragmatism in general, 
there are still, nonetheless, a few others who have researched and supported this view. In his 
article, "Historicism in Pragmatism: Lessons in Historiography and Philosophy," Koopman cites 
Joseph Margolis, who has also written extensively on pragmatism, as arguing the following:  
 Margolis's historicization of pragmatism is perhaps the fullest among the contemporary 
 offerings in his work on a pragmatism which postulates "that the world is a flux, that 
 thinking is historicized, and that selves are socially constructed or have histories rather 
 than natures."
11
   
 It is quite interesting that here explicitly he makes Ortega's statement: what we have are 
histories rather than natures, which is the central maxim explored here, and to which it is added 
to clarify that this is because man's nature is his history - hence the arguments for a potential 
dialogue between a 'historicist' pragmatism within the work of John Dewey, William James, and 
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, with Ortega--all of which are of course topics little explored. 
As Koopman adds,  
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 [...] despite these observations of pragmatist transitionalism, this aspect of James's and 
 Dewey's thought remains largely neglected in the literature on pragmatism. This is 
 unfortunate just insofar as this neglect can act as an impediment to developing the 
 important consequences of pragmatism's transitionalism.
12
 
 And this specific focus in study is recent, so perhaps it will only grow, as Koopman's 
book was published in 2009.  
 A few years prior in 2006 there was another study linking pragmatism with historicism, 
titled  Historicism: The Once and Future Challenge for Theology by Sheila Greeve Davaney, 
which is another key book to support the possibility to at least imagine a historcist dialogue in 
pragmatism. As Davaney concisely asserts, to say that humans are historical means;  
 To be historical means that humans exist within the complex and interrelated matrices of 
 natural and humanly constructed history. Humans always exist somewhere, in particular 
 locales demarcated by distinctive languages, political and economic systems, 
 geographies, myths and worldviews, rites and practices, forms of embodiment and social 
 organization. Humans are human in specific and distinctive ways; there are no humans in 
 general, only humans finely drawn in all their concreteness and particularity.
13
 
 This pragmatist conception of historicism in Davaney's argument can be envisioned to 
dialogue with many central tenets of Ortega's philosophy. In this aforementioned excerpt we find 
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the idea of nature being a part of history. We also find the concept that at every moment we live 
in interaction with our surroundings (like Ortega's yo soy yo y mi circunstancia). And we find the 
concept of perspectivism in the argument that there is no one perspective and that all are valid, 
making each individual particular and unique—as we shall see throughout all of these are central 
theses in Ortega's work. This will all be examined in great depth. And she continues describing 
her view of a pragmatist historicism that "humans as historical,"  "exist not in isolation but within 
the midst of interconnecting influences that constitute them in specific ways and to which they, 
as historical agents, contribute in turn."
14
 In other words, this is why we are ourselves and our 
circumstances, to use Ortega's terms, because we exist in constant interaction, as she continues 
on the topic of pragmatist historicism, 
 the recognition of historicity, with all its emphasis upon particularity and uniqueness, 
 does not imply isolation but, rather, interconnectedness. Indeed, it is the ever-widening 
 web of natural and historical relations that produces the very particularity and uniqueness 
 of experience to which historicity points. Historical particularity does not entail a lack of 
 reciprocal interaction between historical entities but, rather, complex and varied relations 
 in ever-greater scope.
15
 
 The existence of a nature, therefore, is not denied, but rather gathered into the concept 
and understanding of history; nature becomes historical, history is nature; "nature is no longer 
treated as without a history but as historical itself."
16
 This is, in fact, a very current trend 
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beginning to be more explored in pragmatism, as will be explained, which is the precise 
argument here on how to understand Ortega's maxim that man has no nature only history as 
being that man's history is his nature—hence the possible dialogue that can be envisioned 
between Ortega and pragmatist thought. As Daveney refers to,  
 Thus, importantly, in this version of contemporary historicism, history and nature are not 
 viewed as antithetical, and the bifurcation of history and nature that characterized so 
 much of both Enlightenment modernity and early historicism are now deemed as 
 untenable. In the place of this long-standing bifurcation of history and nature, thinkers 
 such as William Dean have called for, in a manner similar to Kaufman and McFague, an 
 interpretation of our cosmic context as a participatory universe in which human history is 
 naturalized and nature is understood as historical.
17
 
And she continues, 
 Pragmatic historicism, therefore, stresses particularity without isolation, individuality, 
 and uniqueness of time and place without assumptions of disconnection. And, perhaps 
 most importantly, it extends the network of relations within which humans reside to 
 include nature as a central component of such context.
18
  
 Now that this area of possible dialogue has been specified and clarified of the historical 
theme within pragmatism, we can move on to present the next topic in this imagined 
conversation. As aforementioned, in the case of Ortega, there is no need to search for historicism 
in his meditations, as he was admittedly quite the historicist. But the term "meditations" have 
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been used here as Ortega's objective was not to create a "philosophy of history" (as he himself 
declared), but rather perhaps a better term for it is "theory of history." In one sense, Ortega 
wanted to focus on meditations on life from a historical, historicist perspective. As Graham (a 
key author in this dissertation who will be introduced more formally ahead), succinctly proposed 
as a possible interpretation here, "At his best, Ortega could be designated a "theorist of history," 
who focused much less on patterns and causes and processes than on the nature of historical 
reality and historical knowledge--and on historical operations or methods."
19
 Further, Graham 
argued that Ortega's objective was to create a more "pragmatic" study and understanding of 
history; "What he wanted from historians was a more "pragmatic" kind of history, in a truly 
pragmatist sense of "useful" and "applicable" in other disciplines and activities, for politicians, 
philosophers, art critics, social scientists, and humanists."
20
 Again this concept of a pragmatist 
historicism in Ortega's work is precisely this paper's imaginary dialogue. 
 So again these are all areas of potential dialogue with Ortega, as will be explored in what 
follows in three instances of imaginary exchanges with Dewey, James, and Schiller. In this 
dissertation, specifically, again what is explored here is in regards to Ortega's historicist maxim 
that ‘man has no nature, what he has is history,’ which, as argued here, can be partly understood 
through a pragmatist basis of anti-dualism. The thesis here is that it is not that man has no nature, 
per se, rather that history is his nature because the two are anti-dualistic concepts; history is our 
nature because it is comprised of, as famously posited by Ortega, “myself and my circumstance.” 
And as shall be explored in great depth, one key reason why we can use the term "history" as 
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broader than nature, and therefore to encompass nature, is because history can imply anything 
"inherited," which can imply something bequeathed genetically, culturally, socially, 
environmentally; in other words, something more than just nature in the limited, traditional sense 
of the term. "History" is simply a better and broader term. 
 In the most general terms historicists agree that human beings live out of the heritages 
 their histories have bequeathed to them; language, culture, interpretations of reality, 
 practices, institutions, and so forth do not spring de nova, or from nothing, but emerge in 
 particular times and places and change and are altered through complex histories of 
 development. Any particular moment is always in some way the reworking, repetition, 
 transformation, or creative departure from what has come before, and what has come 
 before is also part of the ongoing flow of history.
21
 
 This comes from Davaney, who continues writing that in creating a pragmatist 
historicism, key questions that should be asked are as follows: 
 [...] pragmatic historicists ask, What are the repercussions of thinking, acting, organizing 
 life in one way or another? What kinds of life are made possible by living out of one 
 vision of reality rather than another? Who benefits from one set of practices or way of 
 organizing our social lives and institutions? What is historically inhibited and what is 
 nurtured and supported? How does one set of beliefs or practices cohere with another, 
 and what are the ramifications of such cohesion or dissonance? On the most basic  levels, 
 what persons, values, and possibilities get to survive and flourish, and who dies, what 
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 possibilities are lost, and which values disappear? These are the kinds of questions 
 toward which  pragmatic historicism points us.
22
 
 In what follows in this analysis to understand how it could be argued that Ortega's maxim 
that man has no nature, only history, is because history contains his nature, first we will look at 
some basic metaphysical topics in each of the three parts, and then broadly historicism, all of 
which will be envisioned to dialogue with the pragmatism in these three individuals' thought. 
The following are the threads woven throughout all three sections of this dissertation.  
 First, "experience" in pragmatism is an on-going, continuous process of interaction 
between an individual and his or her environment, which dialogues with Ortega's notion of "yo 
so yo y mi circunstancia." We live, understand, and exist along a continuum. We have 
experiences in the interaction of the self with circumstance. And this makes life one essentially 
lived in a "limited freedom" because while we have the freedom of choice in how we maneuver 
among our experiences, we cannot completely control the circumstances.  
 Next, "experience," which will be used often as fundamentally interchangeable with 
"history," exists along a continuum, which means that it is past, present, and future. But, 
"history" is the most tangible, as really everything is "historical" because the present is fleeting 
and becomes "history" almost as quickly as we say so, and the future is non-tangible of course, 
ultimately always a manifestation of the past (as is the present). But the future also plays a key 
role, nonetheless (although still being arguably "historical") in bringing the purpose to our 
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existence and historical study, since we have the goal to improve our futures through learning 
from the past.  
 But what is, history, exactly? For the purposes of this paper, a key part of this definition 
will be to always keep in mind that experience is the fundamental and important feature of 
history, since the goal here is to view history from a primarily and innovative pragmatist 
perspective. By defining history as a set of experiences, without specifying a start or end per se, 
we can avoid discrepancies as to whether or not to see history as monistic or pluralistic, for 
example. Rather, viewing and defining history as experience establishes two main, key features. 
First, this implies that our interaction, interpretation, and understanding of history is an essential 
interplay in what is history. Second, history as experience without a start or finish means that it 
must be seen as a continuum. This is not to say that there aren't potential, defining divisions 
along that continuum, but there is no ultimate or finite starting or ending points, thereby making 
history something alive and futuristic as well, and not just the past. While most traditional 
definitions of history tend to focus on this idea of an aggregate collection or record of past, and 
definitively closed events, this is not the idea being promoted here, as viewing history from a 
more pragmatist perspective, albeit infrequently defined as such, tersely summarized the 
argument here is that history is a continuum of the past, present and future of our experiences.
23
 
 In returning to the main threads of this dissertation, an additional strand is that life, 
therefore, is history, as life is the experience of life; life, reality, truth, experience, history, 
etcetera, is simply what we experience it to be. Hence, we have no nature, only history, because 
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nature is contained within our history—this is another key fiber woven throughout in how so 
much that will be explored must be understood anti-dualistically.  
 A pause must be taken to briefly delve into this concept of anti-dualism, as this is a key 
feature of pragmatism, and one rarely associated with Ortega but that comprises a central part of 
this imagined dialogue's vision and argument. For example, bark on a tree can flake off as 
separately fallen pieces of a whole tree, making it, therefore, visibly separate from the roots 
connected to the ground, but we understand in its entirety to all be part of one tree as we 
generally think of tree when we think of bark, yet we can also use the bark for other things, such 
as making a fire. "Dualism" of course refers to two; for example, this could be in reference to the 
bark and the tree, monism versus pluralism, or Descartes' famous mind versus body distinction. 
Here the argument, however, as to how to understand anti-dualism is to simply define it as "not 
two;" anti-dualism does not mean "one," here it just refers to the argument that concepts such as 
the mind and body are simply more complicated, and this complication can be resolved by 
saying that it is both separate but connected (so, one and two—or more, essentially). In other 
words, there is a thing, and there is what we think that thing is, and these two concepts are 
separate, but interdependently and inextricably linked, though we cannot be completely sure of 
that connection's accuracy or specifics. Meaning, we know that the connection exists, we just 
cannot always confirm it, per se. So anti-dualism here is understood as the argument that a 
connection exists between two things, such as the mind and body, or a whole and parts, but they 
cannot be understood as separate in the first place without recognizing that one cannot exist 
without the other. We could not know what a part is without knowing what a whole is. The mind 
perhaps may separately tell us what the body is, but we would not know what the body is without 
the mind telling us, so since the two cannot be understood completely separately, they are 
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connected, again interdependently and inextricably, though they are two different things. And 
this is a great example of not being able to always confirm this, as this is still pondered in 
philosophy, but can certainly be strongly argued for. 
 Anti-dualistic again means not two, but neither is it one; rather, it is both, because though 
we know that this interdependent and inextricable connection exists, we cannot be certain of its 
specifics. We cannot confirm how to define when a connection coincides with whatever it is we 
are pondering. For example, to return to the classic dualism, there is the mind and the body, and 
there is what we think these two things are and how they are connected, and we know that there 
is some sort of connection, but we cannot be certain of how it is connected and whether or not 
our understanding of this connection and our conceptions of mind and body coincide with what 
they truly are.  
 While this may sound a bit empty at first, as it essentially says that we really cannot know 
much, generally speaking, this is only because what is important is not what something really is, 
but rather what we think something is. This is a very human-centered approach, as it argues that 
we and what we think is what is most important. And this is because for pragmatists in general, it 
is not the truthfulness of something that is important, per se, since we cannot really know that for 
sure, but rather how useful, practical, and applicable something is based on what we think it is. 
The value of something to a human being is important. Some understandings are simply more 
useful for the human race, and we should focus on pondering that rather than whether or not 
those understandings are actually accurate, truthful, in and of themselves. The goal of 
pragmatism generally is not really an end of inquiry, rather a focus is on pondering the 
usefulness of some thing or some belief. Inquiry goes on forever really, as inquiry exists 
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essentially along a continuum, just as history does, as will be elaborated on throughout this 
dissertation. 
 And to continue with this concept of anti-dualism, a next key argument is that we cannot 
really truly know metaphysical topics such as the truth, reality, history, etcetera, because there is 
what they are, and there is what we think they are, and we cannot know if they ever coincide, 
generally speaking. This is also because everything is manifested in individual perspectives, 
none of which are true or false, they are just what we can know. This, as we shall see, is key in 
Ortega's philosophy. One specific instance of this that will be explored is Ortega's maxim "yo 
soy yo y mi circunstancia," which will be argued here we can understand as comprising this 
intricate relationship of interdependency in this separate-but-united concept in which the yo and 
the circunstancias are different and distinct, but in his philosophy together they create our 
realities in every moment, as we are always living as ourselves among and interaction with our 
circumstances. 
 There are thus as many interpretations as there are perspectives (for example, of the truth, 
reality, history, etcetera). This applies, therefore, also to history.  
 As such, history is subjective, individual, and impossible to record entirely, or completely 
objectively, as it is anti-dualistic as well. 
 There is history, and then there is what we think it is and record it as, and it all will not 
ever fully coincide, nor in entirety.  
 But we can find some trends of trends, nonetheless. Everything is manifested in 
individual perspectives because all we understand as truth, reality, history, etcetera, arguably tell 
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us more about the perspective, and the time of that perspective, more than the contents 
themselves; in other words, everything is 'perspectival' and historical. Everything is constantly 
being re-studied and re-understood; as such everything is historical. And what matters most is 
the way we experience something, rather than the experience in and of itself, because it is what 
we can study.  
 And finally all of this must then be applied to creating a better and stronger methodology 
for the study of history, while keeping in mind of course this is all just an imaginary 
philosophical dialogue that should also be considered to proceed along a continuum as well, and 
as such remain unfinished. The goal here is to provoke and inspire more investigation into these 
relatively unexplored and little researched topics between pragmatism, historicism and the 
philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. 
 It must be reiterated that again this is all simply an imaginary dialogue, and at no time are 
specific similarities being drawn (unless quoted as such by other authors, such as Graham cited 
previously). This is all just a study on some areas in which perhaps Ortega might have conversed 
with these three pragmatists. And because the goal is to envision a pragmatist dialogue in Ortega, 
many of the same topics will be revisited in all three parts with the three different pragmatists as 
continued evidence for the possibility to imagine this discourse within Ortega's work. In other 
words, in the effort to imagine how Ortega might be able to dialogue with pragmatism, we must 
look at three different pragmatists (so as to not be a study on just one imagined exchange), and 
by necessity, therefore, also many of the same topics, especially those fundamental to 
pragmatism and Ortega. 
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 To recap the technical details: this way of elaborating a dialogue implies that the same 
topic or issue will be revisited throughout this paper in various moments of the "conversation," 
though there will be new, innovative nuances and interpretations added for each visit. First 
presented are the fundamental, foundational topics of conversation, from which each author's 
view will be explored in profundity, subsequently leading next to points of possible dialogue. 
Still, as has been declared, this is not a comparative study between thinkers. Nor is it a study that 
looks for the roots of these authors' work. This study is not one that asserts any possible direct 
mutual influences. Nor is this only a study of just the thought of Ortega, Dewey, James, or 
Schiller, in and of themselves. Nonetheless, to be able to imagine and create a possible dialogue 
among each of these three pragmatists with Ortega, we must base ourselves in their thought and 
work first, and in what other authors have had to say about it. So again the objective here is not 
to present and elaborate on the knowledge and understanding of their thought and work, per se, 
or in and of itself, but rather, it is more so about utilizing all this to develop and expand upon a 
possible dialogue, and from this point reflect and ponder more broadly the meaning that this can 
have for history, its study, and the philosophy of history, along with a specific area of Ortega's 
philosophy concretely.  
 Although the original purpose behind this thesis was to study Ortega and use pragmatism 
as a lens for new, and possibly better, ways of understanding his thought, during the process 
several additional discoveries have been made to also present some new lines of investigation 
about pragmatism itself, emphasizing the possibility of the inherent, yet perhaps largely ignored, 
concept of history. Thus, what has been developed is a possible dialogue between Ortega and 
Pragmatism, as well as new ways to understand Historicism and the meaning we give to the 
concept of history from a specifically pragmatist perspective; from within Pragmatism. 
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Part One: 
Anti-Dualism in History and Nature: A Possible Dialogue 
between John Dewey and José Ortega y Gasset 
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Section I: Fundamentals toward a Philosophy of History  
I. Introduction 
 Why should we study history? Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset answered 
"Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella."
24
 If a 
central focus of the study of history, therefore, is to learn which have been errors we should 
avoid in the future, most fundamentally, then history is one form of study of humanity. But the 
combination of this focus on errors, and what is by necessity a subjective focus of human beings, 
means that it is by no means simple, easy, or perhaps even truly possible to formulate a 
systematic study for the discipline, such as that which we have developed for some other 
subjects, such as mathematics. It is essentially impossible to record history 'perfectly;' to 
document every second, every perspective, every connection, etcetera, from every event. So 
because it is, thus, so difficult to study, yet so important given that the subject matter is 
ourselves, our own species, its importance cannot be overestimated. Nor, therefore, can there be 
too much philosophical study on the meaning of history, how it relates to humanity, as well as 
how it should be studied and recorded, because of this virtual impossibility for the study of the 
study of history to truly ever end (this is a topic that will be explored at great length throughout 
this dissertation). 
 This was all of great interest and importance to Ortega, as he wrote volumes on these 
topics and issues on history. For this reason, inquiry into his thought on the meaning of history 
and how it should be interpreted is a challenging and precipitous task indeed. And perhaps even 
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particularly more exigent and formidable is the main attempt here to find a dialogue that 
dialogues between these views of Ortega's with those of John Dewey (as well as with William 
James and Ferdinand Schiller in the following two parts), a contemporary twentieth century 
American Philosopher who not only wrote very little on the specific subject of history, but whose 
general philosophical leanings are usually considered nowhere near those of Ortega's. Hence, in 
developing a study between these two and their thought on history; most generally speaking, its 
meaning, study, and relation to humanity, as declared from the start, what is proposed here is 
simply a possible dialogue between the two thinkers in this first section (and two more possible 
dialogues in the next two sections). Moreover, the focus here will also always be on how some 
similar stratum in their diverse layers of thought (which not only is very different in many ways, 
but even over the course of their own work shifted and changed themselves as true for many 
thinkers in history of course), can be at least partially correlated as a way in which in some of 
Dewey's thought can help us better understand that of Ortega's in some very specific instances. 
Thus, here we have a conversational study, a dialogue, and not a comparison and contrast or 
work about influences. Again as stated at the start, here the objective is simply to create a 
possible dialogue between Ortega and Dewey that perhaps can help us better understand some 
parts of Ortega's philosophy, and possibly provide new interpretations of his thought. 
 As specified in the introduction, the main instance of this that is explored here is in 
regards to Ortega's historicist maxim ‘man has no nature, what he has is history,’ which, as 
argued here, can be partly understood through a pragmatist basis of anti-dualism. Again the 
thesis here is that it is not that man has no nature, per se, rather that history is his nature because 
the two are anti-dualistic concepts; history is our nature because it is comprised of, as famously 
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posited by Ortega, “myself and my circumstance.” This will arguably dialogue smoothly, as we 
shall see, with Dewey given the strong element of anti-dualism in his philosophy. 
 And as we shall further see, neither philosopher negates that “preparedness,” or “nature,” 
influences our being and behavior, rather they are arguing, more importantly, that “plasticity,” or 
nurture, plays a greater role given that this encompasses “nature” when we relate Ortega’s 
application of “history” to Dewey’s use of “experience.”25 Our “experiences” create our history, 
and interpretations as to the nature of them are not only potentially infinite, but they are just 
that—interpretations, which can also change over time. Hence, one of the central arguments 
developed here is that what we truly are is our history.  
 The first part of this potential, possible dialogue, or what we can call a sort of 
"conversational study" between Ortega and Dewey, focuses on the fundamentals in building a 
philosophical study on the subject of history, including general metaphysics on life, experience, 
nature, as well as on epistemology, truth, reality, and value. Also included of course in this first 
part is a brief biographical and philosophical background on these two thinkers.  
 The second part then will take all this study from the first part in an effort to find some 
possible cohesion and correlation between it all in the specific focus of the antidualism in 
Ortega's thought on history and human nature (as of course it is a study of humanity), as one part 
of how it should be studied and interpreted. The objective, therefore, is again to conclude how 
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Nature, he presents this new term as an extension, not a rejection, of experience. "Experience" is a word used to 
designate, in a summary fashion, the complex of all which is distinctly human.... "Culture" includes the material and 
the ideal in their reciprocal interrelationships and (in marked contrast with the prevailing use of "experience") 
"culture" designates, also in their reciprocal interconnections, that immense diversity of human affairs, interests, 
concerns, values which compartmentalists pigeonhole under "religion," "morals," "aesthetics," "politics,' 
`economics,' etc., etc." (From: DEWEY, John: Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy,  pp. 166-67).  
(Subsequently referred to as: Philosophy.) 
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Dewey (just as one potential source of course) can maybe help us better understand Ortega's 
thought on history. Analyzed in the second section of this first part are their meditations on the 
instrumentalism of history, as well as on how it is defined and should be studied. Again, 
although these two philosophers are not frequently linked, a dialogue will be envisioned in the 
basic, Deweyen pragmatist antidualism, an elder of Ortega. And even though Dewey, unlike 
Ortega, wrote little on specifically the discipline of history, much of it was arguably indeed 
fundamentally historical, which is part of what is specifically less studied and more innovative 
here in this dissertation. Hence again in summary what will be explored here is a potential 
dialogue between the two important twentieth century thinkers. 
On several occasions José Ortega y Gasset has said that “clarity is the philosopher’s 
courtesy.”26 His notion that “Man has no nature, only history” is no exception to this, as it is one 
of the most polemical yet fundamental concepts in what we should properly call José Ortega y 
Gasset’s “meditations” on history (for Ortega believes that a “philosophy of history” is a 
“misnomer”).27 Nonetheless, if we analyze the many philosophical and etymological meanings 
of the terms “nature” and “history” with those of Ortega’s, we shall find that again it is not that 
man does not have a nature, per se, but rather that man’s nature is his history because these two 
                                                          
26
 See: ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Una interpretación de la historia universal, p. 39. (Subsequently referred to as: 
Interpretación.) The quote in Spanish is as follows: "la claridad es la cortesía del filósofo." This book is a series of 
lectures given by Ortega between 1948 and 1949. Dewey once said something similar about being a philosopher 
when he pondered the following questions for the evaluation of philosophical study: “Does it end in conclusions 
which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more 
significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering 
the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in “reality” 
even the significance they had previously seemed to have?” (From: DEWEY, John: Experience and Nature, p. 7). 
(Subsequently referred to as: Experience and Nature.) (Originally published in 1925.) 
27
 The original quote in Spanish is as follows: "Llamar algo <<filosofía de la historia>> partía del hecho de que se 
tenía la idea más confusa de la filosofía y se pensaba que de todo puede hacerse filosofía. [...] Mas no hay tal 
filosofía de la historia" (Ortega, Interpretación, p. 26). 
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terms are anti-dualistic. In other words, man’s nature is history; history is our nature—this is 
Ortega’s notion of human reality. 
El hombre, no tiene naturaleza, lo que tiene es historia; porque historia es el modo de ser 
de un ente que es constitutivamente, radicalmente, movilidad y cambio. […] El hombre es 
hoy lo que es porque ayer fue otra cosa. ¡Ah! Entonces, para entender lo que hoy es basta 
con que nos cuenten lo que ayer fue.
28
  
 Or, more succinctly, "lo único que el hombre tiene de ser, de 'naturaleza', es lo que ha 
sido".
29
 
So man or woman has “no nature” in part because each person is much more than just his 
or her “yo;” he or she is his or her yo y mi circunstancia and not an independent being, 
ontologically speaking.
30
 This is our anti-dualistic human reality because the two can never be 
separated since they represent more so a continuum, as our lives are defined as “ourselves within 
our lives’ circumstances.”31 As Ortega argues, life is,  
[…] constituida por dos dimensiones, inseparable la una de la otra y que quiero dejar 
destacadas ante ustedes con toda claridad. En su dimensión primaria vivir es estar yo, el 
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ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo XII, p. 237.  
29
 Quoted in: RABADE, S: Ortega y Gasset, Filósofo, 62. 
 
30
 See: FERRATER MORA, J.: Three Spanish Philosophers: Unamuno, Ortega, and Ferrater Mora. (Subsequently 
referred to as: Spanish Philosophers.) 
31
 In Ortega's meditations, "circumstances" is used in quite a general sense, as it is essentially every person, place, 
and thing that surrounds us. But most fundamentally, it is something "temporal" (hence, as we shall see, why 'man is 
his history'); "[...] la circunstancia no se compone sólo de cosas en sentido estricto, sino también de personas: la 
circunstancia es también sociedad humana, el mundo es también <<mundo>> en el sentido social" (ORTEGA Y 
GASSET, José: Unas lecciones de metafísica, p. 62). (Subsequently referred to as: Metafísica.) 
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yo de cada cual, en la circunstancia y no tener más remedio que habérselas con ella. Pero 
esto impone a la vida una segunda dimensión consistente en que no tiene más remedio 
que averiguar lo que la circunstancia es.
32
 
Moreover, as Ortega consistently argues, life is not just ‘given to us ready-made;’ life is a 
drama that we find ourselves in.
33
 And in this “drama” we face certain circumstances unique to 
each one of us (though some can overlap with those of others). Ortega writes, "Cada hombre—y 
claro está, cada mujer—tiene su mundo o circunstancia que se parece más o menos a la del 
prójimo, pero que siempre tiene algunos elementos distintos"
34
 Each epoch brings with it a 
different set of circumstances, and in every moment each of us has to decide how to interpret 
them and what to do next. For Ortega, therefore, man is free in the specific sense that he can 
choose how he will react and who he is going to be. Man has a limited freedom, which is a topic 
that can be envisioned to especially dialogue smoothly with Schiller as we will see in the third 
part. This is why history, or what we can call human or man’s nature, is “permanente inquietud y 
mutación.”35 And this is part of why man has no nature because he simply has too many 
‘possibilities’ to choose from. Life, according to Ortega, is a continual “quehacer,” as A. García 
explains in El laberinto de la razón: Ortega y Heidegger,  
No tener naturaleza implica que el hombre no es cosa ni cuerpo, alma o conciencia, sino 
que el hombre es un drama, ser insustancial, nuevo homo viator, <<peregrino del ser>>, 
                                                          
32
 This Ortega repeats in many of his writings. As one example, see ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: En torno a 
Galileo, p. 71. (Subsequently referred to as: Galileo.)  
33
 Perhaps one here can think of Shakespeare’s idea of “all the world’s a stage.” 
 
34
 Ortega, Metafísica, p. 95. 
 
35
 Ortega, Interpretación,  p. 24. 
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cuya esencia consiste en querer ser lo que todavía no es, lo que convierte su vida en un 
continuo quehacer.
36
  
History, therefore, is what man has, which would be his story of his ‘becoming.’  But to 
move toward the future, all we have to base our decisions on is our contemplation and 
interpretation of the past; “el hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, 
se encuentra con lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado.”37 Thus, concisely stated, the past, 
or history, is man’s nature, “En suma, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene… 
historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia—como res gestae—
al hombre.”38 In the English version this is succinctly translated as the following: “[…] the past 
is man’s nature.”39 Further, as discussed in the introduction, history is to be understood here as 
not just the past, but also the present and the future; as a continuum, thus in part how it can be 
our nature. 
 
 
                                                          
36
 See: REGALADO GARCÍA, A: El laberinto de la razón: Ortega y Heidegger, p. 202.  (Subsequently referred to 
as: Laberinto.) 
As Graham argues, “It [Ortega’s “vital reason”] was something (un quehacer) for anyone or everyone (cada cual) to 
“do” in life, by using concepts as “instruments”—a viewpoint so pragmatic that it recalls Dewey” (From: 
GRAHAM, John: A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset, p. 164. (Subsequently referred to as: 
Pragmatist Philosophy.)   
37
Ortega y Gasset, Galileo, p. 143.  
38
 See: ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: Historia como sistema, p. 48. (Subsequently referred to as: Historia.)  
(Originally published in 1941.) 
39
 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: History as a System, p. 62. (Subsequently referred to as: History.) (Translated to 
English in 1941.) 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
II. Ortega and Dewey: Two Contemporaries 
In order to further contemplate this and better understand what Ortega might have meant 
with his polemical phrase “man has no nature, only history,” as noted, explored here in this first 
section will be American contemporary John Dewey’s conceptions of his terms of “experience” 
and “nature,” as one source of potential exchange. It must be noted, however, that Dewey is of 
course not the only arguable possible source to relate here in regards to this idea that ‘man is his 
history’ in Ortega’s meditations, for we know that Wilhelm Dilthey in particular also had a 
significant impact on these subsequent general meditations on history of Ortega’s, as just one of 
the more studied examples. And this is of course not to mention that this general philosophical 
viewpoint that ‘humans are their history’ is certainly not new, neither to Ortega nor to Dewey. 
But again what is relatively unconventional and to some degree novel here is the attempt to find 
possible correlations between this philosophy of history with American pragmatism and Spanish 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. And again additionally innovative here is to interpret the 
nature of history in Ortega's thought to dialogue with Dewey's pragmatist conception of 
"experience."   
There have been raised, nonetheless, arguments that in a general sense, the social thought 
of Ortega began with a pragmatist basis, in part, and had a subsequently consistent impact on his 
meditations. And pragmatism is defined by Dewey in one instance from 1922 as the following: 
“a “historical empiricism,” but with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon 
antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the 
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possibilities of action.”40 So there is a connection here of historicism (i.e., antecedent/precedent) 
even though the focus on is on the future (i.e., consequent/possibilities). And this possible 
pragmatist impact upon Ortega is particularly apparent in his meditations on history, as despite 
the lack of study on this there is arguably a connection here with historical research in Dewey’s 
vision of pragmatism, and as we shall see, in part specifically this instrumentalist and practical 
application of the study of the past for the future.
41
 Moreover, in further exploring this possible 
dialogue, one scholar has even gone as far as to consider Ortega even more “consistent as a 
pragmatist than Dewey.”42 As J. T. Graham argues, “It [Ortega’s “vital reason”] was something 
(un quehacer) for anyone or everyone (cada cual) to “do” in life, by using concepts as 
“instruments”—a viewpoint so pragmatic that it recalls Dewey.”43  
The research and work of Graham will be quoted frequently in this dissertation, as it is 
one of the very few direct studies between Ortega and pragmatism. However, given the lack of 
research and scholarship on this topic, it must be maintained throughout this thesis that these 
quotes are just arguments and not meant at any time to be considered any degree of declaration 
of fact or parallel. Furthermore, it must also be inserted as a note here that given fellow 
contemporary Spanish Philosopher Miguel de Unamuno's known interest in American 
pragmatism, this could arguably have been another means of exposure to this philosophical 
movement for Ortega. Given the newness of Graham's arguments, we cannot approach his work 
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 See: DEWEY, John and ed. McDERMOTT, John: The Philosophy of John Dewey Two Volumes in One: 1 The 
Structure of Experience 2 The Lived Experience, p. 50  (Subsequently referred to as: Philosophy of Dewey.) This 
book is a compilation of various works by Dewey. 
41
 See: GRAHAM, J. T.: The Social Thought of Ortega y Gasset: A Systematic Synthesis in Postmodern and 
Interdisciplinarity, p. xx. (Subsequently referred to as: Systematic Synthesis.) 
42
 Ibid., footnote p. 10. 
 
43
 Graham,  A Pragmatist Philosophy,  p. 164.  
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yet as directly authoritative. This is all because again as noted, Ortega is not usually correlated in 
any way with American pragmatism. Though as Graham points out, perhaps part of the reason 
for this is that "[…] after 1898, for a young Spanish philosopher aspiring to a national chair of 
metaphysics, having professed publicly a close affiliation with James would probably have been 
fatal to his reputation and career."
44
 This is a strong and plausible argument indeed. 
Ortega did once comment on pragmatism that it deserves "escasa estimación" (“small 
esteem”), and he declared that “el pragmatismo norteamericano se ha atrevido a proclamar esta 
tesis: 'No hay más verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas.' Y con esta tesis, tan audaz 
como ingenua, tan ingenuamente audaz, ha hecho su ingreso en la historia milenaria de la 
filosofía el lóbulo norte del continente americano.”45 And while this is a negative view, clearly, it 
does demonstrate that he was at least somewhat read in pragmatism; this tells us that he did know 
enough of pragmatism to formulate a concluding opinion about it, to say the least. 
So regardless of whatever the argued extent of this pragmatist correlation with Ortega 
may be, what most certainly cannot be denied is that Ortega, at the very least, read some 
pragmatist philosophy, for which we find evidence of within his own library of general books on 
American philosophy and pragmatism.
46
 Moreover, many of these two philosophers’ books were 
published almost contemporaneously.  
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 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 146. 
 
45
 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: ¿Qué es filosofía?, p. 36. 
While not many have linked Ortega with pragmatism, and especially with Deweyan pragmatism, J. T. Graham 
elaborates a great deal on his pragmatist basis in all the three books in his series on Ortega. 
46
 See: Graham, Systematic Synthesis, pp. xx-xxi, footnote 11, as well as Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 149, 
footnote II. Moreover, Graham argues that two of the anonymous articles in the Encylopedia universal ilustrada on 
pragmatism and William James are likely to be in fact authored by Ortega  (see page xix). Perhaps James had a 
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But most importantly, the topics being explored here in this first part are the possible 
imaginary conversations that can be drawn between American pragmatist John Dewey and 
Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, regardless of when their books were published or 
whether or not any admission of influence or agreement was made. We can never know with 
certainty how long either of the two spent thinking, researching, and writing. We generally only 
have access to lecture dates (and still in this case we cannot know for sure how long was spent 
thinking about and preparing a lecture), and publication years. Even reference to their personal 
libraries is insufficient, for it is also possible that books were borrowed. Again this will be 
important to keep in mind throughout this dissertation: the reading here is simply a hypothetical 
dialogue. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
greater impact of all the pragmatists on Ortega’s thought, though Dewey was probably the next pragmatist in order 
of influence. In the entry in the Enciclopedia universal ilustrada on pragmatismo, there are some excerpts that 
appear to support this assertion that it was authored by Ortega. For example, in the section on the critiques of 
American pragmatism, it reads, “[…] it seems that the pragmatist has never asked why a belief drives us more than 
an other  to action” [my translation]. The original quote in Spanish is as follows: “[…] parece que el pragmatista no 
se ha preguntado jamás por qué una creencia nos conduce mejor que otra a la acción” (Ibid., p. 1251). This could be 
identified with Ortega’s stern insistence upon the strength and power of beliefs, as there is a very important 
distinction in his philosophy between “ideas” and “beliefs,” as the latter are in a sense the former that become part of 
us. “Beliefs,” per Ortega’s meditations, are the bases of our lives, and they are thus the core of his “razón histórica.” 
As Ortega declares in his article, “Los <<nuevos>> Estados Unidos,” “The error of pragmatism does not lie in how 
pragmatism considers ideas as instruments, rather it lies in wanting to reduce the things which man has to have 
perceptibly and experimentally, that which is in his hands and present, minerals, plants, animals, and stars. […] If it 
were like this, life would resultantly be an easy task, perhaps determined with a certain fullness for milleniums” [my 
translation]. The original quote in Spanish is as follows: “El error del pragmatismo no radica en que considere las 
ideas como instrumentos, sino en que quiera reducir las cosas con que el hombre tiene que habérselas a lo 
perceptible y experimentable, lo que está a la mano y presente, el mineral, la planta, el animal y la estrella. […] Si 
así fuese, la vida resultaría faena fácil, tal vez resuelta con cierta plenitud hace milenios” (From: ORTEGA Y 
GASSET, José: Obras Completas Tomo IV, pp. 257-258). 
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III. Biographical Backgrounds 
Before examining the philosophy of Ortega and Dewey, perhaps it is appropriate to first 
consider a bit of their biographies in an effort to at least in part better understand the time period 
in which they matured into the philosophers that they became. This is indeed important because, 
as argued here, we are our histories. Each individual is his "yo y mi circunstancia," and part of 
those circumstances; a main part of that history, is the historical time period in which they lived. 
José Ortega y Gasset was born in Madrid on the 9th of May in 1883. This was a time 
which, especially his country, was on the verge of major transitions. The close of the nineteenth 
century brought Spain especially much political and cultural instability and conflict, which of 
course would have a tremendous impact on the thought of Ortega. Politically, the traditional 
monarchical model, and its fusion earlier in the nineteenth century with a parliamentary system, 
would come to be critiqued as no longer abreast of the times. While the rest of Europe gradually 
became more secular, Spain seemed to some to lag behind as considered by those, 'dragged down 
by the Catholic faith.' And this would be challenged as the close of the nineteenth century's new 
intellectual and scientific explorations would, in a general sense, now offer new systems of 
thought, thereby providing new ideas of reality, progress, history, life, just to cite a few, making 
Catholicism and Christianity no longer the sole authority on these matters. For example, there 
was Darwin and his studies on natural selection. There was also Hegel and his philosophical 
studies on the teleology of history in its movement toward an "absolute Spirit." Freud and his 
development of psychoanalysis must also be referenced, as well as Nietzsche and his 
proclamation of the 'death of God.' This would have a particularly important impact on the 
philosophy of Ortega, as central to much of his philosophy was his urging for Spain to move on a 
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path of "Europeanization;" for the country to modernize itself through political reform parallel to 
that in much of the rest of Europe. And this was also likely part of the reason that Ortega was 
motivated to do much of his collegiate studies abroad in Germany, which in his view was the 
defining nation in terms of progress and modernity within Europe at that time. 
Culturally, this new arsenal of systems of thought, while in some instances created a 
thriving and creative intellectual environment, in others only led to further confusion and at 
times disillusionment. Given how long the Catholic faith had been the dominant foundation of 
society and culture, developing new structures of government, new visions of life, to reference a 
few, would take time, and Catholicism's loss of stature and authority would need to be 
compensated somehow. So during this time, therefore, the idea of the "historicity" of humans, 
humanity, and nations, would become redefined and important in new ways. And Ortega would 
be one of those key figures analyzing and redefining the meaning and study of history. 
The end of the nineteenth century would completely redefine not only Spain's place and 
role in the world, but the country's national identity within as well. The nation's colonial and 
economic rise in the fifteenth century that eventually led to Spain being the greatest world power 
of its time would come to lose its last colony in 1898 at the close of the Spanish-American War 
(despite the gradual decline since the seventeenth century). This created a tension, a feeling of 
disillusionment, and a split among the intellectuals of the times in regards to how to alleviate and 
mend this new definition of Spain itself, as well as Spain's place in the world. Ortega was on the 
side of those who were known as the "europeizantes," seeing himself as a "prophet" of sorts who 
would lead the country into European modernization, as opposed to the "hispanizantes," who 
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thought that the opposite direction of focusing on regaining the roots of the traditions and culture 
of Spain was what was most necessary.
47
  
Ortega received his college degree in philosophy in 1902 from the University of Madrid, 
though he had initially started with Law. Subsequently he went abroad to Germany for his 
graduate work, studying at the University of Marburg until 1908. In 1910 Ortega began teaching 
metaphysics back at the University of Madrid.  
Ortega was a prolific writer, as the total of his works span ten volumes, which include not 
only many books, but also quite a lot of writing for various periodicals as well, some of which he 
had founded himself, such as España and El Espectador (Ortega came from a long line of 
journalists, in fact). From the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 until the end of World War 
Two in 1945, Ortega was a voluntary exile because of his support of the Spanish Republic, living 
abroad first in Argentina and then Portugal. After his return to Spain, he would continue writing 
of course, and in 1948 he founded the Institute of Humanities in Madrid.  From then until the end 
of his life in 1955, Ortega would continue his writing and lecturing throughout the western 
world, traveling not only all around Europe, but also holding a conference in the United States as 
well. 
Ortega ventured into many different topics and issues in his manifold of writings, 
covering almost every traditional area of philosophical study. But Ortega is perhaps most often 
known for his thought on razón vital, or the 'metaphysics of vital reason,' and his perspectivismo, 
or 'perspectival epistemology.' Most tersely summarized, in Ortega's thought every individual 
                                                          
47
Hence the formation of the "generación del 98" as a result of this historical disillusionment, which led to the 
artistic and cultural exploration of an objective to "regenerate" Spain in art such as via Picasso, García Lorca, or in 
philosophy through figures such as Ortega and Unamuno. 
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ultimately has a unique perspective because each person's life is comprised of the distinct 
interactions between one's self and the circumstances that surround him or her ("yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia"), so there is a constant dynamic and interdependent interaction between the self 
and our circumstances; people, places, things. And this is what defines each self's reality. 
Moreover, this also leads to each self's truths, which is therefore 'perspectival' because it arises 
from a unique point of view that results from this distinct interaction between self and 
circumstances for each individual. Hence we cannot say that any perspective is false, and what 
we can say is that they are each simply unique; a falsity is to say that any one perspective is 
absolute. Ortega's philosophy of course will be looked at in depth throughout.    
American John Dewey was an elder of Ortega, born twenty-four years earlier on the 20th 
of October, 1859, in Burlington, Vermont. Having grown up in Vermont, he was influenced 
early in life by the region's congregationalism. He would, however, come to distance himself 
from Christianity in general. During the second half of the nineteenth century, for the most part 
the United States enjoyed a gradual movement toward greater prominence on the world scene, 
thanks in part, in fact, to the country's victory in the Spanish-American War (hence, for example, 
one possible explanation of many for why it is not always so easy to find much proof of Ortega 
having read much of Dewey's work, or of any American pragmatist, because of the general 
negative sentiment within Spain toward the United States). Reconstruction was in full force, but 
racism was still rampant in the southern United States especially. Overall the country appeared to 
be benefiting from its post-war integration. And the country was continuing to expand, as 
additional states such as Alaska and California were incorporated in the westward expansion. 
Industrialization was booming, railroads were expanding, cities were growing, and the "Gold 
Rush" in the west was also adding to increasing the wealth of individuals and the country as a 
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whole. Moreover, the dominant laissez faire attitude at the time toward work and the economy 
led to some monopolies that in turn created some social strife where workers rights were not 
being respected and gaps in wealth began to widen. The nation's defeat of Spain in the war of 
1898 redefined the United States as the potentially next imperial and military power, though of 
course in ways that would be distinctively "American," as the general consensus was to remain 
separate and distinct from Europe despite the many shared heritages. Still, though it was not 
always effective or successful, the United States progressively promoted an "open door" policy 
with the world in regards to trading, importing, and exporting, which would be another means 
toward the country's prodigious economic growth during this time. This blossoming appeared to 
be contagious, as the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the highest numbers of 
immigration that the country had yet seen. The United States became a country even more 
culturally diverse, which also, however, resulted in tensing further the race relations throughout 
the nation. This historical background on the United States mostly overlaps all the relatively 
contemporaneous thinkers explored here in this thesis. 
John Dewey received his bachelor's degree from the University of Vermont in 1879, after 
which he first began a career as a high school educator. During this time his interest in 
philosophy began to grow, and two years later he decided to apply to Johns Hopkins University 
to pursue a degree in philosophy (though he would have much preferred to do so abroad, he 
could not afford it at that time). At John Hopkins Dewey studied with other important thinkers 
such as Pierce, Hall, and Morris, and he was particularly impacted by the Hegelian idealism in 
Morris's thought. In 1884 he received his Doctorate in Philosophy and subsequently began his 
career as a university professor, teaching at various schools, including the University of 
Michigan and the University of Chicago, but he would end up for most of his life teaching at 
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Columbia University in New York. While he was at the University of Michigan, he encountered 
the social psychologist George Herbert Mead, who played an important role in specifically 
Dewey's development on his philosophy on psychology. Dewey was strongly interested in social 
and political philosophy, and was involved in a number of key groups working to affect change 
in the United States, such as the NAACP (National Association of Colored People), The 
American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Industrial Democracy, the New York Teachers 
Union, the American Association of University Professors, and Jane Addams's Hull House. He 
was indeed a social activist. And he wanted to influence and develop a democracy that was 
flexible and adaptive to all the changes and tumultuous events that occurred during his lifetime. 
Dewey would come to be considered one of the three founders of "American 
Pragmatism," though it must be noted that Dewey was never comfortable with that term to 
describe his philosophy; in fact, he preferred "empirical naturalism," "naturalistic empiricism," 
or "naturalistic humanism" to classify his work. To understand Dewey's philosophy, therefore, a 
basic foundation that needs to be applied is to use the term "pragmatic" rather than 
"pragmatism," because his emphasis, as we shall see throughout here, in a general sense, is often 
upon the consequences as an important part of experimentation. The concept of experimentation 
in general is key in pragmatism, because it implies that something can change, adapt, conform, 
as so many studies are essentially never finished, especially in the case of human studies. As 
Davaney explains, and in reference here to a specific historicist point of dialogue that will be 
envisioned with Ortega in further depth ahead,  
Dewey's understanding of science and, in particular, of the scientific method did not 
 interpret these as means to some new certitude but as thoroughly historical and finite 
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 efforts at understanding. Claims developed out of the procedure of observation, 
 theorizing, and experimentation are always open to criticism and revision. As conditions 
 change, as values undergo revision, as the range of humane potential is enlarged or 
 restricted, so too, will our human interpretations of them and our theories for improving 
 them be open to question and alteration.
48
 
Pragmatism in general does not really aim to find "ends of inquiry," as aforementioned it 
is more about the usefulness of our inquiries that interest pragmatists. Initially, Dewey's notion of 
experience was quite Hegelian in that he was first focused on empirical idealism, but as his work 
developed he came to deviate from traditional thought in this to one all his own in which he 
added several stages. First there is this basic immediate experience, and then there is "cognitive 
experience," which is the result of inquiry that arises when a problem is confronted in experience 
that we work to resolve. Cognitive inquiry, therefore, is a process in which we take all this 
reflection, and combined with knowledge we come to understand an integrated whole experience 
from these sources and problems of experiences that we are inquiring about. But it is important 
to note that in Dewey's philosophy, none of this is to say that any of this results in any absolute 
certainties, per se, as we shall see ahead in greater depth and specific examples, which is why he 
terms these 'results' to have only "warranted assertability." We create concepts, therefore, that are 
'instrumental' because they help orient and guide us in the future; in our 'future experienced 
worlds.' Thus, also fundamental in his philosophy is the need to rid ourselves of the classical 
notions of dualisms because our knowledge is functional—such as, notions of experience and 
nature, because one is not independent from the other, but rather they interact, and they are 
developing.  
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As we shall also see, there is further a potential dialogue here with Ortega's yo y mi 
circunstancia in that Dewey argues that there is an interaction between the organic (such as 
human nature) and the environmental; "In its comprehensive function, experience denotes 
organic-environmental interactivity, and as a "double-barreled" term, in standing for both modes 
of experiencing and that which is experienced."
49
 Dewey uses the term "organic" because as will 
be argued, he, and Ortega, essentially simply prefer to use other terms rather than "nature."
50
 
Neither denies the existence of nature, what they deny is the great emphasis on the traditional 
uses of the terms throughout history, and they are both essentially "re-defining" this. For Ortega, 
"history" is simply the better term. Along with "organic," Dewey also uses the expression 
"environmental" in place of "nature," which we can understand as involving one's environmental 
circumstances of the time, thus being another point of possible conversation with Ortega (in his 
yo y mi circunstancia).  
In another instance, Dewey defines "experience" as essentially the process of 
experiencing and that which is experienced, and the "interactivity" between the two. As he 
explained, "experience" into certain ways of experiencing and into certain subject matters 
experienced, the former constituting the organic components that dominate in an interactivity 
while the latter are environmental factors that enter most directly and conspicuously into the 
interactivity undergoing analysis."
51
 As he further goes on to explain, this is a "genetic-
functional" method in which all is placed in context via inquiry, which consists of the 
interactivities of life, and that is both temporal and spacial in a continuous manner. By using the 
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verbal conjugation of experiencing; the present progressive, he is highlighting the present yet 
uncompleted character of the process of experience; hence the idea that it is a continuum. And he 
also says the things experienced, which emphasizes both a somewhat solid and past notion. So 
here we also find a possible point of dialogue with Ortega in noting the historical element in this, 
as "experience" is also a form of 'experiencing of the experienced, or the past,' as for Ortega, our 
past is what makes us; we are our histories.  
This of course is a central topic for an imagined conversation between the two that will 
be explored in great depth. And further for Dewey, this all then leads to creating whatever will 
be the future focus. As a clear and concise example, in one instance he references the process of 
a child touching a hot stove, and learning as a result not to do it again in the future. A child will 
not continue to touch a hot stove because the child went through the experiencing of pain from 
heat, of the experienced, the burn.
52
 This will all be explored further in more detail ahead. 
Returning for a moment to the biographical backgrounds, what follows will briefly 
reference the contemporaneity of the two figures, which is relevant to lend more credence to this 
investigative work. It was during the first half of the twentieth century that both philosophers did 
most of their writing, as John Dewey passed away in 1952, and José Ortega y Gasset in 1955. In 
regards to major works (considering both were prolific writers), Dewey published his first book 
in 1887, and Ortega in 1914. Respectively, their final books were published in 1949 and 1950 
(though there were of course posthumous publications of both). Nobody alive during this time, 
anywhere on the globe, could have escaped being influenced in some form or another by the 
numerous significant events during this period. There was the Great War that consumed much of 
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Europe and the United States from 1914-1918. Next the so-termed "Spanish flu" during the year 
following the end of the war took more lives than the total lost in the First World War, spreading 
further darkness and depression around the world (and soon to be followed by yet more; the 
Great Depression and then the Second World War). While many in the west lived a brief period 
of bliss during the "roaring twenties," especially in the United States, this would soon come to a 
crashing halt with the Great Depression that started in the United States after the crash of the 
stock market in 1929 spread like wildfire around the globe, bringing economic recession and 
misery to many countries.  
Spain also enjoyed, nevertheless, some periods of relative harmony from the latter part of 
the nineteenth century to 1923, when the monarchy was restored and some significant economic 
growth was experienced.  But neither Spain nor the United States were able to avoid more war in 
the twentieth century, however, as the former fought a bitter three-year Civil War from 1936 to 
1939, and the latter abroad in both World Wars (not to mention also the Spanish Civil War, as 
the "Abraham Lincoln Brigade," as they were known, was a relatively small group of under 
3,000 Americans sent to help defend the Spanish Republic against the Fascist/Nationalist 
rebellion led by Franco). In the end, however, a dictatorship was subsequently installed in Spain 
under General Francisco Franco (the end of which Ortega was never able to witness). Also after 
the Spanish Civil War, regionalism became even more intense, as Catalan and Basque separatist 
movements strengthened.  
For the most part, the United States, on the other hand, despite the humanitarian losses in 
the two World Wars, was able to bounce back mostly, especially economically, and fairly rapidly 
given all the wartime industry production, and the nation continued its rise toward being a world 
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power started during the close of the nineteenth century. Though this is all of course just a brief 
sketch of the first half of the twentieth century in Spain and the United States, it was under these 
circumstances that Ortega and Dewey were doing most of their writing, and as argued here, 
because we are our histories, it is important to consider of course, among other elements, the 
historical period we live in because it defines a significant part of us. 
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IV. On Life 
 So both Ortega and Dewey lived through some of the most tumultuous periods that the 
world has witnessed in the past several centuries (in fact, the twentieth century is classified as 
one of the most violent to date; more people were either killed or allowed to die in the twentieth 
century than any other before).
53
 Of course this had an especially significant impact on their 
views on life in general; the meaning of life, and living life. And this is of course fundamental to 
understanding the more broad 'history' since 'we are our histories,' as will be explored in great 
depth. As we shall see, there are various points of possible dialogue between the two 
philosophers in regards to general metaphysics. Most succinctly, we can summarize this 
similarity to be that Dewey's notion of "primary experience" correlates with Ortega's concept of 
"mi vida" (my life) in certain regards.  
 In Dewey's philosophy there are two types of experience. First there is "primary 
experience," which is essentially the basic interaction we have with some thing, whatever it may 
be, in the environment. And then there is "secondary experience," which is essentially our 
process of reflection and deeper thought, exploration, and enquiry, in regards to that primary 
experience. Or, tersely stated, secondary experience tries to clarify primary experience. And this 
is of course a central part of 'life,' or 'living,' for Dewey; 'having experiences with things per our 
own experience of things.' "[...] things are what they are experienced as being; or that to give a 
just account of anything is to tell what that thing is experienced to be," declares Dewey 
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throughout his earlier philosophy.
54
 This process is necessary because we cannot simply have an 
experience with something without also reflecting on it for that experience to have any use, 
value, repercussion, etcetera. In other words, as he describes it,  
 An experience has pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in 
 alternation but consists of them in relationship. To put one's hand in the fire that 
 consumes it is not necessarily to have an experience. The action and its consequence 
 must be joined in perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the 
 objective of all intelligence.
55
  
 And he adds that it continues to be subjectively pondered, valued, and therefore 
remembered in an individual sense; "The scope and content of the relations measure the 
significant content of the experience."
56
 And though we are speaking here of "remembering" in a 
general sense, we can apply this to the specific case of historical memory. 
 For the first couple decades of his career, more or less, Dewey was indeed quite the 
idealist in his philosophy. But again Dewey would come to distinguish his thought from anything 
purely idealist given his focus on breaking with traditional dualisms, and thereby creating his 
own antidualistic notion in which there is our experience and then there are our interpretations of 
that experience; there is experience, nature, and then there is our interpretation of those, which 
are in constant, dynamic interaction, antidualistically. So although Dewey was initially quite 
influenced by Hegelian idealism, he would come to take this a step further, adding his distinct 
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antidualistic notion uniting a dynamic interaction between what we experience as our experience, 
and our experience itself.  Further, as a concise, summarizing definition of what we saw earlier, 
Dewey's "experience" can be understood as "experiencing the experienced." This is what he 
termed a "genetic-functional" interactivity that has temporal and spatial continuity.
57
 And he 
specifically mentions that this continuity is maintained as a "life history," which is another point 
of possible dialogue with Ortega and his emphasis on how what defines us is how we are our 
histories, as we shall continue to see.
58
 
 For Ortega, the most basic reality of man is simply life and to live; "la situación del 
hombre es la vida, es vivir".
59
 And life itself is fundamentally disorientation, confusion; life is 
about being lost and trying ('trying' being the key word here) to be 'oriented;' "es propio de la 
esencia humana estar el hombre radicalmente desorientado."
60
 Ortega posits all this quite 
frequently and consistently in many of his writings. As in this instance, Ortega answers, 
 ¿Qué es, pues, vida? No busquen ustedes lejos, no traten de recordar sabidurías 
 aprendidas. Las verdades fundamentales tienen que estar siempre a la mano, porque sólo 
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 así son fundamentales. [...] Vida es lo que somos y lo que hacemos: es, pues, de todas las 
 cosas la más próxima a cada cual. [...] La vida es lo que hacemos y lo que nos pasa.
61
 
 And it is very important to note that what he means by emphasizing, as in the 
aforementioned excerpt, the 'present tense' aspect of life, this is because, as he posits, both the 
past and the future only have a "reality" in the present, because we 'remember our past' and 
'anticipate our future' in the 'now.' This is an important point of potential dialogue with 
pragmatism, as we shall see in all three sections of this thesis. As he writes,  
 Pero la vida es siempre un <<ahora>> y consiste en lo que ahora se es. El pasado de su 
 vida y el futuro de la misma sólo tiene realidad en el ahora, merced a que ustedes 
 recuerden ahora su pasado o anticipen ahora su porvenir. En este sentido la vida es pura 
 actualidad, es puntual, es un punto –el presente–, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y 
 todo nuestro porvenir. Por eso he podido afirmar que nuestra vida es lo que estamos 
 haciendo ahora.
62
 
 Here we find yet another point of possible conversation with Dewey, who in the 
following excerpt notes this idea of temporal, continuous process defining life as the 
accumulation of the past exhibited in the present's focus toward the future (to describe it tersely) 
"living is a temporally ongoing process, both a manifestation of the process a leading into next 
manifestation."
63
 In other words, the basic characteristics of this are the following: life is a 
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continuum ("living is a temporally ongoing process") in which the present is the manifestation of 
the past ("the process") with a focus on the future ("leading into next manifestation").  
 For Ortega, we basically begin in shock of 'being born.' We are in a sense thrown into this 
world, 'free to be,' but within the limits of the 'circumstances' surrounding each one of us, some 
unique, some shared with others. But again it must be reminded here that a circumstance is not a  
reality that exists outside of our "yoes," rather it exists in interaction with our yoes. Ortega 
explains this very clearly on many ocassions, as in the following excerpt: "Dentro de la enorme 
circunstancia que es el mundo, podemos movernos con cierta libertad, podemos ir y venir, viajar, 
emigrar; pero no podemos escapar a su círculo total inexorable."
64
 So we only have "cierta 
libertad," which is a topic that arguably converses with pragmatism, especially that of Schiller's 
interpretation of the movement, which we will see in the third section of this thesis.  
 And as he continues, the following helps clarify in part why we are, therefore, "our 
history;" "La vida deja un margen de posibilidades dentro del mundo, pero no somos libres para 
estar o no en este mundo que es el de ahora. Sólo cabe renunciar a la vida, pero si se vive no cabe 
elegir el mundo en que se vive."
65
 In other words, one of our 'limitations' is the year and time 
period we are born into. Of course this is something we cannot control but that nonetheless plays 
a very important role in our lives. And in another lecture he adds, even more directly and clearly, 
"La circunstancia o mundo en que por fuerza existimos no es sólo un aquí determinado sino que 
es una determinada fecha. Vivir es existir aquí y ahora [...] La vida es siempre un lugar y una 
fecha –es lo contrario del utopismo y el ucronismo–, o lo que es igual, la vida es, por sí misma, 
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histórica."
66
 Again it must be reiterated that history here is not meant to refer just to the past, 
rather it is a continuum of past, present, and future. History is a place and a date, as Ortega notes, 
but really it is also a continuum of places and dates; history, being the past, present, and future, is 
the accumulation of different points of specific and finite places and dates along that continuum. 
History is an anti-dualistic concept in this sense, as it can be both definitively specified places 
and dates, but within a larger set of more of these; there are separate points but that must exist 
along a continuum among others. In other words, this is the basic notion that there are parts and a 
whole, which although separate ideas, one cannot be understood, and therefore exist, without the 
other; they are interdependent. 
 As Ortega metaphorically alludes to often, it is as if life is about being lost at sea, 
shipwrecked, and therefore becomes a "problem that we need to solve." In this sense, this in fact 
is the same for Dewey; "Life, for Dewey, is a series of problems or a series of disequilibrations 
and recoveries."
67
 This notion specifically dialogues more smoothly perhaps with Dewey than 
any of the other pragmatists explored here. For Ortega, life is about always having to decide 
what we are going to be, and what we are going to do. Hence Ortega's frequent commentaries 
that the "radical substance" of life is "insecurity" (and hence our being in a sense 'shipwrecked' in 
his metaphor). We are attentive to our 'circumstances' in our need to "fish" and decide between 
them; to decide which we will choose, which directions we will take, etcetera. As Gray helps 
clarify to support this thesis's imagined dialogue in his intellectual biography on Ortega, as well 
as correlating this to Dewey, "Life, he was wont to say, comes at us "point blank," demanding 
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immediate response. In this, Ortega was closer to William James and John Dewey than to Plato, 
Leibniz, or Kant."
68
 
 And also important in all this is to note that "my life" is not the same as "me" or "I" in 
Ortega's philosophy, because our "me," our "I," is just one part, as our circumstances make up 
the other part of what in sum is "our life." Meaning, there is always some sort of interaction with 
our surroundings, even if it is just "I am sitting in a room," for example, because rarely are we 
'doing nothing' (and, in fact, Ortega also talks about the dangers of boredom frequently). The "I" 
and the "sitting in a room" are separate but united essentially antidualistically as "yo" and 
"circumstance" respectively. Dewey of course also very often argues that in life we are always in 
interaction with our surroundings, given, as we shall continue to see, his strong leaning on the 
malleable, social aspect of human behavior and its influences; "Everything that exists in as far as 
it is known and knowable is in interaction with other things. It is associated, as well as solitary, 
single."
69
 In general this is an important point of envisioned discourse with all the pragmatists 
explored here. In another excerpt he further describes this clearly, "The reactions of man in this 
world and his experiences in it are the subject matter of individual psychology. The second world 
which confronts man is social. He lives in a community of people. [...] By his biological make-
up man is destined to be a social creature."
70
 So here Dewey describes two different worlds; an 
individual one, and a social one, which can arguably converse with Ortega's yo (individual) and 
his circunstancia (social) worlds. As Dewey expert Hickman defends, "We live our entire lives 
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in association."
71
 So this can plausibly correlate with Ortega's notion of "yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia," as Dewey confirms the same idea that we are very much our interactions with all 
that is external to us, yet we are also individuals.
72
 And this also has an important historical 
element, as professor Dr. Greeve Davaney supports the arguments being made here (and who is 
an author uniquely versed on this notion of "pragmatic historicism"), 
 Dewey espoused an anthropology that stressed that humans are bio-social beings who are 
 in continual interaction with their natural and historically developed worlds. From the 
 earliest beginnings of human existence humans were forced to adapt to and respond to the 
 conditions of these intermingled worlds. For Dewey, the insights of evolutionary science 
 and historicism supported this version of human life as dynamically interactive and as 
 developing and changing in relation to the contexts and conditions within which it is 
 found.
73
 
 Again it must be reiterated that because these are new and innovative associations, these 
supporting quotes throughout this thesis are not meant to be considered definitive but rather they 
are meant to lend strength to the goal here to imagine a possible dialogue. The argument that 
there is an important historicist element in Dewey's philosophy is key in proposing that there is a 
dialogue that we can imagine between him and Ortega. In this aforementioned quote Davaney 
supports this possible exchange with Ortega on the topic of our being our histories because our 
nature is contained within our histories, the latter being a broader and better term, therefore. And 
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she also supports there possibly being a dialogue on how that exists within the dynamic of 
ourselves and our circumstances, all of which can be summed up in the following excerpt of this; 
"continual interaction with their natural and historically developed worlds."
74
 
 In a lecture from Unas Lecciones de Metafísica, Ortega reminds his students that "Yo 
espero que a estas alturas ninguno de ustedes confunda ya esa realidad que cada cual llama <<su 
vida>> con su yo. Yo no soy más que un ingrediente de mi vida: el otro es la circunstancia o 
mundo."
75
 So Ortega is not entirely deterministic of course, because life "[...] no me es dada 
hecha. Lo que me es dado al serme dada la vida es la inexorable necesidad de tener que hacer 
algo. [...] Lo que me es dado, pues, con la vida es quehacer. La vida da mucho quehacer."
76
  So 
life is "not given to us ready made," and therefore we each "have to make of it what we will." 
We are obligated to make subsequent decisions in life," but within a limited spectrum of options, 
as he says very clearly, "[...] hay la errónea tendencia a creer que las formas de la vida son 
ilimitadas."
77
 In fact, the thing "given to us," is the "need to do something with our life."
78
 We 
need to "decide who we are going to be," and in "every instant," we have "various possibilities to 
choose from."
79
 As he argues quite clearly, "La vida, en efecto, deja un margen de posibilidades 
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dentro del mundo, pero no somos libres para estar o no en este mundo que es el de ahora."
80
 
Again we do not choose, for example, in what year we are born, or in which country, etcetera, as 
we cannot "[...] escapar a la circunstancia, está confinado en el mundo."
81
 Nonetheless, because 
there are so many combinations of the 'limited' choices that we can make (so therefore almost 
seemingly "unlimited" in this sense), each person is still, nonetheless, in some ways unique; "el 
yo de cada cual es único," both in who he or she is, in part, and in the decisions he or she makes 
(even if within some of the same circumstances as others).
82
 
 So to phrase it quite plainly, these two views of Dewey and Ortega on life as these basic, 
fundamental starting points of ourselves and our surroundings, combined of course with the 
decisions we make, can dialogue, as also argued by Dewey expert David Hildebrand in his book 
on Pragmatism,  
 It should be noted that this notion of "primary experience" (and the PSP it entails for 
 philosophy) is not held exclusively by Dewey. In various works José Ortega y Gasset 
 refers to it, perhaps more lucidly than Dewey, as "radical reality" and "my life." This 
 radical reality is where all metaphysics--indeed all inquiries--start. [...] Ortega makes 
 clear, as I believe did Dewey, that this reality is "basic" and "ultimate" in a way that is 
 crucially different from most other traditional metaphysical accounts.
83
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 This is a particularly important excerpt for this thesis since it is one of the few directly 
linking Dewey and Ortega. As Hildebrand also writes more directly, he argues that this is "[...] 
what Dewey called 'primary experience' and what Ortega called 'my life.'"
84
  
 Ortega writes, "La realidad de mi yo es, pues, secundaria a la realidad integral que es mi 
vida; encuentro aquélla -la de mi yo- en ésta, en la realidad vital. Yo y la circunstancia formamos 
parte de mi vida."
85
 To return to the briefly aforementioned example of being in a room, which is 
used in various instances by Ortega, we must read this anti-dualistically. When we are in a room, 
that room is part of our 'circumstance;' it is part of the 'other part of our life.' Since 'our life' is 'yo 
y mi circunstancia,' the other part, therefore, is our 'yo.' Our 'yo' is distinct from the room, and 
that room, or that part of our circumstance, does not make up part of us, but that circumstance, 
along with all the others (for example, it could be country, year, etc.), does make up another part 
of us, because 'our life' consists of our 'yoes' being concerned, addressing, and working with the 
totality of the circumstances that surrounds us. That is why we would say something along the 
lines of "I am myself sitting in a room" because sitting in a room describes part of the 
individual's reality of course in that moment; I am myself, and I am myself sitting in a room. 
There is each of ourselves, then there is the world, which is there separately, but which we each 
also are forming, and/or form, a small part of—so the two are connected anti-dualistically. And 
in this example, the room is one of the circumstances that makes up part of our totality; the room 
is part of our 'circunstancia' in what we are in sum as yo y mi circunstancia. In other words, in a 
general sense, while they are separate concepts, that which 'makes us up' in sum/totality cannot 
be understood without both the 'yo' and the circumstances.  
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 This notion can be understood using as a metaphor what happens when we throw a rock 
into a pond. This metaphor will be important to keep in mind throughout this dissertation. A rock 
can represent an individual; a "yo," and the ripples that result upon impact can be understood as 
the "circumstances" in that rock's, or individual's, 'life.' If we were to toss a second rock into the 
pond, meaning a second individual, and if it lands somewhere near the other rock we will see 
how some of those ripples overlap with those of the first rock, whereas some do not, showing 
how some of our circumstances overlap with those of others, and some do not. And each rock 
and its set of ripples is still, nonetheless, unique and singular (hence we have both individual and 
shared realities). The "rock," or the "yo," represents the core part of each individual, and which is 
unique as it stands out in its own form and as the center; the rock, or the "yo" is the one part of 
life truly 'each ours.'  
 This metaphor is especially useful here also because Ortega often describes life as a 
'shipwreck within circumstance,' similar in the sense in which a rock is somewhat 'stuck' when 
tossed into a pond, and in which the rock or an individual needs to find a way out; we need to re-
orient ourselves on a path that fulfills one of leading an 'authentic life' according to Ortega (an 
'authentic life' is one that fits with what should be our calling, our vocation, per Ortega's 
thought). Life is a problem, therefore, which is confronted in the form of some specific 
circumstances, and life is about solving these problems, to speak simply here. Ripples result 
from the action of tossing a rock into a pond, just as a person brought into this world will also be 
brought into specific circumstances. The rock (yo) and the ripples (circumstances) are separate 
entities, but when tossed into a pond, they are dynamically linked interdependently; that is,  
antidualistically, since they will occur together (those ripples will not occur without the rock 
tossed into the pond, and vice versa). And because this action will always result in ripples, a rock 
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or person therefore cannot escape his or her ripples, or circumstances, when 'thrown into the 
world,' and this is precisely what defines his or her "life;" the "yo," or the rock, and the 
"circumstances," or the ripples - hence, per Ortega's thought, life is this radical reality of "yo soy 
yo y mi circunstancia." 
 As Ortega explains,  
 Nuestra vida, según esto, no es sólo nuestra persona, sino que de ella forma parte nuestro 
 mundo: ella --nuestra vida-- consiste en que la persona se ocupa de las cosas o con ellas, 
 y, evidentemente, lo que nuestra vida sea depende tanto de lo que sea nuestra persona 
 como de lo que sea nuestro mundo. Ni nos es más próximo el uno que el otro término: no 
 nos damos cuenta primero de nosotros y luego del contorno, sino que vivir es, desde 
 luego, en su propia raíz, hallarse frente al mundo, con el mundo, dentro del mundo y 
 sumergido en su tráfago, en sus problemas, en su trama azarosa. Pero también viceversa: 
 ese mundo, al componerse sólo de lo que nos afecta a cada cual, es inseparable de 
 nosotros. Nacemos juntos con él y son vitalmente persona y mundo.
86
   
 This indeed parallels how early in his philosophy Dewey refers to experience as being 
fundamentally 'what we think it is' in that there is an inextricable connection with one's 
surroundings, and that there is our "me" that can experience things in a unique way, and 
fundamentally daily our life is comprised of these such experiences with what is around us. 
Dewey writes, "[...] experience is experience, or what it is. [...] go to experience and see what the 
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thing is experienced as."
87
 So, as Hildebrand concisely argues, citing another area where we can 
envision a potential dialogue, "Ortega's description of "my life" and "radical reality" accurately 
reflects the nominal sense Dewey intended for "experience" [...]."
88
 
 The envisioned exchange between Ortega's 'my life' as 'I and my circumstance' with 
Dewey's "experience" is stated in the following excerpt, in which Dewey affirms that the 
"congeners, life and history," are "processes of experiencing," and as aforementioned, he 
continues, "It is significant that "life" and "history" have the same fullness of undivided meaning. 
Life denotes a function, a comprehensive activity, in which organism and environment are 
included."
89
 Similarly, for Ortega life as radical reality in the form of "yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia" is summarized in his theory of racio-vitalismo; 'life is being I and my surrounding 
circumstances'—this is Ortega's razón vital, or vital reason.90 Racio-vitalismo, therefore, is not 
about "pure reason," it is about "vital reason." Ortega makes an important distinction here that 
separates him from any notion that is too rationalistic or idealistic; life must have reason, but 
reason must also be malleable and flexible. Hence Ortega surpasses these traditionally held 
views to declare that life is perspective. Each individual has his or her own perspective, and 
never is any one the only true, or false, perspective. There is no one, absolute perspective or 
point of view. An individual's perspective is just one reality of many, and a reality itself is one 
perspective of many. Therefore, every reality has infinite perspectives. And this is also why 
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Ortega next declares that life is history, because life is this change, development, peculiarity, and 
because we 'go into history to get to life,' broadly described. Moreover, per Ortega's thought life's 
vital trajectory is not predetermined; we need to make our lives. 
 So here once again we return to the fundamental idea that we are our histories. And again 
this is an anti-dualistic relationship—in this case, organism and environment, which are two 
separate yet inextricably linked parts that comprise "our life." Again, while we are often free to 
make decisions as to the interactions we have with our environment, there are still, nonetheless, 
limits to and within our environments. There are limits that we have no control over (such as the 
year we are born in), and in part as such our environment is generally more powerful in shaping 
and influencing those interactions. Hence, as shall be elaborated throughout, we can at times 
think of this as the following: nurture (environment) nurtures our nature (organism). This is part 
of why what we are is our history, though this does not negate that there is a nature—again, our 
history is our nature; our history shapes, includes, and influences our nature (history historicizes 
our history, which is our nature). As Dewey argues, "what is experienced," therefore, "is a 
manifestation of nature."
91
 
 Hence, again, the following excerpt of Ortega's parallels the philosophy of Dewey in that 
we must read his "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" anti-dualistically, as for both philosophers in 
this case life cannot exist nor be understood without the interaction it has with its surroundings. 
The two are separate identities that are still, nonetheless, inextricably linked; "[...] la 
circunstancia o mundo, es completamente heterogénea a mí. La circunstancia es lo otro que yo, y 
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estar yo en ella equivale a estar fuera de mí, en elemento extraño."
92
 We cannot separate 
ourselves from some thing else without that some thing else; without that distinction. We are 
each our unique selves, so everything 'not us is completely distinct from us.' If we enter into a 
room, that room is of course therefore completely dissimilar to and separate from us, and we 
become that 'me in the room,' but not per se 'me that is a part of that room,' but rather it is better 
understood, per Ortega's thinking here, as 'me in that other thing which is not me, not my "yo" 
(but that is part of "mi life" in that moment).' But, that 'other thing' still forms part of our life, 
nonetheless, at least in that period of time we are there, despite it being distinct from ourselves. It 
is part of our description because, for instance, "I am standing (for example) in a room;" this is 
separate but connected in an anti-dualistic sense.
93
 The room, being in the room, is part of our 
circumstance of that period of time. Because again, as Ortega argues, "circumstance" is "la otra 
parte de mi vida."
94
 So again "one's life," in this case, can be understood as "he or she is one" and 
at the same time "one who is also one in a room." As he writes,  
 La vida es, esencialmente, un diálogo con el contorno; lo es en sus funciones fisiológicas 
 más sencillas como en sus funciones psíquicas más sublimes. Vivir es convivir, y el otro 
 que con nosotros convive es el mundo en derrerdor. No entendemos, pues, un acto vital, 
 cualquiera que él sea, si no lo ponemos en conexión con el contorno hacia el cual se 
 dirige, en función del cual ha nacido.
95
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 Given that the social environment, our surroundings, are so important in these two 
philosophers' views on life, this essentially implies, again, that there are some limitations in life. 
In other words, society is a type of general circumstance, and within society are various 
circumstances, but we must remember here that per Ortega's thought these are all just some of 
many. Concisely stated, again we are free to choose among some of those, but within the 
limitations that surround us. We can also think of this as a "radical unitary duality," as Graham 
argues, and anti-dualistic, 
 The unity of Ortega's philosophy would be lost, if it were simply a developing "one-two" 
 sequence of "stages" that are not finally a "unitary duality" of self and circumstance as 
 basic life-reality and also of vital reason and historical reason as a "philosophy of life." 
 The textual context is both consistent with and pregnant with this meaning: "two in 
 one."
96
 
 The idea of "two in one" is here anti-dualistic; there are separate parts (two) that also 
comprise one; the parts cannot be understood without the whole, and vice versa, so they are 
interdependent; they are separate but united ant-dualistically. "Radical unitary duality" is the 
term that Graham developed to specifically explain this proposition that Ortega's philosophy is in 
these areas anti-dualistic. And therefore these are areas where we can imagine a dialogue with 
pragmatism. 
 Most fundamentally, for Ortega man is his life, and life is simply history; 'man does not 
have nature, what he has is history.' He writes,  
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 [...] la realidad específicamente humana–la vida del hombre–tiene una consistencia 
 histórica. Esto nos obliga a <<desnaturalizar>> todos los conceptos referentes al 
 fenómeno integral de la vida humana y someterlos a una radical <<historización>>. Nada 
 de lo que el hombre ha sido, es o será, lo ha sido, lo es no lo será de una vez para 
 siempre, sino que ha llegado a serlo un buen día y otro buen día dejará de serlo."
97
 
 As we shall continue to see throughout, therefore, life is history, because nothing in life is 
motionless, static, argues Ortega; "La vida de cada cual –no la biológica, sino la biográfica– es 
un organismo donde nada es inerte: todo lo que en ella se hace se hace por algo y para algo, 
queramos o no," and because man has no nature.
98
 
 As we shall also continue to analyze, Dewey strongly emphasized throughout his writings 
the malleable, flexible, and plastic characteristic of humanity. One of "life's" most basic 
characteristics, therefore, is that again it is "temporal;" hence yet again why 'man is his history.' 
Ortega further clarifies that "[...] si nuestra vida consiste en decidir lo que vamos a ser, quiere 
decirse, que en la raíz misma de nuestra vida hay un atributo temporal: decidir lo que vamos a 
ser, por tanto, el futuro.
99
" Ortega's insistence here upon the focus on the future is quite 
pragmatist. And in the other direction, we find historicity emphasized in Dewey's argument here 
that "all natural existences are histories," because our nature is our history.
100
 Hence there is a 
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future orientation in our historicities, enabling us to indeed envision a dialogue here between 
Ortega and Dewey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
experiences can also be a process of growing, of uncovering connections and relationships, of finding more 
meaning" (Campbell, Understanding John Dewey, pp. 62-63). 
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V. Defining Nature 
 Thus, also essential in appropriately pondering these two philosophers' views on life is 
understanding what it is not, and as has been introduced, clearly what it is not is only "nature." 
Again, what is being argued here most centrally are the possible areas of dialogue between 
Ortega and Dewey in this first section in an anti-dualistic reading to help us better understand 
how what we are is our history, not our nature, because history is our nature. To begin this 
section it must be declared that whatever the definition or inclination in the notion of "nature" 
(meaning, for example, whether it is a biological, genetic, or cultural one, to name just a few 
examples), the concluding argument that will emphasized at all times is that nature always has a 
historical character, element, or essentially, nature. 
 As has of course been noted, while Ortega directly states at times that man does not have 
nature (rather what man has, and is, is his history), what is being developed here is that again 
neither philosopher is really denying, per se, that there is a nature, rather what Ortega especially 
is arguing is that 'history' is much more important, influential, and in fact also contains our 
nature, which is why again we can instead posit that fundamental in this is that our nature is our 
history. As Lasaga Medina concisely explains,  
 Que el hombre no tenga naturaleza, no significa que no tenga una identidad suficiente 
 como para poder ser pensada de acuerdo a las capacidades lógicas de la razón humana 
 (no hay otras), sino que esa identidad es histórica, lo que significa que tiene que ser 
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 comprendida <<al paso>> o mientras pasa, viniendo de algo y yendo hacia algo: como 
 genesis y proyecto.
101
 
 In the following argument of Davaney's we find support for this imaginable specific point 
of conversation with Dewey in that history is really what is most significant, and the existence of 
the concept of "nature" is not being entirely denied either; "Dewey presented a naturalized and 
historicized version of human existence. Humans live within the matrix of nature and human 
history."
102
 The argument here is the same as in this thesis that history contains our nature, as 
they are anti-dualistic concepts, which Davaney here describes as a type of "matrix." 
 For Ortega, as aforementioned, man is never born with a "prefixed or imposed image of 
what he is going to be." Rather, as we saw, what is always characteristic of life, and throughout 
life, is that human beings are born with the "freedom to choose what he is going to be."
103
 Hence 
again the more important term "history," in the form of circumstances, environment, etc. over 
"nature." As must be repeated since it is central here, our "nature" is our history, in part simply 
because our history contains our nature. Dewey relatedly argues that fundamentally our history 
contains our nature, though he uses the term "experience" here, which as we will continue to see 
can be used almost somewhat interchangeably for history in these specific senses; "nature and 
experience are not enemies or alien. Experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is 
a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature."
104
 Moreover, as another 
                                                          
101
 LASAGA MEDINA, J.: José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) Vida y filosofía, p. 151. (Subsequently referred to as: 
Ortega: Vida y Filosofía.) 
102
 Davaney, Historicism, p. 91. 
103
 Ortega, Interpretación, p. 12. 
 
104
 Quoted in: SHOOK, J. R. and MARGOLIS, John: A Companion to Pragmatism, p. 189. 
 85 
 
noted area of potential conversation, Dewey's 'experience' is of oneself and ones surroundings, or 
we could say yo y mi cirucnstancia, as Davaney defends, this is part of "[...] his vision of 
historical and social human beings who are always embedded in both communal and natural 
contexts and whose potential for humane existence depends upon and contributes to these 
interrelated webs of existence.
105
  
 In one instance, Dewey defines nature as follows: "[...] Nature is an environment only as 
it is involved in interaction with an organism, or self, or whatever name be used. Every such 
interaction is a temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence."
106
 So we must 
read this anti-dualistically; nature is a separate entity, but it also cannot exist without interaction, 
(phrased quite generally and plainly). As Hickman argues, for Dewey "nature is treated as 
culture and human beings are understood as involved in the cutting edge of an evolving 
nature."
107
  Nature is not static, it is evolving. We can think of this in part as "nurture nurtures 
nature." This idea is resonated in the following excerpt from Dewey: "The reactions of men to 
their natural environment are colored and determined by the social milieu which has bred them. 
In turn their reactions to one another are limited by their biological and psychological nature."
108
 
Hence why Blau (another of the few scholars who have research the historicist connection in 
Dewey's work) makes the following conclusion on this: "Dewey shared with these other ''genetic 
social scientists' the view that the process of human social evolution is a two-way street, that 
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there is a reciprocal adaptation of men to their social environment and of the environment to the 
needs of men."
109
 
 In other words, the social milieu is foremost in shaping human behavior, with one's 
nature playing a role in how that plays out within the environment. As we shall also see, this can 
converse with Ortega's idea of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" as fundamental is the "interaction" 
aforementioned by Dewey. In the following example, Dewey uses the term "organic" to refer to 
nature, and in which he not only notes a historical element in this, but that it is an ongoing 
process; "In short, the temporal continuum of life-activities, when it is analyzed and described in 
terms of organic and environmental factors, must be regarded as continuous reciprocal doing-
undergoing."
110
 Moreover, those interactions, as he says, are temporal; we can assume that this 
implies that they are also historical. As Sidney Hook explains as support of this in regards to 
Dewey's definitions of nature, “La <<naturaleza>> de una cosa no es algo cerrado por, para y en 
sí misma, sino algo que, igual que todo lo que tiene un desarrollo en el tiempo, adquiere nuevas 
propiedades como resultado de los diversos modos en que el organismo actúa sobre ella.”111 
 So again here we can see how "nature" is a "temporal sequence," or, it is historical; our 
nature is our history, our history contains our nature. As Alexander adds in the comprehensive 
companion book to Pragmatism to the discussion, "Dewey views "Nature" or "Existence" as a 
temporal continuum of processes exhibiting certain "generic traits" (such as stability and 
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precariousness, qualitative immediacy, relational mediation, etc.) occurring in different ways on 
each of these plateaus."
112
 Here nature is not denied, as genetic traits are mentioned, but again 
they are simply under the broader umbrella of "history." This is why Dewey argues that social 
phenomena are "historical," and of course social phenomena influence who we are and our 
behavior quite significantly (as we shall continue to see throughout, Dewey strongly emphasized 
the greatly influential role of "nurture" in life); "[...] social phenomena are historical, or of the 
nature of individual temporal sequences."
113
  
 In Dewey's philosophy, for example, one cannot be "fully human" when not viewed from 
within human society.
114
 Upon the first reads of this, one is inclined to make the assumption that 
he is saying that there is essentially no individuality because there is no nature. After all, he has 
been recorded as saying that outside of a person's social ties, he or she is essentially 'nothing.' 
But we also just saw how there is still an acceptance argued for nature in the traditional sense of 
the term, as for instance in genes. But as will be elaborated throughout, this is essentially a 
matter of significance and priority because Dewey does not negate per se that a person is also an 
individual, or that one has a nature, it is more so that a person's social connections, dependencies, 
etcetera, are more significant in regards to influencing and shaping a person in his or her view; 
their behavior, or life. As Campbell, another expert on Dewey, explains in support of this idea so 
concisely and clearly, "My own view is that his vision of a reconstructed individualism is in no 
way blind toward or unaware of or insensitive to individuality. Dewey does not overlook the 
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reality of diversity; but his concern is always with how it can contribute to the common good."
115
 
In other words, very much along the pragmatist line, it is that Dewey emphasizes more often the 
instrumental aspect of human life and nature. Nurture nurtures nature because nurture is more 
influential. 
 So again, none of this is to say that there is no nature; history/experience and nature just 
must be read anti-dualistically, as there is still an "[...] unique individuality in virtue of which it 
is a historic and social fact," as Dewey affirms in another instance.
116
 Put another way, he posits, 
"[...] nature is an affair of affairs, wherein each one, no matter how linked up it may be with 
others, has its own quality."
117
 So here Dewey is further recognizing individuality and a type of 
nature. As Sleeper concisely explains in support of this, "Dewey does not wish to deny the 
intrinsic nature of things; he merely argues that such intrinsic natures can be known only by 
means of their extrinsic qualities. And these are what are clearly not fixed in advance of inquiry 
or independently."
118
 In other words, one of Dewey's objectives here is to elaborate on the 
connections between experience and things; between how we experience things, and things in 
and of themselves in existence.  
 Further, Blau also interprets this concept of nature as an "affair of affairs" in the 
following way in which it is connected to nature as Ortega proposed,  
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 History, then, has a place, central but not exclusive, in the instrumentalist version of 
 experimental thinking. In a sense, it may be said that history not only has, but must have, 
 a place, that human history is the human aspect of natural process. For Deweyan 
 metaphysics, nature is an affair of beginnings and endings, or processes that have a 
 starting-point in time and a finishing-line in time.
119
 
 Again, there is a thing, and there is our experience with that thing and our subsequent 
understanding of that thing, but we cannot know if this all ever coincides. What we can know is 
simply what we think we know. Theoretically, therefore, we can speak of a "thing" or an 
experience independent of our experience with that thing or experience, but we cannot be certain 
of its true nature or existence. That thing, as we shall see throughout, could be history; there is 
plausibly history independent of the person(s) narrating that history, but we cannot be certain if 
they coincide correctly, truly, or at all really—this is pragmatist anti-dualism. And again while 
this may sound empty at first, it is not meant to, it is just meant to emphasize that what ultimately 
really matters is what we humans think and the value, usefulness, that we place on some thing, 
experience, historical event, whatever it may be, rather than the independent existence, nature, or 
truth of that thing in and of itself. So there is not a denial of some thing's independent existence; 
it is not being declared that there is or is not such a thing, rather the argument is that this is 
simply not the important question; what we should be focusing on instead is what we think of 
that thing and its existence, or the different answers we may provide to this question (but not 
whether or not there is one, true answer). In other words, we should not ask "what is A" or "does 
A really exist, and what is that existence". We should ask instead "why do we think A is this" 
and "why, how is this useful to us". This is the basic pragmatist notion of the truth and inquiry; 
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the goal is not to discover truth or come to the end of inquiry, because while this may be 
possible, this is not what the pragmatist is searching for, as the pragmatist is investigating and 
pondering the conclusions we (as humans) come to on some thing rather than that thing in and of 
itself. Pragmatism is about studying which of these conclusions are more practical, useful, and 
rational to us, and why. Inquiry is endless really, therefore. Pragmatists, most colloquially 
phrased, want to explore the possibility of a better life (in the future) through contemplating our 
justifications, values, rationalizations, etcetera, but without stress on there being one best life. 
 As we have seen and will continue to see throughout in different ways, there is a possible 
anti-dualistic dialogue with Ortega's notion of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" because Dewey 
references that there is uniqueness to each individual, but one that also exists in interaction with 
surrounding circumstances. And, as he adds later, together these interactions, or 'affairs,' create 
our histories; "An "affair," Res, is always at issue whether it concerns chemical change, the 
emergence of life, language, mind or the episodes that compose human history."
120
 The 
following reasoning from Hickman lends support for this, "Dewey understands individuals to be 
unique histories or temporal continuities of behavior."
121
 
 Again, one way to summarize this is to argue that "nurture nurtures nature." In other 
words, again this must be understood anti-dualistically; meaning, there is our nature, and then 
there is the nurture surrounding us, and nature is exposed, developed, as a result of its 
interactions with the 'nurture' around us. Nature, in regards to how we define and re-define it, 
cannot exist without that interaction with nurture. In Dewey's thought, therefore, nurture plays a 
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more significant role; "[...] Dewey's claims about a nature both plastic and hard-setting and 
dependent on a social environment not only for its shape but for how long it can retain any of its 
plasticity."
122
 Nature, therefore, does not start closed or fixed, so it is therefore certainly not 
understood by him in strictly the traditional, classic sense of the term. As Alexander further 
supports,  
 Specifically, Dewey maintains that nature is a creative or emergent process, and he 
 regards various metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological distinctions as functional 
 relationships rather than as oppositional dichotomies of the sort that have led to the 
 "dualisms" prevailing in philosophy [which of course the latter was something he was 
 very much against]
123
 
 The argument here is that Ortega also did not really deny that there was not a nature for 
human beings, but rather he emphasized that it depends more so on history, and therefore 
similarly is not closed or fixed. This he says very clearly in the following excerpt: "El hombre no 
es natural, no tiene naturaleza, no está adscrito a un ser fijo, es... infinito en posibilidades."
124
 
After all, Ortega did emphasize that we are each "yo y mi circunstancia." In one instance Ortega 
refers to nature as "identity," writing that "man has no nature, that is, no identity" because, as 
Dewey also argued as did Ortega, nothing is fixed and predetermined when we are born, other 
than for Ortega perhaps our freedom to choose 'what we will do, who we will become,' etc., 
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within the certain possibilities and limitations that surround us.
125
 And Ortega further posits that, 
"El hombre, señores, no tiene naturaleza sino que tiene historia. La historia es el modo de ser un 
ente radicalmente variable y sin identidad. [...] Al hombre no se le puede identificar. Es un 
Arsenio Lupin metafísico>>, and key in this, he continues, "Y el método para entender lo que es 
la vida humana que es la realidad radical es no la razón pura, sino la razón histórica, la razón 
ultra-eleática."
126
 So again history is key in all this; in understanding human life and reality. 
 For Ortega, in one sense and definition nature is things. Nature is body, soul, spirit, all of 
which man is not entirely. These 'things' that make up nature are simply interpretations that we 
each create. As he writes,  
 La naturaleza es una interpretación transitoria que el hombre ha dado a lo que se 
 encuentra frente a sí en su vida. [...] Porque el hombre no tiene naturaleza. El hombre no 
 es su cuerpo, que es una cosa; ni es su alma, psique, conciencia, o espíritu, que es 
 también una cosa. El hombre no es cosa ninguna, sino una drama [...] Todas las cosas, sea 
 las que fueran, son ya meras interpretaciones que se esfuerza en dar lo que encuentra.
127
 
 Because our interpretations and subsequent understandings of nature change throughout 
the course of history, it is perhaps precisely those changes, therefore, that say more about 'nature' 
than any possibly attainable inherent qualities themselves. Hence what we are, more so, is our 
history, such as in this case for example, 'the history of our changing interpretations of nature.' 
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This dialogues with Pragmatism's aforementioned objective to focus more on the why and how 
we think some thing rather than the what of that thing. As Pedro Cerezo Galán elaborates,  
 Si el hombre tuviese una naturaleza, un ser fijo como lo tienen el mineral, el vegetal, y el 
 animal, podríamos saber de una vez para siempre lo que significaban sus 
 comportamientos; pero como no hay tal, el hombre en cada época pone su vida a 
 finalidades diferentes más o menos nuevas, finalidades que él mismo ha inventado y que 
 son la convención o supuesto tácito de sus actuaciones y ocupaciones.
128
 
 Our interpretations change over time; they are historical. Nature is historical. "Nature" 
indeed must be understood anti-dualistically, as it is an interpretation, and it is also (likely, 
though this is not the goal to discover here) some thing on its own, and neither phenomenon 
could exist without the other despite being simultaneously separate concepts that we may not 
ever know when they overlap correctly. Burón González clarifies this in support in the following 
excerpt:  
 [...] la naturaleza, desde el momento en que la consideramos como <<categoría>> del 
 pensamiento, como concepto, como idea, –y esa consideración es un momento esencial 
 de toda reflexión no ingenua de la realidad– adquiere una movilidad que aparentemente 
 estaba excluida de la misma idea. Pero al mismo tiempo, en la categoría <<naturaleza>> 
 se expresa el momento de independencia respecto de la actividad social, aquello sobre lo 
 que se ejerce la actividad y, puesto que es transformada [...] por ende, también categoría 
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 con pretensiones <<totalizantes>> desde el momento en que sin su referencia no sería 
 posible pensar la historia.
129
  
 Hence again this, in part, pragmatist correlation specifically for this thesis's purposes 
between Dewey and Ortega in general in their anti-dualistic views of history and nature being 
separate yet connected. The ways in which, therefore, 'man is not his nature, rather he is his 
history because his nature is his history, and his history contains his nature,' will continue to be 
elaborated in what follows. This final point is summarized concisely in the following additional 
support of this argument from Burón González, "De lo visto hasta ahora cabría deducir que, en el 
interior del hombre al menos, todo lo natural es histórico aunque siga siendo naturaleza.  [...] 
naturaleza e historia se exigirán la una a la otra cada vez que se mencionen."
130
 And this is also 
supported by Lasaga Medina when he writes that "[...] el pasado es siempre el límite absoluto de 
lo que el hombre puede llegar a ser en el futuro. Ahora bien, su naturaleza humana (biológica y 
psicológica) pertenece a ese pasado: la Naturaleza es el pasado absoluto de la Historia, algo que 
el hombre no puede cambiar."
131
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VI. Ortega and Dewey: Anti-Dualism in History/Experience, and Nature 
Both Dewey and Ortega appear to share the belief in anti-dualism relating to these 
concepts of fundamentally history and human nature. If we substitute Dewey’s key word in his 
philosophy, “experience,” for Ortega’s “history,” then we have a similar construction; ‘man has 
no nature, only experience, because nature is man’s experience.’132 Hence, while much of 
Dewey's writing was not about specifically the discipline of history, much of it was arguably 
fundamentally historical in character. Moreover, because we can understand that his term 
"experience" can also mean "history," the former being a topic he wrote copiously about, then we 
can apply this anti-dualism, a key feature of Dewey's general philosophy. “Experience” is often 
used basically synonymously as “history” in both philosophers’ writings, in fact, as in the 
following example from Ortega: “[…] resulta que la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la 
vida.”133 This is another important thread that must be weaved throughout; how for Ortega life is 
experience of life, something that certainly could be imagined to dialogue with pragmatism in 
not only this use of their term "experience" but in its noted progressive aspect. And a similarly 
concise definition of Dewey’s term “experience” can be understood as this anti-dualistic 
conception of Ortega’s nature and history, or what Dewey, commenting on the position of James, 
calls “life and history” in “experience;”  
[…] experience is what James called a double-barrelled word. Like its congeners, life and 
history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe, endure, 
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and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire 
and enjoy, see, believe, imagine—in short, processes of experiencing.”134 
So as with Ortega’s use of the terms “nature” and “history,” Dewey’s “experience” and 
“nature” cannot be separated or exist without the other; they are not dualistic. “[…] ‘life’ and 
‘history’ have the same fullness of undivided meaning.”135 Perhaps it should be noted that 
Dewey developed these terms ten years prior to the cited definitions of Ortega’s (the former 
published Experience and Nature in 1925, and the latter published Historia como sistema in 
1941, and Galileo in 1947, which are two key books on Ortega's meditations on history). Life 
and history are anti-dualistic concepts. “Dewey suggests that temporal quality and historical 
career are the marks of everything that exists and are the essence of their individuality,” explains 
Richard Bernstein in support here in reference to Dewey’s assertion in 1940 that “everything 
recorded is an historical event; it is something temporal.”136 In other words, again nature is 
man’s experience, which is also essentially his history. As Sidney Hook adds, “Ser un ser 
humano es estar ya en interacción, es ser alguien que tiene experiencias. Estas experiencias 
indican lo que la naturaleza es aquí y ahora."
137
 We have experiences in the interaction of the self 
with our circumstances, we could insert here. Moreover, “la experiencia humana es ella misma 
natural."
138
 So again experience is natural; experience is our nature.
139
 These are anti-dualistic 
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concepts, as James Campbell also supports, “For Dewey, neither experience nor nature is 
primary in itself, and neither can be understood fully without the other.”140 Dewey says this most 
clearly himself in the following extract also from 1940: “my theory of the connection of 
experience with nature— as itself an historical outcome or ‘end.’”141 Or, even more succinctly, 
Dewey declared earlier in 1925 that, “all natural existences are histories."142 
Some of the key qualities of Dewey’s “nature” include not being something fixed or 
predetermined because “experience” shapes and defines what our “nature” is in each moment 
that we have experience(s). So in Dewey’s philosophy, one cannot separate experience from 
nature because experience gives nature its meaning through our own empirical understanding 
and conclusions of the nature of an experience. The idea here is that a thing essentially has no 
meaning (or nature) until we have an experience with it and decide what it is, its' (the thing's 
meaning), or that meaning (for instance of the experience) is or at least could be. So we define 
and experience what “a” (and this is key here, not “the”) nature of any thing or event is. This is 
why Dewey argues that “Objects are possessed and appreciated, but they are not known.”143 As 
has been discussed, it is not about the existence of some thing or event, it is about the meaning 
we attach to some thing or event. Also related to this Dewey writes, “Any immediate object then 
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becomes for inquiry, as something to be known, an appearance. To call it “appearance” denotes a 
functional status, not a kind of existence.”144 So, as he elaborates,  
[…] experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. 
Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in 
certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are how 
things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It 
also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes 
inference
145
 
 Here we find a very clear application of Dewey's belief in antidualism, as the above 
excerpt demonstrates a clear challenge to the previously dominant Cartesian dualism prevalent in 
philosophy. Hence, concisely stated, we cannot genuinely know some thing or event, per se; 
“Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience or thing, in and of itself".146 Rather, what 
we can study and ponder is how something is experienced in our own interpretations of that very 
experience; we can have a unique and direct experience with some thing and a resulting 
interpretation. We experience some thing, and then we interpret that experience, but along 
pragmatists lines we must add that what is important is to ask why and how we make that 
interpretation (rather than whether or not that interpretation is true or false in and of itself). 
Again the pragmatist goal is not an end of inquiry as to whether or not our interpretations of an 
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experience coincide correctly with the true nature and definition of that experience or thing, 
rather the objective is to ponder what we think and why we think that, as well as why it is useful 
or valuable for us to think that. And this is because generally we cannot confirm when what we 
think we experience is actually what we experience; we cannot generally know the true "nature" 
of our experience per pragmatists. So again there is a denial of being able to know "natures;" the 
denial is not of its existence, it is just of our being able to pinpoint exactly "true natures" because 
again what we can know is just what we think we know. This is the difference between 
experiencing something and interpreting that experience; it is not about knowing that experience 
and that we are experiencing an experience, it is about our own interpretations of that experience; 
the funneled interpretations via our perspectives is what we can ponder, not the nature of that 
experience in and of itself separate from our experiencing of them and in their "true independent 
natures." Again, perhaps there is a "true nature" but we cannot confirm what this may be, we can 
only ponder what we think and interpret that true nature to be; it is simply what we experience it 
to be, or at least this is what is tangible and what we can investigate. 
 This connects with Ortega's perspectivism, and the idea that there is no true or false 
perspective. As aforementioned, per Ortega the only fallacy is to say that there is one, absolute 
perspective. Each individual has a perspective and each person is, therefore, a point of view. We 
cannot know or understand our experiences, realities, objectively, but rather we see them always 
in perspective and through our circumstances. This is a key area  that will be revisited throughout 
this dissertation in imagining a pragmatist dialogue in Ortega's work. As shall be explored 
further in what follows, these similarities in Dewey and Ortega, therefore, can help us better 
understand Ortega's notion of the infinite perspectives of truth and reality, but not, therefore, of 
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truth or reality itself. So as there is no one absolute perspective, as we will also see, there is no 
one truth, or no one reality. 
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VII. Truth and Reality 
 Moving forward, we must also look in more depth specifically at the concepts of the 
"truth" and "reality" in both philosophers' writings. In what follows there are some parts repeated 
to re-emphasize their importance while bringing a slight nuance to how we may possibly be able 
to especially better understand part of Ortega's philosophy.  
 As we just saw with the notions of experience and nature, similar constructions can be 
made in regards to interpreting the truth as anti-dualistic. Concisely stated, neither philosopher 
seems to insinuate that there is no truth, per se, but rather, there is the possible, potential truth, 
and then there is what we think is the truth, and we cannot necessarily, at least always, know if 
they ever coincide. This is a bit similar to the way that neither philosopher directly negates that 
there is no nature, but rather that mainly we simply cannot quite understand it, get to it, 
completely; there is nature, and then there is what we think nature is. So again the same can be 
said for the truth; there is truth, and then there is what we interpret and think of as the truth. The 
latter here is what is important to contemplate from the pragmatist perspective, and the resulting 
value and usefulness we place on those thoughts and interpretations.  The truth and what we 
think is the truth need to be interpreted anti-dualistically here, because even though one cannot 
exist without the other, they are, nonetheless, still separate concepts because we cannot really, 
truly know if, how, when, or whether they can overlap. While it may be possible that the two 
coincide, resulting in 'truly knowing what the truth is,' this is something that essentially we might 
not ever even be able to know or recognize with certainty when we do. There is no way of really, 
"truly" being able to tell if they overlap correctly; hence, tersely affirmed, the "truth" must 
always be considered, at least, tentative, provisional, and not certain. Again, as Ortega similarly 
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declared, there are no true or false perspectives, and there is no one, absolute perspective. And 
"truth," therefore, is an (one of many) articulation of the total sum of individual (or social, 
cultural, etc.) perspective(s), points of view, and similarly not absolute. Here again neither 
philosopher is entirely relativist nor absolutist.  
 In this specific point perhaps the dialogue would proceed a bit more smoothly with 
Schiller's notion on the truth, as elaborated on in the third section, because of Ortega's focus on 
individual perspectivism and Schiller's inherent humanism at the center of his philosophy, 
whereas Dewey and James arguably are more broad in their views on the truth (by not narrowing 
it always to something so humanistic/human-centered). For Schiller, it is all about what we think 
some thing is (to put it plainly), whereas for Dewey and James, although this is still central of 
course there are also important influential factors to consider outside of the individual human 
being. That said, this last point, conversely, would dialogue more smoothly with Ortega's yo y mi 
circunstancia, as he, too, recognized the importance of external factors to humans as well; the 
circumstances surrounding us. As shall be explored, Schiller did not deny the role of this of 
course, it is just that his philosophy is more appropriately termed "humanism" because of his 
greater emphasis on humanity at the center. But for the moment, what should remain clear is that 
there are pieces of dialogue that we can envision between all these thinkers, some areas more 
smoothly than others. In fact, in one sense perhaps it can be argued that Ortega resolves these 
discrepancies by putting it all together in recognizing that we are central as individual human 
beings amidst a limiting set of both internal and external circumstances in which the ways we 
react and interpret all this is determined by our individual perspectives. 
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Dewey generally does not use the word "truth" in his philosophy, rather he created his 
own term; "warranted assertibility." Dewey concisely argues that rather than truths there is 
trueing, or "warranted assertibility." As McDermott, another expert on Dewey explains in 
regards to this, "He prefers the adverb "truly" to the abstract noun "truth," but perhaps it can be 
said that what he points to are our attempts at "trueing."
147
 And this is because "Dewey wanted 
'truths,' even if reliably tested, to be treated as tentative, hypothetical, fallible, and in no way 
transcending specific verifications."
148
 We cannot describe or understand anything truly, other 
than as how we experience it to be, in Dewey's philosophy. In other words, truth, just like 
experience, or life and history, reality, is simply what we experience it to be. This is the 
conclusion Dewey makes; that again what we do know is that 'we know what we experience that 
we know.'  
But it must be noted here again that this does not imply pure idealism. While Dewey 
initially in his philosophical career adhered quite closely to idealism, he would come to add quite 
a bit of naturalism, arguing that it not just that reality is what we experience it to be, but he 
eventually added that this was further undergone and confirmed via interactions between an 
individual and his or her environment, and which can lead to sometimes "trueing." During the 
period from 1884 to 1903, Dewey essentially supported idealism, or the idea that our ideas are 
our only realities, before he came to read this more anti-dualistically by eventually concluding 
that along with this realism is involved as well; that there is also a real, true reality, even if we 
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may not be able to know which or what that is.
149
 So in actuality, there are all sorts of "truths." 
As he writes,    
That the truth denotes truths, that is, specific verifications, combinations or meanings and 
 outcomes reflectively viewed, is, one may say, the central point of experimental theory. 
 Truth, in general or in the abstract, is a just name for an experienced relation among the 
 things of experience: that sort of relation in which intents are retrospectively viewed from 
 the standpoint of the fulfillment which they secure through their own natural operation or 
 incitement. [...] Truth per se and in se, of which all transitory things and events–that is, 
 all experienced realities–are only shadowy futile approximations.150 
 The "truth" is primarily, therefore, about the conclusions we make as to the relationships 
between experiences and things experienced. Thus, we can only say with certainty, per early 
Deweyan thought, that, "Hence if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it 
is experienced as being."
151
 
 Furthermore, there is arguably an historicist element in Dewey's concept of "warranted 
assertibility" and the idea that there are no "universal, absolute truths," a point defended in the 
following excerpt from Davaney's book on the history of historicism, and one which can 
arguably therefore be conversable with Ortega; 
 Dewey challenged the interpretation of philosophy as the formulation of universal truth 
 and repudiated the dualisms embedded in such a quest. In their stead he articulated a 
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 thoroughly historicized interpretation of philosophy and human inquiry as the finite and 
 human attempt to grapple with the problematics of concrete human existence.
152
 
 And as Professor Mougan also supports, "Dewey realiza un consideración que es a la vez 
sistemética e histórica" in regards to his notion of the truth.
153
 Ortega had some very similar 
views on the concept of the "truth," and in particular, in regards to this notion that truth is, 
basically, as with Dewey, what we experience it to be (most generally phrased), and for this 
reason there are essentially many 'truths'. Ortega proclaimed that there are 'diverse degrees of the 
truth.'
154
 And this is in part because, as he says, "Una idea es verdadera cuando corresponde a la 
idea que tenemos de la realidad."
155
  
 Ortega also writes that "Para ser verdadero el pensamiento necesita coincidir con las 
cosas, con lo transcendente de mí [...]."
156
 The first point made by Ortega in these excerpts is that 
we consider something truthful when it coincides with reality, but in the second he argues that 
our interpretation is transcendental, separate, and beyond the thing we are interpreting. In other 
words, the first emphasizes the interpretation of some thing and the second the correspondance 
of that thing (and what it really might be) with our interpretation. This of course is in part the 
classic idealism versus realism dilemna in philosophy. But Ortega was neither a realist nor an 
idealist, something which he tried to make very clear in his writings. His emphasis on 
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"interpretation" comes from the persectivism central in his philosophy. And the 
"correspondance"  refers to when we decide something is "truthful." In other words, this is just as 
Dewey argued that truth is determined by this relationship (the correspondance), but Ortega 
consistently adds to this emphasizing that ultimately this process is done via individual 
perspectives. This means that this correspondance could be discovered, interpreted and reached 
differently and at different points based on individual perspective. The argument here is that 
correspondance is simply the moment we decide something is true, but the path we take to get to 
that moment will vary by individual as will when exactly this moment occurs along that path (we 
should see this path as a continuum of time). So this path will be navigated and determined by 
individual perspective per Ortega. This is also the case in Dewey's argument, but again perhaps 
his view is a bit broader in that individual perspective does add to helping determine that path 
and the defined moments along that path (such as when we stop and decide we have reached the 
point that something can have 'enough' history and background corroborated to be considered 
"truthful"), but it also adds to our selection and study of the consequences (some of which are of 
course external to us) that define that correspondance to corroborate something as "truthful." 
This is becuase Dewey emphasizes that it is the matching consequences (and more so real-world 
applications, therefore, and something more "practical"), that are key in our understandings and 
interpretations of the "truth" (but still, it must be reminded that the "truth" does not really exist 
for Dewey because he calls it instead "warranted assertibility"). Meaning, a divergence here is 
that for Dewey consequences are key (though Dewey does note the role of perspective, too), and 
for Ortega, perspective is key, but both would arguably dialogue on the defining moment in our 
conceptions and formulations of the truth being the point of correspondence noted. Moreover, 
these roles of consequences and perspectives are not incompatible, they are just different 
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emphases, but neither thinker would negate the existence of the roles of these both in this process 
of what we could call "truing," they just diverge a bit in which they focus on in their 
philosophies.  
 Dewey argued that the "truth verifies consequences," as he writes, "Like knowledge 
itself, truth is an experienced relation of things, and it has no meaning outside of such 
relation."
157
 For pragmatists such as Dewey, therefore, we should refer here to "justification" 
rather than the truth or the verification of the truth. Justifications and "warranted assertibility" is 
really what our goal should be about, because we cannot truthfully confirm the truth. What is 
important is simply why and how we reach and make those justifications, and not whether or not 
they are accurate, credible, or truthful in and of themselves. Again what is important for the 
pragmatist (even more than how we came to create and define those justifications) is especially 
the future application of those justifications. 
 For example, if the answer to a question, speaking very generally here, is demonstrated 
literally and 'enough' (whatever that requirement may be), then we say something is "true." 
Hence the importance of 'consequences' in Dewey's philosophy here, which is of course quite 
instrumentalist. Correspondence is not just with past consequences, therefore. For the pragmatist, 
correspondence is particularly important because of its potential future applications. In 
pragmatism, the past history of correspondence between consequences simply starts this process. 
Part of this is because the more our consequences come to be confirmed as corresponding in the 
future, the more we consider something to be "truthful." The truth needs to be constantly re-
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affirmed and re-corroborated in order to survive and to continue to last into the future, in other 
words, so this entire process must continue to proceed into the future.  
 Thus for both philosophers, there is a futuristic element in their views on what is 'the 
truth' given that it is something that must be demonstrated, validated, verified, and of course this 
means in the future. The important critique must be noted here, however, that what we are 
talking about is predicting the future, which of course we cannot always do; we cannot always 
know if our predictions are going to be realized and verified. This is, in fact, a central critique of 
instrumentalism and essentially anything too forward-looking and consequentalist in general. But 
this is not to say, however, and as we shall see, that either philosopher does not recognize this of 
course that we can never know all consequences in advance. 
  We can also posit that there is an objective here to create a link of sorts between what is 
real and what is ideal. And perhaps for Dewey, the more agreement there is between individuals 
in regards to having the same or similar meanings concluded based on experienced relations, 
then the closer something is to being 'true' (but not necessarily absolutely true of course). Dewey 
writes, "The best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that of 
Pierce: 'The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we 
mean by the truth, and the object represented by this opinion is the real'"
158
 Nonetheless, just 
because he says that this is, in his opinion, the 'best' definition of the truth does not mean that he 
necessarily completely agrees with it, of course. But to put this plainly, it is a way to simply be 
more 'realistic' and bring philosophy down from too lofty and abstract a position; this makes 
philosophy more tangible, practical, rational, sensible, or in a word, pragmatic. 
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 Ortega, even more so than Dewey, seems to insinuate that there are indeed truths (but 
then, again, there are also what we think are truths, and we may not always be able to know for 
sure if they ever coincide, though there will be times that we think they do –this also must be 
read in an anti-dualistic manner). Moreover, given that for Ortega the "truth" is the articulation of 
the total sum of individual perspectives, points of view, then the more perspectives that we take 
on and incorporate, the closer we get to these possible, potential "truths." For example, if we are 
trying to get as close as possible to any truths about a mountain (to use an example that simply 
has a multidimensional shape to ponder), we should integrate as many perspectives possible from 
as many positions and therefore points of reference, analysis, as possible. We are not going to 
see the 'whole picture of the mountain' looking upon just one side of the mountain; we need to 
look from all sides. And Ortega differs a bit in that he does not rely nearly as much on the 
instrumentalist notion in understanding the process of "trueing." Hence the aforementioned direct 
critique of Ortega's that pragmatists "[...] se ha atrevido a proclamar esta tesis: <<No hay más 
verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas>>."
159
 In other words, while for Ortega the truth 
is what we experience it to be, as it is for the American pragmatist Dewey, there is yet a bit more 
to this for Ortega; he still arguably leans toward there really perhaps being something more solid 
and that may be even tangible in the form of truth that we should strive toward discovering, or at 
least we can say the truth can be true for an individual, if not in general. In other words, while 
the pragmatist generally argues that we cannot ever confirm or therefore know the "truth" 
completely, for Ortega this ultimately does not really matter because something can simply be 
very true, or 'true enough,' for an individual in his or her own mind (hence his emphasis on 
perspectivism). The individual mind is what is more important for Ortega. It is possible that 
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Ortega would agree and dialogue on this concept of there being no real, true truths, but it is 
essentially a mute point for him because not all recognize this or understand things to be this 
way, and because for some they really completely believe in certain truths, to phrase this all 
plainly, and this of course varies by individuals. Truth does truly exist in the minds of some 
(again whether that truth they believe in is actually really a truth does not matter). This is like the 
classic debate among different religions or between the religious and the non-religious; we 
cannot prove the existence, or non-existence, of the Catholic God versus Allah for Muslims, for 
example, but this does not matter to those who really, truly believe in their God, whichever their 
deity may be. Some people simply truly and completely believe in the truth of their deity and 
others do not, or others have a different God or Gods. Thus, what is important to contemplate for 
Ortega is our individual perspective(s) because this is the point from which we see and 
understand things such as the truth, whereas for the pragmatist the focus is more specifically on 
the applications and repercussions in the past, present, and future (even if ultimately determined 
and selected from an individual perspective) that the truth has in the process of the 
correspondence of "truing." But again the point of possible dialogue between Ortega and the 
pragmatists could be that our focus should not be on whether or not something is truly true. This 
is because for Ortega it just simply can be for some and not for others, but this does not tell us 
whether or not something is actually true because this disagreement cannot be resolved. And for 
the pragmatists this is because this just depends on a certain number of practical applications 
corroborating and maintaing our beliefs on the truth of something but not verifying with absolute 
certainty the truth of a truth. So rather to speak generally we should think about how, why, and 
when, for example, that we think something is true (again not whether or not it is really true). 
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 The following excerpt by Álvarez Gómez, referencing some direct material from Ortega, 
supports this argument of where, exactly, this dialogue could occur in a pragmatist notion of the 
rejection of a confirmed true truth but with his divergence in his lack of emphasis on 
instrumentalism in this (since Ortega instead focuses on perspectivism);  
Condición para ello [la 'utilidad máxima que reporta la verdad'] es que la verdad sea pura 
 y simplemente verdad, en lugar de <<hacer de utilidad la verdad...yo he buscado en 
 torno, con mirada suplicante de naúfrago, los hombres a quienes importase la verdad, la 
 pura verdad, lo que las cosas son por sí mismas, y apenas he hallado alguno.
160
  
While Dewey generally only emphasizes that truth is just what we think it is, again 
Ortega accentuates that this, in and of itself, really does make something a so-called "truth," at 
least for that individual or during that time period, but not in terms of being a 'true veracity' in a 
constant and general sense. Hence, as shall be elaborated further along, the notion that "the will 
is real, but the willed is not;" or, rephrased, we could say that 'our belief in the truth is true, but 
the belief of the truth itself, or simply the truth itself, may not be true.'
161
  Perhaps this is part of 
the reason why a core part of Ortega's meditations here are quite individualistic; "El punto de 
vista individual me parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su 
verdad. Otra cosa es artificio."
162
 And he continues, "[...] cada hombre tiene una misión de 
verdad. Donde está mi pupila no está otra: lo que de la realidad ve mi pupila no lo ve otra. Somos 
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insustituibles, somos necesarios. [...] la realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales."
163
 
Again, every individual has and is a perspective, and a perspective is just one vision of reality, 
and just one reality itself. A perspective can never be true or false. Perspective is the means to be 
of the real and also the means to get to know some of the real, again at least for the individual if 
not generally. Life, reality, is perspective. Every reality, therefore, has infinite perspectives, each 
of which are neither true nor false, and again the only fallacy is to say that one is absolute—each 
is simply "true" for the individual seeing it but maybe not in and of itself. But this should still all 
be understood anti-dualistically, nonetheless, as Lasaga Medina explains, and as such 
establishing again where the possible point of dialogue with pragmatism is, 
<<Verdadero>> significa entonces dos cosas: primero, significará <<de acuerdo con las 
 cosas>>, que acierta o desvela lo que hay, que la idea capta realidad; y en segundo lugar, 
 significará <<verdadero en y para mi>>, es decir, auténtico. El sentido final de la verdad 
 en Ortega es verdad como autenticidad. Ambos significados no se pueden separar: el 
 primero depende absolutamente del segundo.
164
 
Dewey does appear to coincide in the notion that truth is ultimately, in the end, a personal 
endeavor and conclusion. As Shook proposes in what follows, the ultimate test in "trueing" 
comes from the individualist perspective.
165
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[...] the individual mind serves as the test of any potential new known truth. 'Truth, in 
 short, from a psychological standpoint, is agreement of relations; falsity, disagreement of 
 relations...It follows from what has just been said that the mind always tests the truth of 
 any supposed fact by comparing it to the acquired system of truth.' [The italics represent 
 Dewey's words.] [...] in this last quotation Dewey declares that the psychological 
 standpoint must take the individual's own internal coherence to be the final criterion and 
 definition of truth.
166
 
It is because of this that we can also understand why there are so many different truths 
and realities, because as Ortega proclaims "algo es verdad para mí cuando para mí es verdad en 
sí."
167
 This definition of the truth is arguably quite pragmatist indeed, because here, essentially, 
my experience transforms my reality, my truth. Here we can say that what is "truth" is what is 
experienced to be truth; meaning, to be quite pragmatist in the choice of words here, practical 
consequences of my experiences lead to my conclusions on my truths. And each one of us is 
unique in certain ways, he continues, "Cada individuo es un órgano de percepción en algo 
distinto de todos los demás."
168
  
And as we shall see in various instances that should be at least briefly noted here, 
Dewey's insistence on a community of investigators being necessary for getting closer to, 
broadly speaking, 'what might be real' (but not right on target of course) perhaps this dialogues 
smoothly with Ortega's notion that the more perspectives we gather, the closer we can get to 
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what might be real; the more people, therefore, to combine the two in dialogue, the more 
authentic and truthful our interpretations and conceptions of reality, without of course ever being 
able to confirm their complete accuracy, precision, or truthfullness. 
In one instance Ortega uses an example of a centaur, arguing that while a  centaur may 
not be real, our imagining it to be real is real; "[...] el centauro no es un ser real – lo real de él es 
la imagen o trozo real de nuestra alma en que lo imaginamos él es un ser imaginado, un ser 
fantástico o de la fantasía."
169
 Once again, our "will to real something" is real, but that 'real' 
willed may not always necessarily be real. It must be noted, nonetheless, that there is a still a 
social element in all this stemming from the concept of "yo y mi circunstancia," as Álvarez 
Gómez clarifies,   
[...] cada dimensión de la realidad está intrínsecamente conexionada con las demás–dado 
 que son dimensiones de una y la misma realidad que en ella se explicita–y puesto que 
 todas y cada una de ellas está enraizada en la realidad, la captación de cada una de 
 ellas en un ejercicio de visión remite a otras en proceso interminable, cuyo 
 sentido, sin embargo, es la detectación de la realidad misma bajo una de sus formas.
170
 
Thus, Ortega proclaimed, "Las cosas –hemos dicho– no son verdad ni falsedad, ni 
verdaderas ni falsas; verdadera y falsa sólo puede serlo la conciencia de las cosas, el pensar las 
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cosas. Y no todo pensar."
171
 Put another way, here Ortega adds that it is the judgment of thinking 
one's judgment is the sole correct one which must be considered false (but not one's judgment in 
and of itself, per se, because neither veracity nor falsity can be completely proven of any single 
one of them); "Las cosas no pueden ser ni verdaderas ni falsas. [...] quien es falso es el juicio del 
sujeto que juzgó [...] La falsedad no es de ese querer, sino de quien pensó que aquel querer era 
un querer real y no ficticio."
172
 It is also recognized by Ortega that we cannot necessarily know if 
what we think is the truth and what is the truth coincide, as he clearly declares in this excerpt, 
"[...] ni poseemos todas las verdades ni podemos poseerlas todas. No es la verdad quien es 
relativa al hombre sino el número y clases de verdades que podemos poseer."
173
 Still, again he 
does seem to insinuate that there are "truths;" "Toda verdad en especie contiene ciertos 
elementos genéricos de verdad [...]."
174
 This is all clarified concisely in the following excerpt 
from Lasaga Medina, in reference to la razón histórica as well, which lacks any a priori notions, 
idealism or Kantianism, rather, 
[...] la razón se vuelve rigurosamente empiricista, más que el empiricismo anglosajón, 
 que no es sino un <<idealismo>> prudente regalado por lo que llaman <<hechos>> y 
 pragmática: el objeto de la razón es aprender la verdadera realidad, lo que ha ido 
 haciendo y pasándole al hombre en las estructuras espacio-temporales en que se da el 
 vivir humano. Esa <<realidad>>, que no es racional, reside y se deja aprender por lo 
 que denomina Ortega <experiencia de la vida>>, que es un tipo de saber preconceptual, 
                                                          
171
 Ortega, Obras Completas XII, p. 429. 
 
172
 Ibid., p. 410. 
 
173
 Ibid., p. 442. 
 
174
 Ibid., p. 373. 
 
 116 
 
 muy difícil de transmitir, y que consiste en la decantación intuitiva (o relexiva) de las 
 experiencias vividas.
175
 
One example that comes to mind here to illustrate all this would be that of the transition 
from the belief that the earth was flat to that of it being round. When it turned out that 
Christopher Columbus and his explorers did not 'fall off the earth' as had been expected, the 
"truth" about the shape of the globe changed. Prior to this, the great majority were generally 
convinced that the earth was flat, just the same as how today we are certain that the world is 
round; in other words, essentially given this belief, this conviction, it was, arguably, just as much 
of a "truth" then as it is now. This is why, as we shall see, what is important to consider in all this 
is, as Ortega proclaimed, that what changes are not truths, per se, rather truths in the minds of 
people. The truth can change in the minds of not just individuals, but within entire societies, or 
for specific historical epochs. Hence, what is important here is not that something is true or false, 
necessarily, but rather it is what is inside the minds of people and what they think is true or false 
that is important (instead of a truth or falsity in and of itself). And because this is something that 
changes, that gives it a historicity. "Entiende cada época lo que para ella es la verdad," argued 
Ortega.
176
 And later he adds, "El descubrimiento de una verdad, es siempre un suceso con fecha 
y localidad precisas."
177
 This Ortega posits consistently in his writings, as in this additional 
example from Una interpretación de la historia universal, "Verdad es lo que ahora es verdad, y 
no lo que se va a descubrir en un futuro indeterminado."
178
 Thus, the truth is also historical. At 
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first glance this appears to proceed in a different direction from Dewey in that there is in this 
greater emphasis on the historical interpretation of the truth rather than on pragmatist 
instrumentalism and its more forward-focused approach.   
One possible analysis on Ortega's view here is that the reason he argues that truth is what 
is true right now is because the truth is historical in that it is true for a historical time period; 
historical epochs have their own truths, so again the truth is historical. We can still imagine a 
dialogue with pragmatism in this because pragmatists would simply take this a step further and 
add that within that historical period (even if they do not use this specific phrase generally to 
describe this), whichever "truths" are consistently tested and demonstrated to be consequentially 
useful, valid, and therefore true during that period, are the ones that come to be defined as 
"truths." And this is further based on the pragmatist assumption that this corroborating process 
will continue to be useful, justified, and applicable in the future. In other words this process must 
be continued into the present and extend into the future if something is going to continue to exist 
as a believed "truth" (note the need to use the phrase 'believed truth' to emphasize the argument 
of the inability to consider it more than a "warranted assertion" in reference to "truth" to use 
Dewey's notion). Ortega would possibly jump in here to dialogue adding in his thought that in 
certain time periods there can be ideas and then beliefs that simply come to function 'best.' In 
general this specific topic of something being "functional", as has been noted, is where we can 
really imagine a dialogue with pragmatism. And as shall be further elaborated ahead, this is what 
shapes our views on reality, this also being historical and dependent on that historical moment in 
reference. Thus while the pragmatist may not generally use the term "historical" in their 
interpretation of the "truth," this certainly is something that they arguably would be open to 
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dialoging on. And while Ortega focuses on the past, because the history of something is what 
determines and defines its nature, or at least our understanding of its nature, the pragmatist in 
general tends to focus on how what is really important, nonetheless, is the future impact. Even if 
we cannot predict the future, in pragmatism generally the future is what matters in our life, one 
reason being because we cannot do anything about the past, since it is done with, but we can do 
something about the future, since it has not arrived yet. While the past may be the most defining 
features of our presents, the present is still ultimately ephemeral because we are always moving 
forward into the future. This movement forward is what matters, therefore, but understanding 
what moved us prior is found in the past, making the past important as well, just in a different 
way. In one sense the past is the explanation and the future is the application, and that 
explanation helps us not only understand that application, but it is what needs to be consistently 
and continually demonstrated and validated in the future. We can insert "truth" here into this 
imagined dialogue and argue that the past explains why a "truth" came to be, but it can only 
remain a "truth" when this continues to be further corroborated in the future and so its continued 
existence depends on the future. As shall be discussed ahead as well, Ortega says that sometimes 
our truths are our beliefs, and that we are our beliefs; they form a part of us. In order to form a 
part of us, these beliefs need a history of validation, thus being again a point of dialogue with 
pragmatism. And of course these two points meet in the present, which is yet another reason that 
this all must be viewed along a continuum. So these two focuses can presumably coalesce, 
further advancing this thesis's purpose to imagine a dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism.  
Dewey emphasized that what is not most important is whether something is true or false, 
rather what is significant to ponder is what we think of as true and false; why we think that, how 
that affects us, how we reached that conclusion, etcetera. To think is to act. To think is, for 
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example, to consider a problem and propose a solution. We have to see consequences, and 
thinking has to include action, per Dewey's instrumentalism. We do need to view the past, but we 
also have to look toward the future. Again Dewey, as a pragmatist, leans more toward 
instrumentalism than Ortega of course. As Sidney Hook explains,  
[...] las cosas no son ni verdaderas ni falsas; tampoco los estados mentales, sean lo que 
 sean, son verdaderos o falsos. Sólo es verdadero o falso los que nosotros afirmamos de 
 una forma significativa sobre ellas. Son, por tanto, las consecuencias de lo que hacemos 
 las que determinan si nuestro discurso es verdadero o falso.
179
  
Part of this is because again there are so many possible combinations of interactions 
leading to various versions of what we think is the truth, and of all these 'experiences' there is 
subsequently what we esteem to be the most important, credible, useful, etcetera. So, also 
imperative to consider here is what we value most, as shall be elaborated further ahead. 
Ortega said that "the world is doubtful, but my doubting is not," and as he further 
elaborated, "[...] diríamos que cuando dudo del mundo hay con absoluta realidad: yo dudando y 
el mundo dudificándome, inyectándose a presión su dudosidad, como entra el lubricante en el 
automóvil. [...] Diremos que cuando dudo hay: yo que dudo y el mundo embromándome."
180
 So 
truth and error are, in this sense, also anti-dualistic. In other words, one key way to move toward 
possibly discovering the truth for Ortega, or at least in part understanding where our notions of 
the truth come from for Dewey (as again the objective is to create a potential dialogue in an 
effort to hopefully better understand some of Ortega's philosophy in particular), is in interpreting 
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and concluding what are not truths. Ortega, in fact, says very directly that "[...] tenemos que 
llegar a la verdad por la duda [...]."
181
 And in another excerpt he adds to this that this anti-
dualistic reality of truth and falsity, in fact, is essentially what makes it possible for there to be 
something such as the 'truth;'  
[...] quien dice <<no hay verdad>>, <<dudo que poseamos verdad>> o como quiera que 
 esto sea expresado, piensa en la verdad y la distingue de la falsedad y no admite que esos 
 dos sentidos sean uno mismo. La verdad del principio de identidad es condición para que 
 la duda tenga sentido. Yo no puedo dudar mi duda si aquello de que dudo no es algo 
 idéntico a sí mismo y distinto de cuanto no es ese algo. [...] En rigor, la duda es imposible 
 sin la admisión de un mundo literalmente infinito de verdades.
182
 
In other words, the idea here is that any discussion on the truth, whether it be on what it 
could be or could not be; any evidence or doubt that might arise, still, nonetheless, creates some 
proposition as to the idea of the 'truth.' Gray explains this argument quite clearly in the following 
remarks: 
Taking issue with the skeptical position that we can have no certainty of the existence of 
 truth, Ortega argues that they very reference to "truth" – even in the assertion that we 
 cannot know whether or not it exists – implies a notion of what it is. Genuine doubt, as 
 distinguished from a complacent skepticism, is seen as a sign of the ongoing quest for  
 clarification. (Hence the appearance of "nodal problems" in the sciences is a healthy 
 sign.) The possibility of doubt arises from our belief "in a realm containing literally an 
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 infinite number of truths," namely, a world in which each individual person's perception 
 makes that claim that things are as he believes them to be. [...] Truth itself, Ortega argues, 
 is not relativistic, although that portion of reality which each person is able to illuminate 
 with his focus of attention is necessarily so [...].
183
 
Note how we can envision a dialogue here with Dewey in claiming that Ortega thought 
that "each individual person's perception makes that claim that things are as he believes them to 
be" because they are what we experience them to be; our experience of something is via our 
perspective—this an example of the conversation we can imagine. 
Dewey proclaimed that "[...] not error but truth is the exception."
184
 Dewey's emphasis is 
on our notions of the truth being a result of experiment; "truth" is an outcome of inquiry that is 
experimentally explored. Hence, as aforementioned in the explanation provided from Hook, 
'things' are true or false depending on how we deem them to be true or false per the 
consequences they create, again per instrumentalist Deweyan thought. And because there are as 
many interpretations as there are consequences, there are equally that many resultant notions of 
the "truth," which is, therefore, the exception. While Ortega may not generally emphasize the 
consequential (instrumentalist) notion in all this, he does similarly aver that "[...] la verdad de las 
ideas se alimenta de su cuestionabilidad."
185
 So again most fundamentally what we can see here 
in regards to how these two philosophers might correspond in dialogue is in the position that our 
notions of the truth rely very much on our notions of the non-truth, and one key is questioning 
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both essentially, in a general sense. Hence again anti-dualism in another sense; the truth is also 
discovered and understood via the non-truth. This, in fact, is a particularly clear example of anti-
dualism because it unites two opposites as one, because one "opposite" cannot be defined and 
therefore understood without its other "opposite," though they must still also be separate things 
to be "opposites" (i.e. "separate but united interdependently anti-dualism"). To apply the example 
of the truth here, what is considered the "truth" cannot be understood without a defining feature 
being what it is not/what is not the truth, but they are of course separate concepts that must exist 
interdependently, or anti-dualistically, because one cannot exist without the other, which is how 
they are united. But they are still separate concepts.  
For both philosophers, therefore, what is also important is the application, and possible 
applications (the concept of "application" being quite pragmatist indeed), of the truth. As Hook 
explains in regards to Dewey, "[...] una idea es verdadera si, como resultado de llevarla a cabo—
como resultado de un experimento—somos capaces de verificar ciertas consecuencias 
especificables que se siguen de creer en ella."
186
 However, while for Dewey these relevancies 
have to do with how they are experimentally applied in terms of 'confirming consequences in the 
future,' Ortega emphasizes more so that this is more about the value and worth we attach to these 
applications, either as individuals, or as a group, or depending (especially) on the historical 
epoch, etcetera. Specifically for Ortega, this emphasis on 'value and worth', or the part of this 
anti-dualistic interpretation which is 'that which we think is the truth' is rooted in creencias 
(beliefs).  
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The difference between ideas y creencias (ideas and beliefs) in Ortega's philosophy is 
central to much of his thought. Tersely explained, for Ortega we have ideas and we are our 
beliefs. The two are related in that some ideas become beliefs, which can become so latent within 
us that we are not always even aware of them; they simply become part of us. To return to and 
use a very simple example of Ortega's, we do not think about nor question that there are walls 
that enclose us in a room.
187
 When we are inside a room or building, we are 'latently' convinced 
that there are walls that surround us – it is a belief. And between these beliefs that we have there 
are some that become the 'truth' for us, as Ortega explains, because humanity 
[...] tiene que inventar el mundo. La mayor porción de él la ha heredado de sus mayores y 
 actúa en su vida como sistema de creencias firmes. Pero cada cual tiene que habérselas 
 por su cuenta con todo lo dudoso, con todo lo que es cuestión. A este fin ensaya figuras 
 imaginarias de mundos y de su posible conducta en ellos. Entre ellas, una le parece 
 idealmente más firme, y a eso llama verdad. Pero conste: lo verdadero, y  aun lo 
 científicamente verdadero, no es sino un caso particular de lo fantástico.
188
 
Ortega classifies truth as "fantasy" here because the truth is often just our beliefs, and he 
himself cites at the start of this excerpt, we must "invent" our worlds. We sometimes inherit 
beliefs, or truths. As we have seen in this specific point of truth being 'fantastical and invented by 
man' basically there would arguably be an imaginable dialogue with pragmatism because it 
denies not necessarily the existence of the truth but rather at least our inability to get to the truth. 
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Again thus why Dewey does not use the term truth and instead uses "warranted assertibility" in 
much the same way that Ortega essentially refers to "beliefs" instead of truths. 
In some recently recovered texts of Dewey's there is a concept of beliefs that can 
converse with that of Ortega's, as apparent in the following excerpt: "His beliefs are social 
beliefs; they are of import because of this fact. Moreover, beliefs are serially as well as 
contemporaneously told and shared. They become traditions, and there are no traces of any form 
of mankind so primitive as not to reveal him possessed of traditions."
189
 And for Dewey, the 
experiences, of course, are what create and shape these beliefs; "The experiences which lay 
deepest hold upon one, to use common parlance, are those that most deeply affect organic 
factors-attitudes, dispositions, habits-upon which formation of subsequent situations depends."
190
 
So our experiences, or our histories really, can create beliefs that become traditions, and which 
become a part of us essentially in the form of attitudes, habits, dispositions, etc. and shape 
subsequent situations, or again subsequent histories. Beliefs, as so much here, are also historical. 
And beliefs are a type of truth. 
But in this emphasis on our beliefs being our 'truths' for Ortega we also find an important 
difference that must be noted from Dewey. For Dewey, there is something more 
"experimentable" in this, in the sense of their being manifest in our lives specifically (but not in 
terms of their "veracity"), than for Ortega. For Dewey truths are, as aforementioned, 
"experimentally determined as the outcome of inquiry," whereas for Ortega it is more about the 
value we place on a truth, albeit latently, that is simply generally a belief of ours. This is why for 
Ortega "[...] la posesión de la verdad, es, como la posesión de Dios, un acontecimiento que no ha 
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acontecido ni puede acontecer en <<esta vida>>."
191
 This example serves well here since God 
cannot be proven or disproven experimentally, but this does not take away from it being a 
truthful belief for the religious. As Ortega says in direct critique of pragmatist thought,  
El error del pragmatismo no radica en que considere las ideas como instrumentos, sino en 
 que quiera reducir las cosas con que el hombre tiene que habérselas a lo perceptible y 
 experimentable, lo que está a la mano y presente, el mineral, la planta, el animal y la 
 estrella. […] Si así fuese, la vida resultaría faena fácil, tal vez resuelta con cierta plenitud 
 hace milenios.”192  
Again his example of God as truth is certainly a good one to back up his case, since God 
cannot be proven to exist or to not exist, but that ultimately does not matter in his argument 
because some people either believe so completely in God or do not that it does not matter for him 
or her if their "truth," whichever it may be, can be proven. Those who are religious believe in 
God, period, and atheists do not, period. It is like his perspectivism; it is not that one truth is true 
or false, there are multiple truths and falsities and the one certain falsity is to say that there is 
only one truth just like the falsity of saying that there is only one perspective—but then again 
couldn't one say this was one "truth" in and of itself, or one falsity in and of itself? Perhaps that 
is a topic for another dissertation, as both Ortega and pragmatists would likely dialogue in 
response saying that what matters ultimately is what we each individually thinks matters, to 
phrase it generally. What matters ultimately is how each one of us answers that question and 
believes that answer to be.  
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Further, since for Ortega beliefs are not conscious (we are not conscious of them until 
they are challenged), we essentially install ourselves in them, and they become sub-conscious. 
They must go through a process of transformation from ideas and subsequently remain as beliefs 
without any challenge to them, so they exist along a continuum. This is also something that 
makes them 'historical' in part as something temporal. If there is some kind of crisis that brings 
the belief (or beliefs) to the surface by putting it into question, or when it no longer serves us or 
matches our realities, for example, we become conscious of it. But until then, so long as they are 
not challenged, they continue to exist as such. A pragmatist dialogue here would probably add 
that they must be continuously verified and corroborated as such, experimentally, and perhaps 
Ortega would agree, but this is not something he specifically mentions (maybe simply by 
omission), focusing instead on how a crisis plays a key role in making a belief most known. But 
the argument could also be made that the omission of a challenge is one form of a corroboration 
perhaps for the pragmatist. Meaning, something can be tested not only in finding evidence and 
proof as to it being 'valid' and proving it, but also the lack of finding evidence and proof to 
disprove and invalidate something is also important—similar to the example of not being able to 
prove or disprove the existence of God (which does not matter because what matters is what the 
individual believes—this is pure "Ortegian perspectivism"). This, too, is perhaps a topic for 
another dissertation. But as another specific point of possible dialogue with pragmatism here for 
this thesis's purpose, when there is a rupture in that continuum it must be fixed and continuity 
must be restored. And Ortega would add such as with another new or refined belief, but again 
specifically a dialogue could be found in a shared view of needing to see this as a continuum. 
This is a topic that will be explored further in the section on 'how we think' but that needed to be 
noted here briefly. 
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For Ortega, since the truth can come in the form of our beliefs, we are not necessarily 
always even aware of them, as they can be latently present and part of us, whereas for Dewey 
(and true to the pragmatist view) we generally test them directly, consciously. So Ortega appears 
to differ here in that experimentation is not always an option. Moreover, Ortega appeared to 
argue against the pragmatist idea of the truth that, as he avers, the essence is found in how it is 
'useful' (once again his distinction in not being as instrumentalist as Dewey). "[...] esa filosofía 
pragmatista que descubre la esencia de la verdad, de lo teórico por excelencia, el lo práctico, en 
lo útil," writes Ortega, then adding, "[...] cuando se trate de buscar lo verdadero tenderemos a 
confundirlo con lo útil. Y esto, hacer de la utilidad la verdad, es la definición de la mentira."
193
 
But, as concisely argued by Graham in reference to Ortega's views, there was one sense in which 
he was, nonetheless, a bit instrumentalist; "In one way or another, he always upheld truth and 
right as absolutes per se, even though they were thus unattainable by human effort or experience. 
Still, he too was committed to the utility and practicability of truths and rights relative to life."
194
 
As discussed, per Ortega our beliefs are considered valid during the time in which they permit us 
to, in a sense, install ourselves into reality because they match that reality or the perspective we 
have of that reality. And when this ceases to be the case; when our beliefs no longer match up 
properly with reality and thus rise to the latent surface to be judged, this arguably gives Ortega's 
concept of "beliefs," or "truths" (since for him some "beliefs" can become our "truths") a sense 
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of "utility" and "functionality;" meaning, how much exactly that they match our realities. In 
other words, perhaps Ortega's aforementioned critique of pragmatism was the result of too 
narrowed an interpretation of the pragmatist use of the term "useful," when really in pragmatism 
it is meant to be applied in a broader sense; it is not meant to be just practical, to reference the 
term used in Ortega's critique, as it is also meant to be broadly simply used or "applicable." 
Taking this into account we thus can argue another point of possible dialogue with pragmatism. 
Moreover, in regards to Ortega's view that it is specifically a crisis situation that arises to call a 
belief into question and brings it to the latent surface, arguing that new ideas are thus resultantly 
formulated (and some of which would eventually convert to new beliefs or "truths"), would 
dialogue with the following interpretation of Dewey's definition and version of 
"instrumentalism:" "Dewey called his pragmatism by the name of "instrumentalism" to signify 
the purposive use of ideas as instruments for reconstruction of an unsatisfactory situation"
195
 
Moreover, as cited previously, for Dewey there are essentially as many interpretations of 
any possible truths as there are consequences that appear to validate any notions of the truth 
(since this is more about direct inquiry and experiment), whereas for Ortega in a sense there are 
as many truths as there are circumstances that influence the beliefs that define us, that make us, 
and that lead to "truths" via as many perspectives as we have. Again we each have and are a 
perspective, which is what gives us our knowledge, and no one perspective is absolute, true, or 
false, as they all provide an infinite number of windows to reality, truth. And since there are so 
many possible 'truths,' therefore, this is why we can never really be sure of them, which is one 
area in which these two philosophers do coincide in that we cannot really say with absolute 
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certainty what is a truth strictly in and of itself. As Hook concisely explains in regards to 
Dewey's philosophy; "[...] las consecuencias de cualquier juicio son infinitas, en tanto que las 
consecuencias que pueden ser actualmente verificadas son finitas, de modo que de ningún  juicio 
podría afirmarse su verdad."
196
 Hence, we can say, nonetheless, that for both philosophers (any 
ideas of) 'truths' cannot be "absolute," but they are certainly more than just opinions. In Dewey's 
philosophy, given the experimentation involved, and the study of their consequences and any 
possible patterns that might verify a notion of a truth, they may not be total and complete, but 
they are more than estimation and guess.
197
 Again we must note the possible dialogue in Dewey's 
insistence on a community of investigators with Ortega's emphasis on gathering as many 
perspectives as possible to get closer, though never right on target, to accuracy and precision. 
Both Dewey and Ortega seem to also concur that man longs for the truth, no matter how 
it may possibly be (tentatively) reached. Dewey writes, 
Its plaintive recognition of our experience as finite and temporal, as full of error, conflict 
 and contradiction, is an acknowledgment of the precarious uncertainty of the objects and 
 connections that constitute nature as it emerges in history. Human experience however 
 has also the pathetic longing for truth, beauty and order. There is more than longing: 
 there are moments of achievement.
198
 
It must also be noted here Dewey's similar emphasis on the historical quality in all this, 
once again, highlighting the central argument in all this that we are our history because our 
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history contains and is our nature. Again, given the imaginable dialogue here that it is next to 
impossible to 'truly prove the veracity of a truth' (an over-emphasis is warranted here), there is 
also a similar relational dialogue we can imagine between the two philosophers in terms of there 
also needing to be an anti-dualistic reading of truth and error. 
As mentioned, truth cannot be (tentatively) stated without its 'error.' So again perhaps this 
direction is taken by both philosophers because since it is so difficult, if even possible, to truly 
know what the truth is, perhaps we should at times focus, in part, on what is not the truth. As 
cited, Ortega proclaimed that "la verdad de las ideas se alimenta de su cuestionabilidad." And 
this is all because perhaps, again, what they are both insinuating here is that what is important is 
to ponder the application of our 'ideas of the truth' more so than trying to truly discover any 
truths. As Dewey similarly proclaimed, "Timeless laws, taken by themselves, like all universals, 
express dialectic intent, not any matter of fact existence. But their ultimate implication is 
application; they are methods, and when applied as methods they regulate the precarious flow of 
unique situations."
199
 Again this is also because of the inherent anti-dualism here in that the truth 
cannot be understood without the non-truth, and vice versa, being thus separate but connected 
interdependently in our complete understanding. 
Even more fundamentally, for Dewey and Ortega the constructions we build of our 
notions of the truth relate to their philosophies of general metaphysics, and their views on the 
concepts of "reality" and "what is real," most fundamentally because essentially our reality is our 
truth in their views. John T. Graham, in his book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y 
Gasset, dedicates an entire chapter to elaborating on the ways in which his "metaphysics was 
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pragmatist" but he does reference how in his view it is more of a Jamesian metaphysics rather 
than a Deweyan perspective, something therefore explored in detail in the second part of this 
dissertation.
200
 
To see how this relates to "reality," in Ortega's meditations one definition of the "truth" is 
that it is the inquiry into reality.
201
 Similarly Dewey posited that "the truth and the realness of 
things are synonymous."
202
 Here both appear to converse smoothly, as Ortega also posited that 
the two are synonymous in that they are both rooted in our 'beliefs.' Ortega declared that truth is 
picking between beliefs; "Esa necesidad, ese haber menester o menesterosidad de decidir entre 
dos creencias, es lo que llamamos <<verdad>>," and then he adds, "[...] la realidad, plena y 
auténtica realidad, no es sino aquello en que creemos, y nunca aquello que pensamos."
203
 What 
we believe and what we think are distinguished in that for Ortega some of our beliefs become 
our "truths" as they become part of us, literally. For Ortega, the difference between believing and 
thinking is essentially that the former can occur without the other; a belief is something that is a 
latent part of us, so that we do not always think about consciously. We think about ideas, for 
example. "Creencias son todas aquellas cosas con que absolutamente contamos aunque no 
pensemos en ellas. [...] automáticamente nos comportamos teniéndolas en cuenta."
204
 So there is 
something automatic and basically mechanical for Ortega in how we believe. We count on our 
beliefs in a way that is so integral to our beings that we do not generally question them, nor are 
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we even aware of them (except under specific crisis circumstances that may arise and bring the 
beliefs into question). Further, Ortega explains that as opposed to ideas, in which there is an 
"impassable distance" between the real and the imaginary, with beliefs we are "inseparably 
united" which is why he argues that we are our beliefs. 
And how, exactly, for Ortega then do some beliefs turn into truths? To answer this we 
must keep in mind the historical nature of everything for Ortega. In his philosophy, the "firmest 
beliefs" are the ones that become "truths." He writes, "Entre ellas [creencias/beliefs] una le 
parece idealmente más firme, y a eso llama verdad." And he goes on to recognize that, 
nonetheless, we cannot confirm the "true veracity of a truth" essentially, being yet another point 
of possible dialogue with pragmatism; "Pero conste: lo verdadero, y aun lo científicamente 
verdadero, no es sino un caso particular de lo fantástico."
205
 And so next we must ask, which are 
the "firmest;" what makes a belief "firm"? The answer to this is that which is consistently "firm" 
without question in our daily lives throughout a period of time; history (or at least until a crisis 
occurs to bring it into question). This is part of the reason why Ortega says that most beliefs have 
been inherited.
206
 And by "firm" we can assume 'firmly matching our reality.' Ortega writes, "Tal 
es la firme creencia en que estamos y por eso nos es la realidad, y porque nos es la realidad 
contamos con ello sin más, no nos hacemos cuestión del asunto en nuestra vida cotidiana."
207
 
This point of a firm belief becoming a truth via a consistent and progressive corroboration in the 
past can dialogue with pragmatism, even if it focuses on just the past - but that is just for 
understanding that "firm belief," or truth, today, and how it came to be our current belief, as what 
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is not to say that this process does not simply continue into the future, thereby dialoguing even 
more smoothly than it appears at first glance with pragmatism?   
And Ortega further includes that "sus creencias no son la única realidad."
208
 So 
essentially, again, Ortega and Dewey both posit that reality is mainly generally what we 
experience it to be, just as with the truth. For Ortega, "reality" is what we call "world," and 
"world" is interpretations of circumstances. Ortega posits that "la realidad o el ser consiste en las 
cosas y su conjunto que llamamos mundo. [...] mundo, como interpretación de la circunstancia, 
como sistema de nuestras convicciones. [...] lo que verdaderamente hay, la realidad, lo que es: es 
el Mundo."
209
 We simply experience something to be real, which is not to say that there is 
necessarily any "proof," per se, that it is "real." As Dewey posits relatedly, "The world as we 
experience it is a real world. But it is not in its primary phases a world that is known, a world 
that is understood, and is intellectually coherent and secure."
210
 Dewey writes, "Reality is what it 
is for the conscious knower" and "reality is how we experience it;" hence, as we have seen, 
"meanings can be infinitely combined" for Dewey in regards to what we conclude is real, or what 
we conclude is reality.
211
  
When Ortega proclaimed that "the will is real, but the willed is not," here perhaps we can 
also add, as with the truth, 'reality is not real, but our vision of reality is real,' for example. And 
this is because the ultimate, "radical reality" is that of each individual per Ortega's thought, so it 
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is not that there is no reality, rather there are "too many realities" for there to only be one 
absolute reality.
212
 They are all true for the individual; the individual perspective—this follows 
the same logic as with Ortega's perspectivism. 
As in the aforementioned quote of his, Ortega proclaimed synonymously that "Lo fingido 
no es real; es decir, lo que hay de real en lo fingido es el acto que lo finge."
213
 So Ortega posits, 
as does Dewey, that there are essentially infinite manifestations of visions in this; "[...] la 
realidad, como un paisaje, tiene infinitas perspectivas, todas ellas igualmente verídicas y 
auténticas. La sola perspectiva falsa es esa que pretende ser la única."
214
 So, this must be 
repeated: for both philosophers, we essentially make our own reality (but again it must be noted 
here that this does not imply pure idealism on the part of either philosopher, as we make our own 
reality, but within limitations surrounding us; i.e., our 'environment' broadly speaking, or in 
Ortega's terms, our 'circumstances'). As Graham argues, Ortega "[...] agreed 'for a moment' to 
'become a pragmatist' by admitting that the will creates its object via conceptualization as an 
'instrument.' In fact, he had soon quietly accepted a version of that idea, and he became a 
'pragmatist' for good."
215
 Of course here Graham goes as far as to categorize Ortega as a 
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"pragmatist," which is not the intention of this paper, but it is used as support for this thesis's 
goal to at least imagine a dialogue with pragmatisms. 
But as with the truth, there are the same key differences between Ortega and Dewey in 
the roots of these metaphysics. Ortega writes, "Realidad es precisamente aquello con que 
contamos, queramos o no."
216
 In other words, our beliefs make up our reality, as we can see here, 
because of Ortega's specific use of the term "count on," which is what he consistently uses to 
describe beliefs; that we simply count on them because they are us."
217
 And Ortega elaborated,  
Conste, pues, que lo que solemos llamar mundo real o <<exterior>> no es la nuda, 
 auténtica y primaria realidad con que el hombre se encuentra, sino que es ya una 
 interpretación dada por él a esa realidad, por tanto, una idea. Esta idea se ha consolidado 
 en creencia.  Creer en una idea significa creer que es la realidad, por tanto, dejar de verla 
 como mera idea.
218
 
Thus, while for Ortega reality, as with the truth, is more about our creencias (beliefs), of 
which we are unaware since they are latently part of us, for Dewey the emphasis here is more on 
simply what we experience, consciously or unconsciously. A significant influence for Ortega on 
our interpretations of what is real and what is reality have to do with the circumstances we find 
ourselves in (again "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" needs to be remembered here). Dewey, of 
course, is more pragmatist in this, and a significant influence for Dewey here is in regards to how 
our interpretations of what is real and what is reality rest primarily upon how they are 'useful,' or 
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in how they are "instrumental," such as in regards to consequences (as his pragmatist reliance 
upon instrumentalism has been noted on several occasions). But Ortega appeared to also argue at 
times in this regard as to how some reality or some thing's usefulness played an important role in 
this. As Graham argues, "[...] Ortega had extended his search for life-reality beyond metaphysics 
even into a metahistory that was meant to be pragmatically 'useful' for life and for the human 
sciences."
219
 This relates to the aforementioned explanation of how certain beliefs are firm 
enough to become "truths," as they are consistently corroborated over time, or history, to be as 
such, which gives even Ortega's "truths" a certain type of "utility;" that of "firmness." So again 
this importance of a process is still a point of possible dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism. 
Where we can further arguably envision a dialogue, again, is in how we need to still read 
these metaphysical issues anti-dualistically. Meaning, there is what is (potentially) real, and then 
there is what we think is real, and again we cannot necessarily know if they ever coincide. While 
these are two separate concepts, one cannot, nevertheless, exist without the other, as 
demonstrated to be the case with the truth. Hence, both agree, most fundamentally, that the 
subject of reality is human life. Our reality, therefore, is our truth. But again, none of this can be 
understood, validated, proven with complete certainty. In a very general sense, all that we have is 
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what we think we have. We cannot really know reality or what is real. As Hook explains in 
reference to Deweyan philosophy on, for example, 'an imagined totality,' such as the universe, 
"Nunca podemos alcanzar esa totalidad de existencias y posibilidades completa y global que 
muchos metafísicos han considerado el sujeto de juicios verdaderos o falsos."
220
 Similarly, as has 
been noted, Ortega postulates that one person's beliefs are not the only reality, and that there are 
many realities. Nonetheless, again Ortega's emphasis is that it is the individual perspective that 
we can understand best.
221
  
La realidad, precisamente por serlo y hallarse fuera de nuestras mentes individuales, sólo 
 puede llegar a éstas multiplicándose en mil caras o haces. [...] Pero la realidad no puede 
 ser mirada sino desde el punto de vista que cada cual ocupa [...] La realidad, pues, se 
 ofrece en perspectivas individuales.
222
 
This is, in fact, the same idea of Ortega's that 'man has no nature, what he has is history,' 
in that it is not that we do not have a nature, per se; there is our nature, and then there is what we 
think is our nature, and again we cannot know if they coincide–again the anti-dualistic reading 
must be emphasized. But as we have seen, for Ortega what we think is our truth, or our reality, or 
in this case our nature, depends in part on our circumstances, and specifically our history in a 
very general sense of the word; our families, our historical epochs, our nations, our cultures, 
etcetera. We cannot know when in general beliefs really do truly coincide with "truth," not to 
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mention that these are all "historical." As Ortega posits, "La realidad auténtica [...] es puro 
enigma."
223
 And as he explains in more detail, 
Para topar con esta realidad auténtica en su efectiva desnudez fuera preciso quitar de 
 sobre ella todas esas creencias de ahora y de otros tiempos, todas esas teorías, las cuales 
 son no más que interpretaciones ideadas por el hombre de lo que al vivir encuentra, en sí 
 mismo y en su contorno.
224
 
Because we can really only say that truth and reality are simply what we think they are, 
we can similarly also only say that nature is what we think it is; "No tenemos más remedio que 
decir, por ejemplo: el ser del hombre consiste en no-ser, en la falta o hueco de ser; o bien, la 
naturaleza humana esta constituida por no tener una naturaleza o consistencia fija."
225
 Whether 
we are referring to the different ideas here of circumstances in Ortega's case, or consequences in 
Dewey's perspective, the related point in all this is that there are simply too many possible 
interpretations and combinations of interpretations, so we really cannot be completely certain of 
the truth, reality, nature, etcetera. 
Hence Ortega's emphasis and reliance on history as the one thing that we do have to 
understand these concepts of the truth, reality, human nature; we can really only begin to 
contemplate all this by reviewing all that we have thought is truth, reality, human nature 
throughout history, rather, more so, than any of these in and of themselves. In order to study 
what could be possibly true, real, human nature, we need to look back upon history, because 
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history has defined what these are in our minds; our interpretations of these have changed and 
therefore have depended on the moment in time in which their interpretations were formulated. 
As Gray supports, "Touched by the apparent power of ideas in history, he proclaimed that things 
are more what our sensibility makes of them than what they may be in themselves."
226
 Hence, 
this is why we can say that in one sense what we can say we do have is reality, human nature, or 
truth for a specific historical period;  
Esto da a las verdades una doble condición sobremanera curiosa. Ellas por sí 
 preexisten eviternamente, sin alteración ni modificación. Sin embargo, su adquisición por 
 un sujeto real, sometido al tiempo, le proporciona un cariz histórico: surgen en una fecha 
 y tal vez se volatilizan en otra. Claro es que esta temporalidad no las afecta propiamente a 
 ellas, sino a su presencia en la mente humana.
227
  
Dewey similarly argues that, events, for example, historical events, also have a double 
meaning; 
 Events when once they are named lead an independent and double life. In addition to 
 their original existence, they are subject to ideal experimentation: their meanings may be 
 infinitely combined and re-arranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner 
 experimentation—which is thought—may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw 
 events.
228
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Truth, reality, nature—these cannot be understood fully, and even in an effort to gain a 
partial comprehension, for both Ortega and Dewey some thing cannot be fully some thing (albeit 
a truth, reality, human nature, etc.) unless we have some sort of experience with it; unless we 
create a 'history' with it, to connect a possible dialogue here (Ortega would be inclined here to 
use the word "history" and Dewey "experiences" or "interactions," though in this regard they are 
in part almost interchangeable). And the principal difficulty in this is the fact that these potential 
and possible experiences are numerous. As Ortega argues, "La verdad, lo real, el universo, la 
vida –como queráis llamarlos–, se quiebra en facetas innumerables [...]."229 But again we must 
remember this must all be contemplated in an anti-dualistic manner–again neither of these 
philosophers ever leans entirely either toward idealism (that some thing exists because we think 
it exists; because of our thought of existence), or realism (that some thing exists in and of itself), 
rather it is more so an anti-dualistic relationship between the two, as both describe truth, reality, 
human nature, to cite a few of the key metaphysical themes explored here.
230
 
But again, per Ortega's meditations, it is not the truth, or reality, human nature, etcetera, 
that changes, but our interpretations of them that change, which is therefore significantly 
dependent on history. As he declared, "La historia es un largo panorama de brazos que empuñan 
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cada uno su verdad –y la verdad de uno lucha con la del otro."231 As in the aforementioned 
example of once believing the world to be flat versus round, this is as Ortega's refers to 
generally, an example of a "[...] verdad eterna que cada tiempo ha vivido."
232
 As elaborated, 
Hemos de representarnos las variaciones del pensar no como un cambio en la verdad de 
 ayer, que la convierta en error para hoy, sino como un cambio de orientación en el 
 hombre que le lleva a ver ante sí otras verdades distintas de las de ayer. No, pues, las 
 verdades, sino el hombre es el que cambia y porque cambia va corriendo la serie de 
 aquéllas, va seleccionando de ese orbe trasmundano a que antes aludimos las que le son 
 afines y cegándose para los demás. Noten ustedes que es éste el a priori fundamental de 
 la historia. ¿No es ésta la historia del hombre?
233
 
Therefore, here we find another part of history that can be studied: the changing concepts 
of the "truth" (or "reality," or "nature," etc.) in the past. As Ortega posits,  
[...] todas las épocas y todos los pueblos han gozado su congrua porción de verdad, y no 
 tiene sentido que pueblo ni época algunos pretendan oponerse a los demás, como si a 
 ellos solos les hubiese cabido en el reparto la verdad entera. Todos tiene su puesto 
 determinado en la serie histórica; ninguno puede aspirar a salirse de ella, porque esto 
 equivaldría a convertirse en un ente abstracto, con íntegra renuncia a la existencia.
234
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So again fundamentally it is the study of history that is a focus here, and why, in a 
general sense, this is so emphasized in Ortega's meditations, as in that which is central in this 
thesis; 'man has no nature, what he has is history.' History and the study of history is what we can 
rely on to simply see how we have understood concepts such as the truth and reality (but not in 
terms of necessarily reaching an understanding of them in and of themselves, per se, as Ortega 
simply emphasizes that what we can do is study how we have interpreted and understood 
them)—hence again another explanation for why 'man has no nature, what he has is history.' And 
Dewey appears to share this view as well that what we can study here is history; and specifically, 
what is useful here is history, per his comments in the following excerpt from Experience and 
Nature; "Just because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly known—
understood, intellectually realized—than are mathematical and physical objects.235 
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VIII. On How We Think 
 To proceed even more profoundly fundamental in all this we should also examine how 
both Ortega and Dewey view the process of 'how we think'. Dewey, in fact, wrote extensively on 
this subject, given he is well known for his philosophy on education. While Ortega did not focus 
as much as Dewey on this topic, we can still indeed find some important points of possible 
dialogue in their epistemological theories. And this is an important topic because in order to 
understand how we come to view and think of truth, reality, history, nature, etc., we need to also 
consider how our process of thinking and understanding perhaps functions in the first place. 
 What is thinking, what does it mean to think, and why do we think? As we shall see, in 
the answers to these questions by both philosophers we find more potential dialogue than 
differences. As with the other topics explored here, we must also consider the concept and 
process of thinking anti-dualistically. For both philosophers, essentially our 'being' and our 
'thinking' are anti-dualistic; while they are separate, one also cannot exist without the other. In 
the case of Ortega, as Ferrater Mora explains, "Descartes' principle Cogito ergo sum ('I think, 
therefore I am') must be replaced by a more basic principle: Cogito quia vivo ('I think, because I 
live')."
236
 Important here is again the idea that we are so often confronted by problems and 
doubts in life, as for Ortega life is essentially 'problematic,' so in these instances we need to 
'think' to search for solutions and ways out of dilemmas, all of this being said of course in a very 
general and plain sense. As Ortega posits, "La verdad es que no existo porque pienso, sino el 
contrario, pienso porque existo, porque la vida me plantea crudos problemas inexorables."
237
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 As we have seen, in Ortega's thought, we have ideas, and we are beliefs. Our beliefs and 
ideas are historical in that generations are somewhat defined and classified by their beliefs and 
ideas. Between epochs and as a result of crises, we must think; we must think specifically to 
create new ideas, and once these new ideas become consolidated and established, they become 
beliefs. This is also how we get out of periods of crisis. Beliefs are also emphasized in Dewey's 
philosophy, as he notes that "For all philosophy as reflection upon existing beliefs operates both 
destructively and constructively."
238
 Dewey used the term "shock" to describe a "crisis" in this 
same way of not necessarily literally "crisis," but moment of 'significant change.' And this leads 
to a possible dialogue with Ortega in the following excerpt from recently uncovered works of 
Dewey: "When groups having different traditional beliefs come into close intercourse with one 
another, there is a shock which makes belief an object of attentive observation."
239
  
 For Ortega, an idea is "truthful" when it functions, when it is functional, which indeed 
sounds quite instrumentalist per Deweyan leanings. Also similar is the need to create a continuity 
in experience per Dewey's thought, and the rhythm that Dewey also sees in experience being a 
constant dynamic of conflict and resolution. Perhaps the specific word choice is a bit different, 
but ultimately there is a possible dialogue here between Ortega and Dewey. For Ortega, "Crises" 
make one question their beliefs and look for new ideas to replace those now outdated and invalid 
beliefs; meaning, beliefs that are no longer applicable or useful in the world, in reality. For 
Dewey, thinking is a process of restoring continuity when its flow has been interrupted or 
hindered; when there has basically been a "crisis" in experience. As Blau interprets it, "Dewey 
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called his version of pragmatism by  the name of "instrumentalism" to signify the purposive use 
of ideas as instruments for reconstruction of an unsatisfactory situation'."
240
 
 Dewey argues that "[...] it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking 
is rather something that happens in us."
241
 In other words, thinking is not a natural process in 
terms of being spontaneous, according to both philosophers; rather, it is something more so that 
we develop in regards to its process. Dewey also posits that "Thinking is not a case of 
spontaneous combustion; it does not just occur on "general principles." There is something 
specific which occasions and evokes it" and that "[...] we learn to think well, but not to think."
242
 
Ortega also emphasized that thinking is something we can develop and strengthen; "ninguno 
[método de pensar] le es regalado [...] tiene que irlos inventando el hombre."
243
 Moreover, this 
notion of improving on processes of thinking is another example of a "nature" we are not born 
with, but again that rather we grow and reinforce—hence again why Ortega would argue that 
man has no nature but rather has history. Ortega declares,  
 Tal vez no hay injusticia mayor que atribuir a la <<naturaleza humana>>–
 <<naturaleza>> es el conjunto de lo que nos es regalado y que poseemos a nativitate–el 
 inmenso repertorio de procedimientos intelectuales que el pobre ente llamado 
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 <<hombre>> ha tenido que agenciarse con tenaz esfuerzo para intentar extraerse a sí 
 mismo del enigmático pozo en que cayó al existir.
244
 
 And a common reason we 'develop' this is, according to both philosophers, for functional 
reasons, which here is another instance in which we can make a bit of an instrumentalist 
connection from Dewey to Ortega (though, in this example, this is quite a given of course) – 
there is an 'end purpose' to our thinking; we think in order to try to understand. Ortega says that 
we think to "averiguar lo que las cosas son."
245
 And he continues, "Lo único que el hombre tiene 
siempre es la necesidad de pensar, porque más o menos está siempre en alguna duda."
246
 And of 
course there are times in which we think, therefore, to clear doubt and solve problems, generally 
speaking; "Pensamiento es cuanto hacemos –sea ello lo que sea– para salir de la duda en que 
hemos caído y llegar de nuevo a estar en lo cierto."
247
 So this is about reinstating beliefs when 
other beliefs fail by searching for new ideas that, by functioning or being useful, later become 
beliefs and allow us to install ourselves in reality anew, and the crisis(es) is (are) resolved. 
Further, as Ferrater Mora concisely explains in regards to the process of thinking to arrive at 
'reason;' "Ortega's repeated assertion that reason must always be conceived as something 
functional in human existence. Again thought is not something that man possesses and 
accordingly uses, but something that he painstakingly brings to existence because he needs it."
248
 
Once again we find this pragmatist notion of the "functional" as a point of possible exchange. 
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 As we know, a key aspect of Dewey's philosophy is instrumentalism (and one which we 
cannot usually tie so similarly to Ortega, but it seems to here in this specific example of the 
processes of thinking), so Dewey of course also argues that there is an 'end purpose' when we 
think; we think for functional reason(s), as he writes, "We think in order to grasp meaning."
249
 
But one difference here is that while Ortega emphasizes the need to 'clear doubt' and 'solve a 
problem,' for Dewey it is functional more so in the generalized sense that we can carry any 
knowledge possibly gained from thought into future experiences, because as we have seen, and 
will continue to see, much of Dewey's philosophy is pondered from the perspective of 
'experience,' whereas for Ortega much of his philosophy is pondered from the perspective of 
'history'  (though of course as we will also continue exploring, these two concepts are still points 
of possible dialogue, nonetheless, in both philosophers in many regards when they are almost 
synonymous). As we shall see throughout, Ortega is still, nonetheless, quite focused on the role 
of the 'future' in this specific example. Moreover, Ortega's thought here could converse in that 
thinking, for example, occurs when we ask about the nature of things, which leads to 
conocimiento, or knowledge, as we shall also continue to see, as one form of thought that is 
meant to give things a sort of meaning. Lasaga Medina provides an interesting argument on this; 
"[...] cuando lo que hacemos para orientarnos es preguntar por la naturaleza de las cosas, su 
resultado es conocimiento [...] El conocimiento es una de las formas del pensamiento, la forma 
de dar a las cosas un ser y una estabilidad o consistencia que ellas por sí mismas no tienen."
250
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
249
 Dewey, How We Think, p. 94. 
 
250
 Lasaga Medina, Ortega: Vida y filosofía, p. 175. 
 
 148 
 
 Dewey argues that we really understand something when we can carry it over to a new 
experience.
251
 There are important differences of course in Dewey's philosophy on thinking 
versus knowing. Early in his book How We Think, Dewey lays out the following basic definition 
of thinking as "that operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) in such a way 
as to induce belief in the latter upon the ground or warrant of the former."
252
 Thinking begins, as 
he explains, when we are confronted with a 'forked-road' situation—hence there being something 
specific and not spontaneous in thinking. Thinking, therefore, entails searching for and testing 
possible conclusions and solutions for example. So 'complete thinking' must involve concrete 
observations. Knowledge or lack thereof is thus what incites thinking, because knowledge is 
'peculiar combinations' as he says in regards to attempting to understand the meaning of objects 
and events, while looking at them as both parts and wholes. Thinking is the start of this path 
toward knowledge, but generally as we walk toward and reach more knowledge, we usually 
continue to find more forks in the road. As he adds, we do not think actively rather it happens in 
us. This is all, of course, a very brief discussion—Dewey's philosophy on thinking is quite 
complex and involves many different steps and forms in the processes between thinking and 
knowing. Here it is just touched upon as simply a partial piece of the larger imaginary dialogue 
being constructed. 
 As Scheffler interprets concisely, referring to a specific case of thinking, 
 [...] the essential ingredient in acquiring knowledge is the perception of relations, 
 especially the relations between our actions and their empirical consequences. [...] To 
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 achieve a grasp of relations, we require experience and the ability to store what is learned 
 from experiences.
253
  
 So as Scheffler proposes, we must 'do' in order to 'know' in Dewey's philosophy. Dewey's 
emphasis on "experience," and his stress on applying it to the future, is still "historical" in the 
sense that, as he writes, our sources for solutions in regards to how we carry that into the future 
are found in our past experience(s) and knowledge. As Hickman argues as well, knowledge is 
"[...] always embedded in ongoing historical processes."
254
 Moreover, Dewey argues that one 
kind of "thought" is belief, and some beliefs can "[...] [...] become traditionary. They give rise to 
doctrines which, inculcated and handed down, become dogmas."
255
 This indeed is another area 
of dialogue, therefore, with Ortega's defining characteristics of his use of the term "belief," as we 
have seen (i.e., as something latent within us, and quite the defining source of our 'truths,' 
'realities,' etcetera). In fact, as aforementioned, just the same Ortega theorizes that many beliefs 
are handed down and inherited, adding to their historical nature and character; "La mayor 
porción de él la he heredado de sus mayores y actúa en su vida como sistema de creencias 
firmes."
256
  Moreover, here we find the "historical" emphasis again in this. Furthermore, both 
philosophers appear to overlap in the sense that often in this form of thinking our objective is, as 
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Dewey avers, "[....] real or supposed knowledge going beyond what is directly present,"
257
 and 
similarly Ortega argues that "Pensar es descubrir lo oculto."
258
  
 One possible end to thinking is knowledge, of course, which is another topic that both 
philosophers appear to perhaps be able to dialogue on—but not all thinking ends in knowledge, 
as we can all agree. If thinking is for Ortega about the movement or attempt toward the inquiry 
into the being of things (not the things themselves), then knowledge is that inquiry, specifically. 
As Ortega concisely defines it, "Conocer es averiguación del ser de las cosas."
259
 And he 
continues, "[...] el conocimiento antes de empezar es ya una opinión perfectamente determinada 
sobre las cosas: la de que éstas tienen un ser. [...] es simplemente una creencia."
260
 Similarly, 
Dewey argues that, as with the process of thinking, "All knowledge, all science, thus aims to 
grasp the meaning of objects and events."
261
 And he continues, 
 We think in order to grasp meaning, but nonetheless every extension of knowledge makes 
 us aware of blind spots and opaque spots [...] Increase of the store of meanings makes us 
 conscious of new problems, while only through translation of the new perplexities do we 
 understand or solve these problems. This is the constant spiral movement of 
 knowledge.
262
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 So once again we can see here that we cannot necessarily always confirm that our 
knowledge is 'correct,' as Ortega insinuates that knowledge is primarily opinion, and Dewey 
suggests that it often leads us to see 'what we have yet to understand.'
263
 
 As we shall continue to see, this is all important as well for understanding the main topic 
here, the meaning and study of history, as a discipline of knowledge. Thinking, and the 
acquisition of knowledge, is yet again instrumental for Dewey; it is focused on consequences and 
it is forward looking. However, as is emphasized throughout, we cannot look forward to the 
future without also looking back to the past; i.e., history. As Campbell so concisely infers here,  
 The function of thinking is to contribute to a life that is forward-moving, carrying with it 
 all that matters from the experiences of the past and the present. We can never hope, 
 moreover, to leave these experiences behind. 'The finished and done with,' Dewey writes, 
 'is of import as affecting the future, not on its own account: in short, because it is not, 
 really, done with.' We are moving forward and carrying with us possibilities for 
 improving our future lives. One of these possibilities is intelligent action, a possibility 
 that reflective thought gives us for addressing our new situations. 'We do not merely have 
 to repeat the past, or wait for accidents to force change upon us. We use our past 
 experiences to construct new and better ones in the future.'
264
 
 This indeed could dialogue with Ortega's infamously quoted "Necesitamos de la historia 
íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella," which, it must be reminded, by 
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necessity has a future orientation to it because when else would we not "fall again" other than in 
the present and the future, more likely (since the present is really quite fleeting and becomes past 
as we say it, as been repeated), as he reminds us?
265
 
 Moreover, the process of acquiring knowledge itself is 'historical' more so than something 
'natural' in the traditional sense of the term, which is something both philosophers appear to 
correspondingly emphasize (hence again why the better term is to say that something has 
"history" rather than "nature"). Dewey writes,  
 We do not approach any problem with a wholly naïve or virgin mind; we approach it with 
 certain acquired habitual modes of understanding, with a certain store of previously 
 evolved meanings, or at least of experiences from which meanings may be educed. If the 
 circumstances are such that a habitual response is called directly into play, there is an 
 immediate grasp of meaning. If the habit is checked, and inhibited from easy application, 
 a possible meaning for the facts in question presents itself. No hard and fast rules decide 
 whether a meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to follow up. The 
 individual's own good (or bad) judgment is the guide.
266
  
 In other words, there is a 'historical inheritance' involved in the potential development, 
process, and acquisition of knowledge, though Dewey's emphasis here is more so on specifically 
social conditions, albeit established over time/in the past. Still, fundamentally knowledge is 
historical. Ortega of course is even more clearly explicit about the importance of 'history' in all 
this, as he writes, "El conocimiento no es una operación <<natural>> y, afuera de ello, 
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inexcusable del hombre, sino una <<forma de vida>> puramente histórica a que llegó –que 
inventó– en vista de ciertas experiencias y de que saldrá en vista de otras."267 But still, Dewey 
did directly declare that "[...] all knowledge is historic."
268
 So here again we find this common 
thread interlaced throughout this dissertation of the historicism that can possibly dialogue in 
pragmatism, and the pragmatism that can arguably converse with Ortega's work in this general 
imagined dialogue. 
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IX. The Process of Valuing 
 This anti-dualistic tendency for there to be two interconnected sides to concepts such as 
the truth, reality, history and nature, etcetera, can also be arguably applied, in part, to Ortega and 
Dewey's partially correlated concepts of "value" and the process of "valuing." This is because 
again something that we can actually study are the different values we have had (generally 
speaking) because this process is also "historical." Meaning, there may be or could be an inherent 
value to some thing, but what we can really only study somewhat directly is the value we place 
on that some thing. So again there may be a value to some thing, and then there is what we think 
is that value (which can change over the course of history), and we cannot necessarily always 
know if they coincide correctly. And this, as we shall see, is also fundamental to pondering 
history and the study of history, for it is in part through this process that we deem what is 
important to record and study in the first place.  
 For Ortega we cannot always discover true, inherent values of some thing, whereas for 
Dewey the process of valuing is again meant to be functional in that it will, in part, help us 
determine what type of society we want to shape and build in the future. 
 Ortega writes,  
 Una cosa no es, pues, un valor, sino que tiene valores, es valiosa. Y esos valores que en 
 las cosas residen son cualidades de tipo irreal. [...] Cada objeto goza, por tanto, de una 
 especie de doble existencia. Por una parte es una estructura de cualidades reales que 
 podemos percibir; por otra es una estructura de valores que sólo se presentan a nuestra 
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 capacidad de estimar. [...] A veces nos es perfectamente conocida una cosa en sus 
 elementos reales, y, sin embargo, somos ciegos para sus valores.
269
 
 For Ortega we cannot necessarily always really, truly know inherent values. Dewey 
correspondingly argued that "[...] to take into account the reason for liking and enjoyment 
concerns the cause of the existence of a value, and has nothing to do with the intrinsicalness or 
nature of the value-quality, which either does or does not exist."
270
 
 Describing how we feel about something is not necessarily the same, per Deweyan 
thought, as describing its value (or at least we cannot know for sure if it could be). Value, 
according to Dewey, is to judge the value of a feeling, which a 'feeling' he describes as a 'fact for 
the person who declared it.' Here we can see how Dewey can be a bit individualist, despite his 
frequent leaning toward general social influence. In other words, Dewey also describes this as 
the difference between, for example, "prizing" something and "appraising" something, 
respectively speaking. Once again here what he emphasizes is the instrumentalist aspect of 
judging the value of something based upon consequences, "to call an object a value is to assert 
that it satisfies or fulfills certain judgment," Dewey argued.
271
 
 To reiterate, perhaps what is most pertinent here and what we can envision Dewey and 
Ortega possibly dialoging on is to take into account more so what we consider to be "valuable" 
rather than what are truly a 'thing's values.' Our systems of value and considerations of what is 
valuable change throughout history, and so these changes, shifts, alterations, etcetera, perhaps 
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say more about the concept of values and the process of valuing than inherent qualities in and of 
themselves. And this is not to mention that this is indeed something we can study; these 
transitions over the time behind us. As Dewey metaphorically phrases it, "values are as unstable 
as the forms of clouds [...] The things that possess them are exposed to all the contingencies of 
existence, and they are indifferent to our likings and tastes."
272
 
 This is clearly what Dewey argues is of significance here; studying and critiquing these 
temporal movements of, in some instances, changing definitions and categories of values, as he 
declares, "[...] the important consideration and concern is not a theory of values but a theory of 
criticism; a method of discriminating among goods on the basis of the conditions of their 
appearance, and of their consequences."
273
 Of course being so very much his own type of 
pragmatist, Dewey emphasizes the instrumentalist aspect in all this; the importance of analyzing 
generally the repercussions in that the value of some thing generally resides in its 
consequences—again in this specifically he differs a bit from Ortega. 
 It must be noted again, however, the important critique here that any reliance on 
consequences must by necessity be forward-looking of course, which also resultantly means 
predictive. In other words, there is a need to at times therefore predict the future, which of course 
we cannot always do; we cannot always know if our predictions are going to be true. Therefore, 
essentially what we are talking about here are hypotheses. But Dewey does recognize of course 
that we can never know all consequences in advance, and as Campbell adds in argument to lend 
support to this idea, "To point this out, however, does not mean that we do not care about 
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potential ends. It means that [...] with a self-conscious method of inquiry we can uncover and 
foster the values necessary for living in the course of living."
274
 
 Ortega, not of course being a self-proclaimed type of pragmatist, may not accentuate the 
instrumentalist perspective here of effects and outcomes, but he does share that what we can 
study most directly is what we think are values; what we think is 'valuable,' rather than what 
really truly are values or what makes something valuable (logically). Ortega for example notes 
that we create over time pre-existing systems, structures, definitions, to cite a few examples, in 
regards to our processes of valuing that prejudice essentially this progression and development. 
Like so much else, values and valuing are historical. Even more importantly, as he argues, "Pero 
hay una razón más poderosa para convencernos de que nuestra visión de los valores es 
independiente de que los veamos o no en la realidad. Y es ésta: ningún valor se da en las cosas 
con pureza y plenitud."
275
 
 Thus not only is this all correlated at least in part, having an anti-dualistic tendency, with 
pragmatism (of course in the case of Dewey, but also in that of Ortega), once again, but it also 
relates to why we can most safely say that what we have, and what we are, is our history, rather 
than nature. But this must be said without disregarding of course again that there can be a nature. 
What is most tangible for study is the general evidence that we can find when we sift through the 
annals of history in our ever-changing views on all that surrounds us and all that we think and 
understand surrounds us; the value we place on some thing; our understanding of life, nature, and 
reality; what we consider to be the truth; etcetera. Our values and what we consider valuable are 
ever-changing, so what we can and should study (because it is what defines us best), is the 
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history of those changes—which are part of our histories in general. What we value to be 
important to record (of and in history) and study, in fact, in the philosophy here, can say more 
about ourselves individually, and humanity, human nature, than that which we are recording. 
Hence, once again, another reason why what we are is our histories. As we shall continue to see, 
indeed these notions can be understood to potentially dialogue in certain ways in both 
philosophers, though Dewey as we know is more inclined to use the term "experience" whereas 
Ortega uses more directly that of "history." 
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Section II: Antidualism in the Philosophy of History 
 Now that some basic philosophy has been elaborated in the fundamental parts to building 
a philosophy of history, the next step that will be explored here in this second section is the 
actual potential construction of this; in elaborating more specifically on its relation to human 
nature as history, its meaning, as well as how it can and should be studied. But again the focus 
here throughout is on how Dewey is just one possible source of many to imagine a dialogue with 
in regards to hopefully helping us better understand Ortega's meditations on history and human 
nature in an attempt specifically to further grasp the meaning behind his infamous declaration 
that "man has no nature, rather he has history." Here, therefore, again what we have is just a 
potential dialogue between the two thinkers. Some explanations and arguments will be repeated, 
but again with the focus narrowed on the philosophy of history. 
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X. Ortega and Dewey: History and Experience 
 As aforementioned, in Ortega's first book in 1914 he posited that the will is real, but the 
willed is not; “[…] la querencia es real, pero lo querido es irreal.”276 As we saw here Ortega is 
arguing generally that the will is real only for the individual doing the willing, but not 
necessarily for anyone else because neither the rationality nor the irrationality of a will can be 
demonstrated, at least most certainly not mathematically, scientifically, or logically. So a 
person’s will is neither true nor false; it is simply believed to be true for that individual, but not 
necessarily always, consistently so in the external, general ‘world.’ Perhaps it is agreed upon 
with some, and others not, but that is not what matters; what matters is what is in the mind of the 
individual. Hence, what is ‘real in the world’ is a person’s will, which has been constructed upon 
knowledge gained in the past, as Ortega argues that man becomes who he is through his past; 
through his experiences and his experiments, as elaborated in the following quote from 1941: 
“[…] va acumulando ser –el pasado—: se va haciendo un ser en la dialéctica de sus experiencias. 
Esta dialéctica no es de la razón lógica, sino precisamente de la histórica […].”277 So once again, 
man is his history. As Dewey also argues, "For life is no uniform uninterrupted march or flow it 
is a thing of histories, each with its own plot, its own inception and movement toward its close, 
each having its own particular rhythmic movement; each with its own unrepeated quality 
pervading it throughout."
278
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 It must be noted, however, that as we shall see, while Ortega links, generally speaking, 
our ‘understanding’ with essentially the individual as an artist of his own life, for Dewey this is 
applicable more so to his vision of the progress of science. Nonetheless, as noted, in this 
aforementioned quote from Ortega he specifically uses the term "experience" (which as we know 
is central in pragmatism), where he defines history in terms of a "dialectic" and by logic an 
accumulation also of "experiences." So what is important for Ortega is our will and how we see 
something, as well as how we experience something, which are certainly points in which he 
could dialogue with Dewey considering in both instances we can summarize this general notion 
by saying experience is what we experience it to be, just as will and the manifestation of our will 
is what we will it to be. 
 Further, Ortega’s emphasis on the general functional and practical aspects of knowledge 
gained from the past clearly dialogues with Dewey’s instrumentalist perspective on experience 
and even the study of history. As aforecited, Graham argues to the extreme that Ortega, “[…] 
agreed for a moment to “become a pragmatist” by admitting that the will creates its object via 
conceptualization as an “instrument.” In fact, he had soon quietly accepted a version of that idea, 
and he became a “pragmatist” for good.”279 Dewey argues that for something to be considered 
“an experience” (or part of a history), there must be something learned as a result (even if it does 
not necessarily end up being part of “knowledge” as he defines it). Just the same, the study of 
history is “instrumental,” or useful, when it yields practical applications for the future, as Dewey 
averred, “intelligent understanding of past history is to some extent a lever for moving the 
                                                          
279
 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 149. 
 
 165 
 
present into a certain kind of future.”280 This helps elucidate how it is possible to reconcile the 
use of the past with a focus on the future, being two opposite directions. As Blau concisely 
proposes on this;  
 How was it possible for Dewey to bring together in his philosophy both the genetic 
 thinker's historical concern for the past and the pragmatist's concern for the future? As 
 far as Dewey was concerned, there was no conflict at all between these two ways of 
 looking at our problems; they supplemented each other, instead of being at war.
281
 
Dewey’s definition of experience also dialogues with Ortega’s definition of history 
because of the aforementioned reference to essentially ‘indefinite’ possibilities in our potential 
interpretations of our experiences and their nature, as we saw in the following extract: 
"Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely 
elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference."
282
 So again key here is how we 
interpret and assign meaning to some thing, rather than any actual potential meaning, in and of 
itself, of an object or an event. Therefore, again, more than understanding nature in and of itself, 
what we can focus on instead is the interpretations and meanings we attach to nature. (What is 
important, again, is not whether they are right or wrong, but rather simply what we think they 
are; what those interpretations are; what we think is right or wrong; etcetera.) And this is because 
experience and history, as well as specifically what we decide they come to tell us about 
"nature," are endless processes of an infinitely possible number of combinations in conclusions. 
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Graham cites, while quoting Ortega,  
[...] we know that 'man has no nature,' but a history of 'variations' instead, for his 'being' 
 is becoming. 'Man who is not, goes on making himself in the dialectical series of his 
 experiences.' Therefore, because of his historicity, 'the only thing we can know of man is 
 what he has been.' 'The past constrains the future.'
283
  
While traditionally “nature” is meant to be understood as something fixed and biological, 
as such it would be understood as definite and closed (meaning, that there is only one true truth 
and reality to some thing when referencing its "nature"). But by considering it something 
“indefinite” in both Ortega and Dewey's thought in terms of our infinitely possible 
interpretations (i.e., we are our history, not our nature, because our nature is our history), this 
means that we have gone beyond just the predetermined or genetic connotation of the term 
“nature” and have included the endless possible ways in which we can attach meaning to 
"nature" depending on the individual, and of course on the “circumstances” in which they live (to 
borrow Ortega’s term for different albeit at times overlapping situations each individual finds 
him or herself in; i.e., “history”). And this is part of the reason why Ortega argued in 1941 that 
“Así se explica que el mundo sea para cada época, y aun para cada hombre, algo distinto.”284 As 
A. García concisely proposes, as further support here, “[…] en tanto soy historia es a la vez la 
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experiencia vital siempre en proceso que se va haciendo a sí misma […].”285 In other words, 
better we should simply use the term "history" instead of nature.  
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XI. Ortega and Dewey: Circumstances and Historical Products 
Ortega’s emphasis on the importance of one’s unique “circumstances,”  from his 
renowned "yo y mi circunstancia," which are in part “historical,” can dialogue with Dewey’s 
philosophy.
286
  Per Deweyan thought, the problems we encounter, and the resources that we have 
to address them and everything else in life, can only be understood in their historical context, or 
as “historical products." As J.E. Tiles clarifies, another expert on Dewey, “Problems do not arise 
in isolation but in historical contexts, and one must grasp the relevant features of the context to 
meet them.”287 And as Ortega similarly posits, “Pero la experiencia de la vida no se compone 
sólo de las experiencias que yo personalmente he hecho, de mi pasado. Va integrada también por 
el pasado de los antepasados que la sociedad en que vivo me transmite.”288 So history is not just 
our personal history, but also the history that surrounds us and the history that comes before us—
this is further example of the social part of our realities, and the importance of the circumstances 
that surround us. As Gray supports,  
Like Benedetto Croce and R.G. Collingwood on the Continent and Charles A. Beard, 
 Carl Becker, and John Dewey in the United States, he emphasized that history was 
 written from the present to account for one's current situation in its dimension of 
 temporal depth. More, that depth, achieved through a historico-logical connection with all 
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 that man had been, was the only one available to modern men, who could no longer 
 invoke a timeless "essence" or "soul" bestowed upon them from above.
289
 
Moreover, perhaps here we can also imagine part of a dialogue in Ortega’s use of the 
term “circunstancia” for Dewey’s “historical career,” or essentially the accumulation of 
historical products, which the latter is defined as “a series of interactions whose uniqueness 
consists of the way in which the individual responds to encountered conditions.”290 For Dewey, 
history is very much cultural and social. As Grigoriev also posits, quoting Dewey on this,  
To see ourselves as human, according to Dewey, is to see ourselves as part of history; for 
 without a sense of history in which we are caught up even at this very moment, social 
 phenomena, on Dewey's view, lose "the qualities that make [them] distinctly social." The 
 historical dimension of human life, then, is irreducible.
291
 
While Ortega defines the state of being of individuals as “yo y mi circunstancia” as a 
“drama,” Dewey describes human experience similarly, albeit as a “movie.” As Tiles explains, 
“We are invited to think of human experience as unfolding before each individual in his or her 
private cinema, where any involvement in the (ongoing) scripting of the plot or design of the set 
is wholly irrelevant to that experience.”292 So we are simultaneously both actors and spectators in 
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our own narratives in Dewey’s argument.293 History, which is on a fundamental level the study 
of humanity, is also similarly compared to cinematography in Ortega’s writings; “La historia, en 
efecto, es, en una de sus dimensiones, cinematografía. […] cambia en cada generación y aunque 
cada uno de ellos sea quieto, como lo es cada fotografía de la película, su sucesión da un 
movimiento.”294 
To return to Dewey’s concept of “experience,” as aforementioned, this cannot exist alone 
because it cannot not have meaning alone, in and of itself without examination. We experience 
an experience, because we must directly experience and then interpret that experience for it to 
have a meaning (in other words, while it is possible that an experience may have a meaning in 
and of itself, it is only after we have an experience with it; with that experience, that we can 
propose what we think is that meaning, and we can never really prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
what that meaning really, truly is—just what we think it is). As he said, “The fact that something 
is an occurrence does not decide what kind of an occurrence it is; that can be found out only by 
examination.”295 This is because, again, as basic to Dewey's early philosophy, “[…] it is only the 
occurrence that is explained, not the thing itself.”296 So this is also why Dewey emphasizes the 
empirical method as a way to truly shed light on any fundamental characteristics of “experience” 
when investigating our experience of experience.
297
 And this is again why we are simultaneously 
actors in and spectators of our lives. As experiences can also be understood as “historical 
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products” for Dewey, a dialogue can be imagined here with Ortega, since for the latter 
everything is historical. If experiences are historical products, then also the study of history is the 
study of experiences. Part of our empirical method is a study of the past as we form our 
meanings of nature. So this interpretation provides a way to not just understand history 
(experiences), but also how to study it (via our experiences). Meaning, part of what the study of 
history reveals is how we have experienced experience(s) in the past. The study of history does 
not reveal the nature of an experience in and of itself, rather it exposes what we think was that 
nature of that experience(s). 
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XII. Related Controversies 
Upon the first reads of Dewey's definitions of experience and nature they appear 
contradictory, as he seemingly posits, albeit rarely, that there is also something “biological” 
present, which would imply something fixed and predestined.
298
 And as we shall see, this is 
similarly polemical with Ortega. For example, in his 1925 book Experience and Nature, Dewey 
states, “In mathematics some variables are constants in some problems; so it is in nature and 
life.”299 Yet he also seemingly contradictorily avers later that “nothing in nature is exclusively 
final.”300 So in truth Dewey’s ideas of nature and experience are not meant to be purely genetic, 
or more generally, completely deterministic in any way. Rather, it can be said more broadly that 
there are some rhythms in human nature that become manifest in human history, but as we shall 
see they are perhaps best understood as very general ones—we can find some trends of trends, 
but in sum life itself is not entirely predetermined as in the genetic, or religious, sense of the 
word because in genetics and religion we find at least the belief of absolutes.
301
We cannot prove 
or disprove that 'things' are fixed or invariable, but this is not what matters, because what is key 
is what we think of as fixed or not fixed. To use Ortega's key word, what is important is our 
perspective. And that perspective can interpret that something is fixed, invariable, logical, but 
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this is only truly true for the individual(s) that hold that perspective, and it does not make it true 
always, absolutely, as well as in and of itself.  
As Rabade proposes in the case of Ortega, <<lo histórico tiene su peculiar naturaleza y, 
por lo mismo, su peculiar lógica. La realidad histórica tiene su anatomía propia, su estructura 
jeráquica, sus leyes internas de subordinación y dependencia>>.
302
 So 'existence is not arbitrary;' 
we can see how history is shaped by human nature, but human nature, experience, and its 
interaction with nature are essentially infinite in combinations and interpretations—this, in fact, 
in and of itself, is a trend of trends we could say.
303
 This is why an interpretation, or meaning of 
something, exists, literally, because of the potential for interpretation it has, as Dewey says, 
“Things have potentialities or are instrumental because they are not Being, but rather Being in 
the process of becoming.”304 Again, this also is a further trend of trends.305 Nature, therefore, is 
really not something entirely fixed then, again in part also because we cannot prove or disprove 
that it is or is not, as Dewey writes, 
The only way to avoid a sharp separation between the mind which is the centre of the 
processes of experiencing and the natural world which is experienced is to acknowledge 
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that all modes of experiencing are ways in which some genuine traits of nature come to 
manifest realization.
306
 
This is a clear example of Dewey's anti-dualism because as he argues here, if it were not 
for that interaction between experience and nature, there would be no possible interpretations or 
conclusions on nature. As Sleeper clarifies,  
Generic form is indeed what makes knowing possible, but it is the very precariousness of 
 such forms as we know them that makes continuing inquiry necessary. The real world is a 
 changing world, a relational world, not one of fixed potentialities and permanent 
 possibilities.
307
 
And Sleeper continues, citing the following quote by McDermott, 
The setting is the interaction of the human organism with nature or with the environment. 
 Nature has a life of its own, undergoing its own relatings, which in turn become what we 
 experience. Our own transaction with the affairs of nature cuts across the giveness of 
 nature and our ways of relating. This is how we experience what we experience. Dewey 
 was a realist in the sense that the world exists independent of our thought of it, but the 
 meaning of the world is inseparable from our meaning the world.
308
 
Therefore, in Dewey’s philosophy experience is a manifestation of nature, just as the 
study of history reveals ‘trends of trends’ of humanity, but neither of which can ever be 
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understood in a complete and fully objective manner—hence also his use of the word “some 
genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization.” And ironically one of these 'traits' is our 
inability to prove or disprove other traits. And another such trait is that we can find some trends 
of trends. And though it may sound minor, trends of trends still can tell us plenty. As Grigoriev 
proposes on this topic in regards to a possible reading of Dewey's historicism in all this; 
It is not that history is off-limits because its subject matter—human nature—defies being 
 known on the terms of natural science. On the contrary, because human "nature" is, at 
 any given point, largely constituted by history, our inquiries into the pervasive cultural 
 and social aspects of human life cannot succeed unless the methods of natural sciences 
 are supplemented and informed by a historical perspective. Such is the first consequence 
 of Dewey's cultural naturalism.
309
 
Further, an additional such trait is that ultimately what we can know is our perspective on 
what we think that trait is, and we cannot prove or disprove the 'genuiness' of that trait in and of 
itself. Human nature, in Dewey’s argument, is plastic and shaped principally by one’s social 
environment. Similarly, Ortega supports this idea of the plasticity of humanity, arguing that man 
is an ‘infinitely plastic entity;’ an “entidad infinitamente plástica."310 Ortega, therefore, appears 
to share the belief that one's surroundings play a more significant role than an individual in 
influencing one's acts, behaviors, or events, etcetera. 
Pero en la vida del hombre, el contorno es más poderoso que el hombre, precisamente 
 porque una de sus partes—el futuro—no está ahí. Y el futuro es infinito no ya en tiempo 
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 y en cantidad, sino en calidad. [...] Por eso el hombre necesita reducir la infinidad o 
 ilimitación del mundo en que se encuentra viviendo a la dimensión finita y limitada de su 
 vida. Es decir, tiene que forjar un escorzo finito de la infinitud.
311
  
But as we shall continue to see, a key difference here is that arguably Ortega’s view is 
still, nonetheless, a bit less social and more individualist than Dewey’s. While Dewey considers 
the general concept of time to be something both made up of a process and a product, because 
there is something much more social in ‘having experiences’ for Dewey, for Ortega what we 
have is history, and our history is in part comprised of our set of circumstances that, although 
they can overlap with those of others, in sum they can make up a distinct, unique set for each 
individual.  Perhaps this seemingly subtle yet important difference between the two can be found 
in the choice of two different verbs; for Dewey, it is more so that we are our histories, whereas 
for Ortega it is also true that we are our histories, but we also have history. In other words, to be 
our histories implies something a bit more malleable and therefore holds a greater emphasis on 
the social aspects, whereas to have history can imply something more solid and individualistic. If 
we are history then there is more process involved, whereas if we have history then there are also 
some aspects that are finished and closed, at least in our perspective (hence again Ortega’s yo y 
mi circunstancia; we are ‘individually and socially incessantly and progressively in the 
making’). As Helm proposes in relation to Dewey's vision on this, “Human individuals do not 
have histories while themselves remaining essentially unchanged: they are histories.”312 
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Nonetheless, there is still a dialogue here; namely, that what is more important to consider is a 
human’s history than an idea of a human being’s nature. 
In general, argues Dewey in 1938, “There are no absolute originations or initiations or 
absolute finalities and terminations in nature.”313 His perspective, therefore, is that we are each 
shaped by our experiences and we are not born with a “core self” that we can ever truly get to 
and understand.
314
 Here Dewey goes even further than Ortega, because “[a]part from the ties 
which bind him to others, he is nothing;” meaning, to compare to Ortega’s “soy yo y mi 
circunstancia,” in Deweyan philosophy an individual only has the “circunstancia” to study, and 
we cannot truly reach and understand any core “yo.”315 There is, as he says, a “continuity of 
experience with nature,” and this is what leads us on our path of “becoming.”316 In fact, the use 
of the “present progressive” tense here of the verb “to become” specifically is key, as it 
illustrates how there is a malleable quality to this since it encompasses both the present and the 
future, which of course are inherited from the past; “[…] the present situation is not located in 
and confined to an event here and now occurring. It is an extensive duration, covering past, 
present, and future events.”317 Again “everything” (which of course includes all experiences), 
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“recorded is an historical event,” declared Dewey in 1940.318 As Dewey affirms, the “human 
individual is himself a history” because of his or her “particular development in time.”319 Hence, 
everything is comprised of a temporal quality that add up, creating what Dewey calls a 
“historical career,” which as we saw Bernstein defines as, “a series of interactions whose 
uniqueness consists of the way in which the individual responds to encountered conditions.”320 
Thus, nature can never be entirely “fixed” because it can never be fully understood; “to exist is to 
be in process, in change” because nature is “an indefinite congeries of change.”321 Because 
nature changes, this is part of why we cannot come to define or understand it. What we think and 
understand nature to be changes over time (it is historical), so what is tangible for study are those 
specific changes; what our perspectives on nature have been, historically. So while we may not 
be able to validate or invalidate, prove or disprove, the conclusion(s) of our perspective(s), we 
still have our perspectives, and we can still study what we think we have thought.  
Perhaps a specific example would serve well here to clarify this. We may ask, is the 
human race by nature violent? In beginning to ponder the answer to this question, we may start 
by looking back at history. Throughout history, we have fought wars; it seems that in general 
humanity has committed violent acts since the beginning of our time. What about today? 
Humans still commit violence. Can we reasonably predict in the future that the human race will 
continue to act and behave violently at times? Perhaps we would all, unfortunately and 
regrettably, agree that the answer to this is yes. There have been wars throughout history, there 
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have been wars and violent conflicts fought recently, and there are threats of more to come in the 
future. But does this prove that humans are by nature violent? It absolutely does not prove it. 
Nor does it disprove it. It is very possible that we are, but again we cannot prove, or disprove, 
this. Historical study is how we can best ponder this, but it does not provide completely objective 
and absolute answers. An historical analysis of this of course demonstrates that we certainly 
think we are violent by nature and that we can have what we could call 'violent perspectives' in 
both how we commit violence and in how we think we commit violence, but this cannot be 
proven or disproven to be true in and of itself as part of our nature. For example, not everyone 
commits violent acts under all the same circumstances. An historical analysis would reveal that 
in some ways we have become less violent, and in others more violent. For instance, we may 
have banned chemical weapons that are globally "agreed" upon to be inhumane, but that does not 
necessarily actually stop all from using them. Today we may not partake in the atrocious human 
gladiator competitions of Ancient Rome, yet in the United States the most innocent of 
individuals, children, are murdered in school. But here I digress.  
The point to this discussion is that knowing the answer to this question is not the 
objective for these two thinkers, being again a point of possible dialogue, rather what we think 
are those answers is what we can study, and this is what is, therefore, the goal of our philosophy 
here. To phrase it plainly, the aim is to think about all that we have thought about, the 
conclusions we have reached, and our perspectives. It is not to find absolute nature(s); part of the 
aspiration is to map out and contemplate our history of perspectives, what they have told us, how 
they have in turn shaped our realities, our truths, our histories, etcetera. We can figure out what 
we have thought over time; what our perspectives have been, so that we can safely study. This 
does not mean that we should not study topics and issues such as whether or not we are violent, it 
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just means that we should always keep at the forefront of our minds the limitations of studying 
such subjects, and that what is tangible in contemplating all such matters is what we have 
thought are to be those answers throughout time. What is tangible are our perspectives and our 
histories/experiences. So, to return to the maxim under study in this paper, again it is not that 
man does not have a nature, per se, it is that there is no way to fully get to it, interpret it, or 
understand it, not to mention that our understanding of it can also change with time. Again what 
is important, and what we can get to, is what we think it is; what our perspective on it is. 
Nor can we ever completely and genuinely understand our experiences that create our 
personal histories, argued Dewey, because again it is “only the occurrence that is explained, not 
the thing itself.” And this is why we do not have a 'core self,' a 'yo,' that we can ever get to 
completely and understand entirely—this is, again, not to say necessarily that there is not one, 
per se, but rather if there is we could never be able to see it or reach it, entirely or objectively.
322
 
This is similar, as we shall see further along, to how Dewey argues that history is (unfortunately, 
inevitably) studied; there is an objective past, but each historian gives his or her own view of it, 
just as each individual interprets his or her own personalized nature based on his or her 
experiences—perhaps there is a core “nature,” but again we cannot ever get to it because our 
social environment and how we interpret and react to all within it shape what we come to see 
consciously or unconsciously as our ‘nature.’  
The general debate (which is still present today of course) over the impact of nature 
versus nurture (or “preparedness” versus “plasticity” to use perhaps the most modern terms) is 
one of the specific polemics in all this, and specifically of Ortega’s maxim, “el hombre no tiene 
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naturaleza, sino que tiene historia.” Throughout Ortega’s writings we find several hints of a 
certain degree of reliance or belief in the role of biology and genetics in shaping a person’s life 
and what he or she does during it; in influencing their “drama” that unfolds over the course of his 
or her life. For example, one of the most important philosophies Ortega developed is his theory 
on the division of society by generations in which fundamentally we find a sort of 
“predetermination” that would therefore imply something genetic given his clear lack of belief in 
a religious type of predetermination.
323
 In Ortega’s thought, societies are ‘naturally’ divided into 
docile, obedient masses, and superior, preeminent minorities. Moreover, Ortega often uses the 
term “raza,” or “race” in a manner that implies “nature” in the modern sense of the word. For 
example, he wrote in 1922 in regards to the history of his nation, “[…] uno de los defectos más 
graves y permanentes de nuestra raza: la ausencia de una minoría selecta, suficiente en número y 
calidad.”324 One reference to this is the Visigoth period of Spanish history, in which Ortega 
argues that the “blood” passed on over the generations from this “unsuccessful race” of people, 
and the resultant lack of a feudal period is part of what explains the then current state of masses 
in revolt and social invertebracy that he describes exists in his contemporary Spain (This is from 
España invertebrada, published in 1922)—hence the role of “nature” is also most certainly 
present at least to some degree in Ortega’s meditation-al philosophy.325 So again neither 
philosopher denies nature, but rather the argument here is that history is a better word choice that 
encompasses nature and more. Again, all that we can be sure of in regards to nature is what we 
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think it is, and what we have thought it is (hence the importance of history again). We cannot 
prove or disprove nature in and of itself. As José Ferrater Mora explains in his book Three 
Spanish Philosophers,  
Ortega has often shown a predilection for biological science […] He has thus even 
seemed prone to consider ‘life’ from the point of view of biological impulse […] It is 
beyond doubt, however, that he would not accept a biological interpretation of 
knowledge, however difficult it proves to lay down a theory of knowledge free from 
biological commitments without purging it at the same time of a biological 
terminology.
326
 
How can we demystify and resolve this 'denied predilection' apparent in Ortega? To 
return for a moment to the example of pondering a specific trait of human nature, that of 
violence, again perhaps Ortega, or anyone for that matter, would believe in his or her gut, 
instinctually, that we are violent; that violence is indeed a part of human nature. But again we 
cannot make this conclusion with absolute, invariable certainty because we cannot prove or 
disprove the nature of being violent in and of itself, as discussed. We can demonstrate that over 
time, over history, we have been violent. We can argue that we are, and that we have violent 
perspectives (we can individually say "I think human beings are violent by nature," for example, 
but we cannot speak for everyone else and all the other perspectives; we cannot make that 
statement for all otherwise it would be a faulty 'sweeping generalization'). We can argue that our 
perspective is that we are violent. We can study that over history our perspectives have been that 
we are violent. We can study the occurrences of violence over the course of history. But we 
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cannot go into natures such as if human beings are violent, we can only go into what we think 
are our natures or what we think are the answers to such quandaries. This is again part of what 
makes us history, not nature, to always return to this thesis's main maxim under study. And this 
is one way to imagine why Ortega or Dewey could arguably have a predilection, whether slight 
or not, for genetics, for instance, because again very possibly many people believe that there are 
certain ways people are 'born' to be, whether they openly admit this or not, but that does not 
make it right or correct. For instance, this could refer to some people having the perspective that 
some people are 'born to be violent by nature.' We may believe that human beings are by nature 
violent, but just our believing this does not make it so in and of itself, it only makes it so for the 
one individual believing this (and, if applicable, for as many individuals together believing this). 
But again this is all that really matters; what we think are the answers rather than the answers 
themselves, because we shape our realities, truths, etcetera, accordingly. Again, it is our 
perspective that matters.  Whatever we believe to be so is ultimately what we can study, and 
therefore what is important. As noted on several occasions, Ortega concisely summarized this 
notion in how "the will is real, but the willed is not." 
That said, still Ortega has been known to also make such clear comments as the following 
in contrast to any degree of biological or genetic determinism, which he labeled a “perennial 
error;” “[…] error perenne […] de creer que el hombre es sustancialmente el organismo 
biológico—cuerpo y alma—con que el hombre vive.”327 As aforementioned, life, or history, is a 
continual “quehacer,” which implies that man is not necessarily “fixed.” A man “without nature” 
is a malleable being. Again we must empahsize the anti-dualism as a possible interpretation here; 
biological nature is not our essence, as we are not defined by a biological nature, neither for 
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Dewey nor for Ortega. For Dewey, there is an anti-dualistic continuum between the natural in a 
biological sense for instance, and the social/human. And for Ortega, any biological conception of 
nature for human beings is just one possible perspective.  
But more generally speaking, as both philosophers imply that our lives are, at least in part 
“historical products,” on a fundamental level this in and of itself also implies to a certain extent 
an “inheritance” of sorts. This would involve something predetermined, even perhaps in a 
“genetic” sense, thereby being another key way in which we can resolve this apparent 
philosophical dilemma by saying that we are indeed our ‘genes’ (without being able to get much 
more specific than that) but we are also much more, as we shall continue to see. More so what 
we are talking about here is a historical re-interpretation of genetics, rather than genetics in and 
of itself. In other words, more important here is a history of genes rather than the genes 
themselves. We can say that we inherit something, we can even venture to say what that 
something is, but that does not make it true, or false. That does not prove, or disprove, that some 
thing. It is just our perspective. But we can at least more safely argue that we inherit something; 
that we are historical, but without going further per se. So also key is what we think to be that 
history, what we think are our 'genes,' and what we think to be the 'power of our genes' rather 
than the genes in and of themselves. 
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XIII. Potential Resolutions to Controversies 
As has been discussed, one of the controversies that at first glance is a bit challenging to 
resolve is whether or not Ortega and Dewey reside more on the side of nurture or on nature in the 
classic debate as to which influences more the progression of life and behavior, though most 
often it indeed seems to be the former. For Ortega, “life is a drama” and it is “not given to us 
ready-made,” which of course appears to be contradictory to the aforementioned possible 
biological and genetic determinism also present at times in his meditations (since it implies there 
not being something that we are 'born with;' since life is not given to us 'ready-made'). But ways 
in which this can be resolved have been outlined at length, showing that ultimately, because of 
what can actually be 'demonstrated' literally, the social and interaction side of the debate carries 
more weight arguably for both philosophers. In the case of Dewey, Tiles offers the following 
concise interpretation of how Dewey views this matter: “[…] human minds are not constituted as 
individual things prior to their entering into natural (including especially social) relationships.”328 
And this can dialogue with the following excerpt of Ortega's from 1941, showing how again 
ultimately for both the nurture side is more influential (both because they believe it simply is, 
and also because that is what we can study a bit more tangibly and directly since as has been 
discussed we cannot really get to "nature"): “El hombre es una entidad infinitamente plástica de 
la que se puede hacer lo que se quiera. Precisamente porque ella no es de suyo nada, sino mera 
potencia para ser <<como usted quiera>>.”329 Here Ortega insinuates very clearly that there is 
nothing necessarily ‘fixed’ about ‘man.’ Even our interpretations and understanding of genes can 
                                                          
328
 Tiles, Dewey, p. 129. 
 
329
 Ortega, Historia, pp. 39-40. 
 
 188 
 
change (i.e., the history of genes), at least at this moment—hence the nurture nurtures nature 
conclusion. In other words, even if we thought we knew what the nature side of the classic debate 
was, that view might change, making our interpretations on nature historical as well, and based 
on our perspective at the time. "Nature" and what we think it is, is historical. Hence again why 
what we have is history, not nature, since history is the determining and influential factor. 
Moreover, a key part of Ortega's philosophy to reiterate here is that this also relates to why 
"perspectivism" is so central and important in his theory, because since we shape our realities, 
truths, etcetera via our perspectives (what is fundamentally important is simply our perspective 
and how we each think, understand, interpret, etcetera), this makes our viewpoints both 
individualist and dependent on the moment in which they are formed, making perspective 
historical as well. This, therefore, makes history, or time, really the key starting force in all 
this—and yet again why what we have is history; we are historical beings.  
Ortega further writes,  
Yo no digo que en cualquier instante pueda hacer de sí cualquier cosa. En cada instante 
 se abren ante él posibilidades limitadas; limitadas precisamente por lo que ha sido hasta 
 la fecha. Ésta es la única limitación concreta que el hombre tiene: su pasado. Pero si se 
 toman, en vez de instante, todos los instantes, no se ve qué fronteras pueden ponerse a la 
 plasticidad humana.
330
 
Again Ortega is expressing a point that will be especially elaborated in the section 
dialoging with Schiller, but suffice to say for the moment that contemplating humanity as having 
"limited freedom" is one way to understand how there can be something deterministic and 
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natural in our lives, but that ultimately does not shape us at least as much as forces external to us. 
We do have some history that is inherited, which means there is something that we are 'born 
with' and that we cannot change that we are born with that, so there is some nature that we can 
contemplate somewhat directly and tangibly. But while this may condition us, it does not 
determine us. This is not only because forces external to us are more powerful, but also because 
by being aware and conscious of that past we inherit, we can adapt and respond accordingly, or 
however we each see fit, and differently; we have this power in how we choose to respond, 
hence again our 'limited freedom.' And this is again how we can resolve how there can be a bit of 
nature that we can contemplate while being more on the nurture side of the debate. 
The degree of Ortega’s apparent reliance on history and on the social environment for 
influencing and shaping an individual appears to be close to the extent of Dewey’s, albeit 
perhaps not quite as extreme given Ortega’s “yo” y mi circunstancia. Thus, in an effort to clarify 
this further, to reiterate perhaps what Ortega meant in his definition of ‘nature': man is not 
simply a “natural thing” but rather primarily a product of each individual’s own interpretation, 
which is similar to how Dewey terms applying a “meaning” to something. (And this is of course 
constructed over time, making us more so our histories.) As Ferrater Mora explains in reference 
to Ortega’s analysis of man’s existence largely as a set of interpretations,  
Man needs to know himself and his circumstances. He needs, accordingly, an idea or an 
 ‘interpretation’ of the world. This is the primary sense of the expression ‘Man must have 
 his own convictions.’ For what is “‘a man without convictions’ is a non-existent entity.331 
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This again is part of Ortega's perspectivism in that we each have our own unique 
perspectives. As has been cited, Ortega writes, “La naturaleza es una interpretación transitoria 
que el hombre ha dado a lo que se encuentra frente a sí en su vida.”332 One example of something 
“natural” for Ortega is literally a ‘physical, mathematical thing’ that humanity has applied and 
defined, but that also changes because of how our definitions can also continue to be altered and 
developed. Humanity cannot be completely understood via physical and mathematical reasoning. 
An individual is not just a “thing,” therefore, as must be reiterated he writes, “Porque el hombre 
no tiene naturaleza. El hombre no es su cuerpo, que es una cosa; ni es su alma, psique, 
conciencia, o espíritu, que es también una cosa. El hombre no es cosa ninguna, sino una drama 
[…].”333  
This is, in fact, repeated consistently in Ortega’s writings, that “el hombre no es su alma 
y su cuerpo, sino su vida,” which we can arguably think of as ‘el hombre no es su naturaleza, 
sino es su historia.’334 Hence, nature here is defined as soul and body, and history is defined as 
simply life.
335
 Thus, each person is more so the mere interpretation of those physical, and non-
physical, ‘things;’ all that encompasses them and all that surrounds them—hence again the 
frequently cited central tenet in Ortega’s philosophy, “yo soy yo y mi circunstancia.”336 In other 
words, there are multiple circumstances, perspectives, and not one sole reality, nor one exclusive 
perspective on reality, as we saw in the first section in detail.  
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Again, this indeed parallels Dewey’s idea that we give a meaning to nature, not the 
meaning because nature is, as he says, a “transitory interpretation” since only the occurrence of 
some thing or event and not the thing or event itself can be explained. Moreover, "transitory" 
implies "time," or history, so we could argue that interpretations are historical as well. Each 
individual is, in sum, a ‘different perspective,’ even though some of a person’s circumstances 
can coincide with those of others in Ortega’s theory (for example, with those of others of the 
same generation, those united by family, region, etc.). The reality of each individual is simply 
more complex because it is composed also of a set of such distinct circumstances that no two of 
us will ever ‘see’ the exact same thing (unless we are speaking of a similarity of certain 
circumstances that coincide specifically via a close relationship of two or more individuals). 
Individual interpretations cannot be “natural things” because they cannot be physically or 
mathematically proven real or unreal, true or false (as aforementioned about a person’s will 
being the only ‘real thing’); they are simply the unique perspectives and interpretations of that 
person’s circumstances of being. So again in saying that one is more than just his or her nature, 
this does not necessarily negate that he or she does not have a nature—it is saying that he or she 
is much more than just his or her nature. As Ferrater  Mora argues in regards to Ortega’s 
philosophy here,  
Life exists in an ‘environment,’ a word that has, of course, biological connotations but 
 also sociological and even ontological ones. In another passage the philosopher writes 
 that the biological notion of life is only a segment of a much broader concept and 
 therefore cannot be reduced to its somatic meaning.
337
 
And he adds,  
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The word ‘life’ has therefore a very broad meaning, certainly not only a biological 
meaning. As a matter of fact, it has a double meaning: a biological and a spiritual one. 
These two meanings appear often as mutually exclusive. […] But on neither side are we 
permitted to conclude that each time the biological side exercises its rights spiritual 
claims must be withdrawn and vice versa. Although extreme separate poles, they belong 
to the same world and they often counterbalance each other.”338  
Man is the interpretation of that nature, and all those natural and non-natural things under 
which they subsist. So, again ultimately perhaps we find here a resolution to the aforementioned 
critiques; really man does indeed have both nature and history for Ortega because man’s nature 
is his history.
339
 Life is a “gerundive, not a participle” and “man is the entity that makes itself;” 
“man is the novelist of himself,” stipulates Ortega in the English translations (to not disrupt the 
lingual flow here).
340
  Again, this further resolves the aforementioned critique of possibly some 
degree of determinism especially in Ortega’s philosophy because a person’s history, in a general 
sense, can also imply a person’s “genetic” history. And as Dewey concisely stated, “The human 
individual is himself a history”341 just as Ortega once said that a man is a historical being; “un 
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ente esencialmente histórico.”342 It should be included as an academic side note that these 
specific quotations date to 1940 and 1947 respectively. 
So again one way this can be resolved is to recognize that it is not that Ortega or Dewey 
is saying that an individual has no nature, rather that the combinations between an individual’s 
nature and his or her circumstances, and the meanings to these arrangements that can be applied, 
are virtually limitless. So in this sense an individual in part forms a history for him- or herself 
that is the total sum of all this. As A. García proposes in regards to Ortega’s meditations on this, 
“Aunque el sujeto de la historia no sea el espíritu absoluto, sino el hombre individual mortal y 
finito, la suma de experiencias históricas del hombre y las posibilidades de nuevas y futuras 
experiencias introducen un elemento de infinitud en la realidad humana.”343 More so than a core 
“being” in Ortega’s thought there are stories, histories of being, for each individual.344 By 
including nature into Ortega’s thought on the meaning and significance of “history,” we are 
therefore further resolving the dilemma posed by Ortega’s apparent leanings toward biological 
and genetic determinism at least at times, as again it simply becomes one factor among many 
others. And so this is why it is not that a person has no nature, but rather that a person’s nature is 
just a starting point of sorts for what will be interpreted and combined with circumstances; this is 
related to the idea of “yo y mi circunstancia,” to create an infinite set of possibilities that define 
man’s nature, which is his history. 
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In the case of Dewey, in order to resolve these critiques we must also similarly recognize 
that man does have a nature, but specifically it is the interaction between a man’s nature and the 
environment which might potentially bring any natural characteristics to manifestation. 
Particularly, therefore, most important is the social atmosphere which essentially ‘powers’ the 
appearance and expression of our innate tendencies, which Dewey often refers to as “unlearned 
activities.” “In short, the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon 
interaction with a matured social medium” he writes.345 Meaning, we do have genes that can or 
at least have the potential to activate behavior and influence our acts, but their manifestation 
and/or solidification in personality and behavior depends on the push forward they might receive 
from our external world and how they might be reinforced, negatively or positively. Here, in 
fact, Dewey was quite precocious, as he was essentially referencing some fundamentals of 
neuroscience which would come after his time considering that the aforementioned quote comes 
from 1922
346
, as Jerome Popp elaborates on in great detail, 
If we overlay Dewey’s analysis of innate behavior, or what he preferred to call 
“unlearned activities,” with contemporary neuroscience, we see that these unlearned 
activities were acquired through inheritance, and their activation produces social 
consequences, which, in turn, cause some synaptic connections in the brain to become 
more active, while many others are inhibited.
347
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Basically what Dewey proposes, we could say, is that “nurture shapes nature.” Hence the 
importance of “experience” or “history,” which is why both share this antidualistic theory that 
what we have is experience or history, because that is what shapes and therefore truly is our 
“nature” since it also contains our nature. The term "inheritance" can imply both environmental 
inheritances as well as genetic inheritances; the environmental can come from society, culture, 
family, and the genetic can also come from society, culture, and family, which is why again 
"nature" would be a limiting term and "history" is better since it encompasses all of this. As 
aforementioned, we logically also inherit history. 
There is an important distinction to reference here between Dewey’s concept of 
“impulses” and “habits,” for the former essentially refers to our nature; or innate tendencies or 
“unlearned activities,” and the latter signifies what we consolidate and reinforce depending on 
the environmental response we receive. Both Ortega and Dewey argue that it is not so much 
about “instincts” in our behavior, but rather we have in Dewey’s case “impulses,” or which 
Ortega terms “needs.” Ortega wrote in 1941, “[…] el hombre no vive, en definitiva, de sus 
instintos, sino que se gobierna mediante otras facultades, como la reflexión y la voluntad, que 
reobran sobre los instintos.”348 Dewey averred prior in 1922, “Man is a creature of habit, not of 
reason nor yet of instinct.”349 One way to understand this is to be reminded of how this can relate 
to nature and nurture when we categorize instinct as part of our nature and add again that 'nurture 
nurtures nature.' We can insert that Dewey's term of "habit" is a way of "nurturing." For Dewey, 
we can argue that we sometimes habitualize certain impulses. And for Ortega, reflection and will 
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re-work some of our instincts. Both of these interpretations are fundamentally two different ways 
of saying that nurture nurtures nature, demonstrating that it can be argued that there is a nature, 
but it is not as tangible nor as powerful as nurture. 
In Ortega’s historical meditations, throughout history humanity has made the changes, in 
general, that it has because of necessities, and not because of instincts; needs such as to eat, to 
drink, and most importantly, to ‘live well.’ Life, history is “a system of necessities,” a “necessity 
of necessities.”350 Ortega’s emphasis on needs moving history can dialogue with Dewey’s heed 
that we fundamentally manage our “learned activities” based on the history of responses they 
receive; meaning, based on the needs we define over time as to which should be manifest and 
which should not. In Ortega’s meditations, in a slightly different sense, this means that 
progressively over time we, hopefully, become who we truly are; with any luck our “nature,” in a 
sense, comes to the surface and we fulfill whatever may be our “true vocation,” as Ortega labels 
it; “[…] cada hombre, entre sus varios seres posibles, encuentra siempre uno que es su auténtico 
ser. Y a la voz que le llama a ese auténtico ser es lo que llamamos <<vocación>>. […] sólo se 
vive a sí mismo, sólo vive, de verdad, el que vive su vocación, el que coincide con su verdadero 
<sí mismo>>.”351 During this non-static process, therefore, the construction is our being. 
It must be noted here, conversely, that this is not so different than the Darwinian 
development of “natural selection” that was becoming particularly prominent during both of 
these philosophers’ lives (Dewey was born, in fact, in 1859, the year of publication of The 
Origin of the Species) in the sense that we have, at times, “adapted” over the course of history in 
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the ways which we have come to believe better “suit us.”352 The influence of this on Dewey is 
well summarized in the following excerpt from Blau:  
 There were, I have suggested, two chief strains in Dewey 's mature thought. One, by 
 which he came legitimately as a member of the generation most directly affected by 
 Darwinism, was genetic, concerned with the question how things come to be what we 
 experience them as being; in the broadest sense, historical. The other, to which he came 
 legitimately through what he derived from his study of William James, was pragmatic 
 and instrumentalist, concerned with the question where things are tending and what we 
 can do to direct their course to ends that seem to us most desirable. James had described 
 the pragmatic attitude as "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 
 categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, 
 facts."
353
 
Still, man is ‘infinitely plastic’ according to both philosophers because of our ability to 
learn and develop from our experiences; from our histories.
354
 Ortega declares in a set of his 
lectures from 1948-49 compiled in Una interpretación de la historia universal, “El hombre, en 
cambio, cuando empieza a existir no trae prefijado o impuesto lo que va a ser, sino que, por el 
contrario, trae prefijada e impuesta la libertad para elegir lo que va a ser dentro de un amplio 
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horizonte de posibilidades.”355 We know today that many genes are not literally destined to 
become manifest (with few known exceptions such as the gene for Huntington’s disease), rather 
many depend primarily on the environment’s response. And this is perhaps really fundamentally 
what Ortega and Dewey are saying here, albeit a bit ahead of their time. Again, both 
philosophers imply that our lives are at least in part “historical products,” and on a fundamental 
level this in and of itself also implies to a certain extent an “inheritance” of sorts. And this would 
still, nonetheless, involve something predetermined, even perhaps in a “genetic” sense. 
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XIV. On History as a System 
In this, however, we still find another interconnected and seemingly contradictory theme 
in both philosophers; namely, this idea that experience/history can also essentially have a nature 
(because nature is our experience/history), yet it is not entirely “systematic.” But in the sense that 
there is not something systematic, what is meant here is in terms of a scientific or mathematical 
logic, since the only “system” is that which we need to define as a “human system.” So concisely 
stated, what is meant here is that history is systematic only in the sense that it is consistently 
simply a representation of human nature—not a tangible human nature of course, but 
fundamentally further beyond what we can grasp is our nature, which is our history.
356
 In other 
words, a prediction we can make about the course of events today that will become tomorrow’s 
past is that they will stem from and simply display at least some of human nature, as a sort of 
‘trend of trends’.  
Further, for Dewey there is something "systematic" in the way that historians create 
categories, periods, epochs, etcetera. As another Dewey expert Phillip Deen proposes, referring 
to Dewey's historical study of philosophy, it "[...]  periodizes time and, like other historians', it 
contains an agenda. Periodizations make claims about history's pivotal moments and arcs, and 
predict where it is headed, for good or ill."
357
 And he continues,  
Dewey's philosophy of history is then not oriented to recount simply what happened, but 
 to stage a critical intervention into that history, to introduce a change in existential 
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 conditions going forward. By producing a selective narrative, he is hoping to provoke a 
 certain interpretive model in the reader and thereby clear the way for a better future.
358
 
As Dewey is a pragmatist there is something more "systematic" in the study of history— 
not history itself per se, but rather its study—than for Ortega. The first step of the process; the 
collection of historical data, is perhaps what is most systematic for Dewey. Undoubtedly Ortega 
would have an agreeable dialogue on this as well. It is in the final step, which is also the relevant 
one; the interpretation, that is especially not systematic because it is 'perspectival,' to use Ortega's 
term, and hence this could arguably be a strong point of conversation between the two. It is 
important to briefly be reminded here that there are various forms of "history" when we speak of 
"historiography." There is, for example, the organization of history into periods, epochs, eras, 
centuries, years, etcetera—the temporal properties of history—that can be systematic, or at least 
proposed as such (because there could still be a difference between what two individuals define 
as the periodization of history). There is also the humanistic study of history, and, for example, 
how history is our human nature; how history is a display of our human nature. There is also the 
issue of how to study history; how to interpret, for example, the different periodizations that are 
proposed. These all need to be accounted for in a philosophy of history. Deen offers a concise 
interpretation of this in the following excerpt: 
Much like the natural scientist or engineer, the historian collects data and  proposes 
 hypotheses that are tested in the course of future experimentation. It is not  enoughto 
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 collect information about past events, but they must also present an interpretation of those 
 events which sets them in relation to one another and to the present.
359
 
In other words, historical data itself is perhaps systematic in that it is collected and as past 
things, we do not generally question metaphysically whether or not one of these things, events, 
etcetera, actually happened. However, our interpretation of that thing is certainly not systematic, 
as we shall continue to see. As Deen concisely adds, "Historical inquiry may discover fixed 
facts, but it does not transform them into facts."
360
 
Moreover, as Dewey argues, we know that experience will change, but what we cannot 
know for sure is how it will change; “That an experience will change in content and value is the 
one thing certain. How it will change is the one thing naturally uncertain.”361 This is another very 
broad feature of what is systematic in the course of history; that changes occur, but beyond that 
we can say no more with certainty. 
Hook proposes that for Dewey, also systematic in the study of history is that there are 
tangible effects that historical things, events, people, etcetera, have, in the present at least. There 
will also be impacts in the future of course, and there might even be a continuity in those effects 
stretching from the past into the future, but the future situation can only be predicted without 
absolute certainty of course. But his being a pragmatist, when this potential of stretching into the 
future exists, this is what gives that 'historical element' we could call it so much weight of 
importance. 
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Pero la cuestión clave es precisamente ésta: que los medios forman parte ellos mismos de 
la serie de los efectos que llegan hasta aquí y continuarán dando lugar a la historia del 
evento; que son una parte específica de su <<naturaleza>> como lo son otras tantas 
cosas; y que necesitamos un experimento para determinar qué efectos del acontecimiento 
del pasado tienen todavía que tomarse en cuenta en el presente o en el futuro antes de que 
podamos adquirir un conocimiento genuino de ese rasgo específico del pasado.
362
 
Hence also the problematic nature of the general colloquial dictum, “history repeats 
itself”; it is not that history repeats itself, literally, but rather that it simply consistently displays 
at least some of the same fundamentals of human nature in its trends of trends. In an example of 
this, Dewey elaborates on wars throughout history, positing that, “History does not prove the 
inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs and institutions which organize native powers 
into certain patterns in politics and economics will also generate the war pattern.”363 Concisely 
stated, Dewey argues, “War is thus seen to be a function of social institutions, not of what is 
natively fixed in human constitution.”364 So, as this example illustrates, we as humans are not 
destined to “repeat the history of war,” for example, as if it were something inevitable that we do 
not learn from, but rather the pattern is simply that there is a conflictive and combative part of 
humanity that manifests itself throughout history at times in the form of war (as also discussed 
earlier on the topic of any possible 'nature of being violent'). And as this comes from a chapter 
titled “Changing Human Nature,” clearly there is not something “inevitable” in this, as 
traditionally implied in the maxim “history repeats itself.” Because as Dewey argues, the root of 
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this has partly to do with motive (while it is not required for action, it can lead to action when 
combined with judgment of consequences), so perhaps there is a way to channel motive into 
something more pacific, thereby disproving that war is always inevitable, for example. “[…] 
when we want to direct his activity that is to say in a specified channel, then the question of 
motive is pertinent,” writes Dewey.365 This also serves as another clarification of a possible 
answer on Dewey's behalf that we could imagine to the question proposed earlier as to whether 
or not human beings are violent by nature. 
Moreover, history is not destined to be repeated, because we have the power in how we 
interpret and apply history, historical events, historical figures, etcetera, to the present and 
potential future. Our motive is that interpretation of history, since history is selective, because it 
is perspectival and written from a specific perspective(s). We shall continue to expand on this 
topic of how the recording of history can never be fully objective, as historical documentation is 
historical in and of itself. In other words, our motive can shape our interpretation, which can 
influence the present and future potential impact of the events of history, for example. The 
following quote from Deen includes a succinct proposal on how to construe this: 
Dewey's history of philosophy is then not oriented to recount simply what  happened, but 
 to stage a critical intervention into that history, to introduce a change into existential 
 conditions going forward. By producing a selective narrative, he is hoping to 
 provoke a certain interpretive model in the reader and thereby clear the way for a better 
 future. [...] the historian's selective interest is futural. Dewey is not writing a critical 
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 history out of a pure concern to report the events, but because it makes way for a 
 naturalistic culture of inquiry, a democratic community that attends to experience.
366
 
Furthermore, history is a continuum, so there is no “complete rupture on the one hand 
and mere repetition on the other.”367 There is a continuity with our experience in history as it 
extends from the past, into the present, and beyond to toward the future. This is because 
experience (or history) exists along a continuum, as Dewey summarizes this, "Because of 
continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, and dead centers when we have an 
experience. There are pauses, places of rest, but they punctuate and define the quality of 
movement. They sum up what has been undergone [...]."
368
 This is also why history itself is 
historical, because it exists along a continuum, and also why the act of recording history is 
historical in itself as well. It is very important to keep this idea in mind of how history is a 
continuum because as Dewey urges it must be studied as such, and not as individual pieces of 
data; it is about sequential periods of time and not finished events or absolute points/moments in 
time. These are important, key pieces to building a strong philosophy of history. And our 
understanding of history is constantly changing because “as culture changes, the conceptions that 
are dominant in a culture change… History is then rewritten.”369 Blau offers a good explanation 
of this in the following excerpt, also quoting Dewey: 
 Thus we can account for the necessity of rewriting history in every generation by the 
 recognition that, as cultures change, the questions that they have to ask of their pasts also 
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 change, and "new standpoints for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise." Each 
 present has a new past; today's past could not have existed a century ago, because  today's 
 questions, today's conceptual structures, and today's sources of information and 
 techniques for discovering and validating data did not exist a century ago. "The writing of 
 history is itself an historical event. It is something which happens and which in its 
 occurrence has existential consequences." History records hypotheses as to the 
 meaning of a past; the hypotheses themselves influence the course of events and modify 
 the future. Thus we come again to the inter-connection of past, present, and future in a 
 course of events, a continuity of beginnings and endings. "The past is of logical necessity 
 the past-of-the-present, and the present is the-past-of-a- future living present."
370
  
As Alexander also adds in further support of this, "[...] the past is not merely repeated but 
transformed. The fundamental feature of nature and experience is transformation, and this is 
accomplished by the emergence of new features that may reconstitute the old order."
371
 This in 
itself is a trend of trends. Larry Hickman suggests that Dewey “rejects all claims that there are 
inevitable laws operative in history.”372 Simply put, instead Dewey's goal with historical study 
and inquiry is to find ways to "better humanity." And again in all this we see how there is no 
explicit denial of an existence of a nature, but there is a complex emphasis on it being something 
'changing.' 
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Ortega shares this idea that history does not repeat itself, though it may display some 
‘trends of trends.’ This is clear in the following excerpt declared in a series of lectures in Lisbon 
1944, and it should be noted that this was after Dewey’s Logic (published in 1939), Experience 
and Nature, (published in 1925) and Human Nature and Conduct (published in 1922): “Ninguna 
situación real, y esto quiere decir concreta, se repite en la historia. Pero en toda situación 
histórica hay un cierto esqueleto o conjunto de factores, componentes abstractos de ella, que son 
idénticos a otras situaciones ya vividas por el hombre en otros tiempos."
373
 This is fundamentally 
the same idea Dewey proposed in the aforementioned example of a war pattern in humans, but 
not its inevitable repetition. And as he further explains more generally,  
THERE are, therefore, common patterns in various experiences no matter how unlike 
 they are to one another in the details of their subject matter. There are conditions to be 
 met without which an experience cannot come to be. The outline of the common pattern 
 is set by the fact that every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature 
 and some aspect of the world in which he lives.
374
 
As Lasaga Medina posits, citing Ortega, 
[...] no pretende imponer a la historia una determinada lógica, los a priori de la razón 
 pura, sino <<de encontrar en la historia misma su original y autóctona razón. Por eso ha 
 de entenderse en todo su rigor la expresión "razón histórica". No una razón extra-
 histórica que parece cumplirse en la historia, sino literalmente, lo que al hombre le ha 
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 pasado, constituyendo las sustantiva razón, la revelación de una realidad transcendente a 
 las teorías del hombre y que es él mismo por debajo de las teorías>>.
375
 
And as Sleeper explains, this is a very similar argument proposed by Dewey; 
[...] Dewey insists that it is not that the same event happens over and over again: each 
 event, or existence—Dewey uses these terms interchangeably—is qualitatively both 
 similar and different from each other event. So what recurs is not the same event, but the 
 same kind of event. It is in this sense that kinds, like particular objects, are contingently 
 experienced.
376
 
Dewey's aforementioned example of the war pattern also serves well here, along with the 
previous discussion on whether or not human beings are by nature violent. War is not destined to 
be repeated in the exact same ways, but there are certain 'patterns' in humans, culture, society, 
that may make it more likely to occur. This again is something that we can study; something that 
may be a bit systematic. As Dewey clarifies, the method behind historical study can be a bit 
systematic as the sciences are, as it is the content which makes it distinct. There are certain 
patterns, or kinds, we can find, but not inevitable traits that we can prove or disprove. As Blau 
supports here, quoting Dewey as well, 
 Historical reconstruction begins, as does scientific inquiry in Dewey's view, with a 
 question: "The writing of history is an instance of judgment as a resolution through 
 inquiry of a problematic situation." Once the problem has been set, the historian, like the 
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 laboratory investigator, begins to collect data, not arbitrarily or at random, but with 
 specific reference to the question posed at the outset. More than this, in the collection of 
 data, the investigator must be guided by a set of hypotheses, a "systematic conceptual 
 structure, " that serves as a preliminary basis for selecting, or rejecting certain data. The 
 data selected must be confirmed.
377
 
Again, as do our historical studies, similarly our interpretations of “nature” also change.  
For Dewey, man’s being is essentially temporalistic. All human activities, be it the 
pursuit of the good, the true, or the beautiful, bear the impress of some unique temporal 
existence. Our tensed mode of speaking in which we refer to our unique temporal 
perspective, is a mirror of nature’s unique temporal perspective, since, as Dewey has 
emphasized, every natural existent is a process of becoming.
378
  
Hence, to repeat: every thing and every occurrence is temporal, so man has no fixed 
nature, rather man has time, or history, which parallels Ortega’s ‘man has no nature only history’ 
because their nature is their time, or history, as they are connected, united, in an anti-dualistic 
manner. 
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XV. The Study and Definition of History 
The study of history, which is therefore also the anti-dualistic study of human nature and 
history (as both agree that history is the study of, to put it perhaps too blunt, the changes and 
variations of humanity), thus should be considered and contemplated in the same way; it is not 
something that is “fixed,” but rather it is constantly shifting upon new studies conducted on the 
same topic throughout the progression of time that build upon one another. And the study of 
history is also historical itself. Ortega declared, “[…] el vocablo <<historia>> queda afectado 
exclusivamente a la historia de las cosas humanas.
379
 Dewey proclaimed that the purpose of the 
study of history was “a deepening appreciation of social life.”380 Further, as Deen proposes in the 
following concise conclusion on Dewey's objective with historical study, it: "[...] looks to the 
future, toward the democratic culture that is synonymous with a culture of inquiry. [...] that 
clears the way for a naturalize[d] account of knowing that, Dewey hoped, would produce a richer 
and more humane community."
381
 This resonates with Ortega's plea noted on several occasions 
that 'we need history in order to make sure we do not fall back into any errors of the past.'
382
 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey raises the example of the discovery of America to 
illustrate this point further. As he explains, while the Norsemen are sometimes argued to have 
been the first to discover America, he adds that regardless of whether or not they actually landed 
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on the continent’s shores, since no “meaning” was changed at that time, such as a newly drawn 
map of the world, no real alteration resulted.   
Moreover, we have to assume that there is "historical data" that has simply been lost 
(such as in a fire or a natural disaster, as a couple examples), so that data certainly will not be 
able to impact subsequent meaning. We can only use, for example, data that has survived, or data 
that was selectively picked to survive. This was a key limitation that Dewey noted, as also 
referenced by Blau, 
 Although the data that enter into the evidence for any historical judgment are matters that 
 can be referred to the past, they must exist, in the form in which they are used, in the 
 present. They must be observable by the historian. "Where the past has left no trace or 
 vestige of any sort that endures into the present its history is irrecoverable. Propositions 
 about the things which can be contemporaneously observed are the ultimate data from 
 which to infer the happenings of the past." Historical narrative is an inferential 
 reconstruction of the past from presently-existing data. The range of possible material 
 for the reconstruction of any particular segment of the past is limited by what has 
 survived into the present.
383
    
Again, this is why meaning, nature, history, is endless because “In some degree, every 
genuine discovery creates some such transformation of both the meanings and the existences of 
nature.”384 As we have seen, we must apply a meaning, because without that, whatever the issue, 
thing, or event in question is therefore is really non-existent per Deweyan thought --this is a very 
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pragmatist concept. “Event is a term of judgment, not of existence apart from judgment,” posited 
Dewey, again emphasizing that we can only judge, but not fully know.
385
 And this meaning can 
apply not just to the present impact and how later history books are written, but also the future of 
course as well, since there is a continuity in meaning also. As Deen more broadly interprets this, 
Dewey did not just want history to 'report mere occurrences,' rather "[...] history is a practically 
engaged, value-laden practice that arises against its background cultural tensions and 
assumptions and is inevitably oriented toward a desired future. It identifies problems and hopes 
to resolve them by proposing and testing hypotheses / interpretive frameworks."
386
 
This is why Dewey has compared the study of history to science, because studying 
history entails not just the collection of historical data, but the reading and interpretation of that 
data as well. And of course being an instrumentalist pragmatist, again the final step in the 
process of analysis is finding good use and application of what was learned to create better 
futures. Blau summarizes this possible reading agreeably in the following excerpt in which he 
also quotes Dewey: 
 The data of history can be considered as corresponding to the data gathered by an 
 experimental scientist. Just as the scientist 's work is not completed by the collection of 
 data, so the work of history is not completed by gathering information about the past. The 
 scientist must next propose an hypothesis, an interpretation of the data; so, too, must the 
 historian. Reasoning shows the scientist what the further consequences of his hypothesis 
 may be, and his work is not complete until he has tested his hypothesis by discovering 
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 whether the predicted consequences do, in fact, follow." [...] "Similarly, the 
 interpretations of the historian are to be carried forward into the future by reasoning, then 
 tested and validated in practice, and used, it may be, by what might be called social 
 engineering as a method of controlling the social environment."
387
 
Moreover, “meanings” can often be reinterpreted and redefined over the course of time. 
Even in just looking at the concept of “dating” something in historical annals, logically speaking 
per Deweyan thought, there is nothing absolute in this either, for this changes depending on the 
moment of speaking—as in the example he cites, “yesterday” means something different today 
than it does tomorrow, for instance—it all varies depending on the specific temporal sequence 
we define. Furthermore, we must also take into consideration the ‘future’ here, as Dewey urges, 
for often as we are interpreting, recording, and constructing any given “history,” it must be 
“confirmed” in the future, consequently being dependent on ensuing events as well.388 For this 
reason the future is also essentially “historical.” Hence, in Dewey’s proposed method of studying 
history, we must remember that it is about the course of events (plural), and not just a single 
event, which as we shall see further ahead relates to Ortega’s parallel emphasis on looking at the 
parts and very importantly its whole. 
Thus, this anti-dualism in history and nature, or experience and nature, respectively 
speaking between Ortega and Dewey, can also be found in their definitions of history in and of 
themselves. As we have seen, similarly between the two philosophers, history is a continuum; it 
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is not just the past, it is also the present and the future. “The past event has left effects, 
consequences, that are present and will continue into the future,” proclaimed Dewey.389 As Tiles 
explains in regards to this Deweyan postulation, “The lesson he wanted to draw was that the 
object of a judgment about the past should be seen not as the past event by itself but as ‘a past-
event-having-a-connection-continuing-into-the-present-and-future.’”390 So again history does not 
have an end or a beginning; it is a continuum that is constantly being built, layer upon layer. 
History is historical. Dewey writes: “Yet the thing which is a close of one history is always the 
beginning of another, and in this capacity the thing in question is transitive or dynamic.”391 This 
is a notion that James expressly declared as well, as we shall see in the next section. And this is 
what we could call 'systematic' in history, but only in the sense there is a "history which is a 
succession of histories" as a 'trend of trends.'
392
 So as with the interpretation of any thing, they 
are endless, and therefore each do not have a meaning in and of itself, just as with any reading of 
history, as it is a “[…] means to weaving together otherwise disconnected beginnings and 
endings into a consecutive history. Underlying “reality” and surface “appearance” in this 
connection have a meaning fixed by the function of inquiry, not an intrinsic metaphysical 
meaning.”393 Again, the consequences and consequential meanings are what are important and 
what change 'things.' The consequences produced in history, and the meanings we interpret from 
those consequences—that we selectively and subjectively study and interpret, re-orient, and 
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change—impact the present and future, as well as our view of that past later (as in the future). In 
other words, a mass of the continuum is altered. To put this into less abstract language: let us 
imagine that we find an event in history that has long had the same basic interpretations and 
beliefs as to how it occurred and the consequences it had, such as that already cited of the 
discovery of the Americas by Christopher Columbus, and now let us imagine that we have just 
discovered this long held recording to be false; for example, that really the Norsemen discovered 
the Americas. This new interpretation would change our view on the ethnic, societal, and cultural 
roots of the people of the Americas, for example. This new reading of history would change the 
next history books produced and the next history taught in the schools. So it would change the 
past in terms of our understanding of the past. It would change our present history books, and the 
ones written in the future to reflect those changes—not to mention that further study on this 
entirely new construal would yield additional and more in depth study, further altering our 
understanding of this event and its repercussions in history, of the past, present, and future. And 
in general, whichever are the conclusions we read in historical study, it all forms part of a 
continuum in which there are only pauses essentially but no stops of complete rupture, as Dewey 
explains it, "Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their 
succession is punctuated and made a rhythm by the existence of intervals, periods in which one 
phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and preparing."
394
 Here again, however, we have to 
assume that we can synonymously replace the notion of experience with history in order to 
envision this thesis's dialogue. 
                                                          
394
 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 20. 
 
 215 
 
As we have seen, one key point to the study of history in Deweyen instrumentalism is to 
apply it specifically to the future. As Deen presents this idea: "The purpose of such engagement 
with the past is not to put it in a museum exhibit as proof of our ability to catch it, or to hold it up 
as a treasure to be admired, but to see how study of history is instrumental to a desirable 
future."
395
 This is how Dewey defines his very discipline of pragmatism in its connection to the 
study of history and its practical applications; “Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension 
of historical empiricism, but with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon 
antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the 
possibilities of action” (1922).396 This, logically, is a conclusion that would be agreed upon by 
all, as we have seen Ortega also referenced that the study of history helps us avoid errors of the 
past, and so of course it also helps us shape better future. Hence, as put forward by Alexander, 
this allows us to  
[...] cease to see the universe as a room filled with fixed, named "objects" and replace it 
 with unfolding and interacting histories whose actualities are set within a wider field of 
 possibilities. When projected into the future, we come to think in terms of what things 
 can become rather than what they presently are. When read against the past, we may 
 understand present events in terms of their origins and how their history affects their 
 current mode of existence, whether for good or ill.
397
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And Dewey considers this an important change in perspective in the study of history, as 
we will see both Dewey and Ortega (as well as the other two pragmatists examined here, 
William James and Ferdinand Schiller) emphasized a need to shift the focus of the study of 
history as it had been traditionally too focused on the past and not enough on studying and 
applying what it means for the future. It is not just about compiling data from the past and 
learning from that data, per Deweyan thought on history, it is also about further applying those 
lessons to create a better future; to actually utilize that knowledge in the future. And this of 
course is entirely reasonable; the past is simply the past and inept if there is not something we 
can learn from it and find in it to apply to the present and the future. As Dewey writes, “The past 
is the past, and the dead may be safely left to bury its dead. There are too many urgent demands 
in the present, too many calls over the threshold of the future, to permit the child to become 
deeply immersed in what is forever gone by.”398  But, that is perhaps in reference to the past in 
and of itself (considered as an object or content, and not as an inextricable part of a continuum), 
but it does live on in the future, as he later writes, "Through habits, attitudes, dispositions, skills, 
formed in the process of interactivity with definite actual environmental conditions, past 
environmental conditions become conditions that continue to operate in future life-situations in 
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which they are not directly there-and-then involved."
399
 And again this means that fundamentally 
there is nothing fixed, and everything remains in the “process of becoming.”400 As he writes,  
And this change in point of view is almost revolutionary in its consequences. […] when 
we take the point of view of pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different 
role to play than that of reporting and registering past experiences. They are the bases for 
organizing future observations and experiences.
401
 
Thus, history is indeed useful, but mainly because it can potentially liberate us from our 
detrimental precedents and it can be applied in a practical sense to the future, which is again pure 
Deweyan instrumentalism. And the study of history is important because it helps provide us with 
“a deepening appreciation of social life,” as Dewey emphasizes.402  
As previously mentioned that Ortega famously declared similarly later in 1930, 
“Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella.403 
Ortega similarly argues that history is really a continuum, as apparent by his stress on 
how man’s being “progresses” (i.e., we can assume there is a dialogue here in the sense of the 
aforenoted "process of becoming") in the following excerpt from 1941:  
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Las experiencias de vida hechas estrechan el futuro del hombre. Si no sabemos lo que va 
a ser, sabemos lo que no va a ser. Se vive en vista del pasado. […] Ahora bien: del 
hombre es preciso decir, no sólo que su ser es variable, sino que su ser crece y, en este 
sentido, que progresa.”404  
Thus, in Ortega’s meditations on the study of history, its principal usefulness is found in 
how it is used to understand the present through speaking of not only the past, but perhaps again 
more importantly how through that we might be able to see part of the future; “[…] en las cosas 
humanas no solamente se trata de que tienen un pasado y tienen un futuro, como el mundo físico, 
sino que están hechas, en su presente, de pasado y futuro,” he asserted toward the end of the 
1940s.
405
 As he also said prior in 1947, “Recordamos el pasado porque esperamos el futuro y en 
vista de él.”406 Further, as another example of this Ortega writes, “[…] entonces la vida de cada 
cual es profecía constante y sustancial de sí misma, puesto que es esencialmente, queramos o no, 
anticipación del futuro. Y cuanto más auténtica sea nuestra conducta vital, más auténtica será la 
predicción de nuestro futuro.”407 And this is also, in fact, specifically how Ortega defines a 
“historian;” “Schlegel solía decir que un historiador es un profeta del revés, pero yo sostengo que 
eso implica también que el profeta es un historiador a la inversa, un hombre que narra por 
anticipado el porvenir.”408 Clearly, therefore, there is some forward-looking instrumentalism in 
Ortega's philosophy, being thus a point of possible conversation with pragmatists such as Dewey. 
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As aforementioned, it is said that the life of each individual has no nature in part because 
it is a continual “quehacer.” This appears to be correlated to Deweyan instrumentalism because 
it is essentially primarily forward-looking. As Lasaga Medina concisely puts it in reference to 
one part of life, our "yo;" "El yo es proyecto, futurición." As A. García supports, linking this 
directly in the following quote to pragmatist thought, “[…] Ortega infiere que la vida no tiene ni 
principio ni fin, un poco como decir que pragmáticamente el hombre es eterno en tanto quiere 
serlo […]."409 Our true essence, therefore, is our history, which is continually being made, told, 
and defined, in a ‘past-present-future’ being. This concept of seeing ourselves as history, as a 
continuum, is arguably quite pragmatist indeed as well, and it will thus be revisited throughout 
all three sections. As A. García continues, this is in part a “[…] manifestación pragmática de la 
temporalidad en tanto se constituye como un continuo advenir, una perenne procreación de 
futuros.”410 History, therefore, becomes narration; a story that essentially has no beginning or 
end, as he continues, “De ahí la meta de Ortega de construir una razón histórica fundamentada en 
la narración, no en inducir o deducir, sino <<lisamente en narrar>>.”411 Generally speaking, this 
is in part why Ortega posits that, simply stated, history attempts to understand human events, 
behavior, phenomena, etcetera, rather than explain them; "En vez de explicar, la historia trata de 
entender."
412
 And Ortega's use of the verb "to try" here is also perhaps because of the argument 
for anti-dualism inherent in this in that we cannot really get to the core of history because we 
cannot know for sure when our perspectives and resultant interpretations match up precisely and 
correctly with any true natures of history; we can only understand what we think we understand 
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and we cannot explain with absolute, irrefutable certainty. "Entender," or "understand" implies 
that there is an individual perspective present in this, making it not absolute. To "explain" is the 
"what," and "understand" is the "why," essentially, so the latter also implies more of the 
pragmatist instrumentalism of adding in pondering where we are going as well via our history. 
The "why" is interpreted from the present as to how we got to the present, where we are in the 
present, and again where we are going in the future. 
But there is yet another fundamental problem in the study of history, which is addressed 
by both Dewey and Ortega; the idea that no history can ever be recorded in an absolutely 
objective manner. And this is, therefore, another awareness that needs to be added to alterations 
in the way history is interpreted and recorded, as all thinkers in this dissertation coincide in, as 
most would agree on. As Dewey argues,  
[…] with respect to means for understanding social events, we are still living in a pre-
scientific epoch […] With respect to information and understanding of social events, our 
state is that on one side of an immense number of undigested and unrelated facts, 
reported in isolation (and hence easily colored by some twist of interest) and large 
untested generalizations on the other side. The generalizations are so general in the sense 
of remoteness from the events to which they are supposed to apply that they are matters 
of opinion, and frequently the rallying cries and slogans of factions and classes. They are 
often expressions of partisan desire clothed in language of intellect. As matters of 
opinion, they are batted hither and yon in controversy and are subject to changes of 
popular fashion.
413
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As Deen concisely interprets this notion of Dewey's, "History is not and cannot be the  
recounting of facts by unbiased spectators, as historians are inevitably concerned agents within 
history."
414
 Again this few would likely disagree with. 
 In his general philosophical theories on “inquiry,” as we saw, Dewey emphasizes that in 
general a study begins with a problem. One kind of important "crisis" for Dewey is a fracture in 
the continuity of experience. When this happens, there resultantly arises the need 'to think' in 
order to reconstruct continuity; to gain a new sense of the present and re-evaluate the past, 
present, and future. We need, therefore, to reconstruct a history. Albeit philosophical, historical, 
or any other inquiry, it begins with a problem that determines the subsequent development of the 
study. But the main concern of Dewey’s here is that the individual doing the inquiring will 
always inevitably be influenced by whatever are his or her present circumstances (the use of the 
term so prevalent in Ortega's philosophy is logically intentional here); whatever are the dominant 
principles, forms of study, ideas, etcetera, at that time. As Thomas Neill explains, quoting 
Dewey,  
And, ‘as culture changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change… History 
is then rewritten.’ Thus as the present changes, Dewey holds, the significance of past 
events also change. History will therefore ‘always be rewritten” since, ‘as the new 
present arises, the past is the past of a different present.’415 
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History is cultural and history is personal, because what it certainly is not, is objective. 
History is subjective. There are specific concerns, reasonings, and resultant interpretations from 
differing societies, cultures, and individual historians, which therefore create different 
frameworks from which to select out specific historical data to record, study, interpret, and insert 
into the continuum of what are set into our annals of history books. Perhaps it must be noted that 
for Dewey historical bias is most influenced and swayed by culture, but proposing this argument 
is not the objective of this thesis, rather the goal is to demonstrate how he might possibly 
dialogue with Ortega in this broader notion of  history being subjective.
416
 
And when interpretations of social events are investigated and reported from a 
disconnected moment in time; when they are too remote, then Dewey argues they are 
opinions.
417
 To study some thing or event as if it were a sole, complete existence in and of itself 
is to take it “unreflectively,” as Dewey argues.418 This idea of a lessening ability to grasp history 
the further back we go, such as because of lost sources, changing geographies, natural disasters, 
etcetera, is logical of course. 
This Ortega also frequently criticizes, as aforementioned, as in this example in which he 
refers to the "historical sense" ("sentido histórico") of his day that "Hemos perdido la propensión 
de buscar a toda costa la continuidad entre los fenómenos, y donde hallamos que éstos se resisten 
a ser unificados, los dejamos pulcramente separados, sin molestarlos."
419
 It must be briefly 
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reiterated here the indirect link with Ortega's theory on ideas and beliefs. To confront a crisis in 
our established beliefs we develop new ideas that re-establish the continuity in our historical 
experiences in a process that is in part influenced by his theory of generations. Ortega's 
generational theory applied here is as follows: in each generation there are certain ideas more 
prevalent than others, and which we resultantly select out because they 'function well' and they 
are 'useful,' to tie in a dialogue with pragmatism here, and that come to be deemed so integrally 
important that they are then installed as "beliefs" by that generation and for the next to come. 
Thus, the crisis ends because continuity is restored. So in reviewing history we learn about which 
ideas came to be considered particularly significant to convert to beliefs for the following 
generation(s) (among other lessons of course). 
And Dewey wrote in 1939, 
All historical construction is necessarily selective. Since the past cannot be reproduced in 
toto and lived over again, this principle might seem too obvious to be worthy of being 
called important. But it is of importance because its acknowledgment compels attention 
to the fact that everything in the writing of history depends upon the principle used to 
control selection. This principle decides the weight which shall be assigned to past 
events, what shall be admitted and what omitted; it also decides how the facts selected 
shall be arranged and ordered. Furthermore, if the fact of selection is acknowledged to be 
primary and basic, we are committed to the conclusion that all history is necessarily 
written from the standpoint of the present, and is, in an inescapable sense, the history not 
 224 
 
only of the present but of that which is contemporaneously judged to be important in the 
present.
420
 
There are many different ways in which history is selective. Historians of the past select 
specific historical data, because there are traditions or certain historical data deemed particularly 
and consistently important to maintain on record. This can be decided by the individual(s) or by 
the culture and society of the time. Again, history is historical. There is historical data that is 
particularly and individually pertinent to the historian(s) exploring and interpreting their specific 
historical inquires, and then doing the historical recording. To use Ortega's term, there is 
perspective in all this that individually siphons out specific selections of historical data. As Deen 
proposes, to lend further support to this interpretation of Dewey's philosophy on all this, 
"Clearly, the historian does not study everything simultaneously, but instead makes judgments 
that some events were more central than others. Whether a specific event lies at the center or the 
periphery is dependent upon the interpretive framework and practical concerns of the 
historian."
421
 And as Deen further reminds us, even though one may argue that historical events, 
for example, just are and cannot be altered by a historian, the subsequent judgments and 
interpretations of that history, history in general, as well as the resultant decisions on what is 
recorded and what is not (even if at times not consciously determined), is indeed influenced by 
the individual historians. 
Blau also offers a good proposal on Dewey's theory on selective history in the following 
excerpt, starting by quoting Dewey again: 
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""All historical construction is necessarily selective." History is not the reliving of the 
 complete past; this is impossible. At most, it is the reconstruction of a segment of the past 
 from a present perspective, with an eye to control of future possibilities. There are, 
 Dewey suggested, three operations of selection that enter into the writing of history. First, 
 there is a selection that was made by the people of the past, because their judgments of 
 value led to the preservation of one type of record rather than another; the historian, by 
 and large, is limited by what the value-preferences of the people who are his subjects 
 preserved. Second, there is a selection that is made by public memory, that is to say, by 
 tradition; what folk memory allowed to survive has remained available for the historian, 
 and this was determined by the value-preferences of the times subsequent to those of 
 which the historian writes. Finally, there is a selection for which the historian and his 
 own age are responsible; the problems, the data, and the hypotheses used to organize the 
 material are all of the age of the historian. The simultaneous co-presence of these three 
 groups of selected preferences suggest that three different pasts and three different 
 presents enter into the construction of an historical synthesis. An event that enters into a 
 written history is not what it was before. "As soon as the event takes its place as an 
 incident in a particular history, an act of judgment has loosened it from the total complex 
 of which it was a part, and has given it a place in a new context, the context and the place 
 both being determinations made in inquiry, not native properties of original existence."
422
  
Moreover, for obvious reasons, the ‘most accurately’ (not the accurately, for it can never 
be entirely accurate, objective, or absolute) recorded history would be that which is recorded 
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“contemporaneously.” But even then, Dewey reminds us of several factors that prevent the 
objective recording of any history, in any moment, because, and this he emphasizes that yet 
again, “All historical construction is necessarily selective.”423 As he concisely declares, “The 
notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates the events that once happened “as they actually 
happened” is incredibly naïve” (not that many would disagree with Dewey here, of course, for it 
certainly would be quite naive).
424
 But again none of this is meant to necessarily undervalue the 
discipline of history, it is just to present some key drawbacks that we should work on and focus 
on to avoid. As Hickman argues,  
All histories are selective. Facts are relevant only to the inquiry at hand. This is not to say 
 that history is whatever we make it, but that the historian is always swept forward by an 
 evolving tradition in which the present leads us to alter what we take to be the critical 
 precedents. In good pragmatic fashion, ever-developing consequences change the 
 meaning of the original event. So our past depends on our image of the present and 
 future.
425
  
This position Ortega clearly shares in a general sense when he insisted in 1947 that  
Es preciso que la historia abandone el psicologismo o subjetivismo en sus más finas 
produciones actuales andan perdidas y reconozca que su misión es reconstruir las 
condiciones objetivas en que los individuos, los sujetos humanos han estado sumergidos. 
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De aquí que su pregunta radical tiene que ser, no cómo han variado los seres humanos, 
sino como ha variado la estructura objetiva de la vida.
426
 
Per Deweyan thought, first, there are decisions made about the importance of past events; 
which should be explored and recorded, and which should be ignored. Also important to consider 
is how they should be organized. Ortega would arguably dialogue with him in this, arguing that 
the ‘thought’ of any given time forms part of the aforementioned “circumstances.”427  
Second, all history can be written from one “present,” and different “presents” may 
decide on the aforementioned criteria differently. Again Ortega would likely have an exchange 
with Dewey in this perspective, albeit generally speaking, when he avers, “[…] en cada época 
preocupan más unas cosas que otras.”428 There are different presents, because there are different, 
individual perspectives that create different realities, and therefore different interpretations of all 
that, including of course history. As Deen offers further support for Dewey's shared view on this, 
Dewey's "[...] theory of history holds that value-free, objective reporting of past events is 
ultimately impossible. Rather, historical writing is inevitably a history of the present and shot 
through with our concerns and judgments."
429
 
Third, memory in general is selective. And this is not to mention that the further back in 
history we go, generally the harder it becomes to study and interpret the past, as Ortega reminds 
us, “[…] noten ustedes que es esencial a la perspectiva histórica —como a la visual— ir 
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perdiendo claridad en razón a la distancia. Vemos más íntimamente los siglos más próximos que 
los más remotos […].”430 The author of history will have his or her own personal preferences; his 
or her own selective memory that will add to the bias of the recorded history. But especially 
important, Dewey contends, the subjectivity of the greater public at the time the history is written 
is what will especially influentially predispose the elaboration of any history, for it is the 
audience of the recorded history whose interests matter most (or else of course the historian(s) 
would fail in his or her endeavor to spark and gain attention if he or she does not reach out and 
respond to the interests and predispositions of the audience, logically). It is the memory of the 
greater public which is most enduring, but of course selective as well, along with the bias of the 
individual historian. As Deen further supports this idea here, "History is not and cannot be the 
recounting of facts by unbiased spectators, as historians are inevitably concerned agents within 
history."
431
 And he continues, because what is recorded is because it is "useful" and "valuable" 
as well;  
[...] histories are selective. Some events are picked out as data while others are not on the 
 expectation that those selected events will prove worthwhile in ongoing inquiry. [...] For 
 the pragmatist historian historical inquiry is then necessarily value-laden and selective 
 rather than Objective and value-free. This does not take place in a vacuum. Behind 
 historians and their inquiries is a broader social context that directs why they inquire. [...] 
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 The historian does not work from outside of culture, but from within one shot-through 
 with cultural problems and inherited cultural frameworks 
432
  
Fourth, Dewey also reminds us that the actual writing of history is historical itself. This is 
because the historian in a sense directs history by the way he or she selectively picks out 
historical data to study, interpret, and record. As he explains, “[…] the writing of history is itself 
a historical event. It is something which happens and which in its occurrence has existential 
consequences.”433 This is because history essentially has a “double meaning” because the actual 
act of recording history leaves its own imprint and can subsequently change the future course of 
events, as well as the contents themselves. As a particularly poignant example of this, Dewey 
references the reactions to such books of historical analyses as those written by Karl Marx; the 
reevaluation of history and its future direction has an, as we know, revolutionary impact on 
economic and political systems around the world, the repercussions of which are still present of 
course. 
And finally, a fifth key concept is that the historiographer starts with an inquiry/problem, 
which he or she tries to subsequently understand and organize, and this means that he or she will 
create and focus on a specific “historical career,” which as we have seen for Dewey implies a 
“course and cycle of change.”434 But the problem with this final dilemma, argues Dewey, is that 
this results in history being enclosed into something that starts and ends, which essentially 
history never does; it is erroneously dividing up history into “parts” or “wholes,” whereas again 
these should be considered anti-dualistic concepts for which history is unequivocally both the 
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parts and the whole as a continuum—as we shall see in greater detail, this is an important 
principle for both philosophers. The example just provided of Marx serves well here to 
demonstrate this, as even if in many places Marxism has been refuted as being a theory better on 
paper than in practice, nonetheless its repercussions are still being felt and there are still political 
and economic elements of his theory in practice in some places in the world. 
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XVI. Parts vs. Wholes in History 
Ortega posits that an “intelligible historical field” is a whole and not just its parts, 
because as has been repetitiously emphasized, history is a continuum; “[…] la cosa, cuando es 
una realidad parcial, no termina en sí misma, sino que continúa en otra, y comenzar por aislarla 
es correr el riesgo de amputarla, dejándonos fuera acaso lo más importante de ella.”435 This is 
because logically “history” is not just about one, solitary individual, for example, even when 
retelling the story of an important historical figure, but rather it is also about the collective social 
circumstances in which a person lived (this also relates to the notion of yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia). As Ortega writes, “La historia no se ocupa sólo de tal vida individual [...] cada 
vida está sumergida en una determinada circunstancia de una vida colectiva.”436 Hence, the study 
of history should, 
[…] deja de ser la simple averiguación de lo que ha pasado y se convierte en otra cosa un  
poco más complicada—en la investigación de cómo han sido las vidas humanas en 
cuanto tales. Conste, pues, no lo que ha pasado a los hombres—, ya que, según hemos 
visto, lo que a alguien le pasa sólo se puede conocer cuando se sabe cuál fue su vida en 
totalidad.
437
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Thus,  in order to understand today, we must look back upon all of the past because, “Si 
una cosa es parte es ininteligible mientras no la referimos al todo cuya es […]."438 Ortega also 
pleads that we must do, “[…] exactamente lo mismo que hicimos con la hoja [the metaphor he 
uses in this lecture], y recuerden que fue ella, la hoja, no una reflexión nuestra, quien guió 
nuestra mirada haciéndola emigrar hasta llegar a ver el árbol todo. Pues algo parejo es menester 
hacer con toda realidad histórica.”439 This is because history evolves—history does not end, as 
both Ortega and Dewey argue—history is a constant process of becoming as we have explored.  
[…] quien quiera ver un ladrillo necesita ver sus poros y, por tanto, acercarlo a los ojos, 
pero quien quiera ver una catedral no la puede ver a la distancia de un ladrillo. Nos lo 
exige el respeto de la distancia. Cada cosa nos impone una determinada distancia si 
queremos obtener de ella una visión óptima. […] el historiador miope que no sabe 
desprenderse de los detalles es incapaz de ver un auténtico hecho histórico, y nos da gana 
de gritarle que la historia es aquella manera de contemplar las cosas humanas desde la 
distancia suficiente para que no sea necesario ver la nariz de Cleopatra.
440
 
So Ortega’s proffer here is that, to reiterate, an historical analysis should be done from all 
distances, and in his day he critiques the historian’s tendency of only looking closely from one 
specifically near scope. Just like life, history can only be told "entirely" (i.e., meaning only all 
that has occurred up to the present time, but not of course in a general sense). History is like a 
song, “[…] la canción de la historia sólo se puede cantar entera—después de todo, como la vida 
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de un hombre sólo se entiende cuando se cuenta de su principio a su fin.”.441 Here by "fin," or 
"end," what he means basically is "all the totality possible." In other words, in this we also find 
antidualism in that we cannot understand via one distance without also looking from other 
distances; or, put even more plainly, one distance is unique, but also cannot exist without the 
other distances, in part because they are points of comparison that define the other as individual. 
In reference to how the "óptica histórica" (or "historical perspective") should be, Ortega 
advocates that "Tenemos que distanciarnos del prójimo para hacernos cargo de que no es como 
nosotros; pero a la vez necesitamos acercarnos a él para descubrir que, no obstante, es un hombre 
como nosotros, que su vida emana sentido" (and Ortega earlier in this writing refers to how 
human facts indeed do have sentido, or sense).
442
 
Dewey proposed a perspective that would dialogue here in 1939 when he said,  
It is absurd to suppose that history includes events that happened up to yesterday but does 
not take in those occurring today. As there are no temporal gaps in a historically 
determined sequence, so there are none in social phenomena that are determined by 
inquiry for the latter constitute a developing course of events. Hence, although 
observation and assemblage of materials in isolation from their movement into an 
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eventual consequence may yield “facts” of some sort, the latter will not be facts in any 
social sense of that word, since they will be non-historical.
443
 
The specifics (dates, figures, etcetera) within historical annals are not history, in and of 
themselves, argues Dewey. Concisely stated in 1939, Dewey claimed “[…] a single trait is only 
the beginning of a description; it is an incomplete description.”444 But neither is a defined 
“whole” course of events since history is again essentially a continuum that does not really end 
because the future is essentially also historical. “Annals are material for history but hardly 
history itself,” he writes, but nor can history be written “en masse.”445 Therefore, we cannot only 
divide up history into the past, present, and future, but we shall see it as that, and, as Dewey 
argues, "[…] the past-of-the-present, and the present is the-past-of-a-future-living present. The 
idea of the continuity of history entails this conclusion necessarily.”446 There is history as 
‘movement toward something’ in effect.447  
Dewey provides a very illustrative ‘metaphor’ of sorts for this when he ponders the act of 
simply pointing at something and asking, “what is that?” The act of merely pointing, and the use 
of the indiscriminate “that” obviously provides no clues as to how to even begin to answer the 
question. Such is the situation for researching and analyzing history in either closed parts or 
abstract wholes; in other words, again we find here an anti-dualistic perspective on studying and 
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viewing history from its parts and its wholes because the two exist as separate but 
interconnected. 
Again both Dewey and Ortega, therefore, were calling for a shift in the methodology of 
the study of history. As Ortega urges, similar to the aforementioned position of Dewey that the 
annals of history in and of themselves are not history, that because of this we need  
"[…] nuevas bases la metodología de la historia, y esperar que esta admirable ocupación 
 humana llamada <<historia>> deje de ser un cuento o, a lo sumo, una técnica  
 maravillosa —admirable, imprescindible, respetabilísima, pero… una técnica y nada 
 más—, y llegue a convertirse de verdad en una ciencia.”  
This he demanded in a lecture in Buenos Aires in 1940.
448
  
Ortega criticizes what he interprets in his day as a “lack of historical awareness,” because 
“man owes everything to his past.” Again, as Ortega famously said, and which therefore must be 
repeated to wrap up this sub-section, “Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos 
escapar de ella, no recaer en ella.”449 And so to summarize and conclude, why is history and its 
study important for Dewey? Perhaps Blau summarizes the answer to this best in the following 
excerpt: 
 The study of history, conceived in the light of Deweyan philosophy, is  instrumental to 
 the future. We do not merely, in the manner of the elementary student, learn history; nor 
 do we, in the manner of the conservative, learn from history. Instead, we employ history 
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 as a means of changing human life. "Concrete suggestions arising from past experiences, 
 developed and matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, employed 
 as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in accom- 
 plishing this task of reconstruction, suffice." Past, present, and future are woven together 
 in the fabric of creative intelligence."
450
 
 And as he also adds concisely, "We do not merely have to repeat the past, or wait for 
accidents to force change upon us. We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones 
in the future. The very fact of experience thus includes the process by which it directs itself in its 
own betterment.""
451
 
 And finally, to further connect this all to reconciling Ortega's maxim that we have no 
nature, only history, because history is our nature, Blau offers a further interesting interpretation 
on how Dewey sees this in the following additional excerpt: "Human history may be understood, 
entirely and without residue, in natural, rather than supernatural terms. What distinguishes 
human history is that it is the history of conscious beings, who are able to be aware of 
themselves as involved in processes of history."
452
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XVII. Conclusion 
As history is, most tersely stated, the study of the course of humanity, then undoubtedly 
this is a discipline of utmost importance since it impacts every one of us. Yet it is also true that 
there is no great value in a traditional structure as simply a recording of the past unless we take 
our compilation of annals and study it profoundly in an effort to learn something about ourselves, 
and our world around us; where we come from, why we are where we are today, and where we 
are going. History should be a guide of sorts, and even though we cannot say for sure if there is 
something teleological in the ‘may be partially guided’ path we are on, we can most certainly say 
that humanity has made alterations over the course of history at least in part in an effort to adapt 
to our needs and desires. Just how much we have changed, or whether or not we have truly 
changed, in our core, may be to some degree up for debate—no longer are we the barbarous 
ancient Romans throwing each other into what was then considered the ultimate entertainment of 
human beings dueling to the death, but today in some countries we still impose the death penalty 
for heinous crimes, for example, which for some is considered barbaric. We have passed through 
all sorts of political systems and technological stages that arose depending on the needs and 
desires of the time, because we have been able to see how much these needs and desires vary and 
define subsequent human history. Nonetheless, it is indeed still hard to say where we will go 
next, even when, for example, we analyze our current dilemmas in our ‘appetites’ regarding what 
we are deficient in and long for.  
Before we can conduct our analyses, we need these different developments of 
meditations or philosophies on history to gear us toward good, effective, at least questions and 
quandaries, or hopefully criteria and methodology, to consider before we begin and apply our 
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historical study. And hence the importance of the contributions of these two philosophers in 
adding to and enlarging the landscape of what should and can comprise the study of history. And 
while these two philosophers are generally rarely united in their philosophical thought (not to 
mention that they were split by a ‘very large ocean,’ especially then in philosophy since 
American pragmatism was not very popular in Europe in general at the time), and although John 
Dewey did not write nearly as much on the specific topic of history as José Ortega y Gasset, 
there is, nonetheless, a possible dialogue that we can imagine, as has been elaborated, in this 
specific connection in the anti-dualistic relationship between history and human nature as a most 
generalized key contribution to the field of historical study when also other dimensions are 
analyzed, such as their metaphysical and epistemological viewpoints. And of course this can also 
help us better understand both Ortega's philosophy, and also new takes on American 
Pragmatism. 
Therefore, the intention here, as it is for the two parts that follow, has been to elaborate a 
potential dialogue between these two philosophers, rather than draw any hard-lined, exact 
similarities between them. The effort here has been to focus on Ortega's at times confusing 
maxim of "man has no nature, only history" from a Deweyan anti-dualistic perspective in an 
attempt to clarify more on what he might have been arguing with this, while also drawing some 
correlated examples on more fundamental levels, to make this possible conversation between the 
two even stronger, such as on the metaphysics of life and reality, as well as going even further to 
the root in regards to how we think and the process of valuing. Also explored here has been the 
basic philosophical definitions on behalf of both thinkers in regards to history, experience, and 
nature, while tying all together as well in regards to what this all means for the discipline and 
study of history in a general sense.  
 239 
 
One of the main, overarching conclusions, therefore, has been that perhaps we can read 
and interpret some of Ortega's philosophy to better understand it from an anti-dualistic vision 
and position indeed (which could have been in part inherited from specifically Dewey, but the 
idea here is just to imagine how they could converse on these matters rather than speculate on 
this). And again the objective with this was to better understand what Ortega might have meant 
in part with his fundamental dictum that man has no nature, rather man has history. 
Thus, in sum, in both of these philosophers we have seen how there is a complex, anti-
dualistic dynamic between history, which are our unceasing experiences, and nature—because 
history is our nature. Neither of these philosophers are strictly on the “nurture” side of the debate 
in regards to what influences and shapes human nature and consequently human history, though 
they both esteem this to be the factor with the most clout—but precisely because our history 
contains our nature, as it is our nature; our history is our nature and everything else in our 
surroundings, and everything else that defines our circumstances. And in this we have an initial 
basis for our development of the study and discipline of history, which we will continue to 
contemplate and build in what follows. Hence the etymological roots of the term “history” from 
the Greek, which means essentially ‘inquiry and knowledge gained from investigation’—"history 
never dies," as Ortega said; history really never truly and completely ends, nor does the study or 
philosophy of it.
453
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Part Two 
Radical Empiricism and Unitary Duality  
in a Possible Historicist Dialogue  
between William James and  
José Ortega y Gasset 
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Section I: Fundamentals toward the Philosophical Historicism  
in James and Ortega 
I. Introduction 
 As was the case with Dewey, linking José Ortega y Gasset and William James's thought 
in a possible dialogue is a difficult endeavor. Not only is there very little direct evidence of 
Ortega having read and studied the elder James either, even if Ortega had any contact with 
James's (or Dewey's) work, it is unlikely that he would have necessarily admitted doing so given 
the particularly strong negative view of the United States in general in Spain during most of 
Ortega's lifetime, as we saw. As aforementioned, Ortega did make some commentary in regards 
to pragmatism in general, albeit very little, which would nonetheless imply that he was at the 
very least familiar with Dewey and James (two of the American philosophical tradition's 
forerunners). And as will be elaborated in great depth in this section, while there might not be 
much in the way of direct, pragmatist theory in Ortega's work, there is arguably a pragmatist 
dialogue that can be created between James and Ortega, just as was the case with Dewey and 
Ortega.  
 By necessity some areas and quotes will be revisited from the first section of this 
dissertation, as many of the same building metaphysical topics will be explored toward better 
understanding and constructing a philosophy of history here. And since Dewey and James were 
both contemporary American pragmatists, there are certainly areas of interest and study that 
overlap between the two as well in this effort to construct an imaginary dialogue with Ortega y 
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Gasset.
454
 And again this potential discourse will be expounded here as a means to help us better 
understand not just some of Ortega's general philosophy and especially his theory of history, but 
in particular the focus here will be again on his maxim that "man has no nature, only history." 
 As noted before, losing the War of 1898 to the United States left a bitter sentiment in 
Spain towards all that represented the so-called "yankees" in the early twentieth century, as 
would be the case in any country, because it was not only a war that was lost, but also Spain's 
very last remaining colonies as well. The defeat represented the loss of the final vestiges of their 
powerful imperialist and globally domineering past, leaving understandably an unfavorable view 
of the United States' politics, and especially in the case of this paper's purpose, the nation's 
philosophical trends of the time. The door on this period's Spanish golden age had been shut by 
the United States, so understandably it would not have been accepted, nor necessarily expected, 
for the Chair of Metaphysics, José Ortega y Gasset, at the main university in the country's capital 
to confess any leaning toward American pragmatism. As Graham proposes, "[...] after 1898, for 
a young Spanish philosopher aspiring to a national chair of metaphysics, having professed 
publicly a close affiliation with James would probably have been fatal to his reputation and his 
career."
455
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 Again this was commented on in the section on Dewey, but it is interesting to revisit this 
here to better understand and incorporate James's position in all this. Furthermore, in a general 
sense American pragmatism, and especially the brand attached to James, can certainly threaten 
religious belief in absolute truths and realities, something so ingrained in much of European 
history and culture—Spain being of course no exception to this.456 In brief, pragmatism and 
pragmatic analysis essentially yield only incomplete truths; variable "truths," or as we saw as  
Dewey so succinctly described it, "warranted assertibility." And this of course conflicts strongly 
with any sacred, eternal, and absolute truths one has in religion. James said that "[...] the absolute 
truth will have to be made," which at first glance of course seems to conflict with religion in that 
it requires proof to be obtained (something also very pragmatist), something which cannot 
always be directly achieved in regards to religious topics. Religion essentially involves 
unattainable elements, as it primarily relies on faith.
457
 Pragmatism (generally speaking), being 
fundamentally a practical, tangible, instrumentalist, and functionalist philosophy can diverge in 
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Although James does offer a strong argument on how religion and pragmatism can coexist, it is, nonetheless, hard to 
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especially during the time of James and Ortega. 
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this sense with religion, given that vitally the latter is all the opposite; it is faith-based, 
intangible, and deterministic, whereas pragmatism requires hard facts and concrete, substantial 
elements.
458
  
 But none of this is to say that pragmatism was nonexistent in Europe in the twentieth  
century, as we shall see in the third part of this dissertation it arose in various figures in Europe, 
but most strikingly in the philosophy of Ferdinand Schiller. And various studies are continuing to 
be developed on the arrival and assimilation of pragmatism in Europe, even if the arguments for 
the degree to which it had an impact varies. As Professor Pinilla from the University of Alcalá 
supports, "Y dígase que aun siendo un fenómeno estadounidense, el pragmatismo fue mucho y 
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 Stuhr is the Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, Department Chair of Philosophy 
at Emory University and editor of 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy. 
 The following quote of James describes how pragmatism, nonetheless, can coexist, to a certain extent, with 
religion: "If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense 
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bien discutido —y asimilado—en Europa." 459  However, given some of these polemical 
elements of the philosophical movement, uncovering a lot of possible impact and influence 
beyond the United States' borders into Europe can be a bit more challenging at times. Moreover, 
it can also be argued that rather than being an "American" version of pragmatism, instead what 
might have developed abroad was more a form of "European pragmatism" specifically (arguably, 
for example, this was especially true for the other major Spanish philosopher of the time, Miguel 
de Unamuno, and again this we shall see in greater depth in the third section of this dissertation 
of an imagined dialogue with the British Philosopher Ferdinand Schiller). 
 Nonetheless, despite all these factors giving pragmatism little hope of success in much of 
Europe, and especially Spain (with arguably the possible exception noted of Unamuno), a 
century later we can search for and tell a different possible side to the story. Today pragmatism is 
studied more in Europe, and not just in current scholarship, but also in reference and reflection to 
philosophy during the twentieth century. Some, such as Livingston in the following quote, even 
goes as far as to argue that this is perhaps one of the most influential philosophies to develop in 
the past century in general: "I want to argue that William James and John Dewey are better 
guides to the end of modernity than Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, who still reign as 
the court poets of the so-called linguistic turn."
460
 Livingston, in fact, as he continues here, 
specifically references Ortega, who we do know was an avid reader of Heidegger, and who as we 
have seen did at times blatantly and openly criticize pragmatism—despite some arguable 
parallels, such as an end to modern subjectivity. Livingston writes,  
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 I enlist José Ortega y Gasset, a close reader of Heidegger, to ask why that 
 accomplishment has not been adequately acknowledged—which is to ask why 
 Heidegger's version of an end to modernity has kept its accreditation. At this stage of the 
 argument, the critics of pragmatism, who invariably emphasize that metaphors of money, 
 commerce, and credit disfigure the philosophical discourse of James and Dewey, turn 
 state's evidence and make my case for pragmatism.
461
  
 The "case" of his that he is referring to is, therefore, "that the original American 
pragmatists revolutionized twentieth-century European philosophy by determining or reshaping 
the intellectual agendas of Edmund Husserl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Emile Durkheim, Georges 
Sorel, Jean Wahl, and Alexandre Kojeve."
462
 
 It could be argued then that pragmatism's reach in general into Europe has been 
underestimated. But this is perhaps a topic for another dissertation. Here that reach has been 
narrowed to specifically the Spaniard José Ortega y Gasset. As Graham suggests and supports, 
"After Unamuno, Ortega was the first notable Spanish thinker to absorb in part the "practical" 
and "useful" philosophy of the Yankees--into his metaphysics, as well as his phenomenology, 
existentialism, historicism, and philosophy of life."
463
 Of course as Graham also reminds us here, 
"proof" of Ortega's pragmatism is in part subjective of course, but as he adds,  
 As I investigated more fully, I discovered numerous connections, similarities, and basic 
 identities, so that definite influence and dependence seem much more plausible than mere 
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 "coincidence" for Ortega and James. And the dependence extends from Ortega's idea of 
 philosophy to his metaphysics and "beyond" to his work in history and the other human 
 (social) sciences.
464
 
 But at the very least, a potential pragmatist dialogue can be imagined between 
specifically William James's and José Ortega y Gasset's philosophies, as was envisioned with 
John Dewey, because in part we are simply reading their philosophies for themselves. 
 As aforementioned, attempting to connect, to any degree, pragmatism in general with 
Ortega's philosophical thought and works is quite challenging and infrequently addressed in 
current scholarship. Yet of all the pragmatist figures,  it is arguably with William James that we 
can create the strongest possible pragmatist dialogue with Ortega. But as noted in the section on 
Dewey, again the objective here is to discuss a potential dialogue rather than directly declaring 
"influence," or "direct similarities," for example, between José Ortega y Gasset and William 
James. Thus, while specific "proof" of study of the latter by the former is indeed possible, the 
aim here is to show how there could possibly be a channel of communication of sorts between 
the two thinkers and their work—in mainly just reading their work for what it is. In other words, 
the goal is to see where we can imagine a dialogue, principally to understand Ortega and his 
writings better, regardless of any specific "proof," and also in part to possibly read some of 
pragmatism in a new way. And again the specific focus in Ortega's writings will be on trying to 
better understand Ortega's historicism and his maxim that "man has no nature, only history." 
 That said, we do still have some specific evidence of some of James's works in Ortega's 
library. Specifically from James he owned the two volumes of The Principles of Psychology, as 
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well as The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, A Pluralistic Universe, and 
Pragmatism: A New Way for Some Old Ways of Thinking. And this is course just representative 
of the books he owned, because as aforementioned there is no way to know for sure what he 
might have borrowed or read elsewhere.
465
 Graham also reminds us of bibliography entries citing 
James in Ortega's work. In his suggestion, "These dates suggest that pragmatism interested 
Ortega most from around the time he became a philosopher until about 1930, which years fit 
well enough with my hypothesis and other evidence. This list is assuredly incomplete, for he 
probably read most of James."
466
 As needs to be repeated for its important emphasis, the quotes 
that will be used from Graham must be read as hypotheses, as he himself mentions here, as the 
connections explored throughout this dissertation are not only new and little researched, but also 
since they are difficult to make they must be considered 'hypothetical.' 
 So, in returning to the main focus here, fundamental in creating a pragmatist dialogue 
within specifically Ortega's maxim that "man has no nature, only history," is to again read this 
anti-dualistically; history is our nature, because the two exist as separate entities that are 
inextricably linked. As Livingston argued, proposing a dialogue here between James and Ortega, 
 James has neither ignored nor repudiated modern subjectivity and its attendant dualisms; 
 he has instead contained them within his more inclusive account. This is an achievement 
 that José Ortega y Gasset could, and perhaps should, have appreciated. He is the 
 philosopher who insisted that "our newest concept has the obligation to explain the old 
 ones, it must demonstrate that portion of truth which they contained," and who declared, 
                                                          
465
 This information was gathered by John Graham, who cites the courtesy of Señora Soledad Ortega to permit him 
to peruse Ortega's personal library. 
 
466
 Graham, Pragmatist Philosophy, p. 147. 
 251 
 
 in 1928, that "our era both needs and wants to move beyond modernity," the historical 
 moment whose "basic principle" was the Cartesian "idea of subjectivity." He is also the 
 close reader of Heidegger who hoped that the conceptual movement beyond modernity 
 was already under way in his own thinking, which was of course shaped by a three-year 
 stint in Marburg: "But suppose that this idea of subjectivity which is the root of 
 modernity should be superseded, suppose it should be invalidated in whole or in part by 
 another idea, deeper and firmer. This would mean that a new climate, a new era, was 
 beginning."
467
 
 Moreover, as will continue from the first part, this call for a "new beginning" was a 
central part of specifically Ortega's historicism.
468
 As we saw in the section on Dewey, he wrote 
at length on his plea for re-conceptualizing and redefining how we study and apply the discipline 
of history. 
 A first step that must be taken here is to situate James within the general pragmatist 
framework of anti-dualism. A fundamental explanation of how James's philosophy is anti-
dualistic in a pragmatist sense can be found in his discussions comparing and contrasting 
monism and pluralism, and the resulting conclusions he reached. Monism, argued James, is not a 
correct world view because it is too closed and rigid; the world is not one complete whole 
without separate parts. But while fundamentally, arguably, James leans more on pluralism, he is 
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not a strictly pure pluralist either. There are both unities and separate identities, generally 
speaking, that need to be upheld in the world and our views and conceptions about the world.
469
  
 This anti-dualistic perspective on how two or more things can be one and separate at the 
same time will again be key to keep in mind throughout this entire dialogue presented here. As 
James declared, in the world, "There is neither absolute oneness nor absolute manyness from the 
physical points of view, but a mixture of well-definable modes of both. Moreover, neither the 
oneness nor the manyness seems the more essential attribute, they are coordinate features of the 
natural world."
470
 And he added, "[...] total unity is the sum of all the partial unities [...] To sum 
up, the world is 'one' in some respects and 'many' in others."
471
 As James explains here, there is 
"unity," which is the "sum" of the "partial unities," or the separate parts that also have "unity" in 
and of themselves; so again separate yet connected interdependently. And as we shall see, this 
applies to everything, including, for example, events, as in a chronological timeline of history. 
History is a continuum, along these lines, that does not have a start nor a finish. There are 
individual events, and then there is the continuum of events in sequence; separate but united 
simultaneously, or anti-dualistically, like the threads of a rope (each separate thread together 
makes up the rope)—the concept we also saw in Dewey. History, as we shall continue to see 
throughout, therefore, must be approached and understood, in part, in this way: as anti-dualistic 
(and in pragmatism in general, considering it is not usually tied with any form of historicism). 
                                                          
469
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But this continuum that is history of past, present, and future is in the sense that we construct of 
it, and how we connect experiences as such. 
 Whereas there is no doubt about Ortega's emphasis on the importance of history and its 
study, James's did not explicitly write very much on the topic of history (as we saw neither did 
Dewey, and hence the lack of study of a "pragmatist historicism"). But as pragmatism in general 
has, arguably, some historicist fundamental elements, William James is no exception to this. As 
supported by Davaney, 
 When James turned to this concrete world of experience, he found a historical world. In 
 his work A Pluralistic Universe (1909), James proclaimed, "I am finite once for all, and 
 all the categories of my sympathy are knit up with the finite world as such, and with 
 things that have a history." The world of finite creatures is the historical world in which 
 there is nothing, including God, which "is great or static or eternal enough not to have 
 some history."' This focus on the world of finite reality led James to argue for letting go 
 of categories such as the absolute and philosophical perspectives such as idealism and 
 rationalism that ignore the fundamental historicity and finitude of existence. Thus, he 
 called for "exorcising the absolute" that "de-realizer of the only life we are at home in," 
 and for developing an empirically minded philosophical outlook appropriate to human 
 historical existence.' [...] It is in relation to how we know the world and how we should 
 understand our ideas about the world and our experience that James sounded his strongest 
 historicist note.
472
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 To reiterate as very important to support the imagined dialogues in this dissertation: the 
concept of "continuum" must involve time, and the "past time" of a continuum is essentially 
history. Experiences are had and accumulated over a continuum; "past experiences" are 
historical. Therefore, again logically it would follow that there is quite a historical emphasis and 
dependence in pragmatism.  
 What is "experience"? Experience, in its basic definition, involves the accumulation of 
knowledge from direct, tangible participation and observation. "Experience" thus implies time in 
that it is the accretion of events and knowledge over time. That said, experience can only happen 
in the past and the present, or the present-soon-to-be-past—and there is also a present-soon-to-
be-future as well. Hence the historical connection here, in part. And hence why this is so 
important for this paper, given the goal to create a potential pragmatist dialogue in specifically 
the area of historicism in Ortega's philosophy. 
 But again most importantly the objectives here involve not only the search to better 
understand these thinkers and their work for what they were in and of themselves, but also more 
specifically to apply new ideas to the study of history (a discipline whose importance cannot be 
overestimated, as it is a study of humanity), and the philosophy of history, with a specific 
narrowed focus on Ortega's dictum that man has no nature only history. 
 Moreover, as was the case with Dewey and Ortega, James and Ortega were relative 
contemporaries (and in the third section we will see Schiller as well), and thus arguably 
sometimes parallels can be made, in a general sense, in trends simply as a result of overlapping 
historical periods. Certainly Ortega would agree with this given his emphasis on 'our being our 
histories,' and in his philosophy on "generations" that is about how those of the same generation 
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are more similar, regardless of culture, society, ethnicity, etcetera (than those of different 
generations from the same country, for example; in other words, age brings people closer 
together to relate more strongly than anything else they might share). And as noted it does so 
happen that historically there are some years in which their lives overlap. Few would disagree 
that there is more "understanding" between those of similar ages (versus those of very different 
ages, and that closeness in generation can create more understanding than those even sharing the 
same country but being of very different ages, language being a main hindrance to really being 
able to demonstrate this better)—and this is something that only becomes increasingly true with 
the further globalization and global interconnectedness that we have in a modern day. As 
Graham tersely argues,  
 Some of the similarities between James and Ortega may be coincidence, and probably 
 several of them are [...], for both minds were working on similar problems from similar 
 principles, and both searched widely for inspiration, often in the same sources. [...] But 
 not all, nor even most, of the similarities are coincidences—especially not for views on 
 philosophy.
473
 
 Moreover, since "life is history," then biography is very important for both philosophers, 
as we have seen is the case for Ortega, and how Richardson reminds us was also true in James's 
mind, "James once observed that one should know the biography of a philosopher in order to 
understand his work."
474
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 But again the same analysis would be made nonetheless, even if this historical overlap 
were not the case, as a goal here is mainly to read their works simply for what they are, though 
also while taking into account specific evidence found in their biographies and personal libraries 
(because again this is something that Ortega deemed so important; narration, 'to study history to 
get at meaning,' to phrase this generally). In other words, despite specific parallels, this is not a 
project of direct comparison and contrast; it is about imagining a possible dialogue between these 
thinkers. 
 As noted in the previous section on Dewey, Professor John Graham will be a key source 
for simply exploring the possible dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism in general given the 
sparse research in this area. But again direct connections will not be drawn, just possible, 
imagined dialogues.
475
  
 Furthermore, it must also be emphasized that Graham sees James (and Dewey), as a 
principal influence for Ortega, which is another hard argument to make given not only all that 
Ortega studied and read in regards to philosophy, but also because in general, regardless of the 
possible connection being explored, one still cannot say with absolute certainty which ideas 
came to him originally on his own, and which from others. Graham argues for this connection so 
strongly in fact that at times it must also be added that he undervalues individual, unique 
initiative and thought in Ortega, because again we cannot know with absolute certainty what 
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influenced him and his work, and what did not. In other words, questionably Graham perhaps 
does not always give credit where due. 
 But this is what Graham argues. And of all the American pragmatists, Graham ties James 
most closely to Ortega. As he opens his argument on this, he proposes,  
 It may help to predispose readers to accept pragmatism in Ortega if they learn of the main 
 evidence here at the beginning. So many of Ortega's basic concepts (even his notion of 
 "concept" itself) were from James that in 1916 he confided to a class that his "system of 
 vital reason" has been crudely anticipated by "so-called 'pragmatism'" and by German 
 Weltanschauung theory, or Dilthey's historical "worldviews." Not until near the end of 
 his life, however, in what he called an "autobiographical" account by "historical reason," 
 did he again directly confess his early debt to James and to Pragmatism (1907).
476
 
 While explored here will be some specific potential manifestations of what that dialogue 
could consist of, the focus threading them all together will be, of course, on a philosophical 
discussion on historicism, as ultimately it will be demonstrated how some of both thinkers' 
fundamental ideas on life, truth, and reality in general can be applied to specifically a historicist 
thought, since the attempt here is to create a potential, imaginary dialogue between the two 
philosophers. The objective in this is to find yet another means to better understanding Ortega's 
thought on history, and specifically his seemingly polemical maxim 'man has no nature, but 
rather he has history.' Again, the main argument here will be to converse from specifically a 
pragmatist perspective an additional way to help better understand Ortega's meditations on 
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history. And as with the section on Dewey and Ortega, similarly a dialogue can be created 
between James and Ortega (and again between Ortega and Schiller in the next section) in which 
a pragmatist anti-dualistic interpretation may help us better understand how we can argue that 
when Ortega posits that man has no nature, only history, it is because his nature is his history 
(they are anti-dualistically interconnected, in a pragmatist sense). As Ortega phrases is: "lo único 
que el hombre tiene de ser, de <<naturaleza>>, es lo que ha sido."
477
 As will be explored, this 
can add to the discipline of history in general by bringing in another perspective on how it can be 
studied and applied. 
 The following is a brief synopsis of how this first part of this section on the potential 
dialogue between William James and José Ortega y Gasset will proceed. First discussed will be a 
brief biography on James, since one has already been included on Ortega in the section on 
Dewey.  Next there will be a discussion on pragmatism in a general sense, and how it was 
specifically interpreted and defined by William James. Then some key areas will be analyzed in 
the first section that will lay the foundation for specific conclusions on how a dialogue can be 
imagined in historicist thought between Ortega and James in the second section, as done with 
Dewey.
478
 
 In the initial section, the first of these key, fundamental areas discussed will be their 
metaphysics on life. The next section will contain an analysis on nature (given we must continue 
to ponder their views and definitions of "nature" in order to understand why this is in part 
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disregarded—but not fully—in a certain sense in the case of Ortega). Next discussed is how the 
anti-dualistic property of James's "unitary duality," or his unitary-dual principle of life-reality, 
can dialogue with Ortega, as what defines us; our lives, our realities, etcetera, is our history. 
Then there will also be a section on the two philosopher's "perspectives on perspective," given 
the importance that both place on this; on individual perspective in particular (though neither 
thinker is entirely individualist in their views, let it be quickly noted). Subsequently there will be 
a lengthy investigation toward envisioning a possible dialogue between Ortega and James in 
regards to their theories on "truth" and "reality." This will then proceed to the next general 
themes of ideas and beliefs, where another potential conversation between Ortega and James can 
be envisioned.  
 And then the second section will apply all this to specifically a historicist dialogue. Again 
there are topics and areas of overlap here with the previous section on Dewey, and as there will 
be in the third and final section on Schiller, because as the main objective is to imagine a 
pragmatist dialogue in Ortega's work, we must therefore envision an exchange on the same 
topics with the three different pragmatists. So again, the principal goal is to explore how these 
imaginary dialogues can possibly lead us to new interpretations on Ortega's work, and perhaps it 
will also shed some new light on pragmatism in general. 
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II. Biographical Backgrounds  
 As aforementioned, it is important that we consider the biographical backgrounds of both 
thinkers given that the maxim explored here is that of how "we are our histories," which would 
include that "we are our biographies." José Lasaga Medina described this importance so 
succinctly in reference to Ortega in the following part of the introduction to one version of 
Ortega's En torno a Galileo, "La vida humana es biografía y la biografía es historia."
479
 Thus, 
while the goal here is to try to understand what they were arguing, proposing, and a possible 
dialogue between the two (in other words, in part just reading their work for what it was), it is 
still important to include academic and scholarly specifics in regards to areas of possible 
dialogue. As Ortega's background has already been covered in the first section, only that of 
William James will be explored in what immediately follows. 
 William James was born almost a half century before Ortega in 1883 and died in 1910 
before Ortega had published his first book (Meditaciones del quijote in 1914). All of James's 
principal works, therefore, had been published by the time Ortega was certainly old enough to 
have potentially read them (all appeared between 1890 and 1912). James was born into quite the 
intellectual family, as growing up his household was associated with a number of distinguished 
figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. His brother, Henry James, 
would also obtain notoriety as an eminent novelist. In fact, perhaps it is hard to say which 
brother gained more fame (although whomever one argues for depends partly on their area of 
discipline and personal interest of course—but this is a topic for another paper of course). 
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 James's academic formation was quite diverse. Originally intended for medicine, James 
received his medical degree from Harvard in 1869, but eventually he shifted to Psychology and 
then Philosophy later as a professor at Harvard. Like Ortega, James quickly became a very 
popular professor, public lecturer, and scholar of multiple subjects. William James is perhaps 
best known for his writings on and work in Psychology and in helping establish Pragmatism as 
the fundamental philosophical movement in the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth  centuries.
480
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III. Defining Pragmatism per William James   
 Before delving into the specific philosophical area of historicism, first studied here will 
be, on a foundational level, William James's idea of what pragmatism is and means, and how that 
may perhaps "dialogue" with some of the style of Ortega's thought, all in a more general sense. 
 In the following excerpt William James explains the beginnings of the history of 
pragmatism as a movement: 
 The term is derived from the same Greek word [pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning 
 action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into 
 philosophy by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How to Make Our 
 Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after 
 pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develop a thought's 
 meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is 
 for us its sole significance. [...] To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, 
 then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may 
 involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. 
 Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of 
 our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.
481
  
 Long considered primarily a very "American" philosophical tradition, it has only 
relatively recently been more recognized outside of the United States even though it was known 
and studied by some abroad when it first appeared (this is a topic we will visit in greater detail in 
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the third dialogue explored here with Ferdinand Schiller, the first principal European 
representative of the movement).
482
 
 As James defines it, in "pragmatism" it is important to first ask the following question: 
"What difference would it practically make to anyone if this [any] notion rather than that notion 
were true?"
483
 And in regards to the next step in the philosophical method of pragmatism he 
responds,  
 If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically 
 the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able 
 to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being 
 right.
484
 
 Pragmatism emphasizes the concrete, empirical, facts and action. And pragmatism's view 
is essentially plastic, but without ever being entirely abstract of course. Pragmatism is about the 
more directly tangible. In a sense, pragmatism attempts to be "practical" and "realistic;" to mold 
with life and reality, arguably. As Kaila proposes is James's thinking on this,  
 We can call this way of thinking--operating rigorously in our everyday experience--a 
 logic of action, defining its basic principle thus: one must dare to face (to "risk") the 
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 chance of failure, if through this daring one can possibly attain a valuable truth (or 
 something concrete). It is easy to see how in our everyday lives we always follow this 
 way of thinking whenever we need to accomplish something valuable but uncertain.  
 [...] All life, therefore, consists essentially in daring, "risking"--life-threatening 
 experiments, in which we expose a great deal of things to risk, and a great deal of things, 
 perchance, will be won by us. Yet if we do not expose anything to risk, neither will we 
 gain anything; that, for one, is certain.  
 This primordial wisdom of everyday experience William James has elevated into a 
 philosophical principle, making it one of the corner-stones of his pragmatic philosophy. 
 At the center of each world-view is the question concerning the value of life.
485
  
 Pragmatism, as we saw in the introduction and the section on Dewey, therefore, most 
specifically emphasizes "experience." Very broadly speaking, to reiterate: essentially what we 
understand and conclude is revealed to us through experience. Something, anything, can only be 
pondered philosophically if it can be experienced. Experience is an ongoing, continuous process 
of interaction between an individual and his or her environment (which as we have and shall 
continually see in great depth arguably resonates with Ortega's central dictum that "I am myself 
and my circumstance;" "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia"). Subjects and objects are created and 
revealed in this progression and development. We cannot really begin to understand anything 
until we have had an experience with it, as we saw with Dewey, and as is the same with James. 
We should not, nor realistically can we ever jump to any conclusions without direct incident, for 
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everything needs to be discovered, explored, and learned about through specific and direct 
experience. It is through our experience with some thing that we begin to possibly understand 
that some thing.  
 This, as we shall continue to see in great depth ahead, most certainly dialogues with the 
interpretation of Blas González that follows on Ortega's definition of "the radical reality that is 
my life": "Thus to summarize, Ortega argues that only through one’s circumstance can one come 
to reflect upon oneself. This is the fundamental dialectic of the lived experience, one that 
demonstrates that it takes different situations, circumstances, and experiences for us to discover 
our “I” of consciousness."486 Here the term "experience" (which as we know is a very pragmatist 
term in this sense of it) specifically is being used to describe Ortega's yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia, arguing that through this; through our experience of this; through our experience 
in general, we come to interpret, view, and understand our realities. This is thus a common 
thread weaved throughout this paper in the three dialogues as it is a key concept in this paper's 
objectives, and as such must be reiterated. 
 It is also important to take a moment to look specifically in detail at one of James's key 
defining concepts in his philosophical work: "radical empiricism." The following excerpt 
succinctly defines James's radical empiricism in a very general sense, declaring that it, 
 [...] consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized 
 conclusion. The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among 
 philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.... The statement 
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 of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as 
 much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things 
 themselves. The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold 
 together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The 
 directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective 
 support, but possesses in its own right concatenated or continuous structure.
487
 
 Most simply stated, our understanding comes strictly from that which we experience. 
And our experiences flow continuously. Further, the transitions in between experiences are 
experiences in themselves as well, so no part of this process is without impact; it all plays a role 
in an interdependent, simultaneous existence of separate but connected processes (i.e., anti-
dualism). For James "radical empiricism" is about the continuous process of "pure experience;"  
 To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is 
 not directly experienced, nor exclude from any element that is directly experienced. For 
 such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced 
 relations, and any kind of relation experience must be accounted as 'real' as anything 
 else in the system. Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things 
 getting corrected, but a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, 
 whether term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement.
488
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 His empiricism was "radical" because it was not "dual;" there is an interdependence 
among classical distinctions such as the known and the knower because experience is constantly 
flowing. And in that non-stop flow, "Radical empiricism, on the contrary, is fair to both the unity 
and the disconnection."
489
 Again here we have anti-dualism in the existence together of both 
unity and disarray. The transitions between experiences are also constant per James. And that 
constant continuity of transitions is a type of experience itself, along with the two connections 
creating that transition. Moreover, this is "radical" because in the universe and in our 
experiences, "No one single type of connection runs through all the experiences that compose 
it."
490
 In connecting this to historicism, that this is the same as historical events along a 
continuum (experiences can be used synonymously here with historical experiences or events), 
and further we could add here the notion that this is another reason why "history does not repeat 
itself" because no event, or experience, is replicated exactly. 
 As experiences increasingly accumulate over time, this continually adds to our general 
knowledge and perception; "The universe continually grows in quantity by new experiences that 
graft themselves upon the older mass; but these very new experiences often help the mass to a 
more consolidated form."
491
 So James's radical empiricism clearly also contained a certain 
degree of reliance on the past, or history, as the collection of past experiences shape our current 
perception and knowledge— but the instrumentalist aspect should be added here that they 
continue to do so into the future as well.  
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 It should be noted, however, that James's definitions of "experience" do vary to a certain 
degree in different books of his, but perhaps that was intentional; in other words, "experience" is 
supposed to be broad enough (maybe more so than for Dewey) that it simply is 'anything that we 
think and feel, and experience, is experience' (experience is simply what we experience it to be is 
perhaps the most simplistic, essential summary of this). 
 Experience, logically, gathers from the past, it is present in the current day, and it 
continues proceeding into the future. Again there is no one, overarching experience in life in 
James's philosophy, rather there is a continuous and constantly flowing stream of experiences, 
plural. Experience is never "closed." Thus, arguably perhaps his seemingly different definitions 
were not really different definitions but rather examples, in one sense, to make his point that 
experience is simply 'everything we experience, and that we experience experience to be,' 
whether we are talking about religion, the divine,  or the subjective, objective, or both—for 
instance. 
 A fundamental statement established at the start of this dissertation is that pragmatism 
arguably inherently places an importance on "history" generally and literally speaking, even if 
this is not directly declared. We can only begin to study something through analyzing its (past) 
experiences, or past history. Again this is a specific area where we can certainly create a possible 
dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset, given his very historicist focus on the other hand. So, again, 
part of the reason for this new possible reading of pragmatism is how "experience" can 
sometimes be used synonymously with "history." 
 Perhaps the following quote best summarizes the idea of  "experience" for James, Despite 
the varying definitions in his work: 
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 Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to impress us, whether 
 spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and acts. [...] experience moulds 
 us at every hour, and makes of our minds a mirror of the time-  and space-connections 
 between the things in the world. [...] and we continually divine from the present what the 
 future is to be.
492
  
 "Experience" is not, like with empiricism, a correspondence with an event, act, fact,  
etcetera of the past; it does not refer to just the "experimented." Rather, "experience" for James is 
about the agreement and concordance between our beliefs and ideas, and a "putting into practice" 
an event, act, etcetera, and in turn its successful realization, execution—so it is more. 
"Experience" is not about a closed experience in the past, but rather it is about an experience 
open to the future as well—it is continual; past, present, and future. 
 As noted, "Radical Empiricism" is essentially at the core of James's thought and work. 
And it is directly connected to the concept of "experience" because, as we saw, "To be radical, an 
empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, 
nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced."
493
 James further explained, 
 I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions 
 concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future 
 experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an 
 hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the 
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 name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically 
 affirm monism as something with which all experiences has got to square.
494
 
 "Radical empiricism," therefore, is never closed, which is a general concept that will be 
explored as part of the dialogue plausible between  James and Ortega. As James continues, "But 
absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains undiscovered, still remains 
a Grenzbegriff [limit-concept]. "Ever not quite" must be the rationalistic philosopher's last 
confession concerning it."
495
 
 Another part of this concept that can potentially dialogue with Ortega is the inherent 
"perspectivism," which as we have seen is central in Ortega's work, and which we saw can 
arguably dialogue with Dewey as well. James writes,  
 [...] there are various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in 
 discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare 
 externality and datum to the other. [...] there may be in the whole universe no one point 
 of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. [...] There is no 
 possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact."
496
 
 So part of the reason that there is no one experience threading as common through all 
others, as we saw earlier, is because our different perspectives lead to different perceptions, 
interpretations, and therefore understandings of our experiences. Again, therefore, there is our 
experience, then there is what we think is that experience, and we cannot know for sure when 
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they coincide (i.e., anti-dualism). Further, we can each perceive a different reality; we can each 
have a different experience and resultant conclusion and interpretation on that experience, its 
meaning, etcetera. In simplistic terms, as deduced from James's final words in this previous 
quote, "we create our own worlds," which then implies that we create our own realities, truths, 
etc.; everything, in a sense, including histories. To reiterate: Ortega declared that the only falsity 
is to say that there is one absolute perspective, as James declared as well in the last sentence 
from the previous quote (i.e., "There is no possible point of view from which the world can 
appear an absolutely single fact"). And as Jose Medina explains on this, "[...] according to 
James's pluralism, there is an irreducibility plurality of different epistemic perspectives, and 
different epistemic perspectives are likely to yield different truths."
497
 Our perspectives influence 
our interpretations of everything around us, such as, as noted in this case, "truths." This idea of 
there not being absolute truths was one that James and Dewey both shared. As we saw in the 
previous section, Dewey termed his truth "warranted assertibility." Hence, the same areas we 
saw then we can argue will continue to dialogue now between James and Ortega. Compare 
James's aforementioned notion of the existence of different perspectives and how they yield 
different truths with the following summarizing excerpts of Ortega's perspectivism: "La realidad, 
pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales."
498
 And further, "El punto de vista individual me 
parece el único punto de vista desde el cual puede mirarse el mundo en su verdad"
499
 So again 
there is no one or absolute truth, as there is no one, absolute perspective; we each create our 
unique versions and interpretations of all this—and this is emphasized by both James and Ortega. 
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And in Ortega's philosophy, the more perspectives we gather together, arguably the closer we are 
going to get to any possible truths—we may not actually always necessarily arrive to any 
truth(s), but again the more perspectives, the closer we can get. This concept is scarcely different 
from that expressed in the following aforementioned quote of James: "The universe continually 
grows in quantity by new experiences that graft themselves upon the older mass; but these very 
new experiences often help the mass to a more consolidated form."
500
 Meaning, to speak 
generally, understanding becomes more consolidated and tangible the more experiences we 
accumulate—and to tie into the dialogue here, experiences are had via different and unique 
perspectives.  
 Moreover, as noted and as shall also be investigated in great depth, there is to a certain 
extent an inherent historicism in this "radical empiricism," even though James did not directly 
explore in detail historicism in his work in general (but again Ortega certainly did—hence in part 
the envisioned dialogue here). As James added in a later essay on the topic, as previously cited, 
"Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a 
generalized conclusion."
501
 He goes on to add that the postulate part of this formula means that 
element which can be debated by philosophers, which is that "drawn from experience." Further, 
"statement of fact" results just as much from direct experience as the things themselves 
experienced, And finally,  
 The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from 
 next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly- 
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 apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, 
 but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.
502
 
 "Next to next" here, in its "continuous structure" as he explains, arguably has inherent 
historicism because as it is continuous, there will be some "nexts" that become, or are, the past, 
(and some that are the present, or will become the present, and some that are the future). History 
does play a role here. To reiterate this section's purpose: putting James's radical empiricism, 
therefore, into an imagined dialogue with Ortega's historicism will not only help us better 
understand Ortega's concept of "man has no nature only history," (because history is our nature), 
but it will also enrich a possible historicist reading of Jamesian pragmatism. 
 The following basic tenet of pragmatism applies to James as we saw it did to Dewey: 
Pragmatism is forward-looking, or more specifically, it is "functionalist" and "instrumental" 
because although we are using the past to search for understanding, the objective is to learn 
something that we can apply to the future. "Theories thus become instruments, not answers to 
enigmas, in which we can rest," wrote James, "We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, 
and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid."
503
 Along with this very pragmatist 
declaration, this last piece here is interesting because as we saw with Dewey, there is an 
acceptance of a "nature," but since as he insinuates it is basically one that changes, we cannot 
really, therefore, ever get to it precisely or accurately—another point of possible dialogue 
between Dewey and James's pragmatism with Ortega that will be further explored.  
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 Thus, this all, as we shall also continually see, dialogues with Ortega's thought even if 
James does not rely as much on history as Ortega because as explored in the section on Dewey 
we saw how Ortega was still indeed forward-looking as well as these two pragmatists. "With the 
"instrumental" side of pragmatism," as Graham proposes, "Ortega obviously agreed" because 
despite Ortega's great emphasis on the general importance of history, he too argued as we saw 
that part of its value is in how it can help us shape better futures.
504
 In fact, one of Ortega's most 
famously cited quotes we saw is the following: "Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si 
logramos escapar de ella, no recaer en ella" which implies that there is an important need to 
apply historical lessons to the present and future.
505
 James cited often the dictum from 
Kierkegaard that "we live forward, but we understand backward," which resonates, 
fundamentally, the similar idea that history is important because it gives us the 'understanding' 
that we can use to help create better futures. Ortega would certainly agree with this, and this is 
both functionalist and instrumentalist in a pragmatist manner. It may be a very broad concept, 
but it is nonetheless one dominant in pragmatism, and therefore adds support to being able to 
imagine a dialogue with Ortega in these areas.  
 James wrote that fundamentally, "In the pulse of inner life immediately present now in 
each of us is a little past, a little future, a little awareness of our own body, of each other's 
persons, of these sublimities we are trying to talk about, of the earth's geography and the 
direction of history [...]."
506
 Hence, "pragmatism faces forward to the future."
507
 And 
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interestingly enough, he essentially notes how history is forward-looking at the end, making thus 
the future also historical, and history forward-looking, thereby being anti-dualistic, 
interdependent concepts. Furthermore, despite Ortega's emphasis on the importance of history, as 
we have seen he was indeed forward looking as well, as the following quote illustrates when 
Ortega similarly affirmed that "la vida es una actividad que se ejecuta hacia adelante, y el 
presente o el pasado se descubre después, en relación con el futuro."
508
 And in another instance 
he declared  (in this quote, it was to one of his classes, but we can assume that this can be meant 
for all in general), "Ustedes en este instante presente no están [....] están en el futuro inmediato, 
proyectados hacia él, atentos a él."
509
 However, the key here to be declared is that what we most 
tangibly have is the history to apply to the future, because while we may be forward-looking, the 
future remains illusive and unpredictable of course. At every moment, therefore, what we really 
have and are is our history (we are our histories, in prospective view of the future). So to put into 
dialogue James's radical empiricism and its anti-dualism projected upon experience in the past, 
present, and future, with Ortega's concept of history, this permits us in one sense to interpret the 
concept of pragmatist experience in a historicist dimension as the process of construction of 
experience in temporal fluidity, and this in turn will also add to the study of Ortega's historicism.  
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IV. On Life, Self, And Circumstance   
 In building a possibly better understanding of how 'man's nature is really his history,' the 
first piece developed here will be the two respective thinker's thoughts on life. "Life" is of course 
quite the broad topic that will in fact never stop challenging philosophers in general, but the 
analysis here will be narrowed to how this ties specifically to ideas on historicism, and to 'life as 
history' particularly. The potential dialogue we can envision is one with Ortega's metaphysics, 
and how it is particularly 'conversable' with Jamesian "radical empiricism."  
 There are basic fundamentals that we can establish about James's definition of experience 
and its relation to life specifically; for example, it is the base of reality, as there is no other reality 
than that based on experience, or other than that experienced, in life. That experienced reality, 
therefore, defines our lives—we are continuously flowing among incessant experiences. Some 
experiences are related to other experiences, through which we add to the development of our 
'understandings' (whether essentially "true" or not). 
 We can certainly imagine a dialogue here with Ortega, as we saw he, in fact, often 
explicitly uses the term "experience of life," or "experiencia de la vida." And as the following 
quote of his shows, this "experience of life" is a continuously building process, as he uses a 
rolling snowball as a metaphor here to illustrate this idea: 
 En esta experiencia de la vida que se va lentamente formando y que es como la bola de 
 nieve que conforme camina se va haciendo de su camino, y es como si se enrollase a su 
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 espalda el camino que va abriendo, se llega a ese punto que suele andar en torno a los 
 cincuenta años, en que se arriba a un estadio muy interesante.
510
 
 Just as with James's "radical empiricism" defined in the previously cited quote of his, 
again fundamental in James's philosophy on life is that it is based on experience. This is because 
"experience moulds us at every hour," as he wrote.
511
 So our experiences are constantly building 
upon one another (as in the previous metaphor used by Ortega of an increasingly growing 
snowball as it rolls); they make up our past, our present, and from that we "divine from the 
present what our future is to be," essentially, as James added.
512
 Again we see here the very 
functionalist and instrumentalist element in pragmatism in general, having also seen this idea 
with Dewey. As Murphy summarizes this so nicely and concisely, citing James as well; 
 When James speaks of the pragmatic method, he is referring to applications of this 
 principle in philosophy: It is "primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that 
 otherwise might be interminable." It can settle these disputes because "the effective 
 meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular 
 consequence, in our future practical experience." Futurity comes in because James's 
 conception of possibility is Diodorean; that is, what is possible is what either is or will be 
 actual, and what is possible for a particular person is what either is or will be actual in a 
 person's lifetime. Hence, according to James, "the whole function of philosophy ought to 
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 be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants in 
 our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true."
513
 
 Again this notion of "what difference does this make" is a key pragmatist one. As we 
shall continue exploring throughout, and as a general idea that we also saw with Dewey, the past 
is part of this continuum, or what is truly history, and this plays a major role in defining our 
selves. As Livingston supports (referring here to time, but time in part implies history, too), 
"James is, then, claiming that the vicissitudes of time are the necessary condition of the self's 
integrity as well as knowledge."
514
 For James it is not just about time bringing changes to 
individual lives and selves, but experiencing those changes are what are particularly impactful 
and influential; "Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one 
of things immediately experienced."
515
 This was key as we saw in Dewey as well; that generally 
speaking, we must, experience, recognize, and acknowledge change for it to really be 'change' 
(for example, in history and what we record of history). This is why the change itself; meaning, 
the transition space itself in between two experiences, is also an experience per pragmatist 
Jamesian thought because we need to experience it for it to be able to exist in the first place. 
 In this there is the important pragmatist aspect here that life, therefore, is "useful." Life's 
past in particular, or our histories (as well as our presents, and potential futures, and that are then 
later present, and then past), are pragmatically useful because this is where we search to better 
explore and understand our presents and our futures in our lives, meanings, and realities. So there 
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are arguably two parts to the pragmatist dialogue here that will be envisioned with Ortega again. 
The first is that life is history, and we are, therefore, our histories. And the second is that our 
life's past histories are pragmatically "useful"—hence a potential pragmatist instrumentalist 
exchange with Ortega. "Ortega had extended his search for life-reality beyond metaphysics even 
into a metahistory that was meant to be pragmatically "useful" for life," argues Graham in a 
possible interpretation relevant here for this study, "and for the human sciences. Even there 
James inspired him. "Life is always a place and a date," Ortega wrote, "...life is of itself, 
historical.""
516
 Though we saw this in the first part's dialogue with Dewey, this perhaps would 
exchange more smoothly with James, which is why it must be revisited here. 
 "Life" for James is often interpreted to be something very individualistic, given, in part, 
this emphasis on individual sets of experiences that shape personal histories. However, his 
philosophy should not be interpreted solely as individualist, as there is not only a very important 
social factor in all this in regards to present and immediate circumstances, but also in regards to 
those handed down to one by his or her ancestors (even though this, arguably, is simultaneously 
something 'individual' as well). In other words, we are influenced in part by other, external 
experiences around us at any one time, as well as in part from those that we inherit. This was the 
case for Dewey as well, as was explored in the first section. James writes,  
 In its widest possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call 
 his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and 
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 children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and 
 yacht and bank-account.
517
 
 Arguably, as we shall continue to see in depth, these texts could dialogue with Ortega's 
view of "circumstance" (circunstancia), as some of what James cites here are circumstances that 
can surround and impact an individual at any given time. Or more succinctly, James wrote that 
"Not only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric 
social way."
518
 So clearly his philosophy is not entirely individualistic, as there are both 
individual and social elements that define a person's life, as we saw was also true for Dewey. The 
resultant sum total combination may be 'individualistic' in the sense that it is a unique 
amalgamation, but that does not mean, as we shall see Ortega argues as well, that there are not 
overlapping social factors and elements within that incorporation that some individuals may 
share also, and as we saw was the case with Dewey.  
 Ortega also wrote that there are both individual and social factors present when defining 
"human life," as is clear in the following quote:  
 [...] la teoría de la vida humana es, por lo pronto, teoría de la vida personal. Pero dentro 
 de nuestra vida personal encontramos no sólo a otras personas individuales como 
 nosotros y que no dan lugar a una disciplina diferente de aquella, sino que las 
 encontramos juntas en un conjunto, el cual es distinto de cada una de ellas y de todas, 
 tomadas una a una; es el conjunto que llamamos sociedad o colectividad. España no es 
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 ningún español ni es la serie de todos los españoles singularmente tomados, sino que es 
 una realidad distinta de cada uno de ellos y con la que cada uno de ellos se encuentra 
 fuera de sí y hasta dentro de sí. [...] pero sí importa decir que sin una teoría 
 perfectamente clara de los fenómenos sociales y colectivos es imposible nada que de 
 lejos merezca llamarse ciencia histórica.
519
 
 In other words, we can certainly be unique and yet similar with others at the same time, 
because there are so many circumstances surrounding us at any one time, some of which we may 
share, and others we may not.
520
 This sounds quite anti-dualistic indeed. But as will also continue 
to be explored in depth, in part what can make us especially distinct are our perspectives that 
result from our realities as 'self and circumstance.' We can be, in fact for Ortega we need to be, 
individuals, but within our limited circumstances (some of which we share, socially); "El hombre 
es afán de ser," he wrote, "—afán en absoluto de ser; de subsistir— y afán de ser tal, de realizar 
nuestro individualísimo yo."
521
 So there is a limited sense in which we are both individual, and 
social, for both Ortega and James, as Medina supports in the latter's case, "James's philosophy 
seems oriented toward the individual and her experiences, but not so much toward interpersonal 
relations. However, despite his recalcitrant and unqualified individualism, I want to argue that 
there is a strong social element in James's philosophy."
522
 As just quoted, James wrote that 
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people, places, things expand our "selves," as social beings, so clearly Medina argues well in 
noting the social element also present in James despite his emphasis on the additionally present 
role of individualism.
523
  
 As has also been discussed in the potential dialogue between Ortega and Dewey, one of 
the key ways to define "life" for Ortega is as "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia; "yo soy 
yo y mi circunstancia"); life is like anything from which one can 'peel' off various 'circumstances' 
that encompass a core 'self.' An onion and its layers serves as a good metaphor here.
524
 As we 
have seen, most broadly and succinctly stated, therefore, for Ortega life is the self and the world. 
As we saw, life is composed of two inseparable dimensions; one in which each is the self and 
circumstance living and working within and among that reality, and the second which is to figure 
out what that circumstance is; meaning, put into simplistic words, what we should do with our 
lives.
525
 So there are two dimensions that are mutually existent; just as we each subsist among 
circumstances, and those are our circumstances, we live among those circumstances and we 
become aware of living among those circumstances, as yet further ways to describe how this is 
both social and individual. Most fundamentally, the notion of "circumstances" implies in part a 
social element. Some of those circumstances are shared with others, and in sum they make up 
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unique sets of circumstances for each individual, so again there is both the social and individual 
element. 
 Ortega's notion of our various such dimensions is scarcely different from James when he 
argued that, 
 Thus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors, —the 
 individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiological and infra-social 
 forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands; and, second, 
 the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts. 
 Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the 
 individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.
526
 
 Moreover, here James clearly notes an argument for the interplay between the individual 
and the social, or in his specific terms, the individual and the community (which could dialogue 
as such with Ortega's yo soy yo y mi circunstancia). And hence Greeve Davaney's supporting 
argument here that 
 James, over against these, sought to articulate a mediating position that he came to term 
 radical empiricism, which offers a portrayal of a pluralistic universe of multiple but 
 connected concrete realities. The vision James developed was of a universe composed of 
 a multiplicity of particular realities. Empiricism also emphasized an interpretation of 
 reality composed of discrete perceptions. Where James differed was to insist that these 
 multiple individual realities are always in relation with one another; they are not separate 
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 entities existing side by side but without connection. Instead, the universe is the dynamic 
 conglomeration of units of reality and experience that are connected with one another 
 without losing their individuality. The universe is not a container holding static realities. 
 Instead, it is the very flow of experience, the dynamic interaction of concrete realities. 
 James thus used words like flow, flux, and pulses, and he repeatedly referred to the 
 continuous changing character of reality. "What really exists," for James, "is not things 
 made but things in the making."
527
 
 To summarize here then, this idea of life as self and world can perhaps dialogue in a 
pragmatist, anti-dualistic manner between James and Ortega. As we saw, life, argued Ortega, is a 
"radical unitary duality," to use the term Graham developed.  As one example excerpt of this, 
Ortega wrote, "[...] lo que nuestra vida sea depende tanto de lo que sea nuestra persona como de 
lo que sea nuestro mundo."
528
 Life, therefore, depends on, is shaped by, both person and world. 
In this effective example to apply here, Ortega affirms that 'to live' is "esa sorprendente 
presencia que su vida tiene para cada cual: sin ese saberse, sin ese darse cuenta, el dolor de las 
muelas no nos dolería. [...] Es el descubrimiento incesante que hacemos de nosotros mismos y 
del mundo en derredor."
529
 We have to be "individual" or else we would not realize things, such 
as the pain of molars in this case, but these things take place on the stage that is the world.  
Arguably James's "unitary duality" is "anti-dualism," because it is representing here the 
generalized idea that there can be two (or more) and one interdependent simultaneously. 
"Unitary" for Ortega we can argue is "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia). And "duality" 
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for Ortega we can argue is "self and circumstance" (or world as circumstance) as separate 
elements. In other words, self and world, as two separate entities, are united into one radical 
reality that is inextricably "self and circumstance;" "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia." A metaphor 
that Ortega used for this was a "ginkgo tree," arguing how just the same there is one ginkgo tree 
(I am self and circumstance) with two equal branches (self and world, separately, but the 
branches are of course tied to just one tree).  
 The one ginkgo tree with its two equal branches supplemented Ortega's metaphors on life 
 as "unitary duality: two aspects of the same basic philosophical reality. Although the 
 duality to which he directly alluded with these metaphors was the "root" (meaning 
 "radical") unity of life comprehending the duality of self and circumstance, it seems 
 logically necessary and aesthetically symmetrical to carry that initial structure of "unitary 
 duality" over into the development of his philosophy, into its obvious duality of stages, 
 vital and historical.
530
  
 A tree really does provide a good metaphor of anti-dualism since it has many individual 
parts; branches, leaves, roots, all connected together into one tree. "Life provided that unity, but 
life itself was dual—on several levels at once," argued Graham, as there is a "'coexistence' of self 
and circumstance."
531
 Life is the "radical reality" because it is the origin of all others, not because 
it is the highest and most supreme reality. This is life's radical unitary duality. And this, averred 
Graham, was in part inspired by James, as a supporting argument for this dissertation's vision of 
a possible dialogue; "Of course James had already given him a convenient rationale for a 
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philosophy from life that represented a "radical unitary duality." So had Goethe."
532
 Graham 
even went as far as to argue that Ortega had a "basic debt to James" for this "view of life as basic 
(and double) reality" (i.e., "radical unitary duality" and the "self balanced with circumstance").
533
 
But the objective here is not to argue, as Graham does, that this came directly from James, it is 
rather to again imagine a possible dialogue between James and Ortega on these concepts, for 
which the arguments of Graham lend support to the ability to envision this possible exchange. 
That said, it should also noted that at no point does this paper argue such a direct inheritance as 
Graham does; in fact, there is no "inheritance" meant to be argued here, because again the idea is 
to just imagine ways in which Ortega might converse with three pragmatists, as here with 
William James, but not which figure had which ideas first, or who influenced whom. 
 In a general sense, this form of pragmatist anti-dualism of life as 'radical unitary duality' 
is conversable with the following additional description of "life" according to Ortega: 
 He aquí cómo hoy nos aparecen bajo nuevo cariz esos dos modos de la vida que son la 
 soledad y la sociedad, el yo real, auténtico, responsable y el yo irresponsable, social, el 
 vulgo, la gente. Y de hecho nuestra vida va y viene entre ambos modos y es en cada 
 instante una ecuación entre lo que somos por nuestra propia cuenta —lo que pensamos, 
 sentimos, hacemos con plena autenticidad— y lo que somos por cuenta de la gente, de la 
 socieded.
534
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 In other words, yo soy yo y mi circunstancia as the "radical reality" that is one's "life" can 
arguably be directed toward a potential pragmatist dialogue, as in the previous excerpt he is 
clearly saying that one can be, generally speaking, 'two things which are separate but coexist 
together inextricably' (as in the individual and the social), which is the general pragmatist anti-
dualistic concept explored in the first section as well on Dewey. 
 Moreover, a further pragmatist dialogue can be established here in the use of the terms by 
Ortega, as we have seen, of "experience of life" (experiencia de la vida). "Experience of life" is 
both individual (myself) and collective (society, and all the other circumstances surrounding 
"myself"). The "saga" that is this continuously building experience of life is what makes up our 
histories, and therefore ourselves—hence what we have is history, most importantly, as the main 
thesis here; this is our 'nature.' And it must be repeated how "pragmatist" this application and 
definition of the concept "experience" can be interpreted to sound. As Ortega argued, 
 Porque esto que he llamado experiencia de la vida personal, por mecanismos que no voy 
 ahora entretenerme en enunciar, se amplía a la experiencia de la vida colectiva del pueblo 
 a que uno pertenece. Y aún más: a través de ese pueblo se amplía a experiencias de todo 
 un proceso histórico humano que la memoria de nuestro pueblo o del conjunto de pueblos 
 a que el nuestro pertenece ha ido conservando.
535
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 So again the idea here is that for Ortega, the "experience" of something outside and 
unrelated to a concrete perspective, and that is free and independent of any perspective, does not 
exist, regardless of whether or not it is personal or universal. We do not "pick" all our 
perspectives, nor are we always directly conscious of them, per Ortega. We are always installed 
in our perspectives; we always see and perceive reality from a concrete, specific perspective 
(whether general or individual) for Ortega. Reflection or 'reflective reason' is nothing other than 
one of the many perspectives with which each human being relates to and with reality, but none 
are the only ones or the only "true" one(s). This is why Ortega says, "Y también esa imagen o 
figura del proceso histórico universal se va formando, (…) al cabo de los tiempos, 
automáticamente y sin que intervenga o apenas intervenga nuestra reflexión," because we can 
perceive reality and create for ourselves an image or notion of the historical process via vital 
perspectives, as opposed to rational or non-reflective perspectives.
 536
 This, of course, is not to 
say that we proceed forming an idea of the historical process "automatically," without reflecting 
on it, or without being conscious of historical process and its effects. Meaning, it is not the same 
to say that we are "installed" in some beliefs that we receive (and that we do not reflect on them 
or ponder them, as they are more 'subconscious') as it is to say that we have some "ideas," some 
of which we are conscious of, reflect on, and ponder rationally (such as in historical reason). 
Here indeed is an interesting point of dialogue with James's position on "experiencing 
experience."  
 For Ortega, life is a happening, it is a becoming; it is something not fixed nor static. Most 
fundamentally, life is the accumulation of history; that of our own histories, that of those before 
us from whom we inherit some history, and some of the history surrounding us. We could 
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arguably re-phrase this here that life is also the history of experiences. Life is in constant flux, 
and hence the dictum that man has no nature, only history (because history really is here 
something in constant movement and progression as a continuum, hence it is really not closed 
partly because it lives on in the present and future). Life is both unique, particular, individual, 
and yet also general, worldly—life is "anti-dualistic" as the pragmatist term implies. Again 
Graham offers the suggestion that this comes from James, which is included here not to argue for 
this direct influence but rather to show that there is some agreement that at the very least a 
dialogue can be imagined between Ortega and James;  
 [...] he defined life in a very Jamesian way: this strange, neglected reality was not a thing, 
 neither physical nor psychic, but was a dramatic "happening." Of itself, life has 
 "structure" that consists in "connections," not just individual and concrete but also 
 general and formal—among the more basic and important of which are the "beliefs," 
 even the doubts, in which we live.
537
 
 Again, in life there is history, not nature, because it is a 'continuously progressing 
process;' there is nothing static or fixed in life. This idea of life being essentially a continuum 
(and therefore of course history as well when incorporating the constant stream of "parts" in this) 
is therefore indeed a dialogue that can be envisioned between James and Ortega. As the 
following additional example that Graham cites illustrates: 
 Consider, for example, James's statement: "The essence of life is continuously changing 
 character; but our concepts are all discontinuous and fixed..." Compare that with Ortega: 
 "Human life is thus not an entity that changes accidentally, rather the reverse; in it the 
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 'substance' is precisely change..." And he had just said that concepts of nature (including 
 "human nature") were (for "intellectualism") of things "fixed, static, predetermined."
538
   
 Change, flux—this continuum present in life is indeed a topic of possible dialogue 
between James's pragmatism and Ortega's historicism, as we saw it was between Dewey and 
Ortega.  
 Furthermore, James's radical pluralism can potentially dialogue with Ortega's concept of 
"self and circumstance", as the following additionally supportive analysis by José Medina 
proposes: 
 James's radical pluralism is based on a theory of relationality according to which nothing 
 can be understood in and by itself, but rather in relation to other things, in a network of 
 relations. On this relational view, the identity of things is concocted in a network of 
 interdependences; and to have a sense of self is to have a sense of the dependences that 
 compose one's life, for we can understand the identity of something only by grasping the 
 fabric of relations in which that thing appears.
539
 
 So again we have further argument for the social element present in James's philosophy. 
We could say here, along these Jamseian lines, "I am myself and my network of 
interdependences." Key here is the term "interdependent," as it implies both dependence and 
independence, but intertwined inextricably as one (i.e., anti-dualism). We cannot be just 
ourselves, because we are ourselves and all that surrounds us—this, therefore, can arguably 
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dialogue with Ortega's dictum "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia," helping us envision how this could 
be understood more clearly as something anti-dualistic. 
 In James's radical empiricism, self and world are two individual elements that cannot 
exist without the each other. Just the same, there are not just wholes and parts, but essentially 
both. James's radical empiricism emphasized time and space. So again here we have two more 
possible parts to a dialogue between James and Ortega on life, reality, and how we are our 
histories. First, James did not separate self and world, but acknowledged that the two exist anti-
dualistically, just as "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia." So again this paper's imaginary dialogue 
enriches studies on Ortega by proposing that this central tenet of his could arguably be labeled 
"anti-dualistic" because our yoes and our circumstances are separate entities but that are 
constantly connected interdependently at all times to make up our realities, our lives, and our 
histories. And second, the best means we have to try to investigate and comprehend all this is 
through the study of history, as James emphasized "time and space" in this while Ortega 
explicitly argued that "we are our histories." Again, as Graham suggests,  
 He [James] refused to separate self and world, which were bound together by a variety of 
 conjunctive relations starting from merely "to be with," and going on to include such 
 terms as time and space, like and unlike, continuity and discontinuity, or disjunction. 
 Possibly it was from this conjunctive relation of "being-with" that Ortega derived his 
 ideas of "self and circumstance" in 1913 and convivencia ("living-with") as a Spanish 
 equivalent. [...] Thus Ortega turned the phenomenon of life implicitly toward history—all 
 consistent with what James implied by his emphasis on "time and space."
540
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 This aforementioned proposition by Graham argues almost exactly the thesis presented 
here of a prospective dialogue between the two arguing anti-dualistically that life is history and 
that history is our nature.  
 For Ortega, we are not our natures because we are more than our natures; we are 
ourselves and the circumstances surrounding us because they restrict and define us because of 
those limitations, and our unique choices of which to address or not, and which to maneuver 
among. Moreover, again as explored in the section on Dewey and applicable here as well, one's 
history also implies one's nature, since it can also involve what one literally "inherits." So here 
we have again the basic pragmatist dialogue; life is anti-dualistic; this is our anti-dualistic human 
reality because the two, life and circumstances, are interdependent, though they are two 
elements, as again our lives are defined as “ourselves within our lives’ circumstances." And we 
are constantly maneuvering among our lives' circumstances, which is why life, for Ortega, is a 
continual "quehacer."
541
 Ortega often writes that "man is the novelist of himself" because he 
must choose, within the circumstances he was in many instances uncontrollably placed in, how 
to direct his life, and, in fact, he must do so. There is a limited freedom, therefore, in life, which 
is a topic we saw in the first part and is particularly important in the third dialogue with Schiller. 
As Molinuevo helps propose here,  
 [...] vida es historia. Efectivamente, afirma Ortega que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, 
 sino historia, y eso significa que su trayectoria vital, teniendo siempre un trayecto, no lo 
 tiene predeterminado, como es el caso de la bala, ejemplo que cita con frecuencia. La 
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 vida no es algo hecho sino por hacer, que da mucho quehacer. Porque lo que nos pasa no 
 está en nuestras manos, pero sí lo está darle un sentido vital nuestro. Lo importante para 
 Ortega no es lo que se vive, sino cómo se vive, ese estilo de vida, sobre el que insistirá 
 mucho luego cuando aborde la vida desde la biografía en la razón histórica. El sentido 
 vital consiste en los proyectos, programas vitales que el hombre elabora con su 
 imaginación y lo que convierten en un novelista de sí mismo, como si fueran diferentes 
 personajes de su vida. Pero no todos son iguales, y entre ellos están los que se acomodan, 
 encajan, con ese proyecto vital que tenemos que ser y al que llama vocación. Cuando 
 encajan entonces se vive auténticamente.
542
 
 So again, as has been elaborated, Ortega is not denying, per se, that we do not have a 
nature, or that we are not also individuals. He is saying that history is our nature because it is a 
continuum, as again our lives are defined as ourselves within our lives’ circumstances and the 
maneuvering movement that is constantly defining and re-defining, and constantly creating and 
re-creating, our histories, or our lives. To repeat: "En suma, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, 
sino que tiene… historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia—
como res gestae—al hombre."543 Or as succinctly translated in an English version; “[…] the past 
is man’s nature.”544 And this is because, as has been explored, it is through history that we can 
begin to try to comprehend and envision an individual's life since the past can be more 'tangible' 
and 'concrete' than the present or future (the present can of course be to a certain extent 'tangible' 
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and 'concrete' as well, but not as much as the past, and perhaps in part because the present 
actually becomes past as we say it, so it is also the 'past' in this sense). As Molinuevo further 
argues, "[...] no se trata tampoco de analizar la <<historicidad>> del hombre, sino de acudir a su 
historia como medio para acceder a su vida."
545
  
 As articulated in the section on Dewey, for Ortega, the most basic reality of man is 
simply life and to live; "la situación del hombre es la vida, es vivir".
546
 And life is history. As 
quoted previously, Ortega defines life succinctly in the following excerpt: 
 ¿Qué es, pues, vida? No busquen ustedes lejos, no traten de recordar sabidurías 
 aprendidas. Las verdades fundamentales tienen que estar siempre a la mano, porque sólo 
 así son fundamentales. [...] Vida es lo que somos y lo que hacemos: es, pues, de todas las 
 cosas la más próxima a cada cual. [...] La vida es lo que hacemos y lo que nos pasa.
547
 
 It must be noted here that when Ortega says "lo que nos pasa" (what happens to us, or 
our history we build) is part of life, this could, again, arguably be interchangeable with the term 
"experience." For Ortega we begin our lives essentially 'free to be,' but within the limits of the 
'circumstances' surrounding each one of us, which as we have seen, some are unique, and some 
are shared with others. So we do have a certain amount of freedom, but it is also limited—we are 
"free" only to maneuver among the circumstances we are surrounded by, some of which we have 
no control over choosing; it is, in other words, a "limited freedom" (again this is a topic that will 
be envisioned as conversable with another pragmatist's view in the third section of this 
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dissertation, that of the British Philosopher Ferdinand Schiller, as it is yet another central 
pragmatist tenet and therefore as such it must be revisited). As Molinuevo concisely explains 
this, "[...] vida es libertad (elección de posibilidades) en la fatalidad (no hemos elegido la 
circunstancia), lo que dota a nuestra vida una dimensión dramática y trágica."
548
 So really we are 
simply re-defining freedom as a "limited freedom." As Ortega writes, "Dentro de la fatalidad de 
vuestra circunstancia sois libres; más aún, sois fatalmente libres porque no tenéis más remedio, 
queráis o no, que escoger vuestro destino en la holgura y el margen que os ofrece vuestra fatal 
circunstancia."
549
 There is a "margin" as Ortega notes, so freedom is limited by our 
circumstances. Again, circumstances exist in interaction with our selves or yoes, and at any 
given time each individual has a unique "circumstance" in regards to a distinct set of 
circumstances in this relation.
550
 
 Life is a continuous decision-making process in regards to what we are going to be, and 
what we are going to do, according to Ortega, so it is, therefore, in a constant state of flux; "[...] 
la situación del hombre, la vida, es desorientación, es estar perdido," as he says on numerous 
occasions.
551
 This is why man has no nature, in the limited traditional sense of the term, because 
there really is no "present, permanent being," as we are constantly living amidst a decision-
making process to shape who we are going to be and what we are going to do in our search for 
our "authentic selves" and our "authentic individual vocations." "[...] this metaphysical 
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character," proposes Rodríguez Huescar, "like any other having its foundation in one and the 
same basic structure, turns human life into something unique and thus irreducible to any form of 
"life" belonging merely to the "biological order."
552
 And as Blas González further posits, this is 
what makes man a historical being; "Man is a historic being in the sense that he is faced with the 
task of forging a history for himself."
553
 González further argues how this essentially is anti-
dualistic, supporting, therefore, the analysis proposed here in this thesis of a dialogue with 
pragmatism in Ortega's philosophy:  
 Authentic life, according to Ortega, is always striving toward individuality and 
 concreteness. Hence, to live is to create and re-create the totality that is the universe. This 
 is why life is in essence a drama or aesthetic creation that should attempt to re-create the 
 ideal that man carries within him as a heroic or tragic being. Thus human life is always in 
 the process of individualization. Yet this individualization can never take place apart 
 from our individual circumstances that frame and shape our being. Therefore, life is 
 coexistence-with-things as well. The unifying structure of life is to be seen in the 
 individual perspective, which organizes reality rather than deforming it.
554
 
 Dialogue can also be imagined with James in this idea of life being essentially 'thrown at 
us.' As was quoted in the section on Dewey as well, Gray argues in his biography on Ortega that, 
"Life, he was wont to say, comes at us "point blank," demanding immediate response. In this, 
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Ortega was closer to William James and John Dewey than to Plato, Leibniz, or Kant."
555
 This is 
precisely how Ortega defines "to live" in the following quote, as "[...] encontrarse de pronto y sin 
saber cómo, caído, sumergido, proyectado en un mundo incanjeable: en este de ahora. Nuestra 
vida empieza por ser la perpetua sorpresa de existir, sin nuestra anuencia previa, náufragos en un 
orbe impremeditado."
556
  As James explicitly argues, "Reality, life, experience, concreteness, 
immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it."
557
 And he 
continues, defining life in one instance as follows: 
 The essence of life is its continuously changing character; but our concepts are all 
 discontinuous and fixed, and the only mode of making them coincide with life is by 
 arbitrarily supposing positions of arrest therein. With such arrests our concepts may be 
 made congruent. But these concepts are not parts of reality, not real positions taken by it, 
 but suppositions rather, notes taken by ourselves, and you can no more dip up the 
 substance of reality with them than you can dip up water with a net, however finely 
 meshed. [...] whereas in the real concrete sensible flux of life experiences compenetrate 
 each other so that it is not easy to know just what is excluded and what not. Past and 
 future, for example, conceptually separated by the cut to which we give the name of 
 present, and defined as being the opposite sides of that cut, are to some extent, however 
 brief, co-present with each other throughout experience. The literally present moment is a 
 purely verbal supposition, not a position; the only present ever realized concretely being 
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 the 'passing moment' in which the dying rearward of time and its dawning future forever 
 mix their lights. Say 'now' and it was even while you say it.
558
 
 This last sentence really highlights how every moment, every reality, therefore, is 
essentially always past, or always "historical." Yet of course also true to instrumentalism in 
pragmatism, every moment is focused on the future as well, because logically that is what we 
live towards—we understand backwards and live forward, to paraphrase again Kierkegaard's 
useful and applicable referenced notion here.  We can most certainly envision a dialogue here, 
therefore, as Ortega also uses the terms "concrete" to refer to experience, and he also promotes 
the idea that the "present" is not just the "now" but also the past and the future; "[...] la vida es 
puntual, es un punto: el presente, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y todo nuestro porvenir."
559
 
Ortega often said that we have to 'decide what we are going to do with our lives and be in our 
lives in every moment' ("[...] tenemos que decidir lo que vamos a ser [...] A esto llamo 
<<llevarse a sí mismo en vilo, sostener el propio ser>>"), so there is also always this sense of the 
present as "going-to-be;" a very pragmatist concept explored in both James and Dewey.
 560
 
Hence why life is history, not nature, because it is always in a flux between past, present, and 
future (as the present can also be considered the present-becoming-the-past-focused-on-the-
future, what we have of course for study and identity is the past; what we have been and done; 
what we have experienced).
561
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 So Ortega's metaphysics can dialogue with James's "radical empiricism." As 
aforementioned, James's "radical empiricism" is very pragmatist in the sense that in order to 
ponder and/or understand something, it must be experienced.
562
 As we have seen, in James's 
philosophy, life, and all that we contemplate and comprehend in life, is gained through 
experience. Experiences are constant. Life is, thus, experience. As needs to be repeated, 
therefore, to support this imaginary dialogue, Ortega says this as well that life is the experience 
of life;  "[…] resulta que la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la vida."563 "Experience" for 
James, as we saw is also the case for Dewey, is "anti-dualistic," as his metaphysics of radical 
empiricism was anti-dualistic as a whole.
564
 In other words, again experience and life are 
separate but united; life is defined by our experiences, and life brings us our experiences, so 
while they are two different parts, one, nonetheless, cannot exist without the other, as one vision 
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and example of this anti-dualism.  This is indeed the case for pragmatism, but again is this also 
true for Ortega? Can we apply this pragmatist idea to Ortega? Again what we can imagine is that 
if he were to converse with James on this, he would likely agree if we were to swap the term 
"history" for "experience." And in the other direction, James would likely respond in agreement 
considering that there is history inherent in the basic, fundamental concept of experience, as has 
been reiterated here. 
 So as we shall again continue to see in great depth, since experience accumulates in the 
process of defining our lives, this implies essentially history, so life is most fundamentally 
history, and, therefore, what we primarily are is our histories. Again experience, or history, and 
life, are anti-dualistic along pragmatist lines. As Wilshire argues in support of this, "James (and 
John Dewey as well) knew that we should not use atomic, or "single-barreled," terms such as 
experience, percept, concept, but rather dynamic "double-barreled" ones, for example, 
experiencing-experienced, perceiving-perceived, conceiving-conceived."
565
 We have an 
experience in the present (i.e., experiencing), which we then use and apply in the future (from 
that 'present' moment) to reflect on, so therefore it becomes the past (i.e., experienced) as one 
possible way of looking at this.
566
 To reiterate: what is generally known, therefore, is 
'experienciable.' And experiences add to one another, constantly layering on top of one another, 
to provide us with our general knowledge, realities, and identities. This emphasis on the addition 
of experiences to other experiences has of course again, logically, an inherently historical nature 
to it, as it in part refers to the 'past'.  
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 In a sense there are two stages in the process of experience per James's thought; first 
there is "pure experience," which is sheer, raw sensation, and then next there is our conscious 
awareness of that experience (a bit like how Dewey similarly labeled "primary" and "secondary" 
experience, respectively). In Essays in Radical Empiricism James provides the simple example 
of a pen to illustrate this, and how there is the physical nature of something ("So far as in that 
world it is a stable feature, holds ink, marks paper and obeys the guidance of a hand, it is a 
physical pen") and its personal relation to us ("coming and going with the movements of my 
eyes, altering with what I call my fancy, continuous with subsequent experiences of its ‘having 
been’ (in the past tense), it is the percept of a pen in my mind. Those peculiarities are what we 
mean by being ‘conscious,’ in a pen"). Meaning, this is how something can be both subjective 
and objective simultaneously, and in regards to how we gain our conscious awareness and 
knowledge about this.
567
 Further, he refers to Kierkegaard's view here again that "We live 
forward but we understand backward"—and hence once again the emphasis on history in all this.  
 In fact, in his book Principles of Psychology, Volume One, James provides a very 
illustrative example of the importance of our history of our experiences in shaping who we are 
and our lives, when he discusses the case of when, for one reason or another, one loses their 
memory, they become in part a 'new person,' logically.
568
 The following excerpt helps illustrate 
his conclusion on why this is so important:  
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 This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I 
 distinguish my Self. Myself is the person who had that series of feelings, and I know 
 nothing of myself, by direct knowledge, except that I had them. But there is a bond of 
 some sort among all the parts of the series, which makes me say that they were feelings 
 of a person who was the same person throughout [according to us this is their ‘warmth’ 
 and resemblance to the ‘central spiritual self’ now actually felt] and a different person 
 from those who had any of the parallel successions of feelings; and this bond, to me, 
 constitutes my Ego.
569
 
  In this excerpt we see a very clear dependence on history determining 'who we are,' as he 
says that we cannot know anything about ourselves other than that we have had experiences; 
other then the memories of our pasts. And specifically perhaps what we find in James here is a 
psychological theory that my Self; myself, "experiences experiences," which in each individual 
are bonded, perhaps organized together in unique "Egos;" as in a sense our 'personal history 
books.' 
 As Jacques Barzun supports, "[...] the radical empiricist logically regards history as the 
crystallized remains of experience."
570
 And he continues that in a "radical-empiricist theory of 
history," "The spectacle of the past is inevitably a reflection of the quasi chaos of experience 
itself."
571
 So again clearly we can imagine a pragmatist dialogue with Ortega's dictum that what 
man has is history, as additional scholars here support the argument for some historicism in the 
pragmatism of James's philosophy. 
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 Ortega argued, "Yo no soy más que un ingrediente de mi vida: el otro es la circunstancia 
o mundo."
572
 This can maybe dialogue in part with the following quote of James that "Every bit 
of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self."
573
 And James adds here a functionalist 
aspect in that the future plays an important role in defining our selves; since this is a continuous 
process, life is, therefore, also future-oriented; "[...] it quivers along various radii like the wind-
rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possibles not yet in our present 
sight."
574
 As has been discussed, in James's pragmatism, his fundamental concept of 
"experience" is open to the future; it is not just in relation to the past or the present, it is about the 
constant continuum of them all.  
 In this line we live prospectively as well as retrospectively. It [life] is ‘of’ the past, 
 inasmuch as it comes expressly as the past’s continuation; it is ‘of’ the future in so far as 
 the future, when it comes, will have continued it. These relations of continuous transition 
 experienced are what make our experiences cognitive.
575
 
 This is what his pragmatism is all about; "I described pragmatism as holding that the 
meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our 
future practical experience [...]."
576
 As was noted to be also applicable to Dewey, Pragmatism is 
"instrumental" and 'functionalist" in part because we use what we study from the past and present 
toward the future. Pragmatism is perhaps more a method than an "ism" to study the practical 
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results and applications of things; of the repercussions of our experiences, as in how what 
happened in the past affects our presents and how it will continue to affect our futures. 
 Ortega's view on life is future-oriented in this sense as well (despite his great emphasis on 
the past), as demonstrated in this excerpt from Unas lecciones de metafísica quoted also in the 
section on Dewey in which he elaborates extensively on his concept of "yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia;" 
 [...] si nuestra vida consiste en decidir lo que vamos a ser, quiere decirse, que en la raíz 
 misma de nuestra vida hay un atributo temporal: decidir lo que vamos a ser, por tanto, el 
 futuro. [...] que nuestra vida es ante todo toparse con el futuro. No es el presente o el 
 pasado lo primero que vivimos, no: la vida es una actividad que se ejecuta hacia adelante, 
 y el presente o el pasado se descubre después, en relación con el futuro.
577
 
 Life is a future-oriented project, therefore, in part, for Ortega. So again there is most 
certainly here an overlapping dialogue that can be envisioned between James and Ortega (as was 
also the case between Dewey and Ortega); both thinkers indeed emphasize the element of future-
orientation in life and its' focus. This possible dialogue Graham also explicitly suggests, arguing 
that for Ortega, 
 [...] that one's reality is "life" as "self and circumstance". That was his basic "pocketbook" 
 metaphysics—his constant vade mecum. In fact, for the most part, that formula had rested 
 first on James's "radical empiricism," which became Ortega's "absolute [later, radical] 
 positivism" after 1916.
578
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 And he adds the further suggestion that Ortega, 
 [...] had developed his vitalist, dual metaphysical basis of Jamesian "radical empiricism" 
 into two branches, first an existentialism and then a historicism that he then still closely 
 linked  as "vital and historical reason." All together, they constituted his general 
 philosophy of  life."
579
 
 As Graham continues to argue this connection to Ortega, "James's invitation to a 
philosophy of life experience based on a radical empiricism as a pluralist unity and using a 
pragmatic method—as a practical, functional "living reason"—was going to greatly attract and 
influence young Ortega."
580
 Further, Graham explicitly presents the possible argument that "The 
parallels between "radical empiricism" and "radical positivism" [the term Graham uses to 
describe Ortega's thought] represented the most basic part of their philosophies, and here they 
were almost identical."
581
 So Ortega's basic metaphysics on how "life" is "self and world" (vida 
es yo y circunstancia) can again possibly converse with James's "radical empiricism" because as 
Graham argues in support of this proposition, Ortega's "metaphysics was mainly a version of 
James's realist "radical empiricism." Such a pragmatist metaphysics, formulated in 
phenomenological terms, supported his well-known formula: 'self and circumstance'."
582
  
 Again it must be noted, however, that Graham perhaps gives much too much importance 
and weight to a direct influence of James on Ortega. Nonetheless, Graham's studies must be 
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noted here as they, at the very least, lend support to the ability to imagine a possible dialogue 
between James and Ortega, as he is another scholar who has clearly envisioned this. Moreover, 
his insistence on connecting a relationship between Ortega's yo y las circunstancias with radical 
empiricism helps strengthen the possible anti-dualist interpretation that we are developing here 
as a possible imaginary dialogue between Ortega and James, which is a central part of the 
discussion here. 
 In one instance James describes what he terms "pure experience" of life as follows, 
dividing this up into two parts in his example of a "room-experience": "One of them is the 
reader’s personal biography, the other is the history of the house of which the room is part."583 
So the fundamental idea here is that, just as with Ortega, there is always some sort of interaction 
with our surroundings, even if it is just "I am sitting in a room," or "being in a room" as again a 
good example here, in fact interestingly enough used by both philosophers. Ortega uses this 
metaphor frequently. As developed in the dialogue explored between Dewey and Ortega, the "I" 
and the "sitting in a room" are separate but united essentially, antidualistically it was argued, as 
"yo" and "circumstance" respectively.  When we are sitting in a room, the "I" and the "room" are 
the two separate elements, but it is not just "I" and "room" alone; it is also "I am in the room." 
 Continuing with this metaphor, in the following excerpt we can clearly find a dialogue 
with James in how Ortega's notions of a "yo" mixing with "circumstances," and specifically in 
regards to histories, together make up our present and the potential of our future, thereby 
defining us. James wrote, "In the reader’s personal history the room occupies a single date—he 
saw it only once perhaps, a year ago. Of the house’s history, on the other hand, it forms a 
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permanent ingredient."
584
 In this example, in reading this literally, the person being in a room 
once upon a time means that there was one specific point along the continuum (i.e., personal 
history) of that person's life in which they were in that room; one specific date and time. The 
room will also always have recorded that moment in its continuum of having had that person in 
its surroundings. The same can be said for the house, as the room is part of the house. But why 
does James say that in the case of the house it forms a 'permanent' ingredient? Perhaps because 
he is referring to how the room is part of the "self" of the house, not the circumstances of the 
house; the person being momentarily in the room of the house is a circumstance, but the room is 
part of the structure of the house, and as such it is an integral separate but connected 
interdependently part of the house (i.e., anti-dualism). Circumstances, on the other hand—
continuing to purposely use Ortega's term here—are permanent marks upon our continuums of 
life, but they may change so they are separate in this sense from our selves (yoes) since a 
circumstance may come and go. This is of course just one proposal of how to interpret James's 
thought here with the goal to specifically apply it to a possible dialogue with Ortega. This is 
likely not exactly how James saw it, but it is possibly an interpretation that he would dialogue on; 
that he might respond is perhaps another way to envision this, as Ortega would. Thus these 
points along the continuum are examples of "circumstances" in Ortega's application of the 
concept. Moreover, the sum of all this is history, and as James would arguably say here, of the 
house's history, or the person's history. To summarize here: history is also the product of self and 
circumstance.   
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 This of course Ortega would likely converse in agreement because for him again we are 
our selves, and we are our selves in the "room" or any part of the manifestation of "world;" "life 
is a dialogue with our surroundings," he also says. 
 La circunstancia—en el caso presente y preciso: esta habitación—, es la otra parte de mi 
 vida. Era un error decir que yo—parte de mi vida−formo parte de la otra parte de mi vida 
 que es la habitación. No; formo parte del todo que es mi vida, la cual es un todo 
 precisamente porque yo soy [una] parte distinta de la otra parte que es la habitación. Así 
 decía yo en la segunda lección: <<Nuestra vida, según esto, no es sólo nuestra persona, 
 sino que de ella forma parte nuestro mundo: ella—nuestra vida—consiste en que la 
 persona se ocupa de las cosas o con ellas, y, evidentemente, lo que nuestra vida sea 
 depende tanto  de lo que sea nuestra persona como de lo que sea nuestro mundo.
585
 
 In James's description, he references personal biography and history of the 'circumstance' 
(in this case, the house of which the room is a part), and again this can certainly dialogue with 
Ortega's dictum that "man has no nature, only history," as both pieces in James's theory on 
defining life emphasize history (and in this particular case directly, which is not all that common 
to find in James's work); specifically, the sole history of an individual, combined with the history 
of their surroundings. To summarize: James's general idea of "life" is as experience, so there is a 
dialogue that can created between the two in both the idea of us being ourselves and our 
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circumstances, and this is all most dependent on our histories. Further, together our selves and 
our circumstances form and continually shape our histories, as this all exists along a continuum.  
 As we shall continue to see at length, the basic formula here is that life is experience, and 
experience is in part history. And when looking at the 'experiences' of two individuals, for 
example, James argues, "My experiences and your experiences are 'with' each other in various 
external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours and a way in which yours and 
mine never pass into one another."
586
 Once again this indeed also sounds like something which 
could possibly 'converse' with Ortega's "self and circumstance." As used in one example 
metaphor in the section on Dewey (and for this reason will just be tersely stated here to avoid too 
much repetition), two individuals may jump into a lake and create ripples in which many, but not 
all, overlap with each other—such is a person's life or "radical reality," in Ortega's term, as there 
is our self/the individual jumping (yo), and that person's circumstances/the ripples 
(circunstancia). And James writes, "In the same act by which I feel that this passing minute is a 
new pulse of my life, I feel that the old life continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no 
wise jars upon the simultaneous feeling of a novelty. They, too, compenetrate harmoniously."
587
 
In the aforementioned metaphor, the ripples extend over time; they are historical, they 
"compenetrate harmoniously," and they are all connected to the initial ripple (in an effort here to 
create a dialogue between the two philosophers).  Graham goes even farther to argue more than 
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just an envisioned dialogue that "Radical reality was life, self and circumstance, mutually 
"positing," "presenting" themselves "absolutely," an idea originally from James."
588
  
 As has been presented, there are many envisionable points of dialogue that can be 
established between Ortega's concept of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" and James's concept of 
life and experience in radical empiricism. As the extensive footnote that follows illustrates from 
James's Essays in Radical Empiricism, "life" for him as well is most fundamentally defined as 
'ourselves within our circumstances,' and we can maneuver, but only among the circumstances 
that happen to surround us (i.e., again 'limited freedom'). And therefore what makes us unique is 
how we choose and which we choose to maneuver among, giving us each a unique perspective— 
something that most certainly resonates, as has been seen, with Ortega (and as we shall see is 
also a significant part of the imagined dialogue in the third and final section of this dissertation 
with the European pragmatist Ferdinand Schiller).  
 The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly called self, is a part 
 of the content of the world experienced.... The body is the storm centre, the origin of co-
 ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles 
 round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word "I," then, is primarily a noun of 
 position, just like "this" and "here." Activities attached to "this" position have prerogative 
 emphasis, and, if activities have feelings, must be felt in a peculiar way. The word "my" 
 designates the kind of emphasis. I see no inconsistency whatever in defending, on the one 
 hand, "my" activities as unique and opposed to those of outer nature, and, on the other 
 hand, in affirming, after introspection, that they consist in movements in the head. The 
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 "my" of them is the emphasis, the feeling of perspective interest in which they are 
 dyed.
589
   
 Here James first states that "the individualized self" is "the only thing properly called 
self"—this arguably resonates with Ortega's aforementioned idea of each man searching for his 
authentic self and his genuine vocation, so surely the two would have an interesting conversation 
on this. Then he proceeds to conjecture that this is "part of the content of the world experienced," 
which can possibly resound as a point of further discussion with the "circumstances" that Ortega 
refers to. He ensues to declare essentially "perspectivism" as in that dominant precept of this in 
Ortega's philosophy, as "everything" "is felt from its point of view."
590
 
 So here again James and Ortega, as Dewey, recognize that while there are ways in which 
we can be similar, there is also a unique individuality within each of us. Ortega wrote that we 
each have to live "una cierta vida," or a "certain life," and as he says here, a strictly determined 
life; "Nótese, una cierta vida. No una vida cualquiera, sino, por el contrario, una vida 
estrictamente determinada."
591
 And as we saw, for Ortega life is the constant struggle to realize 
and make real that unique individual; that strictly determined self within the wider world. He 
further writes, "La vida es constitutivamente una drama, porque es siempre la lucha frenética por 
conseguir ser de hecho el que somos en proyecto [...] Pero la vida no es sólo nuestro <<yo>>, 
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sino que es también el mundo en que ese yo tiene que realizarse."
592
 And this unique 
individuality is manifested in part in our  "point of view," or "perspective," as we saw in the 
previous excerpt from James, and which as has been discussed at great length is a very central 
part of Ortega's thought.
593
   
 Again we "narrate life from a point of view," for Ortega, all narrations of which are 
essentially equally valid, and the only falsity is to say that one is absolutely valid, or absolutely 
invalid. As Gonzalez argued, "Since Ortega’s early thought treats human life as the starting point 
of philosophy, reality is not seen as absolute, but rather as that which depends on individual 
perspective given that, as he writes, “every life is a point of view directed upon the universe.”594 
But this should still all be understood anti-dualistically; hence the objective to re-read Ortega 
here from a pragmatist perspective. Per Ortega's philosophy, essentially all is derived from our 
unique perspectives; "Ortega takes it as a fact" explains Mora, "that individual perspective is the 
only way of seizing reality and, therefore, of formulating universal truths."
595
 So as Graham 
proposes, Ortega developed his own type of "instrumentalist perspectivism," that was arguably 
both pragmatist and phenomenological, in that through a sort of 'trial and error' we use the 
tangible pieces of reality and assumed truths available to us via our individual perspectives for 
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our general comprehension of ourselves and all that surrounds us, and life, reality, truth, 
etcetera.
596
 
 Again as we saw was the case for Dewey, James also would likely converse with Ortega 
on the idea of our lives, our histories, being on a continuum; "Within each of our personal 
histories, subject, object, interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous. Perhaps 
personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things 
immediately experienced."
597
 To repeat the basic pragmatist tenet applicable to both Dewey and 
James: life is made up of experiences, had over time; therefore, again life is very much defined 
by the history of those experiences. Stated in another instance, James cites the following from 
Spencer, "[...] the human brain is an organized register of infinitely-numerous experiences 
received during the evolution of life, or rather during the evolution of that series of organisms 
through which the human organism has been reached."
598
 So, life is the continuous accumulation 
of experiences that are both individual and social/group-based. And he adds another excerpt from 
Spencer, clearly emphasizing the important role of essentially history, though he uses the term 
"bequeathed" in defining our lives (and which is of course again the main part of the dialogue we 
are trying to create here); "The effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences 
have been successfully bequeathed."
599
 Logically of course bequeathed refers to inheritance, 
which of course implies "history." So again here we find an emphasis on history as the 
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fundamental feature of life and self, in this case in James.
600
 Our selves are our pasts (or our 
histories); "This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I 
distinguish my Self."
601
 This is perhaps one of the clearest examples of James expressing 
something similar to Ortega's dominant notion in his philosophy that we have history (not 
nature); that we are our histories. The 'self' is important as it is the source of "narration" or 
"story" of past experiences, as well as restitution and restoration of the continuity of 
experience—hence again life here, too, being a "drama," as with Ortega. This gives our 
"existence," as Ortega affirms, "un gesto terriblemente dramático."
602
 
 Graham proposes directly (again, more than is meant to be done here in this dissertation) 
that Ortega's philosophy on "self and circumstance," not to mention dictum that man is his 
history, therefore, was likely influenced by this radical empiricism of James developed prior; 
 Now this conception of human self and world of things—thus initially compounded in 
 one experiencing and experienced reality as human life—is very like what Ortega began 
 to call  "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia) in 1913 and later justified as the 
 "radical unitary duality" comprising our "life" reality. He had distinguished those 
 elements since 1910, but he had not brought them intimately together until after James's 
 Essays in Radical Empiricism appeared posthumously in 1912.
603
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 As we know Ortega uniformly declares that 'man only has history.' James uses the term 
"life-history" on several occasions. In one example he defines "life-history" as such: "The world 
is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They 
mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds."
604
 
Again this sounds very much like Ortega's "self and circumstance." Life, therefore, is a 
continuous series of experiences that constantly continue defining our histories. Given this 
constant flux, essentially, this is yet another reason we cannot fully separate always our selves 
from our circumstances. Life is plastic for both Ortega and James. "El hombre no es natural, no 
tiene naturaleza, no está adscrito a un ser fijo, es... infinito en posibilidades."
605
  and,  "To a 
certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic," is respectively argued by philosophers 
Ortega and James. As aforementioned Ortega also declared directly; "El hombre es una entidad 
infinitamente plástica de la que se puede hacer lo que se quiera" as an example to coincide with 
James's words just referenced.
606
   
 This, perhaps, is also part of the reason why life carries with it the various synonyms in 
Ortega and James's works such as "drama" or "náufrago" because given its constant state of flux 
and plasticity, we can just momentarily, and perhaps only partially, comprehend certain aspects, 
but overall this is for the most part out of our reach of complete understanding. As Lasaga 
Medina proposes, 
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 Ortega usa el término <<drama>> porque además del sentido ya apuntado, le sirve de 
 metáfora para precisar que vivir es actuar en un mundo-escenario que no se elige; eso da 
 a nuestra vida su peculiar carácter de inseguridad y naufragio. La respuesta es el esfuerzo 
 y afán por vivir que se manifesta en la necesidad de reacionar; interpretando la 
 circunstancia. La vida concreta es posible porque la circunstancia no es pura dificultad, 
 sino un tejido de soluciones y problemas.
607
 
 James describes life in one instance as "always off its balance."
608
 Ortega writes that our 
"radical substance" of life is "insecurity;" hence our being in a sense 'shipwrecked' in his 
metaphor because life is about always having to decide what we are going to be, and what we are 
going to do. Ortega declared to one of his classes,  
 El ser del hombre es lo que éste suele llamar su vida. Somos nuestra vida. Ahora bien, la 
 vida de cada cual consiste, por lo pronto, en que se encuentra teniendo que existir en una 
 circunstancia, contorno, mundo o como quieran ustedes llamarlo. Esa circunstacia o 
 mundo en que, queramos o no, tenemos que vivir no podemos elegirlo nosotros, sino que, 
 sin nuestra anuencia previa y sin saber cómo nos encontramos disparados sobre él, 
 arrojados a ál, náufragos en él y para sostenernos en él y vivir no tenemos más remedio 
 que hacer siempre also, que salir nadando.
609
  
 As Graham suggests directly,  
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 [...] he defined life in a very Jamesian way: this strange, neglected reality was not a thing, 
 neither physical nor psychic, but was a dramatic "happening." Of itself, life has 
 "structure" that consists in "connections," not just individual and concrete but also 
 general and formal [...].
610
 
 Ortega argued that man has no nature, only history, but that history is also of a 
"becoming," so it is the past, present, and future together in what makes up one's own "history." 
Again Graham argues that this was inspired from James, "In Ortega's conception, historical 
reason is subordinate to life, and the intermediate form of "living reason," in which he expressed 
it as most clearly subject to life, from 1933 to 1937, was directly out of James's Pragmatism."
611
 
Here with both philosophers, as was also the case with Dewey, therefore, there is in a sense a 
double meaning of history in that it is both individual and social. 
 So again, most fundamentally, life is history. William James wrote, "A living being must 
always contain within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its 
ancestors."
612
 For James, a partial reason for why we can affirm that we are our histories is 
because it is our memories which define our selves, as previously cited; "This succession of 
feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self. Myself is 
the person who had that series of feelings, and I know nothing of myself, by direct knowledge, 
except that I had them."
613
 Perhaps his emphasis on memories results from the focus on 
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experience being central in our realities, knowledge, "truths," because they are some of the 
results of our experiences. So as we can see in this excerpt, and as Myers argues, James, 
 [...] linked personal identity with preservation of memory. [...] The self is this a 
 momentary phase in the stream of consciousness, the same as earlier ones not because 
 they are numerically identical —they are not— but because essentially the same set of 
 memories attaches to both.
614
  
 In other words, we remember our past selves, and we anticipate our future selves, as 
Myers adds, which at any given time is what defines our selves and our personal identities, as a 
specific part of our streams of consciousness. Here again of course we also find a very 
functionalist, pragmatist nature in James's philosophy, and which was also applicable in this 
specific sense to Dewey. But given also this great reliance on the future and practical aspect of 
the nature of the self, this was also the "ultimate mystery" for James; the 'who am I' and the 'what 
am I.'
615
 And this for Ortega would perhaps dialogue more smoothly with James than with 
Dewey because as we saw the former emphasized more so this illusive, mystifying, mysterious 
characteristic of life. 
 Hence the imaginable dialogue between Ortega and James, as with Dewey, that what we 
can at least in part study and perhaps know is our history, but we cannot be certain of our 
nature—but we can say that our nature is our history, relatively safely.616 Again the means to 
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understanding life is through understanding history, as Graham argues, "Understanding of life 
contributes to history, just as historical understanding adds to philosophy of life," because life is 
history."
617
 Again, man's nature, therefore, really is his history.  
 In summary, how does James's radical empiricism and notion of life dialogue with Ortega 
and thereby provide some new ways of looking at his philosophy on life? When using James's 
philosophy to place a pragmatist lens over Ortega's meditations on life, the result we find in what 
we can imagine is how the two would dialogue is that life is anti-dualistic in that life is history, 
not nature—just as Ortega argued, then adding—because history is our nature . The two exist 
interdependently. Moreover, while our life is shaped by the past, we live toward the future, in the 
pragmatist instrumentalist sense. And to further summarize the key points of this section, life is 
the experience of life. Life exists along a continuum—this is key in James's radical empiricism; 
this  continuous process of "pure experience." And a time continuum implies that there is role of 
history. Again as we have seen life is what we experience it to be in James's radical empiricism. 
Moreover it is "radical" because this continuum has to be understood anti-dualistically; that at 
every moment there are points along that continuum moving from future to present to past 
continually, but while they are separate they all exist together in one continuum linked 
interdependently. This is defining life in every moment uniquely in its combination for each 
individual. Further, there are individual and social elements present at each moment in that 
continuum that define our lives; life is our selves and our circumstances. This concept by itself 
really is best understood anti-dualistically; the self and the circumstances that at all moments 
define an individual's life exist separately but they cannot exist alone; it is an anti-dualistic, 
interdependent relation. This combination in sum is individual for each person, even though 
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some components may overlap with others. And this is all filtered through individual 
perspectives, bringing in further uniqueness to our lives. Although we cannot choose all our 
circumstances, we can choose how we react to them, so life has limited freedom. This limited 
freedom adds to making life "dramatic."  
 This has been only a concise summary of some of the key points of this sub-section in 
which Ortega and James would likely converse. And as we shall continue to see in the section 
that follows, these are also some of the reasons that we cannot say that there is one strict, 
absolute sense of "nature" for each of us, in any sense, definition, or application of the term—or 
if there were to be, we cannot get to it—because there are many elements interacting at any given 
time resulting in unique combinations and resultant perspectives. 
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V. Nature  
 For Ortega, as we know, man has no nature, he only has history. Tersely summarized as a 
basic conclusion for the following section on the topic of "nature," as elaborated in the essay on 
Dewey as well, while Ortega directly states at times that a human being does not have nature 
(rather what he or she has, and is, is his or her history), what is being developed here is that 
again—all philosophers, in fact, explored here—are not really denying, per se, that there is a 
nature, in any sense of the term. Rather, what Ortega especially is arguing is that 'history' is 
much more important, influential, etcetera, and in fact also contains our nature, which is why 
again we can instead posit that fundamental in this is that our nature is our history.
618
 So again 
the dialogue here is to dictate this anti-dualistically; we are our histories because our histories 
contain our natures, which is also precisely another area where we can create a pragmatist 
dialogue, in this part's case here with William James.  
 As we know a fundamental characteristic of Ortega's philosophy is that reality, life, 
etcetera, are not static concepts, they are ever changing. This is part, in a sense, of what is 
"radical" in Ortega's view on life, reality; everything is a "becoming."
619
 Man is essentially a 
becoming because he is making himself.
620
 "No digamos, pues, que el hombre es, sino que 
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vive."
621
 Hence, again life is comprised of this series of events, experiences, etcetera, along the 
path of our constant "becoming;" "life is experience of life."
622
 In arguably a pragmatist fashion, 
for Ortega man makes himself in his experiences, which we can also posit is part of Ortega's 
reason for not studying and applying any kind of "nature" in all this since experience is a 
continuous, incessant process that changes in both type and interpretation. The specific notion 
that "life is experience of life" is quite fundamental in pragmatist philosophy, and also directly 
stated by Ortega. Of course, this is a very general concept not unique to only pragmatism, but for 
the sake of this essay's argument, it is just another piece of the basic dialogue being envisioned 
here between the pragmatist William James, and José Ortega y Gasset, as was also the case with 
Dewey and Ortega. Graham argues that, 
 Since Dilthey, observed Ortega, we know that "man has no nature," but a history of 
 "variations" instead, for his "being" is becoming. "Man, who is not, goes on making 
 himself in the dialectical series of his experiences." Therefore, because of his historicity, 
 "the only thing we can know of man is what he has been." "The past constrains the 
 future." "For that reason, the science of the past, properly understood, is the only science 
 of the future in the very precise sense in which a science of the future is possible. [...] 
 This new reason was "historical reason," which was also a "living reason" that was 
 subject to life. In Ortega's conception, historical reason is subordinate to life, and the 
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 intermediate form of "living reason," in which he expressed as most clearly subject to 
 life, from 1933 to1937, was directly out of James's Pragmatism.
623
 
 As we shall continue to see, one reason for Graham's argument for the influence of James 
in Ortega's view that an individual's nature is essentially in a constant state of becoming is 
because of how James saw nature as essentially plastic as well. This is applied to any reading of 
nature, whether it be a genetic one, or a philosophical one of characteristics and identities, or just 
generally one referring to any notion of innate characteristics, features, or essences. This James 
also wrote (1907) prior to Ortega's first publication (1914). This is exemplified well in the 
following excerpt: 
 The general 'uniformity of nature' is presupposed by every lesser law. But nature may be 
 only approximately uniform; and persons in whom knowledge of the world's past has 
 bred pessimism (or doubts as to the world's good character, which become certainties if 
 that character be supposed eternally fixed) may naturally welcome free- will as a 
 MELIORISTIC doctrine.
624
 
 Arguably James was not entirely on the "nature" side of the argument in reference to the 
genetic interpretation of the term, given that he saw nature and nurture as functioning anti-
dualistically, as the latter reinforces the former—as summarized was the case with Dewey, we 
could say in this specific sense that both essentially argue that "nurture nurtures nature." James 
wrote, 
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 If we look at an animal or a human being, distinguished from the rest of his kind by the 
 possession of some extraordinary peculiarity, good or bad, we shall be able to 
 discriminate between the causes which originally produced the peculiarity in him and the 
 causes that maintained it after it is produced; and we shall see, if the peculiarity be one 
 that he was born with, that these two sets of causes belong to two such irrelevant cycles. 
 It was the triumphant originality of Darwin to see this, and to act accordingly.
625
 
 By essentially calling the "nurture" and "environing conditions" "irrelevant cycles" in 
shaping a person and their behavior, this makes James sound quite like he is leaning on the side 
of "nature," at least in the case of genetics and biology. But again he is not strictly on this side of 
the argument, as he adds later in the article, as quoted earlier, that the individual and social 
elements are both important.
626
 Further, he continues, "To conclude: The evolutionary view of 
history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and 
unscientific conception."
627
  
 In the next excerpt, James appears to be arguing that, again, we cannot really know any 
kind of nature: "[...] nature is but a name for excess; every point in her opens out and runs into 
the more; and the only question, with reference to any point we may be considering, is how far 
into the rest of nature we may have to go in order to get entirely beyond its overflow."
628
 In other 
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words, it is as if we are constantly trying to 'chase down' a meaning of nature, but that journey 
seems and appears endless. 
 As González explains in reference to Ortega, supporting this fundamental concept here as 
well that "nurture nurtures nature;" "[...] a distinction is made between the two forms of life: 
biological and biographical, where man partakes in the former by way of the latter."
629
 So we can 
at best contemplate any notion of nature through our experience with it, or via our 'biographies,' 
but not directly, for the experience is a necessary part. Again the concept of anti-dualism is 
present here because the idea is that experience and nature, in any sense of the term, are separate 
concepts, but one cannot exist without the other as experiences are constantly shaping our 
natures. We may not be able to actually fully get to our natures in terms of our genetics, biology, 
characteristics, essences, identities, etcetera, but we can at least propose here that our nature is 
defined by our experiences; that our experiences are our natures since our experiences are what 
are constantly defining who we are, and our lives as we saw in the previous sub-section - so 
experiences and natures coexist anti-dualistically. And it must be reminded here that the proposal 
is to consider "experiences" and "history" as synonymous. 
 By bringing back in the argument again that "nurture nurtures nature," when pondering 
the genetic and biological application of the term, we are not only emphasizing the greater 
importance and role of "nurture" in a human being's behavior, actions, and human events in 
general, but we are also fundamentally reiterating what Ortega argued that "man has no nature, 
only history," while adding the key point that "because nature is his history." Or, we could also 
say that "man has no nature, only nurture, because nurture interacts anti-dualistically with 
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nature." Nature and nurture in the traditional argument referencing genetics, therefore, coexist 
interdependently as anti-dualistic phenomena dialoguing here with William James's pragmatism, 
as it did with John Dewey. This coexistence can be applied to any interpretation of the concept of 
"nature." "Nurture" implies interaction with the environment, or "experience," and indeed over 
the course of life we accumulate experiences, thereby forming our own individual "histories," of 
"experiences." But to clarify, it is our "natures," whether it be genetic, biological, essences, 
characteristics, identities—in all application of the term—that interact with our environments and 
form, shape, and define our experiences. Hence why we must say 'nurture nurtures nature' (in 
any type of nature). And hence the following example that James gives in the same article,  
 The same parents, living in the same environing conditions, may at one birth produce a 
 genius, at the next an idiot or a monster. The visible external conditions are therefore not 
 direct determinants of this cycle; and the more we consider the matter, the more we are 
 forced to believe that two children of the same parents are made to differ from each other 
 by causes as disproportionate to their ultimate effects.
630
 
 Here we see how he is not denying the existence of a nature, especially in the scientific 
sense of the term, but clearly the idea is to emphasize the concept that one's environment (or 
circumstance to use Ortega's term) reinforces one's nature. Perhaps the idea of James is that there 
are simply so many variables involved in shaping a person, their actions, and human events in 
general that there is no one overarching, determining factor—because two children of the same 
parents, for instance, can be very different (which can be a result of the environment, a distinct 
mix of genes, age and therefore time period, etcetera, just to cite a few possible factors—
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humanity, human behavior and characteristics, is all simply quite complex). Moreover, as we 
saw, he denied the evolutionary view, at least as a sole method, in history, humanity, and human 
development, characteristics, and behavior.
631
 
 Hence also Ortega's view of radical reality and life as "myself and my circumstance," 
because the experiences that come with anti-dualistic parts in that formula are both individual 
and collective.  Meaning, "history" implies something unique and social. As he explains, "Pero la 
experiencia de la vida no se compone sólo de las experiencias que yo personalmente he hecho, 
de mi pasado. Va integrada también por el pasado de los antepasados que la sociedad en que vivo 
me transmite."
632
 Again these excerpts of Ortega's that contain the term "experience" are 
important and therefore at times need to be repeated for this essay's purposes of imagining a 
pragmatist dialogue since "experience" is so key in its methodology. Moreover, the implication 
is also that there are many factors involved in shaping and influencing one's 'experience of life' 
that are individual, social, etcetera, but again all of which can fall under the broader notion of 
"history." We just saw that James declared "A living being must always contain within itself the 
history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its ancestors," so not only are there elements 
that we inherit of course, but there is also an overlay of inheritance within our experiences and 
how we experience our experiences—again in this there is a dialogue to be imagined between 
Ortega and James here in this historicist emphasis as well.
633
 The way we experience experience 
can be inherited also because our perspectives and how we see the world are impacted at least in 
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part by those who came before us. This can be manifested in culture, for example. Arguably 
there is at least some influence in this. So as has been examined, perspective is historical for 
Ortega, and experience is historical as well, at least in part.
634
  
 After grasping that 'what man has is his history rather than his nature, because history 
contains our nature,' we can then continue in Ortega's philosophical steps toward his razón 
histórica as the means to better studying and comprehending our radical reality which is our life, 
our existence. He writes, also here not denying the existence of a nature, "[...] la naturaleza es 
sólo una dimensión de la vida humana, y el glorioso éxito con respecto a ella no excluye su 
fracaso con respecto a la totalidad de nuestra existencia."
635
 To repeat: despite his maxim that 
"man has no nature, only history," he really is not completely denying that man or woman has a 
nature, instead he is emphasizing in part how less important it is than has traditionally been 
believed. And again this is in part because we are in, we live in, a state of becoming; man isn't, 
man lives. As has been discussed at length, we are free to choose within the many, but limited, 
circumstances that surround us; "Ser libre quiere decir carecer de identidad constitutiva."
636
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Again, "man is an infinitely plastic entity that is constantly always faced with limited 
possibilities."
637
 
 In Historia como sistema, Ortega elaborates on the history of the study and development 
of the term "nature," citing, for example, how its connection to science has been strengthened 
over the previous centuries, and then more recent to Ortega's day in particular by the 
revolutionary discoveries of Albert Einstein. Ortega discusses how science, physics, etcetera, 
really cannot add anything to a study, analysis, and understanding of humanity; "Resulta que 
sobre los grandes cambios humanos, la ciencia propiamente tal no tiene nada preciso que decir" 
because, simply stated, there is not much "scientific" in the study of humanity and our 
complexities in regards to emotions, behaviors, etcetera.
638
 Again we can connect the theme here 
of perspective, and the notion that science is yet another "perspective," but not one that yields 
much in the study of humanity and human emotions, conduct, etcetera.  This most certainly 
dialogues with James's comment that (and which is a topic we will look at in the second section 
of this part two), "It is folly, then, to speak of the "laws of history" as of something inevitable, 
which science has only to discover, and whose consequences any one can then foretell but do 
nothing to alter or avert. Why, the very laws of physics are conditional, and deal with ifs."
639
 
This is because, arguably, history is humanity and the study of humanity. 
 Since the Enlightenment, and especially through the 19th century,  it had been a dominant 
belief that most objective truths and reality were mathematically demonstrated. Ortega argued 
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that this cannot be so; that human character, human emotions, behavior, to cite a few examples, 
cannot be mathematically expressed. As Ortega continues, "Lo humano se escapa a la razón 
físico-matemática como el agua por una canastilla. [...] que el hombre no es una cosa, que es 
falso hablar de la naturaleza humana, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza."
640
 This is another 
reason why Ortega argues that man has no nature, because this in part implies science, biology, 
and physics in the genetic connotation of the term, or in the more open philosophical and 
traditional sense of the term something with an analyzable structure that can be studied—none of 
which is true for humankind, as we are far more complex. But again this does not mean he denies 
explicitly and completely its existence, as the thesis here is that he is more so re-defining it to be 
within history. So in other words, any kind of "nature" can really only be studied via historical 
reason (razón histórica for Ortega), not the natural sciences, because per Ortega what man has is 
history, not nature—but as argued here, the addition is because history contains our nature. None 
of this is to say that there is no science or no human nature, just that the former cannot really be 
fully used to explain the latter. And for the same reason, we should not speak solely of an 
"evolutionary" type of historical study (or a genetic, biological notion of nature, we can deduce), 
as James argues in the following excerpt as another point of potential dialogue with Ortega; 
 To conclude: The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of 
 individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception, a lapse from 
 modern scientific determinism into the most ancient oriental fatalism. The lesson of the 
 analysis that we have made (even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with which 
 we started) forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the energy of the individual. 
 Even the dogged resistance of the reactionary conservative to changes which he cannot 
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 hope entirely to defeat is justified and shown to be effective. He retards the movement; 
 deflects it a little by the concessions he extracts; gives it a resultant momentum, 
 compounded of his inertia and his adversaries' speed; and keeps up, in short, a constant 
 lateral pressure, which, to be sure, never heads it round about, but brings it up at last at a 
 goal far to the right or left of that to which it would have drifted had he allowed it to drift 
 alone.
641
 
 So arguably James, as Ortega, does not deny that there is a "nature" for humans of sorts. 
Rather this, like with the "truth" and other metaphysical concepts, is also something that is 
revealed to us (though not completely) over the course of experiences. For instance, in the case 
above James emphasizes the need for "individual initiative" or motivation. We need the past, or 
history, to lead us to our (partial) understandings of nature. But as with the truth, the continued 
process of experiences can reveal to us different natures, and perhaps at times falsify previous 
interpretations and ideas of nature, so we generally cannot refer to any concepts of nature as 
absolute and objective. However, we can study what we have thought it is, and therefore gain 
insight as to our views on nature, how they have changed, how they have remained the same, and 
what that means for us. As James defines it, 
 Nature exhibits only changes, which habitually coincide with one another so that their 
 habits are describable in simple 'laws.' There is no original spirituality of materiality of 
 being, intuitively discerned, then; but only a translocation of experiences from one world 
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 to another; a grouping of them with one set or another of associates for definitely 
 practical or intellectual ends.
642
 
 So again here we have the position that what we can know about nature is what we think 
it is, but not necessarily what it is. And we can use this for "practical" and "intellectual" ends. 
What we think nature is, is in part dependent on history; it is in part dependent on the varying 
understandings and definitions that we have of it over time. "Nature" has history as well, 
therefore (the idea of "nature" has changed over time, just as science has brought new definitions 
and discoveries, for example)—this is why really what we have, for Ortega, is history not nature. 
As James might add in this imaginary dialogue, we experience these changes; we experience 
these changing interpretations of nature as they proceed along a temporal continuum. This again 
is further instance of how nature is really historical, which then Ortega might continue the 
conversation to propose yet again that this is why we have history, not nature. None of this 
denies, per se, that a nature of some sort exists in humans and is something real, but rather the 
idea is that we may not be able to know for sure what it is—but again what we can know, 
nevertheless, is what we think it is.  
 As has been quoted, Ortega defines nature in one instance as a "transitory interpretation," 
and although Ortega may be speaking of nature more generally, we can assume that this applies 
to human nature as well, given this, too, is in a sense 'transitory' (because they are temporal) as it 
is a narration that we build and construct with the details and specifics of our experiences that we 
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have been exposed to in the past or that we are exposed to in the present. 
643
 And as Skrupskelis 
succinctly explains, this same dialogue occurs in reference to James,  
 [...] in the nature of things there are no essential properties. Every reality has an infinity 
 of properties, James argues, and any one of them can be seen as essential in the light of 
 some interest. [...]  He writes: "There is no property  ABSOLUTELY essential to any one 
 thing." The same property which figures as the essence of the thing on one occasion 
 becomes a very inessential feature upon another."  Thus common sense—and much of 
 philosophy—is wrong in thinking that every thing has an essence which makes it just the 
 thing it is. As a matter of fact, the "essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is 
 so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest ... The 
 properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour."
644
 
 Part of what we can gain in understanding about what we have thought or think nature is 
depends on 'interest.' (The topic of "interest" is key in pragmatism, as we saw was the case with 
Dewey as well.) So nature is our understanding of nature (based in part on our interests) and thus 
they change, vary over time (at times from hour to hour even, as cited above). Not only, 
therefore, are our interests different, but even for each individual their own interests can change 
and shift over time. "Interest" is key here for more than just nature, but rather really all that we 
direct our focus and perspective to in general. And there is a key sense of individuality here 
playing an important role as well. This is also important in the process of creating our beliefs in 
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Ortega's thought, which in turn helps shape our realities and definitions of nature. As Malishev 
and González support, 
 [...] no es dificil ver cierta semejanza entre la posición filosófica de Ortega y el 
 pragmatismo. Tanto para el pensador español como para los pragmatistas el ser 
 independiente de la realidad objetiva, las cosas en sí mismas presentan interés sólo 
 porque el sujeto cognoscente y práctico las capta, y las comprende, pues el sentido 
 primordial del conocimiento del mundo es saber qué puede y qué debe hacer el sujeto con 
 ellos.
645
 
 And as an example of this directly from Ortega, he affirmed, that in regards to the world 
and all that surrounds us, key indeed are our interests; "lo importante no es que las cosas sean o 
no cuerpos sino que nos afectan, nos interesan [...]."
646
 
 Once more we have the idea that perhaps part of what we should study, therefore, are the 
changes in our "interests" (as well as in interpretations and ideas on nature) toward nature, rather 
than the definitions and concepts of nature in and of themselves. As the general trend that has 
been elaborated at great length here in various specific examples, perhaps our changing views 
and perspectives tell us more; they provide us more knowledge in general than the specific 
details themselves. Hence Ortega's emphasis on perspectivism. As we  have seen, James talked 
about how the changes themselves are experienced/experiences, as well, so surely the two would 
converse on this. The dialogue here between the two American pragmatist thinkers and Ortega 
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(as this was also explored in the section on Dewey), therefore, is that what we can say is that 
nature is the history of changing ideas and definitions of nature that we have had (but not those 
ideas and definitions in and of themselves necessarily, with absolute certainty). Although as we 
have seen Ortega does not always appear to be instrumentalist, the pragmatist explanation on 
interests permits us to read and interpret in a new, profound way Ortega's position and his 
subjectivism-perspectivism in relation to the polemic here of the concept of nature. Therefore, 
we cannot really say for sure what nature is, we can just say what we think it is, or have thought 
it was (as with the other metaphysical topics we have visited, not to mention of course also 
history and its meaning), and this is certainly very pragmatist at its' core, which is why we saw 
this to also be true for Dewey and therefore needed to be revisited here in the imaginary dialogue 
with James. 
 As Cerezo Galán elaborated in reference to Ortega's thought on this;  
 Si el hombre tuviese una naturaleza, un ser fijo como lo tienen el mineral, el vegetal, y el 
 animal, podríamos saber de una vez para siempre lo que significaban sus 
 comportamientos; pero como no hay tal, el hombre en cada época pone su vida a 
 finalidades diferentes más o menos nuevas, finalidades que él mismo ha inventado y que 
 son la convención o supuesto tácito de sus actuaciones y ocupaciones.
647
 
 Perhaps if we insert "interests" for "finalidades" we then resultantly further insert the 
pragmatist perspective into this interpretation of Ortega. The pragmatist reliance on interests 
really is logical, considering that this is part of our subjectivism (which this Ortega would likely 
converse on) because individual interests add to guiding our lives, behaviors, decisions, events, 
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studies, etcetera. In other words, again, we cannot deny completely that there is a "human 
nature," but again we certainly cannot speak of it in an absolute or definitive sense. This specific 
potential dialogue with pragmatism is also directly proposed by Graham as a possible 
interpretation; 
 How like Ortega's later famous "denial" of human "nature" is the following observation 
 by James about such static "absolutes": "There is no other nature, no other whatness than 
 this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive 
 relations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self." 
 "Practically to experience one's personal continuum in this living way" is so similar to 
 what Ortega later meant by claiming that history is man's only "nature," or that he has no 
 nature but only a history.
648
 
 This quote is clearly key in defending this thesis's main objective to create a dialogue 
between three pragmatist thinkers and Ortega in an effort to better understand his maxim that 
man has no nature, only history. 
As also discussed in the section on Dewey, it is important to remember how there were 
times Ortega recognized, in a specific way, nonetheless, that there are aspects of human nature 
that are fixed, and that he had some degree of predilection for the "biological and genetic" in this 
application of the term "nature," which at first glance seems contradictory (and here the goal of 
this study is to clarify this and how it was not).
649
 The aforementioned quote in which James 
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provides the example of the same parents giving birth to two very different children in the same 
environing conditions also demonstrates a belief in the existence of a "human nature," even if we 
cannot necessarily understand or pinpoint the concept. So this quote of James also is seemingly 
contradictory at first, but essentially expresses the same idea that, again, man does have some 
sort of nature, though any notions of nature are really contained within his history, which more 
appropriately phrased means that again  history is our nature, because history contains our 
nature. Again we fix this "apparent" contradiction and polemic by declaring "what man has is 
history because history contains his nature," thereby not denying nature's existence, just re-
defining it. As Graham suggests in connecting this dialogue between Ortega and James, 
 In 1951 he again asserted publicly that "man has no nature" but history and "variation" 
 instead: no "fixed being" but "pure mobility" -- "always under way." His unusual position 
 was not as radical, pure, or absolute as it sounded, however, for he recognized some fixed 
 traits in human behavior.
650
 
 In the following excerpt from James's Principles of Psychology he writes overtly that we 
can only guess at the nature of one's self, and that this must remain an open question; 
 At present, then, the only conclusion I come to is the following: That (in some persons at 
 least) the part of the innermost Self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist for the 
 most part of a collection of cephalic movements of ‘adjustments’ which, for want of 
 attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are; that 
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 over and above these there is an obscurer feeling of something more; but whether it be of 
 fainter physiological processes, or of nothing objective at all, but rather of subjectivity as 
 such, of thought become ‘its own object,’ must at present remain an open question,—like 
 the question whether it be an indivisible active soul-substance, or the question whether it 
 be a personification of the pronoun I, or any other of the guesses as to what its nature 
 may be.
651
 
 Part of the reason why James denies being able to know our "natures" is because in his 
philosophy, everything "knowable" is "experienceable." We need to consciously perceive to have 
experiences and therefore to exist, essentially. But again, our perceptions vary, in part because 
our experiences vary. As he posits, "When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound 
sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist."
652
 And not 
everything in "nature" is tangible, experiencable, and knowable. Furthermore, again not 
everything in "nature" can be mathematically measured and understood, such as human emotions 
and behavior. For the psychologist side of James, it was important to be flexible to a certain 
extent of course with the study of humanity, such as with human emotion and behavior. But as a 
psychologist it was also important to try to at least find some trends or try to find something 
somewhat 'scientific' in humanity. 
 In this respect we can imagine that Ortega might respond with the following: "El hombre, 
señores, no tiene naturaleza sino que tiene historia. La historia es el modo de ser un ente 
radicalmente variable y sin identidad. [...] Al hombre no se le puede identificar. Es un Arsenio 
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Lupin metafísico>>" [and key in this is what follows] "Y el método para entender lo que es la 
vida humana que es la realidad radical es no la razón pura, sino la razón histórica, la razón ultra-
eleática."
653
 
 Furthermore, the aforementioned quote from James (which has been placed in the 
footnote below for quick reference) that we saw resonates with the metaphor of the ripples in 
water from two (or more) stones being tossed in, each ripple being an experience, arguably 
dialogues with Ortega's notion of "I am myself and my circumstances." This is because both 
ideas insinuate that there is a nature of sorts (the "myself," or the experiencer/rock, and/or the 
experience/ripple in and of itself), though we may not be able to truly get to it or understand it, or 
the ways in which we are each unique. And yet there are still also the ways in which we are 
similar from overlapping circumstances (or "ripples," such as in family, the historical time period 
we are born into, etc.).
654
 This again is further evidence as to how we can imagine a pragmatist 
dialogue in Ortega's work, having seen this prior in the additional example of Dewey. As 
Graham supports here as well, 
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 In discussing the "thing" and its relations, James described the world of living experience 
 as "fluent," flowing, a "flux" or stream, until it is broken into discrete parts by the 
 analytical, reflective intellect. "The great [original] continua of time, space, and the self 
 envelop everything, betwixt them, and flow together without interfering." They 
 "compenetrate." Now this conception of human self and world of things—thus initially 
 compounded in one experiencing and experienced reality as human life—is very like 
 what Ortega began to call "self and circumstance" (yo y circunstancia) in 1913 and later 
 justified as the "radical unitary duality" comprising our "life" reality. He had 
 distinguished those elements since 1910, but he had not brought them intimately together 
 until after James's Essays in Radical Empiricism appeared posthumously in 1912.
655
 
 And as James continues with the previously cited excerpt, which is what Graham refers 
to in regards to the flow of experience, 
 Within each of our personal histories, subject, object, interest and purpose are continuous 
 or may be continuous. Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change 
 itself is one of the things immediately experienced. 'Change' in this case means 
 continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition. [...] Continuity here is a definite sort 
 of experience; just as definite as is the discontinuity-experience which I find it impossible 
 to avoid when I see to make the transition from an experience of my own to one of 
 yours.
656
  
 Here we find an emphasis on "personal history" for James, as well as on change, as that is 
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what we can perceive and try to understand. In other words, a dialogue can be envisioned here in 
that for both James and Ortega, what should be emphasized is our personal history—hence, 
personal, meaning unique rather than generally applied to all—as that is what we can each 
potentially analyze, study, and begin to understand, becoming therefore really what our "nature" 
is (since again that, in and of itself, we cannot fully reach, we can only study what we think it is 
and has been). This is perspectivism, again, because our understandings, as in this case of nature, 
are funneled through our perspectives and therefore have individuality. And finally James 
posited that, as noted in an earlier quote from Graham,  
 There is no other nature, no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of 
 continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations, the passing of one experience 
 into another when they belong to the same self. And this whatness is real empirical 
 'content,' just as the whatness of separation and discontinuity is real content in the 
 contrasted cases.
657
 
 The passing of one experience into another, or history, as James says, has "empirical 
content," so this is what can be at least studied. Because as he writes in what follows, he denies 
that we can be certain of either environmental conditions (nurture) or genetics (nature, in the 
traditional, standard sense of the term), because, we can add here, it is really both accumulated in 
the general term of "history." Perhaps in a sense this is overcomplicating the matter in that he is 
denying both nature (genetics, birth) and nurture (environing conditions)—especially denying 
that we would be able to get any notion of either, more so than their actual existence—to really 
say that they are both possible (just not directly tangible). In other words, since "experience is 
what we experience it to be," it can be experienced and interpreted based on genetic factors, or 
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by circumstances in the environment, so it is neither because we cannot say for sure that it is 
definitely one or the other. By being neither it can also, arguably, really be both here. For James 
then, arguably there is no other nature other than the passing of experiences over time for an 
individual; there essentially is no other nature than history. Hence again the further dialogue here 
that can be imagined between James and Ortega. 
 This conception of "nature" for both thinkers helps explain why they can both deny a 
purely genetic explanation for behavior (in looking at the term specifically from this biological 
and scientific point of view), for example, but while still recognizing that this is a factor, to a 
certain degree, albeit not an entirely deterministic or directly causational one, as was also argued 
in the dialogue between Ortega and Dewey. James writes that 
 [...] 1) That taking the word experience as it is universally understood, the experience of 
 the race can no more account for our necessary or a priori judgments than the experience 
 of the individual can; 2) That there is no good evidence for the belief that our instinctive 
 reactions are fruits of our ancestors' education in the midst of the same environment, 
 transmitted to  us at birth.
658
 
 So as he continues, fundamentally what we can know is what we think we know, albeit 
talking about nature, the environment, circumstances, reality, truth, or history; 
 For in the first place, if a feeling do not mirror the reality which wakens it and to which 
 we say it corresponds, if it mirror no reality whatever outside of the mind, it of course is a 
 purely mental product. By its very definition it can be nothing else. But in the second 
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 place, even if it do mirror the reality exactly, still it is not that reality itself, it is a 
 duplication of it, the result of a mental reaction.
659
 
 In other words, here James appears to be arguing that mental reaction is what we can 
know, for example in this case in comparison to reality (or any other metaphysical topic 
essentially). Again we cannot know for sure what reality is, but we can know what our mental 
reaction to and of reality is. We must add here again the point of possible dialogue that there is a 
history of our mental reactions accumulated upon a continuum that we are constantly 
experiencing, so our mental reactions as James refers to them are historical. 
 So once more "history," therefore, becomes a convenient term to use here to clarify this 
"denying to accept" in James since it can imply all these terms of experience, circumstances, 
nature, etcetera. And it is also the better, more all-encompassing term for Ortega, as supported by 
Lasaga Medina,"[...] el pasado es siempre el límite absoluto de lo que el hombre puede llegar a 
ser en el futuro. Ahora bien, su naturaleza humana (biológica y psicológica) pertenece a ese 
pasado: la Naturaleza es el pasado absoluto de la Historia, algo que el hombre no puede 
cambiar".
660
 So again, we can see how we can argue that man has no nature, only history, 
because history is our nature, as it is such a broad term that it includes all that characterizes all 
definitions and conceptions of nature; ancestry, local history, genes, to name just a few. 
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VI. Unitary Duality  
 As we have seen, one succinct way to summarize Ortega's meditations on life is to 
consider it a "unitary duality" in that there are two, dual parts; "self" and "circumstance," which 
are united as "one" in each individual. In other words, the self cannot be separated from the 
circumstances that surround the self, as they dynamically interact and are inextricably 
interdependent though there are two separate entities. Again one's "circumstances" are the 
specific set of circumstances for that "yo" (self). This can potentially dialogue with pragmatism 
in that an individual's specific set of circumstances arguably in part define one's interests, which 
was aforementioned to be key in James's pragmatism. This is what defines "my life" per Ortega's 
thought, and this, which is "self and circumstance," is what constitutes "reality." Graham 
proposes the possible argument that, 
 The unity of Ortega's philosophy would be lost, if it were simply a developing "one-two" 
 sequence of "stages" that are not finally a "unitary duality" of self and circumstance as 
 basic life-reality and also of vital reason and historical reason as a "philosophy of life." 
 The textual context is both consistent with and pregnant with this meaning: "two in 
 one."
661
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 This "self and circumstance" is anti-dualistic and is an individual "reality" resulting in 
unique perspectives. This dialogues with the same concept at the core of James's radical 
empiricism. As Graham proposes, quoting James at the end of this excerpt, 
 This plurality of "given" fact and individual viewpoints was at the heart of James's radical 
 empiricism, as was later Husserl's Ideen (1913) and of Ortega's "absolute positivism" in 
 1916. James had expressed this insight rhapsodically. "There is no possible point of view 
 from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact."
662
 
 Again, however, it must be noted here that "radical positivism" is a term that only 
Graham created to describe and define Ortega's philosophy in this. But there not being one sole 
point of view is precisely what Ortega argues in his perspectivism, and therefore individuality 
pervades in his thought as well.
663
 James was also known for his declaration of the power of the 
"promethean self," arguing that we are 'self-making,' another case in point for this imaginary 
dialogue here with Ortega. For both Ortega and James, ultimately we make our own worlds. As 
Graham further supports, as a possible argument here, 
 As the basis for knowing reality, James's metaphysics of "radical empiricism" was 
 grounded in "fact" and "thing" and "experience of life" and "viewpoint" or "perspective" 
 thereon, with basic relations and "connections" included. All of that was scarcely 
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more than one person.  
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 different from Ortega's "radical positivism" in any significant respect. [...] Continuity 
 with James is also true of Ortega's "dualism" (or "pluralism") balanced by "unity" [...].
664
  
 There are some differences, however, in Ortega's emphasis on "circumstances" and 
James's emphasis on "experiences" in how they shape the ways in which we are simultaneously 
both personally unique and socially similar. But ultimately the key potential dialogue that can be 
created here is how both share an emphasis on the importance of perspective at the most 
fundamental level.  
 Experience we know is key for James, as it is constant and continually shapes our 
understanding of so much, including life, reality, and truth. Experience is the basic foundation of 
life; reality, truth, etcetera. As we know 'experience' in pragmatism is fundamental in all this, 
which again we can tersely summarize as the following: "experience is what we experience it to 
be." It is continuous, constantly revealing to us our realities, truth, and selves. Pronouncing that 
experience is the experience of the self with our circumstances can arguably dialogue with 
Ortega as this can be broadly understood to encompass again truth, reality, etcetera. In the article 
"What is Meant by Experience?" James provides further detail on what this term "experience" 
means for him, as quoted earlier, "Experience means experience of something foreign supposed 
to impress us, whether spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and acts. [...] 
experience moulds  us at every hour, and makes of our minds a mirror of the time- and space- 
connections between the things in the world."
665
 In other words, again the main difference here 
in this imagined dialogue is that often James is using a broader term here, "experience," but we 
can posit nonetheless that the conversation would still flow smoothly if we were to insist that we 
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could interchange Ortega's use of his term "history" for James's "experience." This is because 
James's notion of 'experience' can arguably be exchanged with much of Ortega's philosophy, 
such as here with yo soy yo y mi circunstancia in that this is what we experience it to be (and this 
exchange we saw also arguably applied in the section on Dewey since it is a fundamental 
pragmatist concept). For Ortega, key is the interaction between the self and the circumstances; 
our yo/self is not just the circumstances that surround us, it is also the interaction specifically; 
that sort of 'in between,' which is a concept similar to James's emphasis on the importance of the 
transitions/changes between experiences being experiences in and of themselves as well. 
 For Ortega, "circumstance," while an integral part of our life, is not the only one, as there 
is also "myself" (yo soy yo y mi circunstancia). The formula here of Ortega's requires both in its 
definition of life and its radical reality. Circumstance is directly a part of our experience of life 
and reality, but not a literal direct part of our life and reality. In other words, there is "ourselves," 
and then there are the circumstances surrounding us that, while they impact and influence the 
experiences we have of our lives, realities, truths, etcetera, they are not direct, integral parts of 
our core selves. This is another area where "experience" again comes in for Ortega, because there 
are our "yoes" (our "selves") and our circumstances as separate phenomena, and then there is 
also the interaction between the two (again similar to James's more broad insistence on how the 
transitions between experiences are experiences as well in and of themselves; i.e., also here again 
anti-dualism). Hence, there is a difference here again between the experience and understanding 
of something, and that something in and of its core self; once  more we must apply an anti-
dualistic conception of this. "Yo vivo, y al vivir estoy en la circunstancia, la cual no soy yo. La 
realidad de mi yo es, pues, secundaria a la realidad integral que es mi vida; encuentro aquélla —
la de mi yo— en ésta, en la realidad vital. Yo y la circunstancia formamos parte de mi vida," 
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posited Ortega.
666
 This we could envision in a concise pragmatist dialogue as "life is what I 
experience it to be." 
 Ultimately the final conclusion reached by the two is that the world and our realities are 
malleable, and we are led to our own truths. Our "worlds" consist of a "unitary duality" in that, 
interpreted from a pragmatist, anti-dualist vision, this permits us to perhaps see more clearly how 
for Ortega we are ourselves and ourselves maneuvering through that which surrounds 
ourselves—this is the basic concluding dialogue that we can potentially envision here between 
James and Ortega. This "unitary duality" of our lives and their realities are individual and 
understood via our unique perspectives. 
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VII. On Perspective 
 Ortega wrote at length on perspectivism, as was explored in the section on Dewey, since 
this was central to his philosophy. He declared that "Es la teoría general de mi filosofía: el 
perspectivismo. Pero no es el "punto de vista" en el sentido idealista, sino al revés: es que lo 
visto, la realidad, es también punto de vista."
667
 Most fundamentally, to reiterate, Ortega's 
perspectivism declares that reality is revealed in individual perspectives, and so each person has 
their own unique perspective, and therefore reality. Perspectives are diverse; they can be vital, 
social, to note just a couple examples, but ultimately, at any given moment our perspective in 
sum is unique and singular to each of us. Perspective, in part, is a distinct orientation and 
reaction to our situation; our "radical reality" of "yo y mi circunstancia" of any given time, so 
because circumstances can change, then our radical realities can change, and our perspetives 
therefore can change. But whatever that perspective be, it is inimitable to each one of us, as least 
as long as it is in orientation and use. Thus, we each can have multiple unique perspectives. Our 
perspectives are a component of our realities. None of these individual perspectives, and 
therefore realities, are correct or incorrect, they just are; each person is a point of view of a 
specific reality. This can arguably sound like James's pragmatist idea, exaggerated here to make 
a point, that 'we experience experience to be what we experience it to be.' Hence, for Ortega, 
again every 'reality' essentially can have an infinite number of perspectives because each 
individual has their own realities. So what we can know about reality is what we perceive it to 
be, what we experience it to be, but we cannot be certain about what it may be aside from this 
relationship/connection. To reiterate, there is what our perspective leads us to see reality as, and 
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then there is what reality might really be, so what we can know is what our perspective leads us 
to see and believe (rather than reality in and of its self). And this, therefore, is also the way to 
understand reality; 'experience is what we experience it to be.' As Molinuevo explains, 
 La teoría de la perspectiva va unida ahora a estas tres palabras: espectador, vida, 
 individuo. Dos affirmaciones complementarias articulan la perspectiva: la realidad se 
 ofrece en perspectivas individuales y cada hombre es un punto de vista de la realidad. Por 
 tanto, la perspectiva es el modo de ser de lo real y también el modo de conocerlo.
668
 
 Graham proposes the theory that this perspectivismo comes directly from James (though 
this of course is, for the moment, just an argument that has not been proven, but we can, 
nevertheless, propose this possible dialogue here for the purposes of this essay); "Despite his 
unfavorable comments on pragmatism from 1908 to 1916, Ortega had derived basic inspiration 
and some key ideas from James during those very years. Not the least of these was his 
"perspectivism," or epistemology of  'point of view'."
669
 Further, as Graham adds, "Most 
basically, his [Ortega's] phenomenology was "seeing" as "perspectivism" —an addition to the 
epistemological side of his Jamsian metaphysics, but also rooted in James."
670
  
 Indeed, there is a pragmatist dialogue that can be imagined here in regards to Ortega's 
perspectivism because pragmatism is inherently 'perspetivistic' as well (as in the case here of 
James), but without of course arguing for a direct causal relationship of influence. As Barzun 
explains in reference to James, 
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 Purpose and point of view—perspectivism—inevitably shape our human truths. Familiar 
 phrases record this necessity: "from this angle," "considering this aspect," "relatively to 
 the norms of that time," "all other things being equal," and the like, show how difficult it 
 is to tell the truth without specifying the perspective. The very change in the meaning of 
 "point of view" to its present sense of "opinion" reminds us that true statements vary with 
 the point of sight. When therefore the pragmatist says that his truth fits his purpose and 
 may not fit others he is not claiming the privilege of being "subjective" or eccentric, he is 
 only pointing to a condition of human thought . [...] The permanent real things for you are 
 your individual persons.
671
 
 It is interesting here how Barzun describes James's philosophy specifically as 
"perspectivism." James's philosophy here is that "perspectivism" is not just "spacial" in terms of 
"point of view," it is also vital and gnoseological, as it is with Ortega as well. In other words, 
here we live directly in our perspectives because we live them in our experiences, which are 
simply, again, what we experience them to be. And as we shall see further ahead, this is arguably 
the same idea behind Ortega's historicism as well; that a historian provides a written account of a 
history from an individual perspective, and hence some of the frequently cited issues in historical 
accounts that they are subjective and therefore not able to bring in and apply all the possible 
perspectives at any one date and time, as we will see again in more detail ahead.
672
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 As has been discussed, in most writings James appears quite individualist. To a certain 
extent he is, but without denying entirely an important social aspect of life, as we have seen. 
James, however, did emphasize the important role of perspectives being unique in how they are 
our lens to life and understanding our lives and experiences in life. For James, not only do any 
two (or more) people not necessarily see the same object, but each individual might not see the 
same object the same way all the time. A good definition of this idea comes from the following 
excerpt from Essays in Radical Empiricism, in which James explains how there would be 
nothing to contemplate if all perspectives essentially were the same, and the same all the time;  
 In general terms, then, whatever differing contents our minds may eventually fill a place 
 with, the place itself is a numerically identical content of the two minds, a piece of 
 common property in which, through which, and over which they join. The receptacle of 
 certain of our experiences being thus common, the experiences themselves might some 
 day become common also. If that day ever did come, our thoughts would terminate in a 
 complete empirical identity, there would be an end, so far as those experiences went, to 
 our discussions about truth. No points of difference appearing, they would have to count 
 as the same.
673
 
 Perhaps James mentions, "if that day ever did come" not because he thinks it might, but 
rather to make a point about perspectives, and how they are ultimately different for each 
individual and funnel different views on realities and truths. So even if there were absolutes in 
these concepts, and that day were thus to come, it does not matter because they will always be 
sifted through different points of view that result in different interpretations (perhaps some may 
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overlap, but not all), so again we have here anti-dualism; there is what we think are such things 
as reality, truth, etcetera, and then there is what they really are, but we cannot know for sure 
when they coincide though they exist interdependently.  
 And this can certainly dialogue with Ortega's aforementioned view that "the will is real, 
but the willed cannot necessarily be proven real," because what we do know is what we see, but 
we cannot say for sure that whatever this vision may be is shared in the exact same way by all or 
even exactly the same always by the same person because again, “[…] la querencia es real, pero 
lo querido es irreal.
674
 
 Moreover, it is not even just about having experiences; this is not enough, we must also 
process them, remember them, and organize them, which 'how' also adds to our "unique 
perspectives" at any one time. Hence again why man is his history. And as was similarly 
applicable in the section on Dewey, to re-quote, Ortega proclaimed that man "[…] va 
acumulando ser —el pasado—: se va haciendo un ser en la dialéctica de sus experiencias. Esta 
dialéctica no es de la razón lógica, sino precisamente de la histórica […]."675 And hence again 
the use of the very pragmatist term of "experience" as very credible evidence of the ability to 
create a potential dialogue here. Our experiences are dialectical; 'dialectic' being in one sense 'the 
investigation and discussion of our thoughts on the truth, concepts, and metaphysics in general.'  
 So again the idea is that everything is offered to us in different and unique perspectives, 
such as reality, and this also applies to history, and our histories. This can help us understand 
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further Ortega's maxim that we have history, and not nature, because we do not have something 
fixed; "No hay una persona única, como tampoco hay un paisaje único."
676
 Hence the importance 
of perspectivismo in understanding Ortega's historicist maxim, and why we have explored this 
here, envisioning a possible dialogue with James as one potential way (of many) to perhaps 
better understand Ortega's philosophy on historicism. 
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VIII. Truth and Reality 
  In this imagined dialogue between Ortega and James, the concept of perspectivism also 
applies here as to how to possibly better understand the following concepts that will be explored 
here of truth and reality. Perhaps the most succinct statement one can make in regards to the 
pragmatist view on truth is to say that there are no "truths" in the strictest and most absolute 
sense, but rather there are only "approximations to" or "assertions of" the truth, as we saw with 
Dewey, who argued that there are only "warranted assertibilities." William James wrote,  
 Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 
 'agreement,' as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. Pragmatists and 
 intellectuals both accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel only 
 after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement,' 
 and what by the term 'reality,' when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree 
 with.
677
 
 For the pragmatist such as James, again "experience" is key here. "Experience" 
corresponds with "consequences" in that they are somewhat interchangeable—experiences, and 
the consequences, speaking broadly, that they bring, construct in a sense our realities, which in 
turn bring into practice our beliefs—a topic that will be further explored ahead, but for the 
moment needs to be referenced here in this section on the concepts of truth and reality. 
 But as James notes, where philosophers might not coincide is in how "agreement" 
between experiences, or our histories, and reality, truth, is achieved and defined—but this can 
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simply be possibly resolved by concluding that this is because our experiences, perspectives, and 
resulting consequences that we experience are different, individual, so of course there will not 
always necessarily be agreement. Hence again the element of individualism prevalent in these 
philosophical ideas as we have seen at length. For Ortega, as we shall explore further just a bit 
ahead, we also start different, rather than only having different end results. Moreover, there are 
differing ideas on when that "agreement" occurs, as for pragmatism it is with future experiences, 
whereas for empiricism and positivism, for example, this happens with past experiences. So 
perhaps this is a key point of disagreement; whether "agreement" comes more from the future or 
the past experience.  
 This idea of truth agreeing with an individual's reality, as opposed to the reality, 
dialogues with Ortega, as well as the idea that this also leads to individual truths, but not 
necessarily the truth(s). As supported by Abad Pascual,"Por lo tanto, el filósofo no puede 
permanecer en al acierto o verdad pretérita, ya que ésta, justamente por ser pretérita, es 
incompleta. Se le impone la obligación de reflexionar sobre ella a fin de intentar encontrar su 
propia verdad, a fin de encontrar su propio conocimiento."
678
 For Ortega, all reality is human and 
is therefore historical, because these individual perspectives, beliefs, truths, and realities are from 
a specific time, as one of the key historical factors in this. But as can be insinuated from this 
quote, if perspective, truths, etcetera, are temporal, again then why can this not be so in reference 
to the future as well as the past? As noted in this aforementioned quote, sometimes the study of 
the past can only bring us incomplete truths, for example, as they must be further corroborated in 
the future, for instance (which is quite pragmatist of course). Moreover, this still does not mean 
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that perspectives, truths, and realities are not historical, because in the future, that time will at 
some point become history, so we can also argue that the future is historical, or it is going to be 
historical at least (as well). But again the past is key because it is more tangible, and therefore 
easier to study, logically, and therefore in certain ways can yield more knowledge as a result. 
And ultimately for Ortega key in all this is how it stems from individual perspective, first and 
foremost, as a defining feature on notions of the truth, realities, etcetera. It must be reminded 
here that the past is not just a collection of dates and registered events, for example, as here the 
concept of "history" or "historical" is meant to convey many additional notions such as how it is 
really part of a continuum of past, present and future, or how it has and will have a characteristic 
of being a narrative. Moreover, by being "temporal," history and historical reason acquire new 
meanings as we incorporate new perspectives. So more safely summarized, razón histórica is 
razón narrativa. Thus as Abad Pascual continues later, 
 Nuestro autor, por el contratio, afirmirá que las variaciones humanas son constantes. El 
 hombre siempre es distinto. No se trata, solamente, de que sea distinto porque viva desde 
 distintas realidades, sino al revés, porque el hombre es distinto, porque son distintas e 
 innumerables las maneras de ser hombre, son distintas sus realidades; Ortega, contra toda 
 posición fisista y mecanista afirmirá que vivir es creación, aumento, expansión, dominio 
 [...] capacidad de crearla.
679
 
 As discussed as well in the section on Dewey, a pragmatist account of the "truth" requires 
direct, tangible observation and experience. The analysis is "functional" and "instrumental" in 
that it requires a look to the past and especially application for the possible future. And as 
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demonstrated in the quote that follows, James emphasizes the individual element in all this (as 
did Ortega), given different "interests" leading these directions here toward "consequences" 
"experienced through experience." 
 Rejecting the absolutist conception of truth, James argues that truths are desired for their 
 consequences, for the impact they can have on our life-experiences and practices. So his 
 view of truth can be understood as an alethic consequentialism and instrumentalism. He 
 himself describes his position as an "instrumental" conception of truth that follows the 
 footsteps of the instrumentalist views put forth by Schiller and Dewey.
680
 
 Linking these notions with the other two pragmatists explored here, Schiller and Dewey, 
lends further support to this dissertation's objectives. Compare this with González's proposition 
that for Ortega, "truth speaks to us through the dialectic that is our lived experience."
681
 
 For James, truth matters because it helps us better understand our experiences and it helps 
better prepare us for future experiences, in the same way as we saw with Dewey;  
 What he wanted to accomplish is fairly clear. Truth matters. Truth is not merely a 
 stunningly pretty word that people reify and then claim to revere. Truth is a matter of 
 being led effectively through the shoals, pitfalls, very real dangers of the world: it is not 
 to be misled. Truth is a species of goodness.
682
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 But again as was the case with Dewey truth is anti-dualistic in that there is the truth, and 
then there is what we think is the truth, and we cannot necessarily know when the two coincide. 
But indeed we can know what we think is the truth, and this can vary by experiences, or which is 
essentially history—and here again we can imagine a potential dialogue between Ortega and 
James, as was proposed between Ortega and Dewey. This is why James, in the same sense as 
Dewey, does not see truth as "absolute" per se, but rather focuses on their being multiple truths, 
just as with perspectives; 
 James argues that we should always talk about truths in the plural. He defends the 
 diversification of truth according to plural contexts, plural practices, and plural interests. 
 On this view, truths are relative to the always changeable reality we cope with in our 
 experiences and practices.
683
 
 No matter which way we look at it, key in James's philosophy is that truth comes to us, 
whether by searching or it is simply revealed to us, via our experiences. And again the specific 
connection that can be made in a possible dialogue between the two is to converse that inherently 
experience is history, because it is in a great part the accumulation of experiences in the past, 
which is the same as one's history in sum.
684
 So truth is historical as well for James, as Greeve 
Davaney supports,  
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 True ideas or theories are not eternal unchanging templates that we somehow discover. 
 Rather, they are the products of human history that work in relation to other dimensions 
 of experience, including other ideas. James used all sorts of dynamic terms to indicate 
 what he meant by truth; true ideas "lead" humans to experience, they are "instruments of 
 action," they "fit" experience. A number of important claims accompany this approach. 
 Truth, for James, is not a "stagnant property" inherent in ideas. Instead, truth is something 
 that happens to ideas as they work for humans, as they allow humans to enhance and 
 enlarge their experience. Ideas become true through a process of contributing to more 
 satisfactory experience. Truth is not discovered but invented. It is not an unchanging 
 attribute of an eternal idea but an event and a process by which historical human ideas are 
 verified in experience and action.
685
 
 To add further support then, Daveney also interprets that the truth is historical. In one 
sense, a partial part of the dialogue we can create here with Ortega, as in the first section, is to 
look at truth as our beliefs, and apply the same meaning of "belief" that Ortega has. Briefly 
revisited, for Ortega we are our beliefs, essentially, as they are latently part of us; "la creencia es 
quien nos tiene y sostiene a nosotros."
686
 "Belief" is like "faith," such as in regards to religion or 
science; "[...] se trata de una fe, que la ciencia es una fe, una creencia en que se está, como se 
puede estar en la creencia religiosa."
687
 And these latent beliefs are arguably forms of 'assumed' 
truths for Ortega, as explained in greater depth in the section on Dewey (which can be found as 
reference below in the footnote). 
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 And in regards to James, as Stuhr explains, 
 James set forth his pragmatism as a theory of truth. In his view, truth is an  instrument for 
 getting us into satisfactory relations with experiences, an expedient in our way of 
 thinking, a marrying function between old beliefs and new experiences, and 
 something made rather than found.
688
 
 As proposed by Graham, "Obviously, "beliefs" as a concept came to Ortega first from 
James, as did 'instrument.'"
689
 It must be repeated here that Graham's very direct affirmations that 
Ortega basically copied quite a lot from James are only theories that have not been proven, as 
few scholars have explored so direct of a hypothetical connection. What is important for this 
thesis, nonetheless, is that the existence of this argument supports our being able to at least 
imagine a dialogue here. Moreover, again as noted Ortega and James lived contemporaneously, 
so there is that historical connection between the two, which as we have seen both would agree 
plays a role in adding to shaping and influencing their views (we are our history).  
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 Ortega argued, "Las creencias constituyen el estrato básico, el más profundo de la 
arquitectura de nuestra vida. Vivimos de ellas y, por lo mismo, no solemos pensar en ellas. [...] 
Por eso decimos que tenemos estas o las otras ideas; pero nuestras creencias, más que tenerlas, 
las somos."
690
 Again, as some ideas become so ingrained in us that they become beliefs, in turn, 
some of these beliefs become our "truths." As quoted in the section on Dewey, humanity 
 [...] tiene que inventar el mundo. La mayor porción de él la ha heredado de sus mayores y 
 actúa en su vida como sistema de creencias firmes. Pero cada cual tiene que habérselas 
 por su cuenta con todo lo dudoso, con todo lo que es cuestión. A este fin ensaya figuras 
 imaginarias de mundos y de su posible conducta en ellos. Entre ellas, una le parece 
 idealmente más firme, y a eso llama verdad. Pero conste: lo verdadero, y  aun lo 
 científicamente verdadero, no es sino un caso particular de lo fantástico.
691
 
 Here again we see the important role of history because some beliefs are essentially 
inherited, as Ortega declares here, and thus are in part dependent on history. This previous 
assertion of Ortega most certainly dialogues with the following excerpt from James, in which he 
also emphasizes the way new beliefs and/or truths can come to us via experiences (which we 
experience experiences over the course of our histories); 
 This is the process "by which any individual settles into new opinions": "The 
 individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts 
 them to a strain" (P, 34). The strain, he adds, may also come from the experience of 
 others who contradict our opinions or add new facts that have to be reconciled with them. 
                                                          
690
 Ortega, Historia, p. 19. 
 
691
 Ortega, Ideas y Creencias, pp. 37-38. 
 
 367 
 
 In these negotiations we try to preserve "the older stock of truths with a minimum of 
 modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty" (P, 35). 
 According to James, the role of "older truths" in our epistemic life should not be 
 underestimated."
692
 
 Hence the following supporting conclusion by Davaney as well that there is, thus, a 
historicism present in James's thought; 
 First, he had a deep sense of the importance of tradition and the past. For James, human 
 ideas do not spring de novo into existence. Instead, they develop over time and change 
 and are transformed as experience stresses them, demanding revision. Humans, according 
 to this perspective, build up stores of ideas, beliefs, and theories through which we 
 interpret our world. As historical beings we are always inheriting the ideas that came 
 before us. But in a dynamic, historical world of ongoing change, experience is always 
 straining, contradicting, stressing our ideas. New ideas, new versions of the truth, emerge 
 as humans amend and revise their inherited traditions in light of new experiences.
693
 
 Truth is historical, we are historical. Therefore, James also accepts this idea that while the 
past, or history, has such an influential role, this does not disregard the responsibility of novelty 
either, as in the excerpt in which he states that "New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-
over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a 
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maximum of continuity."
694
 Generally speaking, it is of course possible to see how continuity 
and novelty, especially in the case of the course of history, are not contradictory terms. 
 And this is all because of the instrumentalist, functional aspect of pragmatism in which 
something that is "useful" gains special value for us, most tersely summarized, but as we shall 
see is something that Ortega argues in this specific sense that beliefs, for him, must be "useful." 
"As James described it, "ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true 
just insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience."
695
  
 As also noted in the section on Dewey, there is an important contrast here that must be 
reiterated between pragmatist thought and Ortega; namely, that some beliefs, and hence some 
truths, are so ingrained and latent in our selves according to Ortega that we are not even always 
aware of them, which this last point is likely not something that a pragmatist would generally 
agree with. As we saw Ortega critiqued directly,  
 El error del pragmatismo no radica en que considere las ideas como instrumentos, sino en 
 que quiera reducir las cosas con que el hombre tiene que habérselas a lo perceptible y 
 experimentable, lo que está a la mano y presente, el mineral, la planta, el animal y la 
 estrella. […] Si así fuese, la vida resultaría faena fácil, tal vez resuelta con cierta plenitud 
 hace milenios.
696
 
 In comparison to this critique, James's theory is that  
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 Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question, "Grant an idea or belief to be 
 true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? 
 How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which 
 would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash value in 
 experiential terms?" The moment the pragmatist asks this question, it sees the answer: 
 True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas 
 are those that we can not. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true 
 ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.
697
 
 This implies, therefore, that the truth is something that we have to search for and discover 
through 'study,' in a sense, via our experiences. What is key is how we experience something, 
rather than that something in and of itself in terms of its 'truthfulness.' "The truth of an idea is not 
a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by 
events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-
fication. Its validity is the process of valid-ation," wrote James.
698
 A good example proposed to 
understand this in simple terms is to think of prerequisite college courses for a degree; they are 
termed "prerequisites" because they are required for understanding through the advancement of 
classes and for obtaining the degree. A college student who does not take these course will not 
receive his or her degree, but taking them is not an absolute guarantee for understanding and 
obtaining the degree; one still has to pass and understand the material. This is one simple, helpful 
way to understand the pragmatist notion of the "truth;" we know something will not be truthful if 
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it does not meet "prerequisites," but just meeting "prerequisites" does not guarantee for 
something to be truthful (hence a somewhat abstract notion of the truth), but it is a requirement 
nonetheless.
699
 In other words, again the truth is fundamentally anti-dualistic; there is the "truth," 
which we might not ever reach, and there is what we think is the truth, and one cannot exist 
without the other though they are separate concepts. Moreover, again key is how we experience 
that truth to be truthful. James writes, 
 Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously 
 from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, 
 working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, 
 true instrumentally. This is the 'instrumental' view of truth.
700
 
 "Truth" needs to be incorporated and assimilated into our lives via experience to be able 
to ponder and conceptualize it. And it is "instrumental" because "truthfulness" depends on 
consequences, and the "usefulness" of those consequences, as well as 'whether or not any 
difference resulted;' how experiences can differ depending on whether or not one believes 
something to be "true." (The pragmatist emphasis on "usefulness" was explored in Dewey as 
well.) Again, our experiences construct a continuous flow that is the narration of our lives, our 
histories—and key is how we experience our experiences. Our lives, our histories, are defined by 
the constant, continual accumulation of experiences, and of course on awareness, consciousness, 
and response to those experiences and their consequences. As another example raised to 
conceptualize this better, James writes,   
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 Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health and 
 wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the concrete benefits we gain are what we 
 mean by calling the pursuit a duty. In the case of truth, untrue beliefs work as 
 perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially.
701
 
 So if truth is based on concrete consequences via experience, we can use the example 
raised here of "health" as if it were a "truth" and think of all the consequences that validate 
"health," such as sleeping well, eating well, being fit, having good circulation, etc. And it does 
not make a difference the order we consider these in terms of validity (logic is another matter); 
"one is healthy because they are fit," is as valid as to say "one is fit because he or she is 
healthy."
702
 Or a treatment for an illness, for example, would be considered "true" if it cures, and 
false if it does not. But there are contradictorily theories out there (regardless of whether or not 
they are proven, they are out there) that eating less can help one live longer and which to most 
sounds ridiculous. So again in these everyday examples here we have this notion that what we 
know is true is what we think is true, but we cannot necessarily know for certain that something 
in and of itself is really true (again to reiterate we can just know that we think it is true). This, as 
has been emphasized, is a fundamental general concept in pragmatism. The following 
propositions from Livingston help support this:  
 They [James and Dewey] were not interested in authenticity of any kind because they 
 knew there was neither a true world apart from "what we say about it"—every truth was a 
 bet on the future that had paid off—nor a genuine self prior to the scene of acting and 
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 thinking.
703
 
 Hence again the anti-dualism in this. In simplified terms,  
 There is a variety of uses and benefits true beliefs and theories yield, and there is no 
 singular truth, but many plural truths. As a consequence, James reasons, theories of truth 
 that take truth to be a property abstractable from those successes are bound to failure. 
 This is why truth is not the sort of thing or property we can have a theory about.
704
 
 "Functionality," therefore, is key here; "truth" has to "function well" in life for James. 
Truths have to "make a difference" (in consequences) to be "worth" anything. But just being 
"useful" does not suffice; there has to be a sufficient amount of usefulness/useful applications. 
One of the challenges here is defining how much is required to be considered "sufficient." When 
something 'makes a difference in one's life' then it becomes 'useful' in one way or another, 
'enough,' and then in turn it becomes valuable; something that we appreciate and remember. 
Hence the idea that what we can say is that the truth is what we think it is (but we cannot say 
exactly, for sure, what it is in and of itself), because it simply depends on what 'makes enough of 
a difference for each individual, and therefore becomes valuable and remembered.' Again it is 
'useful' and 'connotes, marks a difference' because it allows one to, in a sense, 'construct myself,' 
and it allows one to give and define meaning to one's experiences, which in turn permits an 
interpretation of truth and reality in a specific unique, individual sense. James writes, "Once we 
know what "difference ... [a claim's] being true will make in some possible person's history, we 
shall know, not only just what you are really claiming, but also how important an issue it is, and 
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how to go to work to verify the claim."
705
 Note how James uses the specific term here of "a 
person's history," and not "a person's nature" in the construction of this possible dialogue here 
with Ortega—nor does he focus on the future here, as he usually would as a pragmatist. 
 A very "pragmatist" excerpt in Ortega's meditations on the topics of what is real and what 
is reality is when he directly defines it as being something "useful," as he writes that man or 
woman "Lo que tiene de real—de no mera idea—es sólo lo que tiene de útil."706 And this is 
despite the aforementioned critique of his direct negation of the need for something to be 
"useful"—here he declares that what is real is what is useful. 
 This "threshold of usefulness" also depends on the future, as it is not something that we 
can know instantaneously, since it depends on "experiments" of sorts in experiences; hence the 
application of "functionalism" (practical application). "Meanwhile," writes James, "we have to 
live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood. [...] We 
live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards."
707
 So here again is the 
important historicist connection in all this; our ideas of the "truth" depend very much on the past, 
and our projection and foresight about the future, restoring in turn the continual flow of 
experience. As Davaney summarizes in support, in reference to this same quote; 
 James thus developed a picture of historical existence in which human ideas, beliefs, and 
 theories are always in the process of making and remaking. Truths become true and 
 sometimes die. They enhance experience and then no longer function satisfactorily in 
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 relation to new experiences. In practice humans are always testing their beliefs against 
 other beliefs and in terms of the experiences they permit or inhibit. Such ideas are not 
 passive duplications of reality standing outside of the world. Rather, they are part of 
 experience, additions to the ongoing sum of reality. They not only describe the world; 
 they add to it, becoming part of the world's experience as humans and the rest of finite 
 reality move ever into an open future.
708
 
 There is here also a dialogue with Ortega's theories on ideas and beliefs as this reading of 
Greeve Davaney's is scarcely different from the explored themes of Ortega's notion that ideas 
over time become beliefs, installed within us basically subconsciously, until new ideas come 
along and challenge them, creating times of "crisis" and the need for new beliefs—in this 
interpretation from Greeve Davaney she uses interchangeably fundamentally the same concept of 
ideas and beliefs with pragmatist "experience." 
 And there is also an important "individualistic" factor in all this, because truth is relative, 
as it depends on experiences, which can vary by person. Therefore, two people may of course 
disagree on the "truth" of something. But that is why we must resolve this by once again stating 
that we cannot, therefore, truly know the truth, we can only know what we think it is. Truth is 
plural; there can be multiple truths. Again, truth is what we experience it to be. And again this 
can certainly dialogue with Ortega's "perspectivism," because essentially here James is focusing 
on perspective as a determining factor in concepts and ideas of "truth." Succinctly explained, 
"The value of every view is something determined individually by each believer's temperament. 
The matter is not the truth of any of the views, but how they reflect our given inclinations—like 
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finding shoes that fit."
709
 This dialogues with the following affirmation of Ortega quoted in the 
first section that: "cada hombre tiene una misión de verdad. Donde está mi pupila no está otra: lo 
que de la realidad ve mi pupila no lo ve otra. Somos insustituibles, somos necesarios. [...] la 
realidad, pues, se ofrece en perspectivas individuales."
710
 Therefore, again "reality" and "truth" 
for Ortega is essentially based on our individual perspectives on ideas corresponding to our 
realities, and these are, as he says, 'infinite in possibilities.'
711
 Truth, therefore, is revealed to us 
over the course of history in unique perspectives for individuals and time periods (time periods 
both generally speaking, and for the individual him or herself), as arguably a key point of 
possible discourse with pragmatism for Ortega. Truths can change. Truth is also true for its 
historical time period, not necessarily inherently in and of itself (or at least we cannot necessarily 
confirm that). Stuhr supports this same historical notion of the truth in James's philosophy, as 
explained in the following quote: 
 `Day follows day,' says James, `and its contents are simply added. The new contents 
 themselves are not true, they simply come and are. Truth is what we say about them."' 
 Again, all we have are those semiotic artifacts, those provisional, second-order truths that 
 emerge in the narrative time of historical consciousness and explanation. The one true 
 world—"truth absolute and objective"—would appear only at the end of days.712 
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 These so-called "second order truths," therefore, are the only ones we can really 
contemplate, as they are historical. As Livingston explains,  
 James identifies three orders of truth or reality. There is the "practical truth" residing in 
 the "instant field of the present." There are the truths we learn backward by adding, 
 retrospectively, to the practical truth of immediate experience. And then there is "truth 
 absolute and objective." This third order of truth is final in every sense because its 
 condition is the end of time. So the only truths of which we can speak and be aware are 
 those semiotic artifacts, those provisional, second-order truths, that emerge in the 
 narrative time of historical consciousness and explanation.
713
  
 So again what is tangible is that which comes from the past. Moreover, the use of the 
term "narrative" to describe one sense of history dialogues with Ortega's definition of history, of 
razón histórica, as being razón narrativa, as we shall continue to analyze here.  
 Hence the notion of life as narrative that Ortega employs is not just a colorful metaphor. 
 Life as narrative expresses the essential dynamic character of man to whom “things” 
 constantly happen. Thus life-as-lived friction between individual consciousness and the 
 world becomes the foundation of human reality.
714
 
 As a terse summary of all this, we can say that in Jamesian pragmatism "our ideas agree 
with reality."
715
 And in another example, he writes "I conclude, then, that real effectual causation 
as an ultimate nature, as a 'category,' if you like, of reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that 
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kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal."
716
 Ortega also wrote that our ideas are 
"truthful" when they correspond to the idea that we have of reality; "Una idea es verdadera 
cuando corresponde a la idea que tenemos de la realidad."
717
 These two excerpts are scarcely 
different.
718
 
 As we saw, for Ortega, "reality" is what we call "world," and "world" is interpretations of 
circumstances.
719
 We simply experience something to be real, which is not to say that there is 
necessarily any "proof," per se, that it is real. This emphasis again here on "experience" can most 
certainly dialogue with pragmatism in general. So for Ortega, a person's "radical reality" is that 
unique perspective of reality of each individual; each is distinct, and no one is correct or 
incorrect."
720
 And this must all be reitereated here because not only was this arguably a point of 
possible discourse between Ortega and Dewey, but Graham suggests this is even more 
imaginable between Ortega and James, arguing that "Radical reality was life, self, circumstance, 
mutually "positing," "presenting" themselves "absolutely," an idea originally from James."
721
 Of 
course the argument here is not that it was 'an idea originally from James,' but perhaps there is a 
dialogue to be imagined here. 
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 The concept of "truth" for James relies on a "perspectivism," as aforementioned, that is 
not very different from that of Ortega.
722
 It should be further noted that the concept of "truth" for 
James can also dialogue, albeit just a bit indirectly, with Ortega's concept of our lives and how 
we are each defined as being "self and circumstance." As Medina further supports, "When James 
defines truth as "whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief" he is referring not only to 
what we believe individually but also to what we believe together, socially.
723
 
 In pragmatism, the "truth" is connected to reality in that our so-called "truths" agree with 
reality; literally, as argued by James, "our ideas agree with reality."
724
 But again this is not to 
say, however, that they are absolute; this is just to say that over the course of time and 
experiences, something proves to generally correspond with reality, thereby making it "true," but 
essentially only in a tentative sense, as it is possible for something to come along and disprove 
our "truth" (though this also may conversely not happen; this can go in both directions). Truth is 
indeed historical then. Science is a good example to consider here as a case in point, as 
"scientific truths" have changed over the course of history. As James writes, "Truth lives, in fact, 
for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing 
challenges them."
725
 Interestingly enough, there is a shared metaphor used here of "credit," as 
Ortega uses this same idea in reference to his explanation of the meaning of "beliefs," some of 
which, as has been explained, can become our "truths" (hence a dialogue here with James that 
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can be possibly imagined). Ortega explained, referring to how we are our beliefs, and that they 
are the basic foundation of our lives;  
 Cabe simbolizar la vida de cada hombre como un Banco. Este vive a crédito de un encaje 
 oro que no suele verse, que yace en profundo de cajas metálicas oculatas en los sótanos 
 de un edificio. La más elemental cautela invita a revisar de cuando en cuando el estado 
 efectivo de esas garantías—diríamos creencias, base del crédito.726  
 Returning to James, "Truth" is something that is observed, studied, built, and developed 
over time. "Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of 
experience."
727
 And we could add here to this dialogue that this course of experiences thus leads 
us through our histories. The experiences are our histories. This dialogue therefore adds to 
studies on Ortega by proposing a possible pragmatist element and vision in his philosophy, 
which has been explored only very little in general scholarship. And more specifically again it is 
a way to possibly resolve what had at first glance seemed polemical of Ortega's notion that man 
has no nature, only history, because instead man's nature is his history, because our experiences, 
which are everything, comprise a continuum that forms our lives and the drama that is our lives. 
This must be repeated throughout, as demonstrating this is the main purpose of this dissertation. 
 Therefore, again, in James's thought the "truth" contains a certain degree of historicism. 
So given this dependence on the past essentially we also find again this very historicist leaning 
here, further enabling the creation of a dialogue with Ortega who we know leaned quite heavily 
on historicism. As aforementioned, James, referring to Kierkegaard, argues that it is through the 
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past that we reflect on the experiences that led us to the "truths" we hold, or once held; again, 
"We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards. The present sheds a 
backward light on the world's previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for the 
actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story."
728
 Thus, as 
we can see, truth essentially depends at least in part on history per James. He further writes, 
 [...] truth is made largely out of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much 
 experience funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's 
 experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's funding operations. So far as 
 experience means experiencable reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are 
 everlastingly in process of mutation—mutation towards a definite goal, it may be—but 
 still mutation.
729
 
 Our notions of "reality" as well depend on history per James, in a very anti-dualistic 
sense, as Wilshire explains; 
 In his dynamical and organismic view, reality is a matter of interweaving histories. They 
 must be distinguished but not disconnected. There is the history of the knower's 
 believing—and of course what's believed—and the history of the thing or things about 
 which one is believing something.
730
 
 Thus, so much for both James and Ortega is dependent on history. Again we return to the 
idea that there is history, and there is what we think is history/what we think that history is, and 
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both are connected anti-dualistically. In this explanation here we can also find a potential anti-
dualist dialogue again with Ortega's concept of "yo soy yo y mi circunstancia;" there is the 
history of the individual (the history of the knower's believing and what he or she believes; "the 
history of the knower's believing—and of course what's believed"), and the history of the things 
surrounding that individual ("the history of the thing or things about which one is believing 
something").
731
 As was also the argument in the section on Dewey, we cannot really know what 
history is, therefore, as we will continue to see ahead in the second section as well. Part of this is 
because of the perspectivism previously discussed at length, and another reason for this is 
because over the very course of history itself our ideas, views, etcetera, change as well. For 
example, the same person can interpret and write a history book in one year, then subsequently 
conduct new research that sheds life on new findings or theories, and write a second edition that 
could be very different. This we know happens quite frequently. As James explains, "In every 
series of real terms, not only do the terms themselves and their associates and environments 
change, but we change, and their meaning for us changes, so that new kinds of sameness and 
types of causation continually come into view and appeal to our interest."
732
 Also here again we 
find this emphasis on "interest" leading to our interpretations and understandings of things in 
general. Bringing Ortega into the conversation here, we could insert that our interests are in part 
influenced by the surrounding circumstances of the time, and consequently as circumstances 
change, interests change, and so do our yoes/selves. Hence, again, we are our experiences, which 
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together comprise our histories, so more appropriately and properly we are our histories. And 
hence a pragmatist exchange that can be envisioned with Ortega, bringing new thoughts and 
ideas to additional possible readings of his work. 
 Truths come to us in time; they reveal themselves over the course of history. Every new 
era brings with it new perspectives that lead to new truths and new realities—hence why truth, 
reality, etcetera depends on history. And hence again why we are our history, therefore. "Like 
James," proposed Graham as a possible theory here, "he [Ortega] could see human truth and 
error as something that "becomes," "is made," "happens" in the course of time or history, as 
"event" and as "process" of verification or validation."
733
 This idea of the importance of 
"perspectival lens" in history (as it was for the other metaphysical topics explored) shall be 
further looked at ahead, but for now suffice to say that there is an emphasis on this being 
fundamental in both thinkers. Again, essentially all comes to us via our experiences, or our 
histories of the continuous accumulation of the flow of these experiences. This concept of 
"continuum," therefore, is again key. Together our experiences form our histories along this 
continuum, making James thus again perhaps more historicist than generally assumed. As 
Davaney supports here as well,  
 For James, ideas, concepts, and beliefs, including both scientific and religious ones, are 
 thoroughly human and, as such, finite, contingent, and fallible, just like the world of 
 which they are part. In particular, James saw these as human constructions that emerge in 
 history and in turn contribute to ongoing developing reality. In relation to our exploration 
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 of historicism James can be seen to have developed a number of important insights in 
 relation to this process.
734
 
 So, "Although Ortega spoke primarily of a "radical positivism" instead of a "radical 
empiricism," suggests Graham, "that was not an essential difference."
735
 In other words, as 
Graham further argues, while applying himself the definition of "radical positivism" in regards to 
Ortega, we must cite again the following excerpt here: 
 As the basis for knowing reality, James's metaphysics of "radical empiricism" was 
 grounded in "fact" and "thing" and in "experience of life" and "viewpoint" or 
 "perspective" thereon, with basic relations and "connections" included. All that is 
 scarcely different from Ortega's "radical positivism" in any significant respect."
736
  
 Again here we have a possible dialogue between James and Ortega that overlaps in 
several regards. For example, in the case of the emphasis on perspective, here we also need to 
read and conceptualize this anti-dualistically; there is at any given time a perspective per person, 
but given the multifaceted circumstances surrounding that one person, there are an infinite 
number of combinations to possibly focus on and apply. And if perspective in part shapes our 
reality and our truths, then again there are an infinite number of possible realities and truths, 
though in the end there is one unique one that results per person at any given time, as we have 
seen at length. As Skrupskelis argues in support of this applying similarly to James, 
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 Every reality has an infinity of properties, James argues, and any one of them can be seen 
 as essential in the light of some interest. He writes: "There is no property 
 ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing." [...] This common sense—and much of 
 philosophy—is wrong in thinking that every thing has an essence which makes it just the 
 thing it is.
737
  
 Compare this with Pedro Blas González's explanation of reality for Ortega: 
 “I am I and my circumstances” is possible because, according to Ortega, the true idealist 
 immerses himself in the material world and thus makes it his concern to make sense of its 
 being. The reality of the world as an independent entity can never be fully grasped 
 because the coming to consciousness of the universe as a totality of relations is an infinite 
 procedure. What is known, in effect, is the world as a limited idea of consciousness. He 
 states: The outside world is within us, it exists in our power of formulating ideas. The 
 world is my production, and my image—as the rough Schopenhauer will say roughly. 
 The ideal is the real. Strictly speaking, and in pure truth, only the idea-producing, the 
 thinking, the conscious exists; I, I myself, me Ipsum.
738
 
 But to reiterate for this thesis's main purpose, most fundamental in all this is how reality 
is historical, or based on history—or to put it in specific pragmatist terms, it is based on 
experience. Ortega repeats directly that human reality is historical, which is, again, because what 
we have is history; "[...] toda realidad humana, por su historicidad, consiste en venir de algo 
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pasado e ir hacia algo futuro. Por tanto, que es una realidad sustativamente móvil."
739
 Hence 
Ortega's frequent use of specifically the term "realidad histórica." And it also must be 
emphasized again the evidence here for a possible dialogue in his stress on the "reality of man, 
for its historicity," is based on the past, and the future as well.  
 Now that we have established part of a vision of a possible dialogue between James and 
Ortega on basic philosophical concepts, this concept will next be narrowed specifically to 
philosophy on history and historicism. 
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Section II: On the Philosophical Historicism in James and Ortega 
IX. Introduction   
 For Ortega, as we know, basically everything is historical. There are few excerpts from 
Ortega defining history as concise as the following:"La historia es ciencia sistemática de la 
realidad radical que es mi vida."
740
 Also tersely stated, the "historical" is the "way of being of a 
thing;" the "modo de ser de una cosa."
741
 As aforementioned, for Ortega, it is through the study 
of history specifically that we can attempt to better understand, and not just explain, humanity. 
"Para comprender algo humano," declared Ortega, "personal o colectivo, es preciso contar una 
historia. [...] La vida sólo se vuelve un poco transparente ante la razón histórica."
742
 History is 
more than just one event or happening after another, it is another thing after another in part 
because of that other, to phrase this simply. And this shall be a first step in exploring the 
meaning, application, and method of the study and definition of the discipline of history in this 
part's imagined dialogue with James. Hence, Ortega implored that, 
 [...] la historia deja de ser la simple averiguación de lo que ha pasado y se convierte en 
 otra cosa un poco más complicada —en la investigación de cómo han sido las vidas 
 humanas en cuanto tales. Conste, pues, no lo que ha pasado a los hombres—, ya que, 
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 según hemos visto, lo que a alguien le pasa sólo se puede conocer cuando se sabe cuál fue 
 si vida en totalidad.
743
 
 As explored in the general introduction, Koopman's arguments for the inherent 
historicism in pragmatism is especially true of Jamesian pragmatism as he insinuated that 
pragmatism was indeed "transitionalism," a term that implies temporality, and therefore at least 
some history. As Koopman argues at length, and as James stated clearly in the following passage 
from Essays in Radical Empiricism,  
 Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected [...] In this line we live 
 prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is ‘of’ the past, inasmuch as it comes expressly 
 as the past’s continuation; it is ‘of’ the future in so far as the future, when it comes, will 
 have continued it. These relations of continuous transition experienced are what make our 
 experiences cognitive.
744
 
 Continuous transition of course implies that at some point everything is past, just as 
everything is a present, and the future continues those pasts and presents. As Daveney proposes 
in summary, 
 James had a profound sense of the historicity of experience and of ideas that led him to 
 emphasize contingency, fallibility, and the need for ongoing revisions in all arenas of 
 human life. Such a sense would also lead him to propose pragmatism as both the best 
 method for adjudicating disputes and for interpreting the meaning of truth. This linking of 
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 historicism and pragmatism is an important development that will be seen to continue 
 especially in contemporary theological reflection.
745
 
 For James, as we have elaborated on, experience must be past, present, and future 
oriented, as a continuously flowing narrative. This is necessary for us to even be aware of it in 
the first place, as he says here; hence, it has to be more than just history in terms of solely being 
comprised of the past. This is why Koopman uses the term "temporal" and "transitionalism" in 
his aforementioned book on the historicism of pragmatism. "Transitionalism" is arguably found 
in every central topic expounded upon here; reality, life, nature, truth, radical empiricism, 
experience—everything is a continuum, everything is temporal, and therefore part of everything 
has an inherent historicity. Hence the central dialogue here being elaborated between Ortega and 
James that what we have his history, and especially history since this is what we can study more 
tangibly (the present being transient and the future not having arrived yet and existing as a 
potentiality). And this is especially "conversable" between the two when we conceptualize 
history as continual; as past, present, and future. 
 But again, William James, however, is not usually considered a "historicist philosopher," 
but as arguably a fundamental part of pragmatism, and as a pragmatist, the potential dialogue can 
be created, nonetheless, with Ortega. In particular, James's book, A Pluralistic Universe, 
arguably has some historicist discussion, such as his concept of "pluralism" that will be analyzed 
in further depth ahead. James's Essays in Radical Empiricism is a collection that also has some 
historicist dialogue, such as, succinctly defined, his emphasis on essentially everything being 
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based on experience along a continuum characterized by time and date. Perhaps Davaney offers 
here some insight into why James is not considered more often also a historicist: 
 James can thus be seen to occupy an ambiguous position in any tale about historicism. 
 Few thinkers evidence a greater willingness to acknowledge the contingent and fallible 
 character of human thought, the funded nature of human experience, and the open but 
 risk-filled character of a finite universe that is our only home. But James also refused to 
 keep human experience within the prison house of language and insisted that, on all 
 levels, experience always outruns our conceptual understanding of it; we traffic with 
 reality in ways not mediated by language, including trafficking with that More James 
 chose to call God. For James, such claims did not entail a repudiation of historicist 
 insights but a more holistic understanding of human historical existence, including bodily 
 experience. To those who have followed James he stands both as a beacon of historicist 
 thought and a challenge to its limits, offering a heritage that has been debated ever 
 since.
746
 
 And of course as we have seen at length, James being a pragmatist instrumentalist, there 
is also a central emphasis on the future and the importance of its potentiality in our perspectives 
on life, reality, and simply in our lives in general. But as Graham suggests, as a possible 
argument to support the thesis here,  
 No one has ever attributed "historicism" to William James, but Ortega was able to draw 
 from his books and doctrines some of the basic components of his own historicism, 
 which appeared when he was preparing to emphasize his historicist position in the 1930s. 
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 A Pluralistic Universe was the most relatable to history of all of James's works. There he 
 emphasized the "pluralism" that Ortega formally took over into his historical worldview 
 by the 1920s. [...] At the same time, in Essays in Radical Empiricism, he adverted to the 
 "change," "event," "happening," and "doing" that take place in the real, historical world, 
 and he saw this world as only "more or less" rational, and as having to be loosely 
 connection by "hypotheses" following daily experience. Broadly speaking, that is all very 
 much like what Ortega saw and practiced in his historiology.
747
 
 Despite all of the possible dialogue being elaborated here on a type of "philosophy of 
history," in truth "philosophy" here is not the correct term (Ortega was referenced to prefer the 
term "meditations"), as we know there is no very well organized systematic structure of historical 
study in particular included in either Ortega or James's work though both thinkers have 
historicist elements, nonetheless, in their philosophies. They also share the view that what they 
have developed in their work specifically should not be classified as a "philosophy of history" in 
the strictest and most structured sense of the classification. The discipline of history is not like 
that of science. As Barzun explains in regards to James, "What James and I subscribe to is of 
course the opposite of what is called a "philosophy of history." That name is reserved for the 
schemes, the systems, the "laws of history" such as are found in the works of Toynbee or 
Spengler, Buckle or Karl Marx."
748
 And this is because in James's work, the objective is not 
some overarching structure with just one teleological meaning, as Barzun continues, "The 
philosophers of history want the confusion to have meaning, and only one. Every chance event 
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and every active being must conspire and converge toward a single end as in the plot of a well 
made play."
749
 Arguably we could posit that Ortega would agree on this, based on his theory of 
perspectivism that we have seen. In general James did not agree with seeing the world 
teleologically, as he explicitly declares in the following excerpt: "Whoever claims ABSOLUTE 
teleological unity, saying that there is one purpose and that every detail of the universe 
subserves, dogmatizes at his own risk."
750
 As we saw Ortega believed, a “philosophy of history” 
in general is a “misnomer," writing, ""Llamar algo <<filosofía de la historia>> partía del hecho 
de que se tenía la idea más confusa de la filosofía y se pensaba que de todo puede hacerse 
filosofía. [...] Mas no hay tal filosofía de la historia."
751
 So in this fundamental view on how to 
define the existence of historical thought we have a potential dialogue between James and 
Ortega. 
 One of the main reasons for this lack of structure and absolute, or singular teleology in 
history for both Ortega and James is that fundamentally different "philosophers of history" and 
different "historians" have different ideas, ends, and conclusions, of course, logically. For 
example, Hegel's teleology saw history as the process and progress toward freedom and the 'ideal 
state.' Marx envisioned history as specifically the evolution of class struggles terminating in an 
ideal society without class structure. But the problem in this for both James and Ortega is that 
here we have two very different views, although both are teleological, but the ends are different, 
so how can we know for sure which is correct? Is history even teleological? And even more 
broadly speaking, different historians interpret and explain the "same past" differently. This is no 
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different than life essentially and the experience of life as we saw; we each experience our own 
lives in unique, personal, and individual ways. Hence the common thread here from Ortega that 
also runs through James that "life is history." In other words, what we do have is our own 
histories, and we can reflect on our own histories, which are both individual and social, as we 
have seen for both and will continue to see.
752
 It is all simply what we experience it to be.
753
 
Again the argument here is focused on demonstrating how certain aspects of Ortega's 
"meditations" (again, to use the term specifically chosen by Ortega rather than "philosophy") on 
history were in part perhaps uniquely able to converse with pragmatism, and through this 
resultant dialogue we can understand better some specific parts of his work. But it must be 
reiterated that this is of course never to deny the influence of various other philosophical 
movements in Ortega's historicism, and at not point is there any kind of declaration of direct 
influence of pragmatism. 
 Why is history and its study so important? William James answered that "The passing 
moment is the only thing that ever concretely was or is or shall be."
754
 In other words, again the 
past is one thing we can contemplate, because it has already passed. The present is fleeting, and 
the future has not arrived yet, logically. Ortega also declared that one thing, logically, that we do 
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have, is our past; our history, as quoted in the beginning; "el hombre hace historia porque ante el 
futuro, que no está en su mano, se encuentra con lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado."
755
 
Ortega further answered, as we saw, that "Necesitamos de la historia íntegra para ver si logramos 
escapar de ella, no recaer en ella."
756
 For Ortega, therefore, history is a learning tool to create a 
better future; hence again more reason for the discipline's importance. 
 As we have seen, life is somewhat chaotic, undetermined, uncertain, ambiguous, to cite 
just a few adjectives to describe the general view that we can imagine to dialogue between both 
James and Ortega. James wrote that "We realize this life as something always off its balance. 
[...]," and Ortega emphasized our status as "náufragos."
757
 James added, "The general nature of it 
[being-known-together, essentially] we can probably never account for," which resonates with 
Ortega's argument that we have no nature, and James continues, "But the particular conditions 
whereby we know particular things together might conceivably be traced."
758
 And by 
"conditions" we can certainly apply, at least as one option, history, because the past can 
sometimes be traced. Clearly this can dialogue with Ortega's dictum, "man has no nature, only 
history." Stated another way, 'we cannot really ever come to know what our nature is, because 
our nature is based on the conditions surrounding us (and which could also converse with the 
idea of Ortega's circumstances in radical reality), which are historical; which is our history. And 
it is specifically this concept that will be explored in detail in the section that follows. Again: "En 
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suma, que el hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene... historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la 
naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia."
759
 And again each of our histories is offered to us in 
unique perspectives;  
 Todos tienen su puesto determinado en la serie histórica; ninguno puede aspirar a salirse 
 de ella, porque esto equivaldría a convertirse en un ente abstracto, con íntegra renuncia a 
 la existencia. Desde distintos puntos de vista, dos hombres miran al mismo paisaje. Sin 
 embargo, no ven lo mismo.
760
 
 This idea of us being our unique perspectival histories can certainly dialogue with the 
following declaration of James: 
 We shall see that we have a constant feeling sui generis of pastness, to which every one 
 of our experiences in turn falls a prey. To think a thing as past is to think it amongst the 
 objects or in the direction of the objects which at the present moment appear affected by 
 this quality. This is the original of our notion of past time, which memory and history 
 build their systems.
761
 
 We have "our own kind;" our sui generis, or perspective or pastness—pastness is history. 
Hence, as history is individual perspective, history is also life−and thus in part why what we 
have is history (not nature), and in its amalgamation our own kind of history that makes us 
individual (even if again some elements overlap with others, in total our combinations are 
distinct).  
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X. History as Past, Present, and Future 
 As noted, fundamental in understanding history from a pragmatist perspective is to 
contemplate it as a continuum; history is the past, as well as the present and the future. This of 
course was not an entirely new idea when pragmatism was developed. Nonetheless, it is possible 
that arguably this may have come into Ortega's meditations by way of William James (the other 
direction is a possibility in certain respects, but this is stated just going in chronological order of 
biographical appearance), among others; "[...] his interest in a historical concept of time—from 
James, Bergson, and Heraclitus—as a continuous "flow" from the relived past, through a 
conscious present, into an anticipated future was long evident in his thinking," suggested 
Graham.
762
 While the past is what we can concretely reflect on and ponder, in regards to specific 
details (generally speaking), it is what enables us to better understand our current situation, date, 
and time, as well as prepare for, and at times maybe foresee or predict the future direction(s) of 
our next situations, dates, and times. Hence Ortega's argument that, as quoted in English to keep 
the flow here, "All historical knowledge is, in truth, the never-ending story."
763
 History is a 
continuum for Ortega as well, therefore, as clear in his considering it here a "never-ending story" 
(as we saw in the section on Dewey). 
 While in the following passage James does not use the term "history" specifically, we can 
posit that this is inherent in what he referred to here in his description of such a continuum: 
 The knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always 
 mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing. A simple sensation, as we shall 
                                                          
762
 Graham, Theory of History, p. 25. 
 
763
 Ibid., p. 127. 
 398 
 
 hereafter see, is an abstraction, and all our concrete states of mind are representations of 
 objects with some amount of complexity. Part of the complexity is the echo of the objects 
 just past, and, in a less degree, perhaps, the foretaste of those just to arrive. Objects fade 
 out of consciousness slowly. If the present thought is of ABCDEFG, the next one will be 
 of B C D E F G H, and the one after that of C D E F G H I— the lingerings of the past 
 dropping successively away, and the incomings of the future making up the loss. These 
 lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and 
 expectation, the retrospective and the prospective sense of time. They give that continuity 
 to consciousness without which it could not be called a stream.
764
 
 This is a good example to really clearly see how this continuum is a constantly flowing 
interconnected event, concept, between past, present, and future, because as James wrote, it is 
not ABCDEFG, then HIJKLMNOP -- it is ABCDEFG, then BCDEFGH; or one piece only of 
the past drops off (but not into non-existence of course) and is replaced with one piece of the 
future, as they are separate chapters in this progression that flow continually together in an 
interconnected chain, anti-dualistically. One changes because of the other that came before since 
they are still connected. In this part of his writings he seems to provide this example primarily to 
make the one basic argument that the past is connected in a continuum without specific 
separating breaks in between any parts, as they are all connected (even if our memory is 
selective, for example, and just remembers part of that chain, such as just the EFGHI out of the 
ABCDEFGHI, not to mention that we cannot remember all the past, which all of us would agree 
on is true in our lives and despite our ages). As he summarizes right before; "The knowledge of 
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some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with our 
knowledge of the present thing."
765
 In another example he explains,  
 What I do feel simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an earlier one is 
 that they are two moments, the transition from the one to the other is continuous. 
 Continuity here is a definite sort of experience; just as definite as is the discontinuity-
 experience which I find it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition from an 
 experience of my own to one of yours.
766
 
 While again James does not use the term "history" here, he does use "time," "past" and 
"memory," all of which can essentially refer to history. And similarly in the following additional 
example from James he is arguably referring to history since he also here uses the terms "event" 
and "years of time"; "[...] events separated by years of time in a man's life hang together 
unbrokenly by the intermediary events. Their names, to be sure, cut them into separate 
conceptual entities, but no cuts existed in the continuum in which they originally came."
767
 
 Part of the reason why we cannot really know these "cuts," though they have "names," 
which are essentially just superficial, is because just as we cannot know reality absolutely or 
singularly, we cannot know events or experiences as such. Again, we can just contemplate what 
we think they are. The following excerpt demonstrates this, and it can be argued that here in 
particular the use of "experiences" can be somewhat interchangeable with "historical events";  
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 Experiences come on an enormous scale, and if we take them all together, they come in a 
 chaos of incommensurable relations that we cannot straighten out. We have to abstract 
 different groups of them, and handle these separately if we are to talk of them at all. But 
 how the experiences ever get themselves made, or why their characters and relations are 
 just such as appear, we can not begin to understand.
768
 
 However, in this next quote he does use the term "history" and appears to be discussing 
this very same concept just described of "cuts" only being reference to their names, but not their 
existence, existentially; "We must not forget, namely, in talking of the ultimate character of our 
activity-experiences, that each of them is but a portion of a wider world, one link in the vast 
chain of processes of experience out of which history is made."
769
 
 We have seen how Ortega uses the metaphor of a movie or a book to understand life, and 
how it can only be fully understood when we watch all the movie or read all the book. We can 
also apply this same concept, of a continuum basically, when we compare watching a movie or 
reading a book versus if we were to look at still photographs of that movie divided up into 
separate photos or to just read specific, random pages of a book. If we were to just look through 
the stills, or only read specific, random pages without order, not only would it be difficult to 
piece them together into an overall flow and meaning, without going through enough of them we 
would not be able to deduce any meaning at all really (the "enough" is variable really depending 
on what we are trying to comprehend). In other words, while a movie and a book can be 
theoretically divided up into still photographs and distinct, separate pages, a "movie" or a "book" 
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loses its significance and meaning as such (as a "whole product") if we consider these parts 
separately, though we can consider that a movie is a collection of still photographs or a book a 
collection of pages strung together creating a continuous flow. In looking at stills or pages we are 
labeling and naming "moments" but not the movie or book as a whole. Meaning, here again we 
have anti-dualism; a movie is made up of its stills, and a book is made up of its pages, but they 
can only be strung together in a continuous flow to result in a movie or a book, so they are 
interdependent in this way; stills and pages are separate pieces but necessarily all together in a 
continuous flow as one movie or one book, similar to the example of the alphabet provided by 
James.  
 Ortega most certainly sees history as a continuum because it is constantly being shaped; 
"[...] la vida histórica tiene la condición de cambiar constantemente. La historia es permanente 
inquietud y mutación."
770
 In other words, "doing history" is a way to summarize this view of an 
individual's life as history; as continuously "doing history," a term which is also very pragmatist. 
 As we have also seen, experience is central to not just James's philosophy, but the 
pragmatist tradition in general, given its emphasis on practicality, in all that is 'tangible,' and 
individual perspective. Whether we are referring to truth, reality, etcetera, this comes to us 
through experience, a term that has been emphasized several times here is intrinsically historical. 
As Livingston lends further support for this potential interpretation, positing this being the case 
as well for James, 
 He keeps stopping to summarize, to emphasize that historical time is the key to his 
 argument. For example, "According to my view, experience as a whole is a process in 
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 time, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that 
 follow upon them by transitions which, whether disjunctive or conjunctive in content, are 
 themselves experiences, and must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms 
 which they relate." Indeed James insists that timeless knowledge is impossible if not 
 inconceivable because "every later moment continues and corroborates an earlier one": 
 "In this continuing and corroborating, taken in no transcendental sense, but denoting 
 definitely felt transitions, lies all that the knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly 
 contain or signify.... Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of 
 experience. It is made; and made by relations that unroll themselves in time."
771
  
 This aforementioned quote by Livingston certainly dialogues with Velázquez Delgado's 
proposed summary of Ortega's historicism in the following excerpt, arguing that his history is 
 [...] proceso acumulado del ser del hombre. Lo que acumula el hombre es, en efecto, 
 experiencia histórica; la inmensa serie de referentes cognitivas y culturales pero sobre 
 todo vitales, que heredemos del tiempo muerto o pasado. Experiencias que, como ya se 
 ha indicado, se hacen presentes a otros hombres como constructores y responsables de 
 sus propias circunstancias. Tales experiencias son el basamento sobre el cual se establece 
 la tradición o se genera la innovación. [...] tales experiencias son invariablemente campos 
 selectivos y como tales son a su vez campos de indentidad.
772
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 Per James, the continuous flow of experiences clarify our knowledge in a general sense. 
In other words, "knowledge" and "understanding" is a result of "temporal reasoning," which 
come to us via experiences. These experiences then accumulate into personal and social 
biographies, and thus they are historical; they are our histories. And in this aforementioned 
quote, Veláquez Delgado uses the very pragmatist term "experience" several times, because 
reading this pragmatically, history is "experiencia histórica" ("historical experience"). All of this 
is scarcely different than the explanation just provided about James's theory on the continuous 
flow of experience clarifying our general knowledge via "temporal reasoning" accumulating into 
the personal and social biographies that are our histories—thus making us historical beings, and 
this is logical because we have historical experience. 
 As we saw in the dialogue between Ortega and Dewey, similarly there is a specific way 
we must understand what is meant by "system" in the historical theory here of James and Ortega. 
As discussed previously, by "system" what is meant is "human system," which, being as complex 
as it is, is in a sense in part systematic by not being systematic. In other words, there are some 
abstract constants in the 'non-systematic system' that is Ortega's view on history, and its study, 
meaning, and application. And one of these abstract characteristics is this idea that our 
perspective and interpretation of history is really a continuum, as it is the past, present, and 
future. This last point must be clarified, however, that when we affirm here that history is a 
continuum, what is meant (in a very pragmatist sense essentially), is our perception, 
interpretation, and "believed understanding" of history, but not history itself. Meaning, we 
cannot know history absolutely or completely, not just because it exists along a never-ending 
continuum, but also because what we can know is what we think we know of history. So we 
build ourselves this interpreted continuum of historical pasts, and presents, and in view of and 
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projected upon the possible futures, which we define, in summation, as simply "history." Further, 
the continuum of history is not necessarily in and of itself, but rather the way in which we 
construct a meaning for history of the connected past experiences with the present and in view of 
the future—this is what we call "history" The continuum of history is simply what we think it is; 
we perceive the continuum. There is no denying the pragmatist nature of viewing what we 
understand as history as a continuum, as well as that this continuum is simply what we think it 
is—and this is very much a feature of Ortega's historicism as well, as clear in the following 
excerpt from Historia como sistema, not to mention additionally his use of the fundamental term 
in pragmatism of "experience": 
 La historia es un sistema—el sistema de las experiencias humanas, que forman una 
 cadena inexorable y única. De aquí que nada pueda estar verdaderamente claro en historia 
 mientras no está toda ella clara. [...] Cualquier término histórico, para ser preciso, 
 necesita ser fijado en función de toda la historia.
773
 
 This connects with pragmatist notions of the truth that we saw in how it depends on a 
present truth being integrated and assimilated into the future; history and historical truths form 
part of a chain, or a continuum, as Ortega says here, and so historical truths have to be 
continually integrated and assimilated along that continuum to persist in application and 
existence. Again nothing can be entirely "clear" in history except what we think it is. While 
defining "history as a system" could imply that an event has a sense and meaning in the overall 
structure, again we must clarify a characteristic of "system" to be that sometimes history reveals 
to us "trends of trends" in what we think history is and means, as raised as well in the section on 
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Dewey. Meaning, history does not exactly repeat itself, per se, as the common refrán goes, rather 
there are times when the study of history reveals to us certain "humanistic trends," which can, 
therefore, be the root of similar situations and reactions (speaking generally). Perhaps we should 
say, instead, "history as experience" because what we can also say, abstractly, is that history and 
historical structure and systems are simply what we think they are (without being absolutely 
demonstrated or proven). For example, Ortega spoke of an "espíritu del tiempo," "ideas de la 
época," and "creencias de un repertorio colectivo," so to a certain extent there are also specifics 
to particular periods, making history in this sense, and in part, an abstract structured systematic 
study. Ortega wrote, "[...] la mayor porción de mi mundo, de mis creencias proviene de ese 
repertorio colectivo, coincide con ellas. El espíritu del tiempo, las ideas de la época en su 
inmensa porción y mayoría están en mí, son las mías."
774
 And these terms are evidence as to how 
Ortega does not fully deny there is a human nature, which is why we must instead re-phrase his 
dictum to say man has no nature, only history, because his nature is his history; his history 
contains his nature. Exact repetition does not occur in history, per Ortega, as concisely 
summarized by Velázquez Delgado (and as many would agree), "Pero en el fondo del asunto lo 
característico y propio a toda experiencia histórica es su naturaleza única e irrepetible."
775
 And 
note also here the use of declaring that history is nature in support of this dissertation's thesis.
776
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But there are 'trends of trends,' which as has been proposed as a central argument here, is 
something somewhat systematic. 
 As Graham further suggests, Ortega  
 [...] proposed the systematic use of "instrumental concepts" for interpretation, as 
 ultimately the meaning of "history as a system": "the need to think systematically in 
 history" with such carefully elaborated and verifiable concepts. That was historiology in 
 fact, and it was a form of historical instrumentalism. For this technique he owed much 
 more to James than to Dewey, it seems.
777
 
 It must be noted here the "instrumentalism" cited in Ortega's work, which as we know is 
a pragmatist term and concept. In other words, some events, reactions, behaviors, etcetera, may 
appear to be repetitious, but it is because the motive and cause, or "instrumental elements" (in 
regards to trends in human behavior and actions) behind it might be similar. Hence part of the 
reason why Ortega does not think that there can be an explicit "philosophy of history," rather 
essentially there can just be "historical meditations." He argued, 
 [...] no hay tal filosofía de la historia. [...] se trata simplemente de ver si en ese caos que 
 es la serie confusa de los hechos históricos pueden descubrirse líneas, facciones, rasgos, 
 en suma, fisonomía; no ha habido época para la que el destino histórico no haya 
 presentado algo así como una cara o sistema de facciones recognoscibles.
778
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 James agreed that in the world "Lines of INFLUENCE can be traced [...]"
779
 And as we 
shall see this is part of how we can define the study of the discipline of history; i.e., one 
historical "line of influence" we can search for are 'instrumental trends of trends.' 
 Above Ortega discusses how historical study leads to the discovery of "líneas, facciones, 
rasgos," which are elements we can collect in the present, from and of the past, in turn 
"restoring" and "reestablishing" continuity; the continuum of our perception and interpretation of 
history. Note here how James and Ortega both use the term "lines," which additionally helps 
illustrate the concept of a continuum. Here again we must reference the concept of perspectivism 
shared by both to a certain extent in that the interpretations we make of a continuum of history 
comes to us via individual perspectives. Thus, there are multiple "continuums of history," no one 
being true or false—in Ortega's language, the only falsity is to say that one is absolute—it is 
simply again what we think it is, as we shall continue to see in the following section. 
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XI. Historical Perspectives 
 History, therefore, just like life, radical reality, and truth, is perspective. As 
aforementioned, James defined "I" as a "noun of position," and Ortega essentially argued that all 
comes to us in "perspectivas individuales." History, therefore, is no different. These ideas we 
saw in the section on Dewey as well, which we will revisit here in the case of James and how he 
might dialogue with Ortega on these topics. This is an additional part of a "method" of sorts, 
albeit a general one, that we can apply to the study and understanding of history. Hence, as we 
shall continue to see, why history does not repeat itself in exact ways, or why all of history can 
never be fully recorded. This is because every moment recorded is done so through specific 
perspective(s), and each perspective will have a selective memory, which may or may not be 
willingly or consciously remembered. Stuhr posited that in regards to James, 
 It is not difficult to see that our beliefs about the past are perspectival and that they are 
 formed and articulated through selective emphasis. Given the selective nature of our 
 memory, we have to subject to constant critical scrutiny what we remember and forget, as 
 well as how we remember and forget. And the critical examination of how our beliefs 
 about the past are formed and maintained in our memory should be open to a plurality of 
 diverse perspectives in order to avoid limitations and distortions as much as possible and 
 improve their objectivity. [...] Our beliefs about the past maintain their vital force, if they 
 do, thanks to day-to-day epistemic negotiations embedded in a complex network of 
 interpretative practices that always involve a multiplicity of perspectives.
780
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 The first key argument that James is referenced to arguably make here is that what we 
should first analyze in all this is how we remember and forget, in a general sense, and in turn 
why we remember and forget what we do. This is the first step in understanding why history 
cannot be objective, since we are individually selective in our memory, and this therefore differs 
between individuals in what is remembered, forgotten, and therefore again history, historical 
memory, is perspective; it comes to us via individual perspectives. And as he continues, the next 
step is to study and incorporate as many of these individual memories, perspectives, as possible, 
to get as close as possible to objectivity (but never completely). A better historical theory, 
therefore, is that which applies, as James arguably insinuates, a "multiplicity of perspectives." 
This is because again we see things differently, and we have unique sets of experiences, some of 
which overlap and others which do not; "You see how differently people take things. The world 
we live in exists diffused and distributed, in the form of an indefinitely numerous lot of eaches, 
coherent in all sorts of ways and degrees; and the tough-minded are perfectly willing to keep 
them at that valuation."
781
 
 History is perspective and therefore history is subjective. Again what a historian records 
can never incorporate all the possible perspectives of the time in which he or she is recording and 
reflecting on because there simply are too many, since each one of us has our own. This is 
especially true of a history written after the fact (meaning, as opposed to an event, for example, 
being recorded as it is happening). This James clearly affirms in the following quote: "There 
have been numerous events in the history of our planet of which nobody ever has been or ever 
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will be able to give an account [...]."
782
 Moreover, any one perspective is going to be shaped by a 
number of factors, most importantly and broadly of which is simply that person's history of 
course. In other words, we need to speak of "historical perspectives" when we speak of recorded 
history. But none of this is to say that we cannot, resultantly, study history, again it is just to 
provide some important criteria and limitations to keep in mind as we develop further the 
discipline of history, what it means, and how it is studied. As Greeve Davaney support in this, 
 James stressed as well what might be termed the perspectival character of historical 
 experience and knowledge. Humans do not know everything equally or passively reflect 
 what is before us. Instead, we attend to some things while ignoring others, highlight 
 certain realities while downplaying others that might as well have demanded our 
 attention.
783
 
 Ortega wrote at great length on his theories of generation and the importance of seeing 
life, reality, and history in regards to "generations," as one influence on "perspective." His theory 
of generations is also important to briefly discuss here because it involved his theory of crisis, 
which was also key for his historical theory; namely, that different generations may have 
different beliefs, and a generation can enter a period of "crisis" when beliefs are lacking, or 
proven incorrect, and this is part of what creates a sort of historical division. A "generation" is 
also a type of "circumstance," which has a specific date and time, so it is thus historical. Just as 
man must 'decide who he is going to be at any given moment,' so must a generation. Although in 
the following quote James does not use the term "generation," he does create a "group" together 
as a "society of men," emphasizing as well this idea of 'living in potential,' just as Ortega 
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consistently argues that at every moment we must choose who we are going to be; "Societies of 
men are just like individuals, in that both at any given moment offer ambiguous potentialities of 
development."
784
 And as he continues, 
 Each bifurcation cuts off certain sides of the field altogether, and limits the future 
 possible angles of deflection. A community is a living thing, and in words which I can do 
 no better than quote from Professor Clifford, "it is the peculiarity of living things not 
 merely that they change under the influence of surrounding circumstances, but that any 
 change which takes place in them is not lost but retained, and as it were built into the 
 organism to serve as the foundation for future actions. If you cause any distortion in the 
 growth of a tree and make it crooked, whatever you may do afterwards to make the tree 
 straight the mark of your distortion is there; it is absolutely indelible; it has become part 
 of the tree's nature. ... Suppose, however, that you take a lump of gold, melt it, and let it 
 cool. ... No one can tell by examining a piece of gold how often it has melted and cooled 
 in geologic ages, or even in the last year by the hand of man. Any one who cuts down an 
 oak can tell by the rings of its trunk how many times winter has frozen it into 
 widowhood, and how many times summer has warmed it into life. A living being must 
 always contain within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its 
 ancestors.
785
 
 As this illustrates, the argument is that for James we indeed have history. And our 
ancestors (which can be understood as encompassing both nature, as in genes passed on, and 
nurture, as in the social influence such as the culture and traditions passed on, for instance) and 
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the generation we are born into are also logically a part of that history. Hence, again, our nature 
is our history, because history contains our nature, as in the example he cites above of the tree's 
nature which is its past, which serves as a great metaphor here as each is unique but we can still 
see the influence of the past in a root's rings. Yet much of the time we will not be able to know 
all of a past, or history, as in the example he provided of melting gold, which without the fanciest 
of scientific tools we would not be able to know who melted it and when. Moreover, perhaps in 
the example of the gold melting and our not being able to determine how many times that had 
happened over the course of its history, this metaphor can serve as a reminder as to how history 
can never be fully recorded. And this also dialogues again with yo soy yo y mi circunstancia as 
well, as also noted is the role of circumstance in influencing all this.  
 Moreover, again we see here how this is the same idea in regards to truth; there is the 
history (such as historical happenings, events, figures, etcetera), or the truth, and then there is 
what we think is the history (in other words, our experience of what history is and our resulting 
interpretations of that experience of history), or the truth, and we cannot know for sure when 
they coincide. Moreover, what we think is history is of course dependent on history. Perspective 
and history are anti-dualistically interrelated and interdependent as well. Just as there are 
multiple realities, no one reality ever being absolute, there are multiple histories, no one history 
ever being absolute either. All these concepts have this basic foundation in common, which is 
most tersely summarized again as "anti-dualism," something which has been repeated here as 
fundamental in pragmatism. Graham proposed as a possible argument here that, in regards to 
Ortega, "[...] historical "perspective" now changes with  every historian and with every 
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generation, but what is seen, reexperienced, or understood is (in a pragmatist sense) necessarily 
"true" for us in our epoch and society—in James's sense of "truths" but not 'Truth.'"786  
 In other words, for Ortega, what the historicist should and tries to recreate, along these 
lines, is the "reality" of a certain time period or event, which is manifested in the "perspective(s) 
of the time"—this is how we may attempt to discover the sense, emotion, feeling, or viewpoint, 
for a particular moment in time, a particular event, person, period or generation, for example. 
Unique perspective(s) and historical circumstance(s), albeit two different concepts, are connected 
anti-dualistically. The following explanation by Rodríguez Huescar helps corroborate this idea 
further: 
 [...] we continue to "live" in others after we are dead, for this is one of the essential 
 dimensions of history, of what I could call "historical life," as opposed to [my] personal 
 life, however inseparable these two dimensions may be de facto (although they are never 
 inseparable de jure or formaliter), for life is always one and the other, both overlapping 
 and existing for each other's sake.
787
 
 This dialogues again with James's arguments on how to get as close as possible to the 
"truth," whether it be "historical truth" or some other kind of truth, we need to gather and relate 
as many perspectives as possible. In other words, in applying this specifically to historicism, 
while we may not be able to gather all recordings of history, nor can we ever record everything, 
the more we do collect, the more accurate our historical record will be, without ever being fully 
complete or truthful of course. So again this adds to studies on Ortega by offering some other 
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areas of possible conversation, in this case with pragmatism and William James, to add new 
levels of potential interpretations of his historicism.
788
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XII. History as the Evolution of Self and Circumstance 
 Given the dialogue that can be created between Ortega and James that we have seen in 
regards to life as self and circumstance, this being so fundamental, it is no different to then apply 
this to history and the study of history as well, given that self and circumstance lead one in part 
to his or her unique perspective. History is the essential foundation of "life" that is comprised of 
"self and circumstance."
789
 This Graham posits in the following excerpt, citing Ortega, "To study 
the past is, then, to study the radical reality that is my life. The past is not a past reality, [...] but 
is the actual dimension of the past that integrates present reality."
790
 As history is a continuum of 
the past, present, and future, we can also say, therefore, that history is the constant evolution and 
potential realization of self and circumstance, in the past, present and future. And this inclusion 
of the focus on the future again is another specific area in which we can create a pragmatist 
dialogue, as we have seen, as this is intrinsically instrumentalist and functionalist. A pragmatist 
aspect in this is the searching for something useful and practical in the past to be applied to the 
future, for example. Ortega wrote,  
 La historia nace del rebote de nuestra curiosidad, afanosa por el futuro y porvenir, que 
 nos lanza y nos hace descubrir el pretérito. El recordar, el volver la cara atrás, el mirar el 
 pasado no es algo espontáneo que por si acontece sino porque, sin miedo seguro ante la 
 enorme indecisión del porvenir.
791
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 History always has some aspect that is current; there is always "una dimensión de 
actualidad," Ortega wrote.
792
  
 James also avowed that the past always has a part that is connected to the present as well 
(logically); "But whether our feeling of the time which immediately-past* events have filled be 
of something long or of something short, it is not what it is because those events are past, 
because they have left behind them processes which are present."
793
 Again history is the study of 
our (ever-changing) perspectives and interpretations of the past-continued into the present-while 
looking ahead to the future; "[...] por historia entiendo el estudio de la realidad humana desde el 
más remoto pasado hasta los hombres presentes inclusive."
794
  
 History is the study of human lives and man has history because there is constant 
variation in how that history progresses and proceeds, as it is not something stable as in the 
traditional, classic understanding of the term "human nature;" "He aquí, señores," wrote Ortega, 
"por qué hay historia, por qué hay variación continua de las vidas humanas. Si seccionamos por 
cualquier fecha el pasado humano, hallamos siempre al hombre instalado en un mundo."
795
  
 In what follows, James similarly references that what we have are times, dates, spaces, 
from which we can study history, and therefore humanity, in and during a particular place and 
time.   
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 No one has anything like a perception of the greater length of the time between now and 
 the first century than of that between now and the tenth. To an historian, it is true, the 
 longer interval will suggest a host of additional dates and events, and so appear a more 
 multitudinous thing. And for the same reason most people will think they directly 
 perceive the length of the past fortnight to exceed that of the past week. But there is 
 properly no comparative time intuition in these cases at all. It is but dates and events, 
 representing time; their abundance symbolizing its length. I am sure that this is so [...]"
796
  
 And he continues, 
 When we come to study the perception of Space, we shall find it quite analogous to time 
 in this regard. Date in time corresponds to position in space; and although we now 
 mentally construct large spaces by mentally imagining remoter and remoter positions, 
 just as we now construct great durations by mentally prolonging a series of successive 
 dates, yet the original experience of both space and time is always of something already 
 given as a unit, inside of which attention afterward discriminates parts in relation to each 
 other.
797
 
 Here James seems to highlight the anti-dualistic nature of history in that as a continuum 
there are still separate divisions; those "series of successive dates" as he says, so it cannot exist 
as such without its part as again they exist interdependently; separate dates (parts) and history as 
a continuum (incomplete "whole" because history is not complete as it continues into the future).  
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In an extension of an aforementioned quote by Ortega he continues writing that history is 
essentially a continuum, being therefore another point of possible dialogue in this with James, 
 [...] la cosa, cuando es una realidad parcial, no termina en si misma, sino que continúa en 
 otra [...] quien quiera ver un ladrillo necesita ver sus poros y, por tanto, acercarlo a los 
 ojos, pero quien quiera ver una catedral no la puede ver  a la distancia de un ladrillo. Nos 
 lo exige el respeto de la distancia. Cada cosa nos impone una determinada distancia si 
 queremos obtener de ella una visión óptima. [...] el historiador miope que no sabe 
 desprenderse de los detalles es incapaz de ver un auténtico hecho histórico, y nos da gana 
 de gritarle que la historia es aquella manera de contemplar las cosas humanas desde la 
 distancia suficiente para que no sea necesario ver la nariz de Cleopatra
798
 
 To reiterate as a key part of Ortega's historicism: the critique here is essentially that a 
historical analysis should be done from all distances (i.e., perspectives), not just one. Ortega 
criticized how in his day historical study often committed this error by examining history from 
too close a perspective. It is important, therefore, to study and preserve all layers and 
perspectives in history—or at least as many as possible, to revisit this point of dialogue with 
James that we have seen. 
 This, therefore is one way to somewhat "structuralize" history and its study, but it 
remains, nevertheless, as such, perspectival, subjective, and still lacking in a more formalized 
logic and system. Therefore, as we shall continue to see in what follows, these are important 
limiting factors to keep in mind as we explore the discipline of history, what it means, and how it 
should be studied.  
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XIII. The Study of History 
 Now that we have established some key features of what history essentially means to 
James and Ortega, some of which overlap of course with those we saw in the first section of 
James's fellow pragmatist John Dewey, we can put this together into a potential dialogue 
between the two in regards to how the discipline should and could further be studied. In order to 
study history, per Ortega, we need to see it as fundamental to understanding humanity, and 
therefore in the same way as man or woman; that history has no nature, only its history, 
essentially, as he wrote,  
 La razón histórica, en cambio, no acepta nada como mero hecho, sino que fluidifica todo 
 hecho en el fieri de que proviene: ve cómo se hace el hecho. No cree aclarar los 
 fenómenos humanos reduciéndolos a un repertorio de instintos y <<facultades>>—que 
 serían, en efecto, hechos brutos, como el choque y la atracción—, sino que muestra lo 
 que el hombre hace con esos instintos y facultades, e inclusive nos declara cómo han 
 venido a ser esos <<hechos>>—los instintos y las facultades—, que no son, claro está, 
 más que ideas—interpretaciones—que el hombre ha fabricado en una cierta 
 coyuntura de su vivir.
799
 
 Again Ortega gives history "fluidity," as it is a continuum, in how we see and interpret 
history. And Ortega also reiterates here the argument that history cannot reveal itself in its 
absolute true nature; we cannot know it entirely, but rather it reveals, simply stated, what we 
think it reveals, so just ideas, interpretations, which are, therefore, 'human-made.' 
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 History is the radical reality that is life; "[...] Ortega was a pragmatist and neo-positivist 
(committed to an "absolute positivism") in his search for system, structure, schematic models, 
and regularities with variables, for he understood "history" as "the systematic science of that 
radical reality," or "the basic reality" of human life," proposed Graham.
800
  
 As also discussed in length in the section on Dewey, while there are a number of reasons 
for the following, we must conclude, in line with both Ortega and James, that history can never 
really be fully studied. In other words, even if one were to live in the moment to be recorded, one 
can never take in and be, include, every perspective of that soon-to-be historical moment. As 
noted, this is the same as one's unique perspective on reality or truth, and therefore reality or 
truth itself; there is no one absolute, just a multitude, none of which are true or false (it is simply 
false to say one is absolute). History is always recorded and written from a specific perspective, 
or sometimes a group of perspectives, but never all of them. Therefore, what we can say is that 
history can be recorded in parts, but never completely. And furthermore, history really does not 
stop since it is not just past, it is also present and future (again history is a continuum). This 
general idea is arguably essentially what James called the "specious present";  
 When a long-past event is reproduced in memory and conceived with its date, the 
 reproduction and conceiving traverse the specious present. The immediate content of the 
 latter is thus all my direct experiences, whether subjective or objective. Some of these 
 meanwhile may be representative of other experiences indefinitely remote.
801
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 So again the recording and subsequent study of history, therefore, should incorporate as 
many different perspectives as possible. This only "improves" objectivity but does not provide 
full objectivity. But given that we would never be able to incorporate all of them, what we 
should be doing, therefore, essentially, is "negotiating" between them and figuring out which are 
most imperative, useful, etcetera, for example, as James says,  
 The idea that retrospection can proceed through the meshing of diverse perspectives 
 suggests a negotiating model of memory. According to this  pluralistic negotiating model, 
 memory is not something that can be fully monopolized, and, therefore, it always remains 
 beyond the exclusive control of any singular perspective, be it the perspective of a 
 particular individual or that of a particular group or institution. Our memory, both 
 individual and collective, is forged and maintained through negotiating processes (often 
 unconscious) in which different experiential standpoints intersect and different agential 
 perspectives are coordinated. The past of individuals and peoples is not something fixed 
 and inert; our epistemic relation with the past is always in the making through our agency 
 and negotiations.
802
 
 In an article that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly by William James, published in 1880, 
titled "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment" (and which was originally a lecture he 
gave at the Harvard Natural History Society), he discussed quite a bit about his thoughts on 
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history, which is a rare find. The following excerpt from this piece explains more generally why 
it is that history will always be viewed and recorded selectively, subjectively;  
 The human mind is essentially partial. It can be efficient at all only by picking out what 
 to attend to, and ignoring everything else, —by narrowing its point of view. Otherwise, 
 what little strength it has is dispersed, and it loses its way altogether. Man always wants 
 his curiosity gratified for a particular purpose.
803
  
 This, as we saw, was the same concern fundamentally expressed by Ortega in the 
aforementioned quote in which he criticizes historians of his days of having "myopia" (near-
sightedness). 
 What we have in the way of history books, therefore, can never encompass everything 
and should, therefore, be read that way—as not absolute. In fact, there are events, individuals, 
acts, to cite just a few elements, that may never even make it into the books, which to some may 
be considered of utmost importance. This we can conclude from the following quote from James, 
even though he does not reference history exactly and specifically, but he references experiences 
(which we at times here use interchangeably with history), as well as time and predecessors; 
"Some experiences simply abolish their predecessors without continuing them in any way. 
Others are felt to increase or to enlarge their meaning, to carry out their purpose, or to bring us 
nearer to their goal."
804
  
 There is a selective memory in history, based in part on interest per James. History is 
what we think it is, and our selective interests shape and define that in part in the first place. 
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Again, in order to understand the past, history, we have to remember to always see it as 
perspective and as a continuum. And this does not include just the specific study of history, but 
anything that incorporates, whether subtly or very directly, the past, as James proceeds, 
 The past is constantly being recreated in our everyday practices through a plurality of 
 heterogeneous interpretative activities, formal and informal, conscious and unconscious. 
 These diverse interpretative activities that recreate the past and maintain our memories 
 alive include heavily regulated practices designed for this purpose: for example, writing 
 and reading historical narratives (memoirs, biographies, history books, etc.), celebrating 
 commemorations, and creating and consuming historical artworks (movies, paintings, 
 novels, songs, etc.); but also more informal activities that have a historical or 
 retrospective component: for example, habits and customs that reproduce how things had 
 been done previously; ways of talking (naming, describing, praising, etc.) that echo in 
 particular ways past subjects, events, and cultures; and ways of using and interpreting 
 symbols from the past (e.g., the confederate flag, the cross, the pink triangle, etc.). There 
 are many institutions (museums, historical societies, universities, governments, etc.), 
 many artifacts (archives, libraries, public commemorative objects such as statues, 
 plaques, etc.), and many disciplines (history, anthropology, museology, cultural criticism, 
 etc.) that actively participate in the epistemic practices that shape our beliefs about the 
 past; but even more importantly, there is always an irreducible plurality of experiential 
 and agential perspectives involved in these practices. For the agents who participate in 
 the interpretative practices that recreate the past have (or at least can have) differently 
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 organized and differently situated selves with different temperaments, and they go about 
 differently in the assessment of their memories and in the reconstruction of their past.
805
  
 The first and last parts of this long excerpt are the most important here. First, James 
argues that the past is essentially constantly being re-interpreted, whether we are aware of it or 
not, so we can conclude from this that any historical recording is not final, and is constantly 
being re-defined. So in that sense historical record can tell us more about our selective interests, 
and of that time, and the specific time itself in which it was recorded, than the historical details 
themselves. Second, at the end James affirms that each historical reading is based on selective 
perspective, so at any one time there are multiple ways, means, views, to see, interpret, and 
define history and what we resultantly record. Thus, we cannot say absolutely that one historical 
recording is ever more true over another. 
 This certainly dialogues with Ortega per his view that man is not a fixed entity, so neither 
is his history. Most tersely stated, he argued, "El tema de la historia queda así formalmente 
precisado como el estudio de las formas o estructuras que ha tenido la vida humana desde que 
hay noticia."
806
 And more specifically, Ortega outlined two criteria: first, that man is not a fixed 
being, and second, for this reason, he only has history (and no nature, although this is because 
history is his nature). He added, 
 Esto nos permite formular dos principios fundamentales para la construcción de la 
 historia: 
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 1. El hombre constantemente hace mundo, forja horizonte. 
 2. Todo cambio del mundo, del horizonte, trae consigo un cambio en la estructura del 
 drama vital. El sujeto psico-fisiológico que vive, el alma y el cuerpo del hombre pueden 
 no cambiar; no obstante, cambia su vida porque ha cambiado el mundo. Y el hombre no 
 es su alma y su cuerpo, sino su vida, la figura de su problema vital.
807
 
 As also just seen with James, Ortega as well argues that man is constantly making, and 
re-making, his world, and therefore his history. Although there is emphasis here on individual 
life, this is not the only or main objective focus in historical study, as Ortega continued: "La 
historia no se ocupa sólo de tal vida individual [...] cada vida esta sumergida en una determinada 
circunstancia de una vida colectiva."
808
 There is of course an important sociological aspect to the 
study of history for Ortega, given as we have seen his emphasis on the anti-dualistic relationship 
in life with generations and circumstances as well. History, like life, is self/selves and 
circumstance(s). 
 As explored in the dialogue with Dewey, Ortega does argue that there are "trends of 
trends," as something at least partially 'systematic,' essentially, as we saw he used phrases like 
"espíritu del tiempo," ideas de la época," and "creencias del repertorio colectivo." And as a 
summary of this, part of what we can consider somewhat "systematic" in Ortega's historicism is 
his theory of generations in that there is a historical division of generations that manifest these 
'trends of trends' cited (and he even cited this being divided by approximately fifteen years). This 
is a specific method that Ortega wants historians to adopt;  
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 La idea de las generaciones, convertida en método de investigación histórica, no consiste 
 más que en proyectar esa estructura sobre todo el pasado. Todo lo que no sea esto es 
 renunciar a descubrir la auténtica realidad de la vida humana en cada tiempo —que es la 
 misión de la historia.
809
 
 The aforementioned idea that in order to record history as accurately as possible (but it 
cannot ever be fully accurate), we need to incorporate as many perspectives as possible, is one 
that James concludes in the following excerpt: 
 Our beliefs about the past maintain their vital force, if they do, thanks to day-to-day 
 epistemic negotiations embedded in a complex network of interpretative practices that 
 always involve a multiplicity of perspectives. It is within these plural and diverse 
 interpretative practices that our epistemic negotiations about individual and collective 
 memories take place, and the objectivity and truth of our beliefs about the past is 
 established.
810
 
 Though James in the previous quote specifically does reference "objectivity" and "truth," 
what we can safely conclude is that again this is in terms of what we think history is; we can 
study what we think, and have thought, history is and was—or will be. And this is because he 
still also uses the terms "interpretative" and "multiplicity of perspectives" in, as he says, "our 
beliefs about the past"—"beliefs," not absolutes or truths. And of course again we know that 
Ortega would converse with James on this because of Ortega's central dictum that there is not 
one absolute perspective, such as on history or on a specific historical moment. And again this 
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applies to how we study history: we should gather as many perspectives as possible, while 
keeping in mind the limitation that we can never gather them all. Thus, history can never be 
recorded completely, and as such it can never be studied in its entirety or in complete accuracy. 
It is important to be aware of these limitations, but not, of course, to say that we cannot study 
history, rather we should just keep in mind what the results represent, exactly, when we do 
ponder the discipline. 
 So as we have seen, not only is it impossible to record all feasible perspectives, but we 
also cannot be certain of the accuracy of each perspective in and of itself. History cannot be fully 
objective, as history is perspective. Again as James notes there is always some degree of 
subjectivity integrated. As aforementioned James cites the need to "negotiate" among the 
different interpretations of the past (as many as possible, because acquiring and reading all is not 
possible). This therefore is key in pondering a methodology for historical study. 
 When we assess the objectivity of our beliefs about the past and of the interpretative 
 practices in which they were formed, we have to consider whether there has been an 
 unbiased process of negotiation among differing perspectives, that is, whether our beliefs 
 and interpretations have been compared with others in a negotiating process in which 
 each perspective has been given an equal voice and treated with equal respect.
811
 
 And this can certainly dialogue with the following argument from Ortega: 
 Porque historia es entender bien las realidades humanas a que estos documentos aluden y 
 que esos dosumentos son, y esta intelección supone poseer todo un surtido de dificiles 
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 teorías, fundamentales unas e instrumentales otras, que esos beneméritos hombres no 
 conocen e ignoran concienzudamente, tanto que ni siquiera las echan de menos. Pero sin 
 ellas no hay historia. Por eso es la historia todavía una ciencia adolosecente que con 
 frecuencia balbucea.
812
 
 And hence Ortega's desire to transform the study of history into "una ciencia adulta."
813
 
At first glance this can seem a bit contradictory in that Ortega denies the role of science, math, or 
physics for the study of humanity—which this last is the purpose of history in regards to its 
changes— yet this is also, in some specific senses, what he wants to convert it into. Ortega wants 
to advance the discipline of history to a systematic and essentially therefore somewhat 
"scientific" level, in the sense of being practical, rational, organized, somewhat exact and 
precise—but all in specific ways that do not in any way interfere with the complexities of 
humans, human emotions, or human behaviors, which cannot be studied in such a tangible and 
systematized way. Ortega clarified,  
 La historia necesita de una peculiar exactitud, precisamente la exactitud histórica que no 
 es la matemática, y cuando se quiere suplantar aquélla con ésta se cae en errores como 
 el de esta objeción que podía muy bien haber extremado más las cosas reclamando el 
 nombre de coetáneos exclusivamente para los nacidos en una misma hora o en un mismo 
 minuto.
814
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 As quoted, a specific method that Ortega wanted historians to adopt was "La idea de las 
generaciones, convertida en método de investigación histórica, no consiste más que en proyectar 
esa estructura sobre todo el pasado," which was because for Ortega, "[...] la edad es,[...] un cierto 
modo de vivir. [...] La edad, pues, no es una fecha, sino una <<zona de fechas>> y tienen la 
misma edad, vital e históricamente."
815
 And this is important because within that "zona de 
fechas" we can find that "el hombre vive en un mundo de convicciones, la mayor parte de las 
cuales son convicciones en su época: es el espíritu del tiempo."
816
 Again, Ortega uses terms to 
describe that there are at least "trends of trends" that we can search for and study in history, as he 
says that generations have "convictions (or beliefs) for their era" (convicciones en su época) and 
a "spirit of the time" (espíritu del tiempo). Moreover, since there is a specific division of fifteen 
years in Ortega's generations, this gives his historicism an element of structure, system, and what 
he called for, "an adult science." And finally, as Ortega then summarized,  
 Y como el tema de la historia no es la vida humana, que es asunto de la filosofía—sino 
 los cambios, las variaciones de ella—, tendremos que el mundo vigente en cada fecha es 
 el factor primordial de la historia. Pero ese mundo cambia con cada generación porque la 
 anterior ha hecho algo en el mundo, lo ha dejado más o menos distinto de como lo 
 encontró.
817
 
 So, as Ortega posits, there are some specifics in historical generations, which is 
something we can study. And he argues that history is not about "human life just itself," but 
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rather the changes in human lives. This is because the former would imply "human nature," and 
more importantly what we can study are these "variations and changes" as he says, in human 
lives, or history, in history. This emphasis on variations and changes arguably would converse 
smoothly with the aforementioned notion of James that experience is also the transition between 
experiences. For reference, this was one example of a quote on this from James: "Personal 
histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of things immediately 
experienced."
818
 Clearly, therefore, this dialogues with Ortega's position above that the study of 
history includes the changes and variations in and of human lives.  
 As history is a continuum; the past, present, and future, each of these generational 
divisions contains all the history prior up to that present as well, as he continued, 
 [...] cada generación humana lleva en sí todas las anteriores y es como un escorzo de la 
 historia universal. Y en el mismo sentido es preciso reconocer que el pasado es presente, 
 somos su resumen, que nuestro presente está hecho con la materia de ese pasado, el cual 
 pasado, por tanto, es actual.
819
 
 Thus, as James also affirmed, summarizing this possibly shared dialogue concisely, 
"Space and time are thus vehicles of continuity."
820
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 And this is why Ortega's theory of generations is "el método fundamental para la 
investigación histórica," because it is within this that we can search for and study any 'trends of 
trends,' not to mention that, frankly speaking, history, as a formal discipline of study must have 
some organization and discipline.
821
 Through the division of generations we find the variations of 
human life, which is what Ortega believed the discipline of history should be; through the 
comparison and contrast of generations, we can study and better understand how humanity has 
changed and these are some of the "variations" he was referring to (rather than more 
metaphysical topics such as the study of life in and of itself, which is for the philosophers, per 
Ortega, rather than historians, reasonably).  
 Again, this is also another motive for why Ortega argued that man has no nature (as here 
we are studying the variations, changes in humanity, rather than any fixed or stable 
characteristics within an individual), but rather history (we are those changes, variations, because 
we are all the generations that have come before us as well as our own, and more; we are our 
history, not our nature, though history encompasses our nature, and more).
822
 As Ortega 
continued, "El hombre es primariamente su vida —una cierta trayectoria con tiempo máximo 
prefijado. Y la edad, [...], es ante todo una etapa de esa trayectoria y no un estado de su cuerpo 
no de su alma."
823
 It is, therefore, again through the study of generations that we find what are 
possibly some of the 'trends of trends' of each one because, although he is speaking in general 
terms here (and for a specialized "new" type of discipline of history, as a so-called "adult 
science," it would be helpful to provide perhaps a bit more in the way of more concrete 
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specifics), nonetheless, "[...] cada generación tenía por fuerza que ver sus problemas desde una 
altura distinta. [...] el principio general de que cada quince años cambia el cariz de la vida."
824
 
Ortega does, therefore, provide some structure by dividing generations specifically in fifteen-
year increments. Again generally speaking, he continues, "Un mismo hecho acontecido a dos 
generaciones diferentes es una realidad vital, y por tanto, histórica, completamente distinta."
825
 
 Per Ortega, as we know one factor that we always find in history is man among his 
circumstances; the circumstances are 'spacial' and temporal, within which we are born, live, and 
pass on. So this is one characteristic that we can study, at least in part; the unique, concrete set of 
circumstances in any one moment or period of history, or in our generation(s), or our 
generation(s) itself. So perhaps here again we can continue to search for something systematic. 
And more specifically, one type of circumstance, as noted, is a man's generation. Generations 
shape and move history; they are "agentes o sujetos históricos que participan en forma diversa en 
las variaciones vitales de la historia," as they are "referentes espacio-temporales" in a 
"determinado momento colectivo de la historia."
826
 Again each generation is also representative 
of a historical set of perspectives. 
 As previously mentioned, Ortega further divides the concept of generational divisions 
into a focus on historical crisis periods within generations. Life is a drama, life is insecurity for 
Ortega. Life is about 'being shipwrecked,' to use one of his most frequently cited metaphors, so 
crises are key in moving history. He wrote, "Porque nuestra idea es reacción a un problema [...] 
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Y esta observación me importaba mucho hacerla porque es la clave para entender las crisis 
históricas."
827
 But Ortega defines "crisis" quite generally (which is a bit of a weak point here 
because as an "adult science" it would be useful to have a more detailed structure to apply, but 
this is in part precisely what he is asking that we explore and develop). Essentially Ortega 
considers a "period of historical crisis" when there is a shift in "convictions," which we can also 
understand here as "beliefs" (creencias) between two successive generations; "[...] hay crisis 
histórica cuando el cambio de mundo se produce consiste en que al mundo o sistema de 
convicciones de la generación anterior sucede a un estado vital en que el hombre se queda sin 
aquellas convicciones, por tanto, sin mundo."
828
 And having convicciones, or "beliefs" 
(creencias), is essential in life, as we saw, in Ortega's philosophy; "Vivir es siempre, quiérase o 
no, estar en alguna convicción, creer algo acerca del mundo y de si mismo"—hence why not 
having them would result in "crisis."
829
 Perhaps we can also interpret this via a dialogue with 
pragmatism in how for both Ortega and pragmatists such as James the idea is to recuperate the 
fluidity of the continuum of experiences, to use the pragmatist term, or of the continuum of 
"history" to use Ortega's emphasis. 
 Having "convictions" is important because as concisely explained by González, "History, 
then, is the outer manifestations of an internal dialectic of beliefs and convictions."
830
 And this is 
Ortega's "historical reason" (razón histórica), González continues, 
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 Convictions then, as the core of the dialectic of the lived experience attempt to question 
 the opinions prevalent both in the past as well as the present in order to give them form 
 and thus make concrete our immediacy. This task, Ortega gives the designation 
 “historical reason.” He [man] goes on accumulating being—the past; he goes on making 
 for himself a being through his dialectical series of experiments. This is a dialectic not of 
 logical but precisely of historical reason.
831
 
 Since history is a continuum ('man goes on accumulating being,' but this is not a logical 
reason, but a historical reason—hence this being an abstract sort of system), we need to study it 
as such, which means that we need to study it as the past, present, and future. This is also how 
we would apply James's empiricism to historical study, or his "content empiricism" specifically, 
as explained by Richard Gale, 
 [...] and there seemingly is no way to explain why it is not without tracing the past 
 history of this cap against that of my original cap in order to show that it is not spatio-
 temporally continuous with the original cap. Thus, unless it is possible to refer to a past 
 object qua past object, it is not possible to determine that a present object is the referent 
 of a past act of reference. In order to show how a past object can be referred to he must 
 again supplement his pragmatic account of meaning with that of content empiricism. In 
 the case of my cap that is now in the next room, my causal recipe for getting my hands on 
 it must be supplemented by a content empiricism description of the cap's past history, its 
 continuous history since I purchased it seven years ago, that is, a description of the 
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 experiences that would have been had were an observer to have continuously observed it 
 over this seven-year interval. And this is content empiricism.
832
 
 Again the basic conclusion in all this, therefore, is that again we must remember that we 
cannot ever completely record and therefore study and subsequently understand history given the 
impossibility to integrate and apply all the different perspectives along that vast continuum that 
add to shaping and creating that history. Moreover, if history is a continuum that proceeds from 
the past and also exists in the present and projects into the future, since 'the future has not arrived 
yet,' this is another reason we generally cannot be conclusive in historical study, as this would 
involve 'predicting the future,' which of course we cannot always do. The discipline of history is, 
therefore, an open-ended one in which study is continuous, just as history itself. The study of 
history should, therefore, also be seen as a continuum. This is why Ortega argues that history can 
only be narrated; "razón histórica" can not be deduced, for example, it can only be recited; "La 
razón histórica, que no consiste en inducir ni deducir, sino lisamente en narrar, es la única capaz 
de entender las realidades humanas, porque la contextura de estas es ser históricas, es 
historicidad."
833
 
 James also posited that history, and therefore logically its study, is ceaseless of course,  
 It is important to note that the critical reconstruction of one's past is a never-ending task. 
 No matter how much critical reflection goes into the establishment and evaluation of our 
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 memories, the critical reconstruction of our beliefs about the past cannot reach an end-
 point and be declared final.
834
 
 By "critical reconstruction" we can logically understand here "historical study"—which is 
a never-ending task. Again, history itself, and thus historical study, is ceaseless. 
 This most certainly dialogues with Ortega's shared view that a historian's work is never 
finished. He averred, "[...] la pupila del historiador para ver una cosa determinada [...] tiene que 
moverse sin cesar, oscilando constantemente del pasado al futuro, del futuro al pasado."
835
  
 Of course Ortega uses the literal 'metaphor'  of pupil since history and historical study 
comes to us via different, unique, and specific perspectives. History is always unfinished (despite 
the term traditionally implying the exact opposite) not only because it is open to the future but 
also because we are constantly incorporating new perspectives (never all of them of course), and 
so as James added, history and historical study is constantly changing. So again the historian's 
task continues to be endless and limitless. 
 History must be read like a novel, as we must read it in order (this is arguably similar to 
James's aforementioned example of ABCDEFG leading to BCDEFGH). And this is another 
piece of what is "systematic" to a certain extent in Ortega's historicism, which most appropriately 
perhaps we should call a "requisite" in his "system," or form of historical study. 
 Por eso la canción de la historia sólo se puede cantar entera —después de todo, como la 
 vida de un hombre sólo se entiende cuando se cuenta de su principio a su fin. La historia 
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 es sistema —un sistema lineal tendido en el tiempo. La serie de las formas de vida 
 humana que ha habido, en efecto, no son infinitas, son unas cuantas, tantas como 
 generaciones, unas cuantas precisas y determinadas que se suceden unas a otras [...] 
 Porque en la vida humana va inclusa toda otra realidad, es ella la realidad radical, y 
 cuando una realidad es la realidad, la única que propiamente hay, es, claro está, 
 transcendente. He aquí por qué la historia —aunque no lo hayan creído las últimas 
 generaciones— es la ciencia superior, la ciencia de la realidad fundamental —ella y no la 
 física.
836
 
 Although Ortega does refer here to history needing to be studied from start to finish, 
arguably what he means here is 'ideally,' and more specifically and appropriately just along as 
much of that continuum as possible, since in reality along all of it is not possible. Here also we 
find an anti-dualistic dialogue along pragmatist lines in this idea of continuum and therefore 
reading and studying history ideally just like a novel, in order—the idea that each "chapter," or 
each "page" in history is singular yet part of a larger "book" or "story," one not existing without 
the other, as they are separate elements but bound all together in one book. The following 
additional excerpt of Ortega's illustrates this very clearly, where here he uses the metaphor of a 
movie instead of a book in this case, but these fundamental ideas just outlined are the same (just 
as with "pages in a book" there are "screenshots/still images in a movie"), as quoted earlier;  
 La historia, en efecto, es, en una de sus dimensiones, cinematografía. Cada hombre vive 
 en una actualidad, en un paisaje vital, en un mundo, en un sistema de creencias —todas 
 expresiones son sinónimos— que de ordinario está quieto por lo menos en sus grandes 
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 líneas topográficas. Pero ese paisaje o estructura de la vida cambia en cada generación y 
 aunque cada uno de ellos sea quieto, como lo es cada fotografía de la película, su 
 successión da un movimiento.
837
  
 Compare this with the following excerpt of James also cited earlier: 
 The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending 
 at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them 
 completely in our minds. In following your life-history, I must temporarily turn my 
 attention away from my own. [...] It is easy to see the world's history pluralistically, as a 
 rope of which every fibre tells a separate tale; but to conceive of each cross-section of the 
 rope as an absolutely single fact, and to sum the whole longitudinal series into one being 
 living an undivided life, is harder. [...] the world is unified by its many systems, kinds, 
 purposes, and dramas. [...] That there MAY be one sovereign purpose, system, kind, and 
 story, is a legitimate hypothesis. All I say here is that it is rash to affirm this dogmatically 
 without better evidence than we possess at present.
838
 
 The notion that the world's "partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and 
ending  at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them 
completely in our minds" is one which resonates with and helps us understand more profoundly 
Ortega's conviction that 'we are ourselves and our circumstances.' And a rope with its separate 
unique fibers all interconnected is another excellent and clear way to understand the ceaseless, 
anti-dualistic progression of history and the multiple tales, or perspectives, present at any one 
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time along its continuum. And just the same, whether we are speaking of pages in a book, 
screenshots in a movie, or a rope in James's account —whatever the metaphor be to illustrate this 
anti-dualism in the continuum that is life, which is history— through this succession we can 
search for and find some trends of trends that might even have a certain degree of logic. Hence 
why Ortega can call his historicism to a certain extent "systematic," as illustrated in the 
continuation from the excerpt on applying the metaphor of cinematography to history, because at 
the very least, that is the objective; to create something hopefully more systematic, even if at 
times abstract: 
 Pero claro es que si al reconstruir nosotros el pasado mediante la historia, hallamos que 
 cada nueva época o estadio emerge del anterior con una cierta lógica o, dicho de otro 
 modo, que a cada forma de vida sucede otra que no es cualquiera, sino precisamente una 
 que la anterior predetermina, quiere decirse que también será posible en alguna medida lo 
 contrario, a saber; viviendo en un época vaticinar como será en sus líneas generales la 
 inmediata futura, en suma, que es en serio posible la profecía.
839
 
 Per Ortega, historical "pieces" are of course not random, rather previous ones are 
connected to present ones which will eventually be connected to future ones as, regardless of 
strength or degree, some extent of connection is there in the continuum that is history. Or, as 
more concisely stated by Blas González "history is indeed the system of my experiences, which 
are “linked in a single, inexorable chain”"840 While Ortega is not cited here as explicitly using 
the example of a rope, as James did, Blas González describes historical progression as a chain 
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when explaining his argument on Ortega's theory here, which fundamentally is no different. 
Moreover, he uses the specific, very pragmatist application of the term "experience." Hence why 
this quote is included here, as further evidence for leanings toward there being a possible 
pragmatist dialogue to imagine with Ortega. So in connecting this possible dialogue further with 
James, we could add here that experiences which have proven successful in the past and have 
'made some sort of difference,' we can then take what we have learned and gained to verify them 
as such in practice, confirm their utility, and then apply them to creating better future(s). 
 Personal history is indeed the system of my experiences, which are “linked in a single, 
 inexorable chain.” Thus, what we take to be life as biographical, emotional, and 
 experiential reality, Ortega simply views as an inevitable and ongoing dialectic that will 
 take place regardless of our being conscious of it or not. This existential dialectic that 
 makes up personal life is directly responsible for the movement of history that manifests 
 itself as quantitative and universal.
841
 
 But again as Ortega pleaded the study of history does not just imply reading and 
reviewing that "novel" from any one, strict view. For example, it should not be read from a 
strictly individual or just a social perspective, per se. It is not about just psychology or sociology. 
The study of history is not just about "the lives and events of the past," for example, it is about, 
as Ortega argued, 
 La historia se ocupa en averiguar cómo han sido las vidas humanas, pero suele 
 malentenderse la expresión como si se tratase de inquirir cuál ha sido el carácter de los 
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 sujetos humanos. La vida no es sin más ni más el hombre, es decir, el sujeto que vive. 
 Sino que es el drama de ese sujeto al encontrarse teniendo que bracear; que nadar 
 náufrago en el mundo. La historia no es, pues, primordialmente psicología de los 
 hombres, sino reconstrucción de la estructura de ese drama que se dispara entre el 
 hombre y el mundo. 
 [...] Es preciso que la historia abandone el psicologismo o subjetivismo en que sus más 
 finas producciones actuales andan perdidas y reconozca que su misión es reconstruir las 
 condiciones objetivas en que los individuos, los sujetos humanos han estado sumergidos. 
 De aquí su pregunta radical tiene que ser, no cómo han variado los seres humanos, sino 
 como ha variado la estructura objetiva de la vida. 
 [...] La pregunta radical de la historia se precisa, pues, así: ¿qué cambios de la estructura 
 vital ha habido? ¿Cómo, cúando, y por qué cambia la vida?
842
 
 This last part certainly dialogues with James's basic question that he posits pragmatism 
should ask about the general aim to discover 'what difference something would make.' This last 
sentence of Ortega's, therefore, would arguably dialogue very smoothly with pragmatism. 
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XIV. Conclusions 
 While this all may sound pessimistic and negative to mostly conclude that we cannot ever 
completely record and therefore study and know history, the idea, nonetheless, is that in order to 
understand it as much and as best as possible, and improve the discipline (as it is a very 
important one), these are some of the "prerequisites," or standards, that we need to have in mind 
always. None of this should read as an impossibility to create a more logical, systematic, and 
scientific-like discipline of history, but rather it should be read as a critique of the important 
limitations to the study that we must always keep at the forefront, and that we need to consider 
before we outline how we can improve historical reading, revision, and interpretation. We will 
get closer, therefore, to the "truth" on history, but not right on target. It will remain, however, the 
truth that we think it is on history, and we will not reach the actual truth(s) in and of 
it(them)self(ves). But we will improve the discipline of history, nonetheless. 
 This is what James appeared to believe, as witnessed in the following quote: 
 The reconstruction of our past-both individual and collective-has to contend with a 
 plurality of perspectives and must, in that sense, be polyphonic. The memory of an 
 individual or of a people cannot be monopolized, that is, it cannot be completely unified 
 and fully controlled by a single perspective.
843
 
 This again certainly resounds with Ortega's affirmation of perspectivism and the 
argument that the only erroneous perspective is the one which claims to be the only and absolute 
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—for example, how "positivist rationalism" denies any reality that cannot be explained 
rationally. 
 And as James also posited, 
 Our memory (both individual and collective) always remains open to reinterpretation and 
 renegotiation. The articulation and interpretation of memories (as well as their critical 
 reconstruction) require the weaving of past and present experiences and their projection 
 into the future, that is, the delineating of trajectories: our beliefs about the past get 
 articulated and interpreted in relation to the present and future; and this means through 
 the mediation of our understanding of the present and our vision of the future (or of 
 possible futures in the plural). This task of articulating and interpreting by delineating 
 trajectories can always be carried out in multiple and varied ways since subjects and 
 groups are differently situated with respect to their past, given the different circumstances 
 of their lives.
844
 
 It must be reiterated here James's emphasis on the idea of circumstances in this excerpt to 
further corroborate the possibility for a dialogue with Ortega. Additionally, again history weaves 
together like the threads on a continuous, never-ending rope as James also references here. 
 Moreover, recognizing further the subjectivity in the recording and study of history will 
help us better see each historical revision for what it is, and the accuracy it may or may not have 
for itself and its own perspective. In other words, we will incorporate into our study how the 
piece we are reviewing is uniquely subjective and therefore study its accuracy for its own 
perspective (but not necessarily for history in general, just a part), because history, as James 
                                                          
844
 Ibid., p. 136. 
 447 
 
argues, needs to be "open to reinterpretation and renegotiation." If we focus on history as a 
perspective (not as history in a potential completeness), then perhaps we can analyze in a 
comparison and contrast the different views, potentially even correct the errors in the process, 
and compile as many perspectives as possible to get as close as we can to accuracy (but never 
completely). Once more, history is the study of what we think it is, what we think it has been, and 
what we think it will be. Studying history will provide detail, in part, on the history of what we 
have thought and think history was and is. 
 As José Medina explains, providing support for this argument for an imagined dialogue 
here between James and Ortega, 
 The reinterpretability and renegotiability of our beliefs about the past have been viewed 
 by many as an obstacle to historical objectivity and historical truth, the thinking being 
 that (at least in principle) we should be able to determine and fix the veridicality of our 
 memories once and for all, so that we reach a point where we can no longer change our 
 minds through reinterpretation and renegotiation. However, James's radical fallibilism 
 and pluralism suggest that, far from being at odds with objectivity and truth, the openness 
 to reinterpretation and renegotiation of our beliefs is in fact what makes it possible to 
 improve their objectivity, to correct their biases and mistakes, and to maintain their truth 
 alive, that is, dynamic, adaptable, and integrated in our lives. The openness to negotiation 
 that James's pluralism recommends calls attention to the kind of accountability and 
 responsiveness to others required by our epistemic agency. As more perspectives are 
 taken into account in our epistemic negotiations, we can improve the articulation and 
 justification of our beliefs, and our epistemic appraisals thus become more objective. The 
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 reinterpretation and renegotiation of our beliefs should be thought of as opportunities for 
 learning from each other and correcting each other.
845
 
 So we can study history, of course, and we should always remember to take into account 
as many perspectives as possible. Hence Medina's support of "perspectivism" in all this, a 
cornerstone of Ortega's philosophy, is something that can certainly dialogue with James. Thus 
again there is a conversation to be imagined between Ortega and pragmatism, and pragmatism 
with an Ortegian historicism (as the goal here is simply envisioning a dialogue, not establishing 
lines of comparison, contrast, or influence). James further concludes that 
 Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one's own biography remain 
 untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries 
 old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. 
 We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this 'problem of maxima 
 and minima.' But success in solving this problem is eminently a matter of approximation. 
 We say this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; but that 
 means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of 
 satisfaction differently. To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic.
846
 
 But, again, everything here is "plastic," including this imaginary dialogue between 
William James and José Ortega y Gasset. This discussion is just meant to add to the study here of 
Ortega's polemic maxim, "man has not nature, only history" in further envisioning a possible 
pragmatist conversation in this. At no time is it meant to be definitive, finished, or a study of 
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comparison and contrast. Rather, again it must be reiterated that here the objective has just been 
to simply elaborate more on philosophy of history. As has been repeated: history itself really 
exists along a continuum, which is therefore never closed, and neither should its study. The 
purpose of this dissertation is just to essentially continue expanding that continuum, and that 
continuum of study.  
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Part Three 
European Pragmatism's Principal Representative:  
Ferdinand Schiller 
"On the Topic of the Historicity of Life" 
in an Imagined Dialogue with José Ortega y Gasset 
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Section I: European Pragmatism and its Principal Representative: 
Ferdinand Schiller   
I. Introduction 
 To begin this section it must be restated that the main objective of this full dissertation in 
general has been mainly bipartite. First, the goal has been to understand that when José Ortega y 
Gasset declared "man has no nature, only history," it was because what was meant by this was 
that man's nature is his history. Second, the objective has also specifically been to demonstrate 
how one way to possibly better understand this famous maxim of Ortega's is through a potential 
pragmatist dialogue. Of all the pragmatists and 'pragmatist leaning' philosophers, three have been 
chosen in particular to be used in this envisioned, feasible pragmatist dialogue with Ortega. As 
has been demonstrated in the first two parts of this dissertation, the two Americans chosen, John 
Dewey and William James, are perhaps those with whom we can imagine the strongest possible 
dialogue. And the third figure chosen was the most 'pragmatist' philosopher from Ortega's shared 
European continent of the time (and therefore an envoy of sorts of the movement's at least reach 
into Europe). British philosopher Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller has thus been chosen as the 
representative for this third and final section because he was the preeminent representative of 
pragmatism in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, as further evidence and proof of 
pragmatism's reach abroad, and which also coincides with Ortega's lifetime, as did Dewey and 
James' lives. This is part of what, therefore, makes it possible to envision this dialogue between 
Schiller and Ortega, the specific details of which will be elaborated in the pages ahead.  
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 In this third section there is not quite as much overlap as in the first two, because there 
were some ways in which Schiller deviated from American pragmatism quite significantly. 
Schiller and James, however, were friends who corresponded relatively frequently, so there is 
still, nonetheless, quite a bit shared between the two (more than Schiller and Dewey). 
 This third section will be divided into two parts similarly to how the first two sections 
were divided. The first part will focus on some basic metaphysical topics in an effort to outline 
some basic principles in an envisioned dialogue between Schiller and Ortega that can be used 
subsequently as a foundation for the application to contemplating a possible discussion between 
the two on the topic of history; its meaning, purpose, use, and how it should be studied.  
 In this we will begin with a background discussion on the historical development and 
context of pragmatism in Europe, with a brief overview of the key European figures who had 
incorporated, at least to a certain extent and for a certain period of time, some pragmatist 
influence and elements in their thought and work. This helps serve as proof and evidence of its 
reach into Europe.  
 The next part of this first section will outline the basic biographical background of 
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, the principle representative of pragmatism in Europe. 
Subsequently there will then be a basic general explanation of Schiller's philosophy, which 
though he termed it "Humanism" rather than Pragmatism, and it was a bit distinct, it was still 
predominantly pragmatist at its core.  
 After this, again some basic metaphysical discussion on the topics of truth, reality, and 
life (and especially here in this third part, on life as limited freedom) will be discussed in an 
imaginary shared dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. This will all then be applied in a second 
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section to the concrete topics of history, historicism, and the historicity of life. Thus the second 
section will apply all these fundamentals toward establishing possible definitions on the 
historicity of life, it will also provide some additional quandaries for the philosophy of history, 
and finally it will create some standards in a possible methodology of ideas for the study of 
history.  
 Very importantly, however, in all this it must remain abundantly clear, as declared on 
numerous occasions throughout this dissertation, that at no point is any of this meant to serve as 
a comparison and contrast of Ortega with these three pragmatist figures. Nor is any declaration 
of direct influence being made at any point. The objective here in this dissertation as a whole is 
at no time to determine influences or concrete similarities. Rather the aim is, at all times, to 
imagine a possible dialogue that could be discussed between them all as a way to not only 
possibly better understand the conclusion established here on Ortega's maxim that man has no 
nature only history because nature is his history (at least as part of a way to contemplate this as a 
pragmatist dialogue), but also with the hope that this will all add to the improvement of the 
academic discipline and study of history in general. Moreover, and more concretely, as a result 
of imagining this dialogue we are also looking to clarify and elaborate a vision of history and the 
importance of the concept of history in the "European pragmatism" of Schiller. Plus we simply 
have the contemporaneity of these four individuals to consider as further evidence for the ability 
to imagine a possible conversation (as Ortega, our philosopher of principal focus here, would 
certainly agree given his theories on generations as we have seen). Again, this is not a study of 
influence or similarity, but rather a study of a way to perhaps better contemplate a specific and 
significant piece of Ortega's philosophy by simply imagining a possible dialogue with some 
specific areas of pragmatism and pragmatist thinkers. Here the intention is mainly to take the 
 456 
 
philosophies as they are, and analyze profoundly the concepts in and of themselves 
philosophically. 
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II. Historical Development and Context of European Pragmatism 
 American Pragmatism has only relatively recently gained a particular popularity on the 
European continent, specifically starting in the latter decades of the twentieth century when 
figures such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam appeared with a new reborn and reinvigorated 
generation of pragmatism. Part of the reason as to why pragmatism did not become more 
widespread in Europe during the first part of the twentieth century was a question of essentially 
'bad timing.' Amidst a strong air of racism and pessimism, to cite just a bit of the negative energy 
circulating at the time, pragmatism was simply a "hard sell," as Porrovecchio, one of the few 
experts on Ferdinand Schiller, explains, as it was seen as "too optimistic and popular" (popular in 
terms of "vulgar," and optimistic in terms of basically "naive").
847
 There was also the eventual 
leaning toward fascism in some European countries that also inhibited further its potential reach 
in Europe, as its "popular" ideology did not exactly fit with the demagogical and elitist beliefs of 
fascism. And this is not to mention that Ferdinand Schiller was a bit of a racist who developed a 
leaning toward eugenics and resultantly attached this association to pragmatism in Europe, to a 
certain extent. And despite the times of existent discrimination, this was not something everyone 
agreed with of course. 
 Nonetheless, during the movement of the first American pragmatists in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is still plenty of evidence that it reached the 
European continent, at least to a certain extent, and found expression in a number of important 
figures across various academic disciplines (albeit not as much as the late twentieth century). 
There are scholars that support this, as witnessed by the following comment from Professor Julio 
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Seoane Pinilla from the University of Alcalá; "Y dígase que aun siendo un fenómeno 
estadounidense, el pragmatismo fue mucho y bien discutido—y asimilado—en Europa."848 And 
in another instance he also defends this further, arguing that  
 Pragmatismo siendo, como indudablemente es, un movimiento de marcado carácter 
 estadounidense, no es realmente algo propio solo de los Estados Unidos; existe también 
 un movimiento europeo con el mismo tono pragmatista. No se trata en este punto de 
 atender al modo como en Europa se recogió y recibió el Pragmatismo, sino que la apuesta 
 es algo más profundo: en la tradición europea existen modos de pensar con un tremendo 
 parecido de familia con el Pragmatismo (que incluso se pueden datar con anterior fecha a 
 las exposiciones de Peirce o James).
849
 
And he adds that arguably we can imagine a dialogue with Ortega specifically;  
 En Europa no sólo se leyó el pragmatismo estadounidense, sino que se supo discutir con 
 él y hacerlo compatible o integrarlo en tradiciones que despuntaban por la época en 
 diferentes países y que llevaban caminos y reclamaciones similares. [...] o con el mismo 
 Ortega y Gasset que en no pocos momentos se descuelga con ideas pragmatistas.
850
  
 Jaime Nubiola also supports this position, arguing that  
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 James's thought and books were received early on in Spain by prominent scholars such as 
 Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), and Eugenio d'Ors 
 (1881-1954). In fact, it is possible to assert that, contrary to a superficial impression, 
 there is a deep affinity between the central questions of James's thought and the topics 
 and problems addressed by the most relevant Hispanic thinkers of the twentieth 
 century.
851
 
 So clearly there is a circle of scholars addressing pragmatism's further reach into Europe 
during this time, not just generally but also in reference to Ortega, and it only continues growing. 
 In particular, from about 1900 to the 1920s we find evidence that William James and 
Ferdinand Schiller were broadly read. Moreover, these prominent European figures of the early 
twentieth century who took on varying degrees of pragmatism in their thought and work extend 
around the continent to several different countries. However, the key representative of American 
pragmatism in Europe, and who incorporated the most pragmatism into his work and thought 
was undoubtedly the British thinker Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller. Furthermore, it was 
Schiller who was read around Europe and considered to be the foremost "European Pragmatist."  
 Although Oxford philosopher F.C.S. Schiller remains the only European to design a 
 comprehensive version of pragmatism that ranks with the systems of Charles Pierce, 
 William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, many thinkers in England, 
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 France, Germany, Italy, and other countries incorporated pragmatic themes into their 
 philosophies.
852
 
 In moving around the continent to France we find the pragmatist message inspired figures 
such as Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel, Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem, Éduard Le Roy, André 
Laland, Émile Durkheim, Georges Sorel, and Gérard Deladalle. This last individual, Deladalle, 
was arguably the primary exponent of American pragmatism in France, who through his lectures 
inspired bits of pragmatic views to additional important French philosophers later such as Michel 
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Lacan around the middle of the twentieth century. But 
pragmatism in France in the early twentieth century, as in much of the rest of Europe, was short 
lived. Consideration of the American movement in France began with William James at the end 
of the nineteenth century but quickly disappeared with the First World War. Arguably this all 
perhaps coincided with similar veins of thought prevalent in France at the time of modernism, 
and of a disapproval of conservatism and rationalism.  
 Moving on to Italy, both James and Schiller had a brief period of influence, inspiring the 
key thinkers self-defined as pragmatists and humanists Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezzolini. 
Also moved by pragmatism were Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni, Giovanni Amendola and 
Antonio Aliotta. But as in France, pragmatism virtually disappeared by the start of the First 
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World War. American Pragmatism was first seen by Papini as a source for renovation of Italy 
toward further modernization. But Papini would later move into the Italian Futurist movement, 
as well as come to strongly support Italian Fascism, moving therefore away from American 
Pragmatism. And prior to him, Vailati and Calderoni had developed an even more "moderate" 
version of pragmatism significantly different from its American counterpart. Nonetheless, the 
reach of American pragmatism in Italy even extended to Mussolini, who himself declared that  
 The pragmatism of William James as of great use to me in my political career. James 
 taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. 
 I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to live and fight, to which Fascism 
 owes a great part of its success.
853
 
 It must be noted, though a bit off topic however, that Mussolini declared a long list of 
influences, and that he goes on to say here that George Sorel was the individual to whom he 
owes "the greatest debt"—so James's "influence" is debatable. Nonetheless, the point of this is 
just to show that American pragmatism did clearly extend to much of Europe, even if in 
unintended and at times secondary consequential ways (given that James would never have 
supported Fascism).
854
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 Germany also provides an interesting historical case for the spread of American 
pragmatism, as the history of philosophy there in the early twentieth century resulted in an 
environment already hostile and certainly not open to its reception. The common thread running 
through the nation's philosophical fabric was one of denial and inferiority of American 
pragmatism. Professor of philosophy at the University of Darmstadt, Julius Goldstein, was one of 
the early defenders of American pragmatism in Germany. James, in fact, kept frequent 
correspondence with Goldstein, hoping to inspire more pragmatist thought in Germany, writing 
in one letter to him, 
 Schiller had already written to me about you as the only pragmatist now living in 
 Germany. I hope that this will not long be true, but that you may succeed in inoculating 
 your fellow-countrymen with a taste for more empirical philosophy, or rather with a 
 distaste for the elements of absolutism which so many Germans still leave to flourish in 
 the midst of an otherwise very empirical way of thinking, 
 I am getting numerous acknowledgments of my book, but only one so far as been as 
 enthusiastically sympathetic as yours. It is evident that your mind and mine are cut on the 
 same pattern....The Germans, as you say, are given over to monism--monism in the 
 depths, however empiricist they appear on the surface. My empiricism and pluralism are 
 in the depths also.
855
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pragmatism's reach into Europe during its first 'phase' to show it was there—and specifically during the time of the 
Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset's life, who is the focus of this dissertation, and who could, therefore, have 
arguably been plenty exposed to American pragmatism. 
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 The case of Germany is a particularly important one here for this dissertation's purpose, 
as Ortega spent a significant portion of his academic formation there. Though his time there only 
spanned a few years, they were quite focused on academic study and were arguably quite 
influential nevertheless. Briefly noted, first he studied classical philology and philosophy at the 
University of Leipzig in 1905. Then in 1906 he studied at the University of Berlin. Six months 
after that he headed over to the University of Marburg where he obtained another degree in 
philosophy. This aforementioned aversion yet existence of American pragmatism in Germany, 
albeit to a small degree, could perhaps help explain part of the same sort of 'recognition' we have 
seen that Ortega made of American pragmatism. As has been quoted in the other sections of this 
thesis, in his second chapter from What is Philosophy, Ortega dedicates a small section at the 
very end to pragmatism, of which his thoughts on the American philosophy can be summarized 
in the following excerpt, part of which has been quoted but should be revisited here:  
 [...] la verdad es el precipitado intelectual de la utilidad práctica. Poco tiempo después, en 
 los albores pueriles de nuestro siglo, se hizo de este pensamiento una filosofía: el 
 pragmatismo. Con el simpático cinismo propio de los <<yankees>>, propio de todo 
 pueblo nuevo—un pueblo nuevo, a poco bien que le vaya, es un enfant terrible—, el 
 pragmatismo norteamericano se ha atrevido a declarar este tesis: <<no hay más verdad 
 que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas.>> Y con esta tesis, tan audaz como ingenua, 
 tan ingenuamente audaz, ha hecho su ingreso en la historia milenaria de la filosofía el 
 lóbulo norte del continente americano.
856
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 Still, as noted there were a few inspired by American pragmatism in Germany, 
particularly after World War Two. Prior there was Hans Vaihinger, professor of philosophy at 
the University of Halle. And post-World War Two we find the self-declared pragmatists of Karl-
Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. In fact, in general, pragmatism appeared to have more reception 
in Europe beginning toward the middle of the twentieth century after the Second World War.  
 Further across Europe we also find  F.P. Ramsey in England, as well as Tomas Garrigue 
Masaryk and Karl Capek in the Czech Republic.  
 But most importantly for this dissertation's purposes, in Spain we find José Ortega y 
Gasset, who is of course not directly linked in any form to American pragmatism, but a possible 
dialogue with three pragmatist figures in particular; John Dewey, William James, and in what 
follows, with Ferdinand Schiller, is envisioned as being possible nonetheless. As noted, there 
was another key Spanish philosopher who read pragmatism; Miguel de Unamuno, who serves as 
further evidence for its reach into Spain. Unamuno read and cited European pragmatists as well 
in his work, including Schiller and Papini. But this is of course a topic for another dissertation, as 
again here the focus is on his fellow Spaniard and Philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset. Despite the 
lack of study in this imagined pragmatist dialogue with Ortega, as this is certainly a unique topic, 
there are a few initial steps in this direction, nonetheless, as we have seen and will continue to 
see in this final part. As proposed by John Shook, an author referenced on several occasions in 
this dissertation given his profound study of pragmatism,  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
assert that pragmatism, which began outside the boundaries of the European stage, did not reach its full maturity 
until it was integrated in the framework of German philosophy, that is, in the mainstream of his own philosophical 
position (Ortega 1980: 14). This is for me one of the main avenues for further exploration concerning the 
overlapping of pragmatism and Hispanic philosophy: if one understands Ortega's thought as a German flourishing of 
pragmatist roots, it is possible to bring the most distinctive traits of Hispanic philosophy and James's philosophy 
closer" (From: NUBIOLA, Jaime: "The Reception of William James in Continental Europe," 81). 
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 One of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, José Ortega y Gasset, 
 developed several recognizably pragmatist themes at the core of his humanist philosophy. 
 Some scholars have claimed that American pragmatism, and above all James's radical 
 empiricism, were a major influence, alongside the acknowledged impact of 
 phenomenology, on Ortega y Gasset. Regardless of direct influence his philosophy 
 should be taken seriously as a major development of the pragmatic worldview on the 
 primacy of lived creative experience, the ineliminable nature of perspective, and the 
 historical nature of reason.
857
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III. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller 
 As aforementioned, Schiller is considered the first "representative" of pragmatism in 
Europe. As Thayer summarizes in one of the few in-depth studies on Schiller, he was "the most 
famous pragmatist outside of the United States" who, as he continues to explain, with William 
James was given more attention than any other pragmatist in Europe, perhaps considered by 
some even as equals.
858
 Schiller, in fact, was developing "pragmatist" ideas prior to his meeting 
James—this is of course up for debate and also a topic for another dissertation, but it should be 
noted that this argument has been proposed. However, he always considered himself a 
"humanist" and championed this separate term to define his philosophy as something a bit 
different, nonetheless, from American pragmatism.  
 Sadly, however, his role in promoting pragmatism not just in Europe but in general has 
not been studied and appreciated enough. Yet still some consider Schiller to be "pragmatism's 
most forgotten figure."
859
 As Porrovecchio argues, even though he was a bit younger than his 
American pragmatist contemporaries, a further look into whether or not some of his ideas 
appeared prior is warranted;  
 There is ample evidence to suggest the tripartite origins via Peirce, James, and Dewey 
 should more rightly be viewed as quadripartite. And, chronologically speaking, Schiller 
 should be placed prior to Dewey in explicating the basic components of pragmatism. As 
 Winetrout notes: "[...] On certain levels he antedated both James and Dewey as an 
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 explicator of this new philosophy. Much of the source material for this conclusion was 
 published before key philosophical works of Dewey appeared."
860
 
 This can be debated, however, and so the objective here is not to determine who came 
first with which ideas, but rather simply to continue to explore a possible dialogue between 
Ortega and pragmatism, with the three figures in particular of Dewey, James, and Schiller. 
Whether or not Schiller had some ideas before or after James or Dewey is a topic for another 
dissertation, but it is noted here since it is nonetheless important background information. 
 As further background history, Bertrand Russell, in his History of Western Philosophy in 
fact considers James, Dewey and Schiller to be the three founders of pragmatism (he did not 
include Peirce based on his retiring himself from pragmatism early in the twentieth century). 
Porrovecchio in his work cites another academic, British Alban Gregory Widgery, who agreed 
that Schiller has been underestimated and underappreciated, arguing in 1927 that "Schiller's 
thought was not a product of the discussion of Pragmatism in the first decade of the century; his 
work was a predisposing cause of and a leading part in that discussion."
861
 
 This leads one to question, why, therefore, Schiller has not been more studied and 
recognized, and why he has been so undervalued. Perhaps part of Schiller's lack of appearance in 
the historical annals of philosophy can be attributed to his rebellious and polemical character. He 
did not take to criticism very well and quite stubbornly stood his ground on his beliefs, so much 
in fact that, as aforementioned, he decided to forgo the final examination for his doctorate simply 
because he disagreed with the methods and standards set where he studied at Cornell University. 
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Moreover, he is by no means considered a "great" or "clear" writer, as his sometimes humorous 
and convoluted style can be quite challenging to interpret. And this is also not to mention that he 
was quite repetitive in his work. But is this sufficient for being so little studied? Probably not. 
 Despite Schiller's great respect for the American pragmatists, and their lives being 
contemporaneous, he nevertheless, as aforementioned, still developed a version that was a bit 
dissimilar, and hence the use of his different term to define it of "humanism." Maybe this is also 
part of the reason for his lack of further recognition to-date? Perhaps it could also be labeled a 
"pragmatic humanism," but key is his centering humanity in his philosophy much more so than 
pragmatism; "all acts and all thoughts are irreducibly the products of individual human beings, 
and are therefore inescapably associated with the needs, desires, and purposes of men."
862
 Hence 
the term "humanism." Schiller's "humanism" will be analyzed in detail further ahead, but suffice 
to say for the moment that while he was certainly a pragmatist in many respects, he also wanted 
to develop something a little different and his own; hence, "Humanism." And thus this is part of 
the reason why he is also a bit distinct from Dewey or James. Nonetheless, he did not reach the 
level of notoriety for either pragmatism or his humanism that Dewey or James did. 
 In regards to the specific dialogue being envisioned here in this dissertation, as argued to 
be the case inherently in pragmatism as in the case of Dewey and James, there is an historicist 
element in Schiller's "pragmatist humanism" as well, as will be elaborated throughout. As 
succinctly proposed by Porrovecchio, one of the key ways in which to understand his "pragmatic 
humanism" is as follows: "knowledge (or truth) is subject to the conditions of the time in which 
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it occurs."
863
 "Knowledge" is what we gather in experience; it is what we experience over time, 
as we have seen as a basic pragmatist concept. Hence, we can deduce that knowledge is 
historical, being based on time, and knowledge forms our ideas of truth, reality, and history as 
well. And at any given time we can have different experiences, traditions, and therefore truths, 
realities—so much, therefore, is contingent on time, or history, and hence the historicist element 
arguably present in Schiller's philosophy that we will use here as a basis to envision a possible 
dialogue with Ortega, who as we know centrally emphasized history and how 'man has history' 
as being of the most fundamental concepts defining Ortega's view on the world, life, truth, 
reality, and metaphysics in general. This inherent nature of "time," or history, in "experience" we 
saw was key in the other two pragmatist philosophers explored here. This, therefore, is key to 
imagining a dialogue with Ortega because, tersely summarized, it fundamentally argues for the 
historicism present in pragmatism, which along with any pragmatism in the work of Ortega, 
these are both topics that have been explored very little and are therefore both quite the 
innovative subjects, as has been noted.  
 As American pragmatism was not widely popular in Europe during its 'first wave,' 
arguably Schiller's "humanism" was more intended for a "European" audience. We can more 
specifically consider him the "English representative of American pragmatism in Europe." 
Though Schiller was English and lived much of his life in England, he was born in the Danish 
side of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 and then died in Los Angeles, California in 1937. His studies 
included "classical moderations," "the Greats," German, and an M.A., all of which were 
completed in England. He received two firsts; one in 1883 in Classic Moderations, and another 
in 1886 in Literae Humanitores. He was awarded his B.A. in 1886. Then a year later in 1887 he 
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earned the title of Taylorian Scholar in German. In 1891 he earned his M.A. and published 
Riddles of the Sphinx anonymously as A. Troglodyte.  He never did officially complete his 
doctorate at Cornell University, however, because he decided not to do the final examination, as 
he believed it was poorly and improperly structured. Instead, he took up a prestigious job back in 
England at Oxford University. 
 Later, in 1893 he returned to Cornell University as an instructor of logic and metaphysics. 
It was during this time that we know he was exposed to William James and quickly engrossed 
himself in his pragmatism (or at least this specific dating we can be certain of given the concrete 
evidence for this, but this is not to say that it was not possible he had been exposed to his work 
prior). In 1897 he was called home again and began a long and fruitful career at Corpus Christi 
College in Oxford. At home he gained the titles of Treasurer of the Mind Association, President 
of the Aristotelian Society, President of the British Society for Psychical Research, and Fellow of 
the British Academy. Then in 1926 he headed back to the United States to teach at the University 
of Southern California until 1935, just two years before he passed away there. 
 Perhaps one of the most summarizing lines of Schiller's work is the following: "man is 
the measure of his experience, and so an ineradicable factor in any world he experiences."
864
 Just 
as the Greek Philosopher Protagoras claimed in the fifth century, "man is the measure of all 
things," this is the core of Schiller's humanist doctrine. Individual consciousness is indeed 
powerful and influential in shaping how we live our lives, but we each live, nonetheless, in a 
world of 'limited freedom.' This notion is one we saw was also present in James's philosophy. So 
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Schiller supported trends in personal idealism, as well as evolutionism and voluntarism, which 
were becoming increasingly prevalent in the United States. But he did believe, nevertheless, that 
individualism plays a strong and prevalent role in general in the progress of our lives. 
 For Schiller, although our freedom is limited, we can still each be strongly influential in 
our own lives, a notion explored previously here within the philosophies of Dewey, James, and 
Ortega as well. As Shook concisely explains in regards to Schiller, James, Sidgwick, and Papini; 
they all shared the philosophy that a "common view was a belief in the reality of human power 
and growth in an accommodating universe."
865
 Fundamental in directing this strong but limited 
freedom was specifically individual human interest, and especially that which was "valuable" 
and ensured survival.  
 In James's Principles of Psychology (1890) Schiller then discovered a biological theory 
 of consciousness as an interactive process of growth within a selectively perceived 
 environment. Both James and Schiller followed the primary philosophical implication: all 
 thought must service the organism's survival efforts in a plastic and malleable world. 
 Schiller promptly expanded upon James's will-to-believe doctrine, declaring truth to be 
 what proves to be valuable to the individual, and formulated a subjectivist version of 
 James's stream of consciousness theory, declaring that reality must only be as it is 
 knowable by an individual mind. Schiller asserted the ontological ultimacy of the creative 
 personal mind because it is the most real thing knowable, and he argued that personal 
 values must always be the final judge of all knowledge.
866
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 In this passage we find some of the fundamental elements in Schiller's philosophy, and 
that are of American pragmatism in general as well, that arguably might specifically dialogue 
with the philosophy of the Spaniard José Ortega y Gasset. In regards to American pragmatism, 
one way in which he is linked is by highlighting individual "experience" at the center of 
knowledge, as we have seen with all the pragmatists here. This is what leads us to what we think 
of reality, truth, history, to cite a few examples. So we find here in Schiller (again as noted in the 
first two sections of this dissertation), the idea that reality, truth, or history, is what we think it is; 
experience leads us to think what we think we think, to put it plainly. Hence the pragmatist 
"plastic and malleable world." The emphasis on the "individual mind" within a "selectively 
perceived environment" is a general concept that arguably resonates with Ortega's theories on "I 
am myself and my circumstances" and "perspectivism" (as we have seen throughout this 
dissertation these latter two notions of Ortega seem to converse quite smoothly with 
pragmatism). Meaning, we are each our individual minds, our yoes, but our freedom is limited by 
the circumstances that surround us, and together this all adds to creating our individual, selective 
perspectives. Further, we should look at this anti-dualistically; we are free in our choice but 
limited by what those choices are, so they are separate but interconnected concepts that define 
our state of limited freedom. This is a summary of the dialogue we can imagine here between 
Ortega and Schiller. 
 Here Shook provides a concise, summarizing explanation on Schiller's idea that we live 
in a world of "limited freedom" that we can imagine to potentially converse smoothly with 
Ortega:   
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 Schiller (like James) exulted in the "open universe" of genuine possibilities for personal 
 evolution toward greater harmony within both the social world and the natural world. 
 Reality remained a cooperative yet quasi-independent partner to human efforts. While 
 natural processes cannot be identified apart from the results of human transformations of 
 the world, since nature cannot be known before such transformations, reality surely 
 imposes many constraints on our partially free enterprises.
867
 
 This text introduces another key American pragmatist concept that is also fundamental in 
Schiller's thought: anti-dualism (again the idea of connected but separate parts; separate but one 
cannot exist without the other). This notion is important, because as Schiller reminds us, "It is a 
well-known fact that things are not only known by their affinities but also by their opposites."
868
 
 As in the previous two sections on Dewey and James, reality, nature, the truth, history—
we cannot really know what these things are, we can only know what we think we know that they 
are, via our experiences. "Meaning cannot be either an inherent property of objects or a static 
relation between objects, but is an activity or attitude taken up toward objects by a subject. To 
attribute meaning and to attribute value are practically the same thing."
869
 And as we will also 
continue to see at length, Schiller emphasizes an essentially optimistic view on personal growth, 
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development, and advancement, something that is also very prevalent in Ortega's work and his 
stress on the need for us to each find our fitting personal vocations, for example.
870
  
 A further key conclusion to remember here is the following: we cannot really know 
reality, truth, or history, for example, they are never 'complete,' as they are 'always in the process 
of being experienced, made, and defined.' We are 'constantly becoming ourselves within our 
constantly re-discovered realities,' to describe this succinctly and simply. 
 Again, this constantly progressing evolution gives our truths, realities, or history the key 
characteristic of being in part dependent, therefore, on time; i.e., history (again). And Schiller's 
interest in evolutionism is an area that specifically relates to this dissertation's focus on the role 
of history and historicist thought in all this. Human thought, interest, placement of value, 
conceptual definitions of reality, truth, etcetera, are also socially determined (not just 
individually); meaning, they have "evolutionary roots," but more so arguably in the idea of 
"historical roots" rather than biological or genetic (considering also that "history" can contain 
biology and genetics, along with much more). And this will be explored in great depth in the 
second section of this third and final part. 
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IV. Pragmatism, or "Humanism," per Schiller 
 As aforementioned, while Schiller was a zealous reader of American Pragmatism, he did 
develop his own brand that was a bit different, which he termed "Humanism." However, 
"Humanism" starts with the basic foundations common to the American pragmatist thinkers and, 
as he says, it simply goes a little bit further. In what follows Porrovecchio offers a clear 
interpretive explanation for this, quoting Schiller as well: 
 Thus pragmatism, while not forming a logical system to organize human action, 
 nonetheless provides "an epistemological method which really describes the facts of 
 actual knowing." It articulates the means by which options are decided upon, tested, and 
 then accepted in everyday life. But pragmatism is connected to the larger framework of 
 Schiller's humanism. Simply put, humanism is a philosophical approach to ameliorating 
 human problems. [...] As a result, pragmatic humanism can be understood in two ways. 
 Pragmatism is the method by which to apply humanism; or framed differently, humanism 
 is the pragmatic approach writ large. Together, then, they provide the basis for arguing 
 against any complete or systematic metaphysics since: (1) knowing is subject to human 
 idiosyncrasies, and (2) knowledge (or truth) is subject to the conditions of the time in 
 which it occurs.
871
 
 Schiller's development and use of the concept of "humanism," rather than labeling his 
philosophy "pragmatism," therefore is a key initial reason to set him a bit apart from Dewey and 
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James. As Schiller himself begins to explain in the book in which he really develops his 
philosophy of Humanism, Studies in Humanism, 
 Pragmatism, on the other hand, essays to trace out the actual making of truth, 2 the actual 
 ways in which discriminations between the true and the false are effected, and derives 
 from these its generalisations about the method of determining the nature of truth. It is 
 from such empirical observations that it derives its doctrine that when an assertion claims 
 truth, its consequences are always used to test its claim. In other words, what follows 
 from its truth for any human interest, and more particularly and in the first place, for the 
 interest with which it is directly concerned, is what established its real truth and validity. 
 This is the famous Principle of Peirce, which ought to be regarded as the greatest 
 truism.
872
 
 And as Schiller continues to explain about this fundamental pragmatist concept, human 
interest plays a key role, as the consequences that are studied in this method must be related to 
interest and have some sort of 'purpose'. This we saw was present in Dewey and James as well, 
but it is perhaps even more emphasized by Schiller, given his greater placement of humanity at 
the center in his philosophy in general. This focus on the importance of "interest" Schiller 
argues, is perhaps "the most essential feature of Pragmatism"; that "all mental life is 
purposive."
873
 And again this was also quite present, as we saw, in James's philosophy, as well as 
in specifically the historicism imagined to dialogue with Dewey.    
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 This principle, however, focuses on the concept of the "truth," which is where there is 
differentiation with Schiller's "humanism," because as he says, "But humanism seems to me to 
go further still, and not to be restricted to the one question of truth."
874
 Still, however, key in all 
applications is the idea of epistemological method in the use of experiments and testing, and 
especially via experiences. "Hence there is implicit in Pragmatism," Schiller writes, "a demand 
for an inquiry to ascertain the actual facts."
875
 And in Schiller's "Humanism," he simply wants to 
expand this to cover as much as possible; "Humanism will seem more universal."
876
 Schiller 
declared, 
 I propose accordingly, to convert to the use of philosophic terminology a word which 
 has long been famed in history and literature, and to denominate HUMANISM the 
 attitude of thought which I know to be habitual in William James and in myself, which 
 seems to be sporadic and inchoate in many others, and which is destined, I believe, to win 
 the widest popularity.
877
 
 An important distinction, therefore in Schiller's "Humanism" as compared to "American 
Pragmatism" is that it is a bit broader; it is perhaps less methodological and less empirical. This 
is fundamentally what Schiller means by "universal;" simply broad enough to essentially 
encompass all. This is because as man is the center, and man creates methods, man is greater 
than those very methods since he is the creator. Humanism is therefore "greater" as well in terms 
of "more extensive" than Pragmatism. "Man" and his malleable character and ability for varying 
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interpretation makes this "individualism" particularly strong in Schiller's philosophy, which is 
not exactly what American pragmatism in general specifies and elaborates. He wrote, "Great 
therefore, as will be the value we must claim for Pragmatism as a method, we must yet concede 
that man is greater than any method he has made, and that our Humanism must interpret it."
878
 
Again Schiller's humanism thus has the objective to extend a bit further. By placing so much 
emphasis on man at the center, and on his individual interpretations, perspectives, or views, his 
philosophy becomes more plastic and abstract, and therefore broader and more "universal," 
because of how much each of us vary from one another—and this specifically is an area of 
potential dialogue with Ortega, as we shall continue to explore ahead.  
 To pause for a moment, it must be reminded that the three pragmatists explored here are 
unique and distinct from each other, despite strong areas of parallel. The objective is not to 
compare and contrast the three pragmatists chosen for analysis here, but rather to use three 
different figures' philosophies on similar topics to see how there might be a dialogue with 
Ortega's philosophy, so for that reason, again some areas of overlap among the three 
philosophers need to be revisited to be able to envision this possible dialogue with Ortega. 
 All of these key philosophical topics of truth, reality, life, and of course history, will be 
expanded in great depth in separate sections in what follows. 
 Continuing with laying out Schiller's definition of his philosophy of humanism, he writes, 
 The method we have observed; it is empirical, teleological, and concrete. Its spirit is a 
 bigger thing, which may fitly be denominated Humanism. 
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 Humanism is really in itself the simplest of philosophical standpoints: it is merely the 
 perception that the philosophic problem concerns human beings striving to comprehend a 
 world of human experience by the resources of human minds. Not even Pragmatism 
 could be simpler or nearer to an obvious truism of cognitive method.
879
 
 And as noted, at the center of all this is man (or woman), as he writes, "man is the 
measure of his experience, and so an ineradicable factor in any world he experiences."
880
 So to a 
certain extent this is 'individualist,' but not completely, as there is a social element that he 
recognizes as important, hence again why he chose the term "humanism" (as opposed to 
something such as "individualism").  
 While one of Ortega's famous maxims is "man and his circumstance," arguably 'man' is 
still part of the center in Ortega's philosophy as well, as has been explored, in regards to life, 
reality, and history (circumstance comes into play in that a life is 'submerged in a specific, 
determinate circumstance of a collective, social life' as well)—but without it being a philosophy 
of pure individualism, as is also the case with Schiller. This was an important concept explored 
in the previous two sections as well; the idea that no thinker investigated here soley and purely 
emphasized the individualistic nor social position. "La vida no es sin más ni más el hombre, es 
decir, el sujeto que vive," wrote Ortega, and "man" the subject, lives within a drama of being lost 
in the 'not ready made' world, forced to find a way to navigate through it, adding that history and 
its study, therefore, is "[...] reconstrucción de la estructura de ese drama que dispara entre el 
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hombre y el mundo" (to connect to the historicism prevalent in all this).
881
 Thus Ortega and 
Schiller would likely still converse on this basic conclusion on how we live both individually and 
socially, as we saw in the previous two parts of this dissertation. 
 In Schiller's philosophy, everything starts with the "immediate facts of our experience," 
as he states.
882
 This is a point that was inspired of course by pragmatism, as this is shared with 
the other two pragmatists explored here. Humanism is thus as he defines it like "Common 
Sense," using as a "natural starting-point" experience, and specifically in terms of man and "the 
world of man's experience as it has come to seem to him."
883
 And as we have seen in the 
previous two sections, when we interchange the terms "experience" and "history" we find a 
possible dialogue between Ortega and these three pragmatist thinkers. In other words, everything 
starts with our experiences, as Schiller reminds us, or our histories, which is why what we are is 
our histories, to further connect the two thinkers in a possible dialogue. Moreover, in this last 
quote of Schiller's he appears to insinuate that there is a subjectivity in how we view and 
interpret our 'worlds of experiences,' or our histories, thus there are unique perspectives that they 
are offered to us in and from which we see this all. "The world of man's experience" is part of 
our own specific continuum (i.e., a history that also lives in the present and its potential future as 
well) that over time has been created and understood in a specific way(s); i.e., our unique 
perspective(s), and via these, because our perspectives are historical as well, "as it has come to 
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seem to him." These selective and subjective perspectives thus shape everything, including what 
we think the truth is, as the first metaphysical topic we will explore in this third and final part.  
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V. Truth 
 The topic of the "truth" is one that must be explored at length in any paper that involves a  
pragmatist discussion, as its fundamental interpretation is essential to understanding most of the 
basic principles of pragmatism. This is why a separate section on this has been developed in each 
of the three parts of this dissertation. Summarized in the most simplistic of ways, we can say, as 
has been elaborated throughout this dissertation as common to all the pragmatist thinkers 
explored here, that truth is what we think it is. There is, therefore, certainly no absolute truth, 
there is just what we think there is. "[...] absolute truth is futile," writes Schiller in further 
agreement with the other pragmatist thinkers here, as he continues, "Even if it existed, it could 
not help us, because we could not attain it. Even if we could attain it, we could not know that we 
had done so. Even, therefore, if it could remove doubt, it would not do so to our blinded eyes."
884
 
This so very clearly demonstrates a basic principle repeated here throughout this dissertation of 
anti-dualism, and the general concept that 'there is what we think there is, then there is what that 
'thing'/'object of our thought,' but we can never know if they ever coincide, though we do know 
that they exist both interconnected and separate, simultaneously.' This is in fact precisely what 
Schiller was just quoted as arguing in line with the other pragmatists explored here. 
 Thus there are some basic and stable-like features we can use in defining the key 
characteristics of the "truth," but in the end it is not something that we can know or identify with 
complete authenticity, certainty, or accuracy. Schiller writes, 
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 [...] no truth can ever be so certain that it need not be verified, and may not mislead us, 
 when applied. But this only means that no truth should be taken as unimprovable. [...] We 
 shall, therefore, conceive ourselves to have attained, not complete truths without a stain 
 upon their character, which there is no reason to doubt, but only approximations to truth 
 and working hypotheses, which are, at most, good enough for practical purposes. [...] the 
 discovery of truth is such a personal affair. [...] truth is made, by human operations on the 
 data of human experience.
885
 
 As we know this is central in pragmatism; this basic inability to reach any real truth. And 
here Schiller adds quite an even more personalized aspect to it by positing that what we think is 
any truth is a "personal affair." This has important implications for history, and historical study, 
as we shall revisit further ahead, in that the same must be applied to what we come to believe are 
"historical truths"; they are made by humans, so we cannot confirm their complete 
'truthfulness'—a conclusion that we have already reached in the previous two parts of this 
dissertation as well. We can only really say that historical truths are just what we think they are. 
And as Schiller notes in the above quote, truths, or historical truths are instrumental in that 
usually their existence in part stems from and depends on their having "practical purposes," and 
this must be continually verified and re-verified in the future. This last point is of course a very 
pragmatist one as well. 
 Ortega's concept of the "truth," however, does not potentially dialogue quite as smoothly 
as some other topics with pragmatism, as we have seen, but again there are some specific areas 
that we can possibly envision to be conversable. As noted, the conclusion, for example, that the 
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truth cannot really be assured or absolutely known is something that Ortega might relate to with 
the pragmatists. Ortega differentiates two kinds of "truth."  
 The first is one is essentially personal, as it is "evident to me," which he labels "reason" 
("razón"). This first type would perhaps converse most with James, but this next type would 
certainly dialogue with all three, as witnessed in the case of Schiller in this last point in which he 
declares that the truth is made based on the amassing of experience, which is essentially the 
history of our experience. And in the aforementioned quote of Schiller's, we see how he 
considers the 'discovery of the truth to be a personal affair.' Ortega's second type of truth thus is 
one which is agreed upon socially by the people in a given time period (a historical truth, 
essentially), which he calls "tradition" ("tradición").
886
 Schiller broadly uses the terms "human 
experience" and "human operations," which we can consider as referencing something more 
social in this instance, and Ortega considers the plural, "socially" in this as well. And a dialogue 
could be imagined with this idea that it is simply what we think it is (and thus not "absolute") but 
specifically dependent on the individual and the social traditions --of the time, to add very 
importantly again here his historicist leaning, as we have also seen throughout. The "truth" is 
historical, as it is in a large part dependent on time/history, as declared in the aforementioned 
quote that "[...] todas las épocas y todos los pueblos han gozado su congrua porción de 
verdad."
887
 The objective is to show both the individualist and social elements present in all this. 
 But as we have seen, it is the general pragmatist conception of the "truth" that Ortega 
specifically criticizes in his one referenced direct mention of pragmatism, without specifying any 
single pragmatist philosopher, however, as we saw; "[...] el pragmatismo norteamericano se ha 
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atrevido proclamar esta tesis: <<no hay más verdad que el buen éxito en el trato de las cosas>>." 
Part of the reason for this disagreement is perhaps because Ortega sees some more specifics in 
the truth, as mentioned above in the example of distinguishing between individual and social 
truths, rather than it being just only about something "tried and true" (without knowing for sure 
of course if it is really truly true).  
 Again the main conclusion, therefore, that can maybe dialogue here is the idea that we 
cannot really say for sure what is the truth. While perhaps there are several other features of 
conceptions of the truth that are quite dissimilar between Ortega and the pragmatists, still at least 
in this we can arguably find a potential conversation. For the pragmatists, such as Schiller, most 
simply stated truth is more so something that we demonstrate enough, sufficiently to accept, 
essentially, whereas for Ortega the truth is something more so true for a historical period, 
fundamentally, but neither of which can be shown to be truly true. Influence or conceptions of 
the truth may vary, but in the end, regardless, we cannot even truly know or be certain of the 
truth—this last point is arguably a point of possible dialogue between Ortega and all these 
pragmatists explored here. 
 Again we can explore methods in how truth is developed, defined, maintained or 
disregarded, but not necessarily the truth in and of itself; "The difficulty about objective truth lies 
not in observing the fact, but in devising a philosophic theory of its possibility" Schiller 
argued.
888
 Again, this is still powerful and important because studying what we think the truth is 
and why we think that will still reveal quite a lot; this will still tell us a lot about humanity, and it 
must be added, about that time period in which it was formulated (i.e., the truth is also 
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historical). The "Principle of Peirce" is cited as the key definition of the truth by all of the 
pragmatists explored here, as in this instance from Schiller,  
 Pragmatism, on the other hand, essays to trace out the actual making of truth, the actual 
 ways in which discriminations between the true and the false are effected, and derives 
 from these its generalisations about the method of determining the nature of truth. It is 
 from such empirical observations that it derives its doctrine that when an assertion claims 
 truth, its consequences are always used to test its claim. In other words, what follows 
 from its truth for any human interest, and more particularly and in the first place, for the 
 interest with which it is directly concerned, is what established its real truth and 
 validity.
889
 
 Here we can revisit two basic pragmatist concepts about the truth. First is the idea that 
what can be explored is a method for understanding how it develops (but not the truth in and of 
itself). Second is that key in directing this method is human interest, as we saw was especially 
true for James's thought. Studying the "truth" is empirical for the pragmatist, and therefore 
dependent on consequences. And those consequences are searched for, emphasized, and selected, 
mainly as a result of human interest, and what purpose and value they serve; "Human interest, 
then, is vital to the existence of truth [...] its consequences must be consequences to some one for 
some purpose."
890
 And this reliance on human interest in the formulation of truth makes it again 
logically a very "human" concept (and hence again Schiller's use of the term "Humanism" for his 
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philosophy rather than "Pragmatism"); "truth has to be felt before it is understood."
891
 Schiller 
therefore relies a bit more than the other pragmatists on the specific individual human interest in 
formulating our beliefs on the truth; meaning, while they all reference the role of human interest 
in influencing our beliefs on the truth, Schiller simply gives even more weight to this (given that 
as he declares his philosophy is "humanism"), which we can also extend to envision as a type of 
perspectivism that would resultantly dialogue with Ortega even more smoothly here. In the 
following discussion on the truth that Ortega elaborates on in Unas lecciones de metafísica, he 
develops the idea that truth arises out of need, and specifically he also emphasizes, as does 
Schiller, a human need; "Decimos que hemos encontrado una verdad cuando hemos hallado un 
cierto pensamiento que satisface una necesidad intelectual previamente sentida por 
nosotros."
892
While "interest" and "need" are of course different, the fundamental idea is that this, 
whichever it be, is directed by humans; hence again Schiller's "humanism." Moreover, while an 
interest may not always be a need, a need is always an interest, too, logically, so there is still 
overlap in imagining a dialogue between Ortega and Schiller here since in this specific quote 
Ortega references an 'intellectual need.' 
 So again, given this emphasis on human interest arguably we can also bring in the 
concept of "perspectivism" to further envision a dialogue between Ortega and Schiller, which has 
been discussed at length throughout this dissertation as a key concept of Ortega's that can 
dialogue in numerous ways with various pragmatists. To reiterate: in one sense, everything we 
see, focus on, and interpret, is funneled through an individual lens that we either actively or 
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sometimes subconsciously channel specific, selective information. And this is because we have 
specific, sometimes differing, interests and place diverse degrees of value on different objects, 
events, behaviors, etcetera. In this dialogue, therefore, we can envisage the commonality that 
truth is at least in part individual because it can be influenced and shaped from and within 
perspective. Additionally, perspective is unique and it can be funneled through individual 
interest.  
 Schiller raises a key point as to why the individuality in all this is so important; because 
"individuals are infinitely different," so our perspectives, interests, and considerations of values 
can also be infinitely combined, as must be revisited here.
893
 So again in extending this to our 
possible dialogue with Ortega, our individuality is part of what leads to differing truths. This is 
what Ortega implies as well directly in the following declaration: "Cada vida es un punto de vista 
sobre el universo. En rigor, lo que ella ve no lo puede ver otra. Cada individuo —persona, 
pueblo, época— es un órgano insustituible para la conquista de la verdad."894 
 A key claim in pragmatism that was explored at the start is that we must emphasize 
consequences and practical study, because it is arguably one of the more "rational" methods of 
verification, as it is specific, and it is empirical. Pragmatism is an "epistemological" method. 
Schiller argues with this need for the empirical and concrete defining features of pragmatism as 
he in fact considers the philosophy teleological.
895
 In other words, specific tests are carried out, 
making this mode of thought something more tangible, cogent, perhaps more "scientific" and not 
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just only or always "pondered"  in a more loose, abstract, and ungrounded philosophical way. 
Pragmatism, therefore, lays its claims to being a more "practical" and "rational" philosophy by 
establishing some specific criteria and methods, but it does not cease to be a philosophy, 
nonetheless, left with many open ends and unanswered quandaries. In other words, it remains a 
philosophy and not a science. And one of the "practical" aspects that Schiller is referring to here 
is specifically as follows: "[...] truth is 'proved' by its practical working, by the way in which it 
stands the test of experience [...] the question of the 'practical working of a truth will always 
ultimately be found to resolve itself into the question whether we can live by it."
896
 Here also is a 
bit more of Schiller's social element in defining the truth, as living is a social experience as well 
of course, and as is arguably true for all the philosophers examined here. It must be noted as well 
that for both thinkers, especially Ortega, there is also a social element, such as tradition, and 
specifically historical tradition, in any conceptions of the truth. This point will be revisited 
ahead. 
 So  the truth is "tested," as Schiller explains it, "All testing of truth, therefore, is 
fundamentally alike. It is always an appeal to something beyond the original claim. It always 
implies an experiment. It always involves a risk of failure as well as a prospect of success. And it 
always ends in a valuation.
897
  
 In fact, this is so important because a "truth," being such a grandiose concept, must be 
verified, logically, per pragmatist (and logical, rational) claims. 
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 [...] all truths must be verified to be properly true. A truth which will not (or cannot) 
 submit to verification is not yet a truth at all. Its truth is at best potential, its meaning is 
 null or unintelligible, or at most conjectural and dependent on an unfulfilled condition. 
 To become really true it has to be tested, and it is tested by being applied. Only when this 
 is done, only that is when it is used, can it be determined what it really means, and what  
 conditions it must fulfill to be really true. Hence all real truths must have shown 
 themselves to be useful; they must have been applied to some problem of actual knowing, 
 by usefulness in which they were tested and verified.
898
 
 So we may not be able to verify truths as absolutely true, but we can nonetheless 
categorize them as being useful after testing and verification, thereby funneling out here what we 
could call 'more real' truths (as opposed to "more true" because the logic in that is essentially 
faulty since something ideally is simply true, and that's that, but for our purposes here; for how 
truths can be historically confirmed and continue corroborated as such into the future, we can 
sometimes insinuate, therefore, "more true" or "truer"). Perhaps Schiller calls this here "real 
truths," or "really true" truths as another means to demonstrate how it depends on human interest 
and value, which reveals itself to us from "application to experience" —as experience, we have 
seen at length, is key in pragmatism. A "truth" that is not tested, applied, and verified as 'useful' 
is not as "real." For us to at least think that it is really a truth in our lives and/or in society it 
needs to pass this pragmatist process. Meaning, per Schiller we need to differentiate from 
something that we cannot 'corroborate' practically and tangibly as useful versus something that 
we can, regardless of how 'true' we individually or collectively believe something to be. Even if 
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we are convinced of something being true, the less we test and verify per the pragmatist process, 
the less 'true' something really is—and vice versa, the more it is tested, the more 'true' it is (or, if 
we are speaking of reality, the more real it is, as this same idea applies to other concepts such as 
the 'real' and 'reality').   
 But this pragmatist process does not prove any absolute truths (or any one absolute 
reality), hence why what we should refer to is primarily 'more real truths' because again while 
there may be some truths that some individuals are convinced are 'very true truths' (to 
purposefully exaggerate) to be a properly pragmatist theory we must add that in order to consider 
a truth "true" it needs to go through this pragmatist process of test, application, and verification. 
But again this process will only yield more warranted truths, to use the key word from fellow 
pragmatist Dewey's philosophy, as there is no one supreme, complete process and assessment for 
determining any absolute truths (or any absolute realities). Our truth, just like our reality, is just 
that; ours. Again the anti-dualistic concept that there is what we think is the truth, and what we 
think is reality, and then there is what either really, truly is reality or a truth, but we cannot 
confirm if our perspectives ever coincide with these absolutes. And it does not matter essentially 
because it is what it is; there is just what we think it is, to phrase this colloquially. And this we 
can ponder and study what it says about us perhaps more so than the actual manifested truth or 
reality (in other words, phrased generally, what we think about something sometimes tells us 
more about ourselves and out time periods rather than that something). And also hence the 
connection to "perspectivism" lending further support to possibly imagine a dialogue here with 
Ortega given that as "ours," reality and truth exist via our perspectives. Moreover, our truth is 
part of our reality, and our reality is part of our truth, and some specific, concrete examples 
within are more "warranted," "affirmed," and perhaps we could say here "justified," when they 
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can get further through this pragmatist testing process, but it does not prove their absoluteness. 
To conclusively summarize: none of the thinkers explored in this dissertation confirm the 
possibility to prove an absolute truth or reality. Ortega also essentially considers these two terms 
of "reality" and "truth" as being simply what we think they are and that they cannot be absolutely 
proven one way or the other; "La realidad es la coexistencia mía con la cosa. [...] La verdad es la 
pura coexistencia de un yo con las cosas, de unas cosas ante el yo."
899
 Again, there are simply, 
therefore, more potentially real truths, but no absolutely real truths.   And as we shall see, within 
these notions we can substitute just the same history and the study of history, which is part of the 
main goal in this dissertation. 
 In this referenced pragmatist process "experience" is of course key. Perhaps the following 
is one of the clearest and most concise summaries of the importance of experience in Schiller's 
words, not to mention an additional very clear connection to pragmatism in general: "everything 
known to exist must be connected with our experience."
900
 The tests we conduct for determining 
what we think is a truth are carried out via experience. And as shall be continued to be explored 
throughout, key in Schiller's philosophy on this is immediate experience as the most tangible and 
useful of all. Our human interest and value that we develop over the course of our experiences 
makes life purposive, which he considers the most essential feature of pragmatism.
901
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 Hence, "truth, then, being a valuation, has reference to a purpose."
902
 And this is because 
"truth depends on its consequences, that the true must be good and useful and practical."
903
 This 
ultimately, therefore, makes the "truth" something "human." This is key in Schiller's philosophy, 
as has been repeated,  since humanity is central in his humanism. "It must be frankly admitted," 
writes Schiller, "that truth is human truth, and incapable of coming into being without human 
effort and agency; that human action is psychologically conditioned."
904
 
 Truth, therefore, must always be "regarded with suspicion," similarly to how Dewey 
called it a "warranted assertion," because a truth cannot be proven entirely accurate or valid. A 
truth is ambiguous; it is simply a "claim which may or may not turn out to be valid."
905
 Even 
after it has been tested and endorsed, we shall still be obligated to continue to examine it, return 
to its testing, and remain skeptical, per Schiller, and the other pragmatists explored here. After 
all, one has only to do a quick review of history to ponder some examples of what was once 
considered "true" that over time was "tested" and proven not to be true, as in the example cited in 
the earlier section on Dewey of being certain once upon a time that the world was flat.
906
 
 And in moving toward this dissertation's main focus on historicism in all this, given the 
changing nature of truth over the course of time, or history, we can posit that truth is not just 
human, but also historical (as it is also individual and social). For example, in one instance 
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Schiller argues how 'established truths" are "made in historical times."
907
 So this is another 
dialogue link, therefore, that will be explored here; the possible connection here to historicist 
thought between Schiller and Ortega, as it was with Dewey and James as well. As examined in 
the introduction, arguments have been presented on how pragmatism has some fundamental 
historicist aspects to it (of course something again which was key in Ortega's philosophy), and 
the work of Schiller is no exception to this.  
 And as with other topics explored here, like we just saw with truth and reality, history is 
what we think it is. Since it can never be fully recorded, nor completely objectively, we can only 
find ways to get closer to what it really is, but never completely. We can study what we think 
history is, which at times reveals to us more about ourselves within that historical time period in 
which it was recorded and/or studied, rather than the actual historical details themselves. As 
there are "more real and more true truths" and "more real, more true realities" there are "more 
real and more true histories" but we can never get to any of this absolutely. These are all what we 
think they are, making this all quite "human" and therefore adding to smoothing a possible 
dialogue between the "humanist" Schiller and the "perspectivist" Ortega.  
 Here we can argue a possible association in that consequences, which we use to study the 
development of our ideas of the "truth," because they are based on human interest and value, 
they are practical. Arguing that a truth needs to be practical is quite pragmatist of course. And 
consequences can be practical, interesting, and valuable, because of the effects and repercussions 
that they produce. In other words, consequences can direct, or at least partially influence, a 
course of events; or, in a word, history. An important part of what we study in general, therefore, 
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is simply history. Schiller writes, "all consequences are practical, sooner or later, in the sense of 
affecting our action. Even where they do not immediately alter the course of events, they alter 
our own nature, and cause its actions to be different, and thus lead to different operations on the 
world.
908
"  
 This arguable link to history will be explored in great depth in the second section of this 
part on Schiller and Ortega, but suffice to say here for the moment that there is most certainly a 
historicist element to Schiller's concept of the "truth" as well. Just as with other pragmatist 
notions, there is the important feature of being continuous; truth and its changing characters, 
natures, and definitions, is on a continuum that proceeds through the past into the present and 
onwards into the future. So there is always, also, a past element that is considered, examined, and 
applied in study since this concept of a "continuum" is key here. Schiller writes, "We avowed 
that our truths were made out of previous truths, and built upon pre-existing knowledge; also that 
our procedure involved an initial recognition of fact."
909
 Logically previous truths implies 
previous time, or history. So here he essentially states that truth is, at least in part, historical. And 
this is also because truth is dependent on experience, and experiences are, logically, accumulated 
over the past, or history. This has been repeated here throughout because it is key in 
understanding how "experience" can be historical since this is not often directly declared by 
pragmatists. And this last point is one of the key objectives that this dissertation's imagined 
dialogue offers: not just a new layer of reading of Ortega, but also of pragmatism as well in 
particular in the cases of James, Dewey, and Schiller. As Schiller argues, this is why "In its 
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fullest sense our truth must harmonise, not only with its own ways of thinking but with our 
whole experience."
910
 
 A further demonstration of how truth is also historical is because it also has an important 
social element. While truth is pondered and developed often by an individual in distinct ways, 
man is also a social being, and so in order to continue to apply and exist a truth needs extensive 
social acceptance. A truth, therefore, needs to be individually as well as socially useful to be 
accepted, applied, and remain in existence (at least in a defined moment in time, or history). To 
be accepted, socially, time is required for the truth to disperse, to be tested, to become believed, 
and to be 'validated.' So again truth is also dependent in part on time, or history. Schiller writes, 
noting also the social element here, 
 For man is a social being, and truth indubitably is to a large extent a social product. For 
 even though every truth may start in a minority of one, its hold upon existence is 
 exceedingly precarious, unless it can contrive to get itself more extensively appreciated. 
 [...] Truth, then, to be really safe, has to be more than an individual valuation; it has to 
 win social recognition, to transform itself into common property.
911
 
 This excerpt succinctly demonstrates how Schiller can view the truth as something both 
individual and social. This dependence on "social usefulness" is another defining characteristic 
we can add to our list of features for Schiller's notion of the truth, as it is clearly of course not 
something that is entirely indeterminable or not understandable; "social usefulness is an ultimate 
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determinant of 'truth'" he writes.
912
 Moreover, this shows how despite Schiller being often 
presented as quite the individualist, there is clearly an important social element in his philosophy 
as well. 
 But being the pragmatist that he is, it must be noted of course that Schiller is most 
interested in the future application of all this in the following, pragmatist, instrumentalist and 
functionalist declaration that proceeds:  
 The past is dead and done with, practically speaking; its deeds have hardened into facts, 
 which are accepted, with or without enthusiasm; what it really concerns us to know is 
 how to act with a view to the future. And so like life, and as befits a theory of human life, 
 Pragmatism faces towards the future.
913
 
 While it might seem at a first glance a bit pessimistic, ambiguous, and incomplete to say 
that we can never really know with complete certainty any "truth," "reality," or "history," the 
argument throughout this dissertation is that what we can do is improve our understanding of 
them, as this is in part what happens over the course of history. Improvement is something, if not 
better than nothing. As Schiller adds on a more optimistic note, there is still value in these 
conceptions of the truth outlined here, as they can improve, and they can tell us quite a bit about 
the historical time in which they were formulated and the people of those times, as a common, 
threading conclusion weaved throughout this dissertation;  
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 [...] our errors were truths in their day. For they were the most adequate ways we then 
 had of dealing with our experience. They were not, therefore, valueless. Nor were they 
 gratuitous errors. More commonly they were natural, or even indispensable, stages in the 
 attainment of better truths.
914
 
 There is certainly a historicist element in this quote. Human interest and value is 
important here in this pragmatist understanding of the "truth" because, tersely defined, at times 
we assign value to something "good," and then claim it to be true. Schiller writes,  
 If an assertion is to be valuable, and therefore true, its consequences must be good. [...] If, 
 therefore, the consequences of an assertion turn out to be in this way good, it is valuable 
 for our purposes, and, provisionally at least, establishes itself as true; if they are bad, we 
 reject it as useless and account it false, and search for something that satisfies our 
 purpose better, or in extreme cases accept it as a provisional truth concerning a reality we 
 are determined to unmake.
915
 
 There is an important argument made here by Schiller in his use of the term "provisional 
truth" in which as such he is reminding us that there are no absolute truths, which means there 
are no absolute historical truths either. A truth or historical truth is provisional while its 
consequences remain "good" per Schiller. And until bad consequences arise, if they do (we 
cannot of course predict what will happen with all), at that point then the truth is falsified as he 
argues above. Consequently the search for new adapted truth(s) begins. 
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 Perhaps this also dialogues with Ortega's notion of ideas and beliefs that has been visited 
here in this view that the ideas which become beliefs through their usefulness are also just 
provisional because sometimes crises arise and bring their falsity to the surface, starting anew the 
process of contemplating and pondering new ideas that will  later become installed as new 
beliefs. This is part of what defines a "generation" for Ortega; a generation's set of beliefs, 
making beliefs in this sense also historical. For Ortega, because beliefs are a form of 
"truths"/'"human truths," or to use Dewey's term which applies quite appropriately here of 
"warranted assertions," they are provisional of course as they must be maintained as 
"truth"/"truthful" because the potential remains that they might be overturned in the future. And 
it is through history in which they remain as such. These warranted assertions, or beliefs, or 
provisional truths, however we call them, thus define their corresponding historical periods and 
contexts since they must be continually verified and validated along their continuum of 
existence, making them historical, and again never absolute. But as part of a continuum there is 
also an element of the present and future within. 
 Moreover, here we also have the connection in the pragmatist views that the truth and 
reality are, to a certain extent, interchangeable concepts, as we shall see in the section that 
follows on reality. "Truth and Reality," Schiller writes, "grow for us together, in a single process, 
which is never one of bringing the mind into relation with a fundamentally alien reality, but 
always one of improving and extending an already existing system which we know."
916
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VI. Reality 
 Two of the main reasons why Schiller's interpretations of "Truth" and "Reality" are 
somewhat similarly interchangeable are because first, they are analogous in that we cannot really 
know either, we can just know what we think we know they are (and, therefore, there is no such 
thing as an "absolute truth" or an "absolute reality," as they are both not just unreachable, 
essentially, but also basically ever-changing) as we have seen in the previous two parts of this 
dissertation. And second, they are both, therefore, also human-made through the same processes 
in a large part based on the accumulation of experiences (i.e., history, so as we shall see, reality 
is also historical as well, which is of course revisited here since this dissertation's general 
purpose is exploring the historicity in everything here). Hence, as Thayer supports this somewhat 
interchangeable idea as well, "Schiller is led to couple the making of truth with the making of 
reality."
917
 Schiller claims 
 That the pragmatic theory of knowledge [...] conceives reality as something which, for 
 our knowledge at least, grows up in the making of truth, and consequently recognizes  
 nothing but continuous and fluid transitions from hypothesis to fact and from truth to 
 truth [...] the making of the truth is also in a very real sense a making of reality. In 
 validating our  claims to truth we really discover realities.
918
 
 And he continues, even more succinctly, "Reality is reality for us, and known by us, just 
as truth is truth for us. [...] The making of truth was necessarily also a making of reality."
919
 Just 
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as with the truth, at the core of this is the pragmatist concept of "anti-dualism" that we have seen 
throughout this dissertation. Meaning, there is reality, and then there is what we think is reality; 
the two are connected anti-dualistically because they are separate (we cannot know for sure if 
and when they ever coincide) yet interdependent (there is something called "reality" and 
something that we think we can call "reality"). They are not just separate concepts, because what 
they are, and what we think they are, are also connected necessarily—again, pragmatist anti-
dualism.  
 As we have seen, this proposal of how truth and reality can be interchangeable terms 
might dialogue with Ortega to a certain extent, and in a specific way. As included in an 
aforementioned excerpt, Ortega defines reality and truth as somewhat interchangeable; that the 
"truth" is the pure, co-existence of "yo" with things, and things in front of "yo."
920
 We are never 
fully alone in Ortega's metaphysics on reality. We are always in existence with other things 
(places, people, things, etcetera) around us at all times, and that are also not directly part of us 
but they are necessarily still part of our realities and lives. He writes, "[...] siempre que encuentro 
mi yo le encuentro coexistiendo con algo frente, ante y contra él: el mundo o circunstancia. [...] 
mi existir es coexistir con lo que no soy yo. La realidad es, pues, esta interdependencia y 
coexistencia."
921
 Reality, therefore, is 'me and what surrounds me;' reality is yo y mi 
circunstancia. "Yo" and "circunstancia" are separate but interconnected concepts in Ortega's 
philosophy, which is again the arguably inherent anti-dualism examined throughout here as an 
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innovative way to contemplate this notion of his, and hence again evidence for the possibility to 
imagine a dialogue with pragmatism. 
 This anti-dualistic nature of reality (and the truth, as we saw) makes this, again, a very 
"human" concept based on human, and individual, experiences. And there is an important 
"individualistic" element in this because of differing "perspective"; as Ortega argues as well, we 
see reality and the world through individual eyes and lens that filter selectively, whether 
consciously or not. This is, again, Ortega's "perspectivism." As he directly declares, "La 
perspectiva es uno de los componentes de la realidad."
922
 Moreover, as reality is presented to us 
via perspective, there is no one absolute and objective reality, as has been analyzed here in 
Ortega's philosophy, rather there is a great diversity of perspectives that manifest, present, and 
give us our realities. An appropriate metaphor here is imaging looking through a kaleidoscope; 
there is a multiplicity of perspectives through which we see and experience our reality, and 
through which our realities come to us. As Professor Seoane argues to be the case for Schiller, 
there are going to be different "truths" because it can depend on what we each value as 
important, and what we each think is important can vary of course. "la realidad es aquello que 
evaluamos como importante."
923
  
 Thus, given the multiplicity of perspectives, we cannot say, most certainly not with any 
conviction, that there is any "absolute reality," just as we saw we could not say there were any 
"absolute truths," for not only Ortega, Dewey, and James, but Schiller as well would agree with 
this. And as Schiller argues, "the conception of Absolute Reality will naturally run parallel to 
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that of Absolute Truth."
924
 The same applies to historicism and historical "truths," as we shall see 
in the case of Schiller and that we saw applied to Dewey and James.
925
 Therefore, what we have 
is potential reality (or truths), and this is quite the pragmatist concept in that it is future-oriented 
as something quite instrumentalist and functionalist. What we have are truths and realities via 
perspectives filtered by individuals within a social milieu, as one way to summarize this. And per 
Schiller, because what we have is the potential, what we have is thus something plastic, 
constantly in the making, and never ending;  
 [...] there may be as many more potential realities, unreal at present, but capable of being 
 brought into existence by our efforts. [...] reality is still in the making. Nothing is 
 absolutely settled. Human operations are real experiments with a reality that really 
 responds, and may respond differently to different manipulations. [...] Thus our actual 
 experience contains literally infinite possibilities of alternate universes, which struggle 
 for existence in the minds of every agent who is capable, in however limited a degree, of 
 choosing between alternatives.
926
 
 Here Schiller makes the same claim as Ortega that there is no one absolute perspective or 
reality because there are "more potential realities," "infinite possibilities of alternate universes," 
and 'agents can choose between alternatives'. For Ortega as we know, perspective is indeed also 
part of the defining features of what reality is. But for him the perspective in the first part is to a 
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great extent shaped by its background history; perspective, like so much else is, again, historical 
for Ortega.
927
 
 This always incomplete reality, in fact, is a basic principle of Schiller's "Humanism," as 
he declares that Humanism involves "the assertion of a really evolving, and therefore as yet 
incomplete, reality."
928
 The following quote from Ortega perhaps dialogues quite well with this 
previous one just cited from Schiller: "Progresar es acumular ser, tesaurizar realidad."
929
 Hence 
the potential for a dialogue in this idea again of a "continuum" weaving as a common thread 
throughout this thesis. The world is plastic because reality is always a becoming, also because it 
is always dependent, in part, on the future. Our reality, our selves, therefore, in part live for the 
future—something undeniably quite pragmatist. Ortega writes, "Por tanto, el yo posee la extraña 
consistencia de ser futurición. Yo soy el que tiene que ser y ser de un cierto modo determinado, 
del mío en el porvenir, inmediato y remoto."
930
 So in this specific concept of us being also our 
futures we also find a possible dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. Even though Ortega most 
strongly emphasizes that what man has is history, here he clearly also recognizes that what man 
also has is his future (again because his future is part of every "present" and therefore also every 
past because at some point the future will become the past, and since we are at times forward 
thinking and focused—not to mention that a main objective in historical study is to learn from 
the past how to be create better futures). Thus being history is not just being the past, it is also 
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'being the past seen from the present while oriented toward the future'—this is a point of 
dialogue woven throughout this dissertation between Ortega and all three pragmatists. Again, in 
this way of seeing our existence as a continuum we can smooth this imaginary conversation by 
bringing in a historical element to pragmatism, and a pragmatist commentary to Ortega, which 
are two of the principal innovations argued for here. 
 Here we can also further continue a dialogue between Schiller with Ortega's idea of 'man 
adrift, shipwrecked and in search of his need and obligation to find his true self and true 
vocation' in our 'limited freedom' to choose among the different possibilities or circumstances 
that we find ourselves among and within. Schiller writes, "Thus it is our duty and our privilege to 
co-operate in the shaping of the world; among infinite possibilities to select and realize the 
best."
931
 Again reality here is arguably "perspective," essentially (because we "select and 
realize"), which is another area we can certainly create a dialogue with Ortega. This is why there 
are 'as many different circumstances as there are individuals"; "[...] tantas circunstancias 
diferentes cuantos son ustedes."
932
 Schiller posits that it needs to be modified that  
 [...] individuality is an ultimate and definitely determined characteristic of reality,  but the 
 general flux of reality itself. The individual also is in process, and so individuality 
 becomes a characteristic of which reality may be seen to have less or more. [...] 
 Individuality thereby becomes a hypothesis and an ideal, as well as a characteristic of 
 reality. [...] we must learn to think of the individuality of the real as we have learned to 
 think of its reality, not as a completed being, but as a becoming, i.e., as being in process. 
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 That which we designate by the term individuality is a varying and growing quantity, 
 never wholly absent, but not always fully developed.
933
 
 This notion of our really always existing in a state of "becoming" has been discussed at 
length here and clearly applies in this third section as well, as this Schiller has stated exactly in 
the excerpt above.
934
 Again it must be reiterated: history is man's story of his ‘becoming’ 
because history is really a continuum; in the present we are our history, and the future will also 
be incorporated later as our history. This, as we saw, Graham argued for precisely to be the case 
with Ortega;  
 [...] we know that 'man has no nature,' but a history of 'variations' instead, for his 'being' 
 is becoming. 'Man who is not, goes on making himself in the dialectical series of his 
 experiences.' Therefore, because of his historicity, 'the only thing we can know of man is 
 what he has been.' 'The past constrains the future.
935
  
 This is perhaps deduced in part from Ortega's claims that man is plastic, as in this excerpt 
we have see; "El hombre es una entidad infinitamente plástica de la que se puede hacer lo que se 
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quiera. [...] En cada instante se abren ante él posibilidades limitadas."
936
 Being 'plastic' and living 
'plastically' means, at the very least, that we are not only static, fixed beings with invariable, set 
characteristics, or circumstances, which leads to and supports the argument that we are not only 
"being" we are more so "becoming." 
 We can only "grow" over "time," hence again a historicist element here. And as with the 
truth, Schiller notes two key factors in what we can establish as part of a "method" of sorts. He 
posits, "It is fallacious, therefore, to claim ultimate reality for anything that is not (i) known or 
know-able, and (2) useful in operating on apparent realities."
937
 This is clearly quite pragmatist 
in how reality needs to be something more tangible; that can be experimented with and on, and 
that is empirical. 
 In returning to the connection for Schiller between truth and reality, he explains his 
position further that in our study toward truth, we can only do this and conduct ourselves as such 
via the ever-changing reality; "In the ascent to Truth we can never lose touch with a continuous 
reality."
938
 And the way in which we are specifically in touch with our reality is through most 
specifically and poignantly our immediate experiences. Immediate experience is, therefore, our 
general starting and ending point for Schiller; "We must begin therefore with reality as well as 
end with it, and cling to it all the way as closely as we can."
939
 The following excerpt 
summarizes quite clearly Schiller's connection here between immediate experience and reality;  
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 Now the only reality we can start with is our own personal, immediate experience. We 
 may lay it down therefore that all immediate experience is as such real, and that no 
 ultimate reality can be reached except from this basis and upon the stimulation of such 
 immediate experience. [...] In other words, the distinction of 'appearance and reality' is 
 not one which transcends our experience, but one which arises in it.
940
 
 In other words, most simplistically and tersely stated, what is more real is what we 
immediately experience is real—this is not to say that we can say for certain it truly and 
absolutely is real, but at least it is what we think is real. Schiller's emphasis on "immediate" 
experience is key because this is what is most tangible, essentially, as he explains, "it must never 
be forgotten that the immediate experience is after all in a way more real; i.e., more directly real, 
than the 'higher realities' which are said to 'explain' it."
941
 While at first glance it seems a bit 
illogical to say "more real" (because a common first thought is that something is simply real, 
period), here we just find again the need to exaggerate this notion to make a point. It is through 
immediate experience that we can test, value, and influence (in a limited freedom) our realities. 
"Immediate experience forms the touchstone whereby we can test the value of our inferred 
realities."
942
 This division of a 'more recent' type of experience we saw was also emphasized in 
Dewey and James, albeit somewhat differently.  
 To a certain extent we can imagine a dialogue here in how these immediate experiences, 
as they are labeled by Schiller, can be of the circumstances that surround us in Ortega's 
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philosophy. And going further with this, the experience of our circumstances together add to 
helping shape our 'perspectival' interpretations of reality (and the truth, etc.); this adds to moving 
our lives along the directions it proceeds (or from the past, of history in general). Hence to tie 
this to the thesis's main objectives to better understand the historicism in all this, contemplating 
how our realities or truths are formed help us improve our comprehension of what influences 
how history is seen, recorded, and interpreted. This is because history is in part these kinds of 
differing, 'perspectival' interpretations of realities or believed truths of the past set of 
circumstances and our immediate experiences (then) of them, to connect this all in a possible 
dialogue. Hence all the same limitations to not being able to get to any absolutes, this all being 
what we think it is (the truth, reality, etcetera) as we have seen, apply to the study and discipline 
of history as well. But here, as history is in part our perspectival interpretations of the immediate 
experiences of our circumstances from the past (from whichever time period we are referring to 
the history of), the more of all this that we gather, the closer we get to more accuracy on that 
history (but without being able to ever record it all, or fully accurately, or entirely objectively of 
course). So in this again we have this criteria to add to improving the study and discipline of 
history, as again improvement is of course something needed. 
 Experience, albeit fundamental to life, is not the only factor defining and shaping our 
realities for Schiller. Experience is unique and fundamental, as Porrovecchio explains, in 
Schiller's philosophy, "each person's experience of the world is personalized by his or her 
experience of it."
943
 But we also need to contemplate, consider, ponder, and form conclusions, on 
those experiences. And he continues, quoting Schiller,  
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 [...] the whole world in which we live is experience and built up out of nothing else than 
 experience.[...] experience, nevertheless, does not, alone and by itself, constitute reality, 
 but, to construct a world, needs certain assumptions, connecting principles, or 
 fundamental truths, in order that it may organize its crude materials and transmute itself 
 into palatable, manageable, and liveable forms.
944
 
 And as shall be elaborated in great detail further ahead in the second section, this is 
connected with historicist thought in that, suffice to say for the moment, these processes of 
interpretations and inferences form a continuous, never-ending chain in which the past impacts 
the present and future, ceaselessly; "The results of our past thought enter into and transform our 
immediate perceptions and render them more adequate as guides to action."
945
 Again we have 
this important thread weaved throughout here of the notion of continuum. And to bring this all 
full circle to this dissertation's objectives, this certainly can dialogue with the following 
declaration from Ortega on his definition of history that "[...] por historia entiendo el estudio de 
la realidad humana desde el más remoto pasado hasta los hombres presentes inclusive [...] 
porque historia es entender bien las realidades humanas [...]."
946
 For Ortega, therefore, really 
what we should call reality is 'historical reality' with man at its center—this latter idea being 
another that can potentially dialogue with Schiller and his humanism; "Por eso el hombre y todo 
lo humano en él es realidad histórica [...]."
947
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 So "reality is made by the shaping of our experiences," proposes Porrovecchio, because 
for Schiller "what I experience is what I experience."
948
 Thayer supports this as well, also 
quoting in his book on pragmatism how Schiller, to paraphrase, said the world was not 'ready-
made and that the 'world is a construction.'
949
 And in this we can find further possible dialogue 
with Ortega on the notion of how nothing is "ready-made," which is something Ortega repeats on 
numerous occasions as we have seen (also in the dialogue with James), as in the following 
example:  
 De ahí mi fórmula conocida: la vida no es dada, puesto que nos encontramos en ella, sin 
 saber cómo ni por qué; pero eso que nos es dado, la vida, no nos es dado hecho, sino que 
 tenemos que hacérnosla nosotros, cada cual la suya. La vida es qué hacer y da mucho 
 quehacer.
950
  
 As Porrovecchio suggests in reference to Schiller, "For in science, as in history, what is 
of consequence is not some ready-made, pre-existing form that we yearn to discover. What is 
crucial is the extent to which one or another experience succeeds in moving forward our 
understanding of reality."
951
 Again, a key pragmatist element here is how this understanding is 
based in part on the experiences we have, and they allow us to progress and move forward 
because their consequences (now and in the future) are (and persist to be) beneficial, useful, and 
they continue adding to the continuum of our experiences. In other words, again to reiterate: 
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understanding comes not from an exact correspondence between an interpretation of some thing 
and that thing, but rather "understanding" is just our experience of that some thing. This concept 
of a not ready-made world referenced above, which dialogues arguably quite smoothly with 
Ortega, is key in Schiller's philosophy, as it also is in understanding his humanism and his 
'personalism'—as Thayer posits, Schiller's "[...] purely plastic world shaped and constructed by 
our trying, that is, our "experiments" in a quest of harmoninzing and satisfying experience."
952
 
Being quite the pragmatist of course, experiment, as Thayer continues to explain, is central to 
Schiller's philosophy;  
 [...] experiment is any trial or attempt to affect the materials of experience [...] all
 conscious human action is experimental, and it follows that for Schiller, a theory of 
 experiment or analysis of experimentation constitutes the fundamental philosophic 
 conceptual scheme for discussing and understanding human nature and conduct.
953
 
 As with the truth, and loyal to pragmatism, part of what we consider "real" and "reality" 
is that which is useful to us, argues Schiller; "[...] we experiment with notions which are 
suggested to our intelligence by our immediate experience, until we hit upon one which 
engrosses us. And then we declare real the conception which serves our purpose."
954
 In other 
words, reality converts into the truth when it becomes valuable, useful, tested, and therefore 
when it brings "harmony" to our life; "An assumed reality, then, approves itself to be true in 
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proportion as it shows itself capable of rendering our life more harmonious."
955
 Again this 
involves time, being a "continuum," and therefore they are 'historical' concepts, at least in part. 
This is a common fiber strung throughout this dissertation, as we have seen. 
 But of course there is nothing "absolute" in any of this for Schiller, as it is anti-dualistic; 
there is just what we think is 'satisfactory or harmonious,' but there is nothing absolutely and 
completely so, or at least we cannot confirm this with complete certainty. Moreover, there is no 
threshold explored of what becomes "satisfactory" or "harmonious," nor when. There is no 
'Absolute Truth' or 'Absolute Reality,' or at least we cannot know for sure if we have discovered 
them—a key concept threaded throughout this dissertation again.956 Truth, reality, "nothing is 
ever quite all that it is capable of being; nothing can ever wholly realise itself in any single 
moment. [...] nothing is ever all it might be."
957
 Hence here we find again the emphasis on 
"potentiality," and the lack of at least knowing anything absolute, and therefore our nature as 
living within limited freedom. This future orientation is very pragmatist of course. So this is 
about "becoming," not "being," as we have been reviewing throughout all three sections of this 
dissertation. Man/woman is plastic—this is something that all four thinkers discussed in this 
paper would dialogue on. But since the future is intangible, since it has of course logically not 
arrived yet, instead the past, specifically our histories, is what is tangible; again, this is what we 
can indeed ponder and study.
958
 And everything along that continuum in our processes of 
                                                          
955
 Ibid., p. 200. 
 
956
 See conclusions: Ibid., pp. 202-203 . 
 
957
 Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
 
958
 For reference here, as quoted already: "el hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, se 
encuentra con lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado”  ( Ortega, Galileo, p. 143). 
 517 
 
becoming later becomes, at some point, part of our history as we progress forward, and it thus 
becomes past, so the changes and transitions in between become historical as well. 
 We could certainly envision a dialogue with Ortega here, not only in the historical 
element of all this of course, but also because he would not deny that we live within a limited 
freedom, as clearly evident in the following excerpt as one of many examples that has been cited 
here: "Dentro de la enorme circunstancia que es el mundo, podemos movernos con cierta libertad 
[...] pero no podemos escapar a su círculo total inexorable."
959
 We live among a "margin of 
possibilities" as he continues, within the world, and among which we can choose from in regards 
to how we react, behave, act, and move in the world. This makes for a somewhat tragic existence 
per Ortega in that we are to a certain extent lost among these circumstances, often applying the 
metaphor of being a person shipwrecked at sea, as we have seen. In fact, to show clearly that 
essentially Ortega is referring to a limited freedom, he also employs the metaphor of being a 
"prisoner within a prison," as we are "confined to our world."
960
 
  Schiller's concept of reality debatably dialogues with this idea, as it specifically ties into 
his notion of limited freedom because again these ideas are somewhat interchangeable. Though 
this notion of "limited freedom" will be dealt with in great detail in the sub-section that follows, 
it must be visited briefly here to tie into how reality is plastic and ever-changing, and this thus 
provides us with a certain degree of freedom to choose among that plasticity—but we do not 
have complete control over reality itself, therefore we do not have complete freedom. "To sum 
up," theorizes Schiller, "our Freedom is really such as it appears; it consists in the determinable 
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indetermination of a nature which is plastic, incomplete, and still evolving."
961
 This dialogues 
with Ortega's argument yo soy yo y mi circunstancia in which we are free to move among our 
circumstances, but we do not have complete control over which circumstances those are. As 
Ortega declares, "La realidad es, pues, esta interdependencia y coexistencia."
962
 So while Schiller 
indeed emphasizes the "individual," and that reality is essentially reducible to the "self," there is 
still also an important social element for Schiller as well because he recognizes, as does Ortega 
clearly (there is the self and there are the circumstances), that the self is not isolated. As 
Porrovecchio proposes as an explanation on this, "Even if the "individual" is not always the 
isolated self, it is a 'hypothesis and an ideal, as well as a characteristic of reality.'"
963
 
 And as we shall see further ahead in the second section, this is one 'trend of trends' that 
has been elaborated in the previous two parts and that we can find in Schiller's philosophy as 
well on what moves history (and thereby adding philosophy to consider to history as a discipline 
and methodology). Meaning, reality, the world, is indeterminate because we have a limited 
freedom to see, interpret, conceptualize and believe we understand that reality and world. We 
each have the power to choose between an, albeit limited, set of alternatives at any given time. 
And this power we have can change a course of events; it can change and therefore shape 
history, while being within history at the same time. In other words, we do not have complete 
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control of course over the shape and form of history, but we have the power to influence it to a 
certain degree, and at certain times.
964
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VII. The Limited Freedom of Life  
 As we just saw, life, per Schiller, is succinctly defined as being one of "limited freedom." 
Tersely stated, what makes us "free" is our option to choose, but what is limited are the options 
to choose from. Nonetheless, there are so many combinations that we can create among those 
choices that they seem almost limitless, and hence why we can still use the term "freedom" to a 
certain, of course limited, extent. This means that for Schiller, our life, or our realities, are 
plastic. As explained in this extension of an aforementioned quoted, 
 [...] reality is still in the making. Nothing is absolutely settled. Human operations are real 
 experiments with a reality that really responds, and may respond differently to different 
 manipulations. [...] Thus our actual experience contains literally infinite possibilities of 
 alternative universes, which struggle for existing in the minds of every agent who is 
 capable, in however limited a degree, of choosing between alternatives. [...] Thus it is our 
 duty and our privilege to co-operate in the shaping of the world; among infinite 
 possibilities to select and realise the best.
965
 
 As we have seen for Ortega, the world is not brought to us 'ready made;' it is not 
deterministic, and so neither are our lives. Clearly Schiller would converse with him on this as 
noted he proposes above, "reality is still in the making" (i.e., it is not deterministic). We have the 
power to navigate through the potentials that lie in the future, as well as the current 
circumstances that surround us. Hence we have the power to influence and mold at least to a 
certain degree our realities and therefore our lives. But we do not have complete control, nor can 
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we choose which are all of those future potentials or current circumstances to steer through. Here 
thus is further conversation we can imagine between Ortega and Schiller. 
 It is important to emphasize freedom in Schiller's philosophy, because not only does he 
accentuate the great individuality among each one of us (therefore making us "free" in our ability 
to be "individual" and unique, but without denying of course that we live among others still as 
'social beings'), but as he describes it here, we directly take part in shaping our realities, the 
realities, the world.  
 The last sentence of the aforementioned quote certainly resonates with Ortega's emphasis 
on our individual duties to find our calling(s), our vocation(s), in life; "La vida da mucho 
quehacer. [...] antes de hacer algo tengo que decidir yo mismo lo que voy a hacer; por tanto, lo 
que voy a ser."
966
 This is similar, albeit more specific, to what Schiller says here about our duty 
to 'co-operate in the shaping of the world.' We each share duties in shaping the world, as he says 
we "co-operate," or "we operate separately but together" (as opposed to "cooperate," as in 
specifically "work together"). In other words, one possible interpretation here is that Schiller is 
again still, nonetheless, emphasizing the important individuality within and among each one of 
us, but without denying of course that we still exist and live among others as social beings since 
we co-operate (because the "co" represents there being more than one individual, element, 
reality, etcetera—whatever we are referencing, the key points is that there is more than one—and 
regardless of it being as 'co-operate' or 'cooperate'). In Schiller's aforementioned quote he seems 
to reference more specifically that we co-operate with the circumstances that surround us ("co-
operate in the shaping of the world; among infinite possibilities to select and realise the best"), so 
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this arguably dialogues smoothly with the same concept behind Ortega's yo soy yo y mi 
circunstancia, which also recognizes individuality and sociality.  
 "Individuality," per Schiller, as we saw, is  
 the general flux of reality [...] individuality thereby becomes a hypothesis and an ideal, as 
 well as a characteristic of reality. [...] as a becoming, i.e. as being in process. That 
 which we designate by the term individuality is a varying and growing quantity, never 
 wholly absent, but not always fully developed.
967
 
 Hence it is not just about individuality, since this is always in a state of becoming.  
 In an effort to return consistently to this dissertation's main purpose, the historical nature 
of this must be noted; a becoming, growing, or being in process all suggest a temporal, therefore, 
historical element. Further, as noted, we can certainly envision a dialogue with Ortega on 
Schiller's concept of life being one of a "limited freedom" in the added sense that even though 
some lives may seem similar at times, or overlap, and even though we are social beings, we are 
still unique within our limited freedoms, for instance in the combinations we at least mostly 
individually choose to make in our reactions and movements. This again is the concept of a rock 
(el "yo") thrown into a pond that creates ripples (the "circunstancia") that was explored and 
applied in the previous two parts as well (more than one rock will create more than one ripple, 
some of which will overlap, and others which will not, just like individual lives and their 
circumstances). The following aforementioned but extended excerpt exhibits this concept clearly 
(which is why it is reinserted here):  
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 Dentro de la fatalidad de vuestra circunstancia sois libres; más aún, sois fatalmente libres 
 porque no tenéis más remedio, queráis o no, que escoger vuestro destino en la holgura y 
 el margen que os ofrece vuestra fatal circunstancia. Cada hombre—y claro está, cada 
 mujer— tiene su mundo o circunstancia que se parece más o menos a la del prójimo, pero 
 que siempre tiene algunos elementos distintos.
968
 
 Again, some circumstances overlap, but no two sets of circumstances are necessarily 
exactly the same (as no two human lives are exactly the same). Ortega's key dictum that 'we are 
ourselves and our circumstances,' as we have seen, implies we live and operate among a specific, 
and limited, set of circumstances. We can choose freely which circumstances to react to, address, 
etcetera, but again those circumstances are limited. Hence, for Ortega we can also argue that we 
live in a "limited freedom." Within life "yo puedo hacer muchas cosas diversas, por lo menos 
varias."
969
 Here "margin" can arguably imply "limited."
970
 
 True to pragmatist fashion, in the case of Schiller life (and as we shall see further ahead, 
history), is experienced and understood upon a "continuum." He writes, "Man is but a transitory 
term in an infinite series of necessitated events which recedes into the past, and portends its 
extension into the future, without end; so that at no point can any independence or initiative be 
ascribed to him."
971
 Again, as central to the pragmatist interpretations throughout this paper, 
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because life is experienced and understood upon a continuum, this means that our history 
(understood as the repertoire of past events along a continuum) is not our only defining 
characteristic; it is but one element of three, as there is also the present and the future that we 
must always take into account. All three are necessary elements in our "nature," as he writes, 
"[...] the essential elements of our nature can never be composed by beings subjected to the 
material world of Time and Space. It is impossible to compromise the claims of the future with 
the desires of the present, impossible also to cast off the fetters of the past."
972
 
 Being a pragmatist, Schiller is quite "forward-looking" in his emphasis on what life is all 
about. And while Ortega often emphasizes history most directly as being the key element in 
defining our lives and our natures, as we have seen he does also conceptualize this all as part of a 
continuum, and also specifically how man also has an important future-focused element in his 
realities. This, therefore, potentially adds to an envisioned dialogue with pragmatism in general, 
and in the specific case here in this section with Schiller. Ortega is at times quite forward-
looking, as has been discussed throughout this dissertation; for example, defining life as such; 
"La vida es una operación que se hace hacia adelante."
973
 There are many exemplifying quotes of 
this from Ortegs's works, as we have seen.
974
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 As noted, this can be confusing at first glance given his great emphasis on history, but 
this must not be confused with this being the only element, as ultimately Ortega values history as 
the element that, at least we could say we can study the most, the best, and the most fully, within 
our lives and our realities since it is more 'tangible' than the future as it has not arrived yet, and 
than the present as it is ephemeral. Moreover, even though we begin our analysis by looking 
forward, ultimately we live in our "presents" because the past and the potential future converge 
in the present. Life is the present, and in the present we have history and we look forward, 
logically. "La vida es puntual," writes Ortega, and he continues, "es un punto: el presente, que 
contiene todo nuestro pasado y todo nuestro porvenir.
975
 Further, as quoted earlier because it is 
such a clear description of this, Ortega explains that 
 Pero la vida es siempre un <<ahora>> y consiste en lo que ahora se es. El pasado de su 
 vida y el futuro de la misma sólo tiene realidad en el ahora, merced a que ustedes 
 recuerden ahora su pasado o anticipen ahora su porvenir. En este sentido la vida es pura 
 actualidad, es puntual, es un punto —el presente—, que contiene todo nuestro pasado y 
 todo nuestro porvenir. Por eso he podido afirmar que nuestra vida es lo que estamos 
 haciendo ahora.
976
 
 In other words, the distinctions are as follows. What we have and are, in regards to what 
is most tangible, or what we are most able to study, is the past; our history. We live our lives, 
however, at times looking forward to the future, during the present. The two; past and future, 
therefore, converge in the present. Again what we have and are, however, at any given time is 
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(at least) mostly our past; our history, since the present is fleeting, and the future has not arrived 
yet and exists in us as a potential, as we continue living on our continuums. Logically we can 
assume that since history is the one of the three elements that we can most directly study and 
know, it is one of the more influential and important, therefore, for Ortega clearly, and perhaps 
arguably for Schiller as well when we look at it this way as being a big part of a continuum, and 
the part which is most tangible.  
 Schiller emphasizes the importance of the past, or our histories, in the following excerpt: 
"[...] his (man's) nature is a disordered jumble of misinherited tendencies. [...] for each man's soul 
contains the representatives of ancestral savages and beasts, and has out of such discordant 
elements to form a government to guide his course."
977
 And of course this most certainly 
resonates with Ortega's notion that "man is his history." As he writes, and part of which we saw 
but is again important to re-cite here, 
 La vida, decía yo, es una operación que se hace hacia adelante. Vivimos originariamente 
 hacia el futuro, disparados hacia él. Pero el futuro es lo esencialmente problemático: no 
 podemos hacer en él pie, no tiene figura fija, perfil decidido. [...] El futuro es siempre 
 plural: consiste en lo que puede acaecer. Y pueden acaecer muchas cosas diversas, 
 incluso contradictorias. De aquí la condición paradójica, esencial a nuestra vida, de que el 
 hombre no tenga otro medio de orientarse en el futuro que hacerse cargo de lo que ha 
 sido el pasado, cuya figura es inquívoca, fija e inmutable. [...] Recordamos el pasado 
 porque esperamos el futuro en vista de el. [...] Aquí tienen ustedes el origen de la historia. 
 El hombre hace historia porque ante el futuro, que no está en su mano, se encuentra con 
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 lo único que tiene, que posee, es su pasado. Sólo de él puede echar mano: es la navecilla 
 en que se embaraca hacia el inquieto porvenir.
978
 
 And so, of course as has been discussed throughout this dissertation, man has and is 
history for Ortega, as life is historical, because 'the only thing we really possess at any given time 
is our past' as he said above. Moreover, he avers, "La vida es siempre un lugar y una fecha [...] o 
lo que es igual, la vida es, por sí misma, histórica."
979
 But as has been discussed, this is not to 
negate that there is also present an important forward-looking orientation in man in Ortega's 
thought. What we have and are, again, is our history because what we are, in whatever is the 
'current present', is our history of forward-looking orientations, as one way to phrase it. And this 
is because what we have, and therefore (at least mostly, to argue this more safely) are, at any 
given time are our histories. 
 We can safely posit that here, too, within Schiller's philosophy, "man is history" (at least 
for a significant part), which he clearly declared in the aforementioned quote that "his nature is a 
disordered jumble of misinherited tendencies."
980
 Moreover, just as each human is uniquely 
individual, so are the events in history. Hence he is subscribing here as well to this idea of there 
being individuality in history as well as in human life, which is important as we shall see in 
greater depth ahead because it elucidates an important piece of historicist methodology to declare 
false the banal colloquialism that "history repeats itself," as another key strand interwoven 
throughout this paper. Briefly, however, as evidence of this, Schiller argues, "[...] the great 
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events in history are utterly unique, and turn the course of things so thoroughly that they need 
never be repeated."
981
 As we saw, Ortega expressly declared that history does not repeat itself; 
"Señores, ninguna situación real, y esto quiere decir concreta, se repite en la historia."
982
 
 And as we shall see further in the section that follows, this idea of the "limited freedom" 
of life connects with history in many additional ways, one of which is the idea that since, as we 
saw, for Schiller we choose among alternatives in life, and thereby shape realities, the world, 
then we have the power to have an influence in developing and shaping history as well (history 
encompassing realities or worlds of the past). As he clearly explains it; "If human freedom is 
real, the world is really indeterminate. [...] For if we really have the power to choose between 
alternatives, the course of things will necessarily differ according as we do one thing or an other. 
[...] therefore, there will be alternative courses of history."
983
 In other words, the history part of 
the continuum (the points and what they represent on that continuum) can be defined differently 
depending on the choices we make, giving us some freedom to shape what will become our 
histories, and therefore our lives, our selves—but again, what we can choose among is limited, 
so that freedom in general is a limited one. This is a key quote because it is one of the few where 
Schiller talks directly about history. Thus, we can deduce again that we are most certainly our 
histories, and we will most certainly be and continue to be our histories. But again, by "free" 
Schiller means in a limited sense because we are free in our ability to choose, but what we can 
choose among is limited. 
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 Ortega, as we know, of course clearly declared that "man has history," because man is his 
history, but we could also envision a possible dialogue here with Schiller in a possible agreement 
with the aforementioned conclusion of Schiller's that, therefore, the world is indeterminate. 
While Ortega might not always describe the world, life, and its processes, as "indeterminate" 
specifically, he does refer to life often as a "radical disorientation;" "una radical desorientación;" 
"[...] la situación del hombre, la vida, es desorientación, es estar perdido." Being disoriented and 
lost, one key characteristic of life for Ortega, when combined with the idea that we must at all 
times decide what we are going to do, implies an indetermination in how life is going to proceed 
and progress. The future has not been written yet of course; it has not been determined, though 
the past can condition at least some of the present, and as such, the future which comes next as 
well (since the present was once the future in the past—it is all part of a continuum). And this is 
yet again the concept of "limited freedom" in how we have some (not complete) influence over 
the course of history, which then influences the present and future as well, as this is all part of a 
continuum. What follows is some evidence of Ortega's related thought process:  
 [...] nuestra existencia es en todo instante un problema, grande o pequeña, que hemos de 
 resolver [...] en todo instante nos sentimos forzados a elegir entre varias posibilidades. 
 [...] nuestra vida es nuestro ser. Somos lo que ella sea y nada mas; pero ese ser no está 
 predeterminado, resuelto de antemano sino que necesitamos decidirlo nosotros, tenemos 
 que decidir lo que vamos a ser [...].
984
 
 The world is indeterminate because the future, logically, cannot necessarily always be 
predicted. And as we live in the present, which will become our history in the future, we have a 
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limited freedom in the directions that continuum moves in and therefore some influence and 
control (but again not complete) over our historicity, and therefore the continuum to a certain 
degree at least. Again what is tangible and what we can study is history; hence further the 
importance of recognizing the historicity of life—and this will be delved into specifically in what 
follows. 
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Section II: On the Topic of the Historicity of Life 
VIII. Introduction 
 As we have begun to see, understanding Schiller's view on history and historicism is 
complicated at times because not only does he not elaborate much directly on this academic 
discipline (as neither did Dewey nor James), but it is difficult at times to understand just how 
important he deems its study and concept within his philosophy when it is discussed. He clearly 
appreciates how history can be more directly and tangibly studied, since it is something of the 
past (as opposed to the un-arrived future and fleeting present). Yet as we have seen he would 
probably not at least directly declare that we are our histories as Ortega did, though we can argue 
by deduction that perhaps at times he would dialogue with Ortega on this if it were proposed. 
 A good example of this somewhat confusing position can be found in a discussion of his 
on the classic quandary of the chicken and the egg from his book Riddles of the Sphinx. This 
helps clarify a bit just where he perhaps stands. Schiller's answer to this debate is essentially 
both. In order to understand how it can be both, we need to keep in mind pragmatism's general 
emphasis on anti-dualism. And this also helps elucidate why history must be conceptualized on a 
continuum (as always a separate element, the past, but inextricably connected to the present and 
the future, anti-dualistically in each relation). The chicken and the egg both came first because 
one simply cannot be understood without the other. He argues; 
 [...] take the old puzzle which really involves the whole question of philosophic method, 
 though historically the egg comes before the chicken, it is yet an egg only in virtue of its 
 potentiality to become a chicken; the egg exists in order to the development of the 
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 chicken out of it. Or, to put it into modern phraseology, the lower is prior to the higher 
 historically, but the higher is prior metaphysically, because the lower can be understood 
 only by reference to the higher, which gives it a meaning and of which it is the 
 potentiality.
985
 
 One cannot be understood without the other, but they are separate elements (hence anti-
dualistic). To understand any one thing, we need to analyze its causes (history), its significance 
and its purpose (present and future, respectively). As has been repeated: some thing is its history, 
present, and future (i.e., continuum). Schiller writes;  
 In ordinary life and science, where we think backwards, and are more concerned with the 
 past than with the future of things, the explanation by their causes, germs, and 
 potentialities is more in point. [...] things must be explained by their significance and 
 purpose instead of by their "causes," by their ideals instead of by their germs, by their 
 actualities instead of by their  potentialities. And these two ways of looking upon things 
 are reconciled by the fact that they regard the same connexion of things in reverse order; 
 the process is one and the same, but we find it convenient to look at it now from the one 
 end and now from the other.
986
 
 Here Schiller clearly does not consider history the only element we should study, but we 
can add in again the aforementioned argument that history is the more tangible and direct 
element that we can study as being part of the interpretation to better understand these general 
metaphysical concepts, because as he later adds, "[...] history had a meaning, and was capable of 
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rational formulation. But we may now go a step further and assert that the conception of the 
world as an evolution is the conception of the world as a process."
987
 Understanding why 
Schiller considers the term "Evolution" to be more fitting  for understanding "world" will be part 
of the key in understanding his view on the meaning, purpose, and use of the study of history. 
History does have a role in his philosophy, such as in understanding the "world" or how "things" 
are explained, but in that it falls along a continuum, as was the case with the other pragmatists, 
since it is a process with other vital factors as well.  
 Thus Schiller certainly does not place the same emphasis on history as Ortega does, 
which we saw was also the case for Dewey and James in comparison, but he still does recognize 
its great importance, nonetheless, as was additionally the case for the other two pragmatists 
explored here. There are some areas in the discussion of historiology and historicism, therefore, 
that can certainly dialogue between the two thinkers, as they relate back to the key fundamental 
and metaphysical concepts that have already been explored as being part of a possible dialogue 
between Schiller and Ortega. And there are also some key limitations on the academic discipline 
of history within this dialogue between them that will be analyzed ahead that will help us 
elaborate a more accurate (never completely accurate) methodology for its study. In other words, 
although the limitations will be part of the focus again, it must be reiterated that they are meant 
to help us contemplate and formulate a more efficient, accurate, valuable, and effective discipline 
of history. 
 While Ortega says directly that 'man has history;' or man is his history, for Schiller it is 
perhaps more accurate to say that part of the fundamental nature of man (or woman) is his (or 
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her) history; there is to a certain extent a historicity of life. Understanding the similarities and 
differences between these two ideas in envisioning a dialogue between Ortega and Schiller is 
what will be explored in the first sub-section of this second part. Then in the second sub-section 
this will all be applied to the attempt to perhaps better understand the meaning and definition of 
history, in regards to both specifically Ortega as well as in a general sense. Then this will all be 
applied to some discussion on the limitations within the academic field and therefore some ideas 
on how it can be better studied and used  in a general sense, as well as within this third part's 
possibly imagined dialogue between Schiller and Ortega. Subsequently this will then all be 
wrapped up with some general conclusions. 
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IX. Defining the Historicity of Life  
 History has a role in understanding life, reality, ourselves—this would not be denied by 
any of the thinkers in this dissertation. But since we live along a continuum of experiences, we 
are also within a process; history, the world, our lives—each is a process, per the pragmatists 
explored here, including Schiller. We, the world and our realities, are ever evolving; we are 
within a process of evolution in Schiller's philosophy. This "evolution" is his continuum 
comprised of the past, present, and future. As we saw in the section on reality, the world is 
plastic, because reality is always a becoming, also being in part dependent on the future; thus, 
each "reality," and each "present" is plastic, and so in turn we can conclude again that history; 
historical constructions and interpretations, are plastic as well, also because they are in 
themselves historical (i.e., dependent on time, circumstance, tradition, etcetera). History is 
historical, we should say here to reiterate a key strand intertwined in this paper.
988
 
 Albeit in a slightly different way, Ortega also recognizes how there is a process in the 
historicity of life, as well as how, as has been explored in depth, to use the pragmatist term, 
"experiences" accumulate to form and shape that process, or continuum. As we have seen, he 
writes, "[...] la vida es constitutivamente experiencia de la vida," and he continues that as we age, 
"[...] se ha acumulado más pasado viviente, se ha sido más cosas y se << tiene más 
experiencias>>. [...] el tiempo no vuelve porque el hombre no puede volver a ser lo que ha 
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sido."
989
 This is a great quote for this envisioned dialogue because "experience" is such a key 
term in pragmatism (and therefore which is why it has been re-quoted on several occasions), and 
as it is used here in the case of Ortega, the argument in this dissertation in general is that within 
pragmatism this term can be sometimes used somewhat interchangeably with "history" in just the 
way it is used here; experiences, or history, accumulate in the past, in our lives. 
 In Schiller's plastic "process" of "evolution" there are two summarizing characteristics of 
this that must be explored here briefly to help us better understand what he means when he uses 
terms such as "determinate" and "fixed." First, the points in the past are finite (and when the 
future ones become past, they are then finite as well). Second the continuum is teleological in 
specific future points, but not in terms of the entire future and its direction. So by finite and 
teleological, what is referred to with the former are the points in the past, and with the latter, 
parts of the ideal future that we envision. The latter is not a future pre-programmed and 
determined for us completely beyond our control by external, outside forces. Nor is it meant to 
include all of the future, again. We have some influence, as we have seen, over our continuums 
(i.e., we have limited freedom). Meaning, in order to get to any idealized fixed points in the 
future, we learn over time actions and beliefs that in the past work well toward taking us in this 
direction. So in this sense we influence at least a bit of our continuums, but they are never 
completely deterministic, neither by ourselves nor by external, outside forces.  In this second 
characteristic of we could say some teleology we find an important slight deviation from the 
other pragmatists examined here. And again in regards to the first point we must understand 
something, such as historical events, as a clear example of this; as existing within "fixed limits," 
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so in the previous example explored the egg and the chicken are also both "fixed points" within a 
process. Hence, now we can better comprehend the following position of Schiller: 
 In saying, therefore, that the world is evolving, we say that it is in process, i.e., it is 
 becoming something determinate out of something determinate. [...] Hence, if the 
 conception of a process involves two ideal fixed points, then if we assert the process to 
 be a real one, its fixed points must also be real fixed points in the history of the world. 
 [...] the world-process is a determinate Becoming, proceeding from one fixed point or 
 beginning to another fixed point or end, and that all the events which take place within it 
 are susceptible of having their places in that process assigned to them as members of a 
 series, and with reference to those fixed points. In other words, all things are susceptible 
 of explanation from the point of view of the end of that process, as tending towards, or 
 aiming at that end.
990
 
 In other words, while the direction of the process of evolution can be malleable, the 
"points" along the continuum in the past are fixed; they are past and finite in and of themselves 
(again it is the end, or future, that is plastic).  
 As noted Ortega often describes history metaphorically as a song that must be sung in its 
entirety for us to even begin to understand any events in the past, or as a novel that must be read 
to completion, thus also establishing "fixed points," along a continuum in a similar sense. For 
Ortega, the historian's task, therefore, is to compile, establish, analyze, and study those points 
and give it all some comprehensive meaning, most succinctly explained. As he argues, "El 
historiador tiene en su mano todos los datos, es decir; los detalles del proceso íntegro que va a 
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historiar, desde su principio hasta su fin. Sólo le falta descubrir el sentido orgánico de esos 
datos."
991
 He continues to explain how we cannot, of course, again completely predict the future, 
but we can be better at foreseeing some details perhaps. And specifically, as aforementioned, one 
factor that helps in this endeavor is studying 'closer epochs'; the further back the history, 
logically, the less we can be certain of and therefore study. The general conclusion here that we 
must reiterate is that history should be approached in its "entirety" ("entirety" being gathering as 
much along the continuum as possible); "la historia no se puede contar más que entera," this 
would imply fixed points, in the past of course, with also a start and an end—at least ideally, 
which is something that we can also envision here Ortega and Schiller having a dialogue 
about.
992
 But again as we have seen, pragmatists emphasize more the future end of the 
continuum, whereas Ortega stresses the past, being thus a point of deviation in accentuation. But 
again they would of course converse on the concept of this all being part of a continuum and the 
importance of conceptualizing history as such. 
 The emphasis here on teleology relates to pragmatist fashion in its functionalist and 
instrumentalist elements in there being a forward-focused orientation, but the idea of there being 
a "fixed end point and objective" is something more a part of Schiller's philosophy than any other 
philosopher surveyed here. But this is still, nonetheless, another area in which a dialogue can be 
visualized between Schiller and Ortega in some specific areas. For Ortega, as we have seen, man 
or woman accumulates the past over the course of his or her experiences, which in turn becomes 
his or her 'historical dialectic.' This then stretches into envisioning his possible future. Man, or 
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woman, therefore is unstable and in a process of continual progress, and to use Schiller's term, 
"evolution," as he or she continues accumulating "pasts." Again, man (or woman) 
 Va acumulando ser —el pasado: se va haciendo un ser en la serie dialéctica de sus 
 experiencias. Esta dialéctica no es la de razón lógica, sino precisamente de la histórica. 
 [...] El hombre es lo que le ha pasado, lo que ha hecho. [...] no tiene una naturaleza, sólo 
 hay una línea fija preestablecida y dada, que puede orientarnos, sólo hay un límite: el 
 pasado. Las experiencias de vida hechas estrechan al futuro del hombre. Si no sabemos lo 
 que va a ser, sabemos lo que no va a ser. Se vive en vista del pasado. En suma, que el 
 hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene... historia. O, lo que es igual: lo que la 
 naturaleza es a las cosas, es la historia —como res gestae— al hombre. [...] Tampoco el 
 hombre tiene otra <<naturaleza>> que lo que ha hecho.  
 Es sobremanera cómico que se condene el historicismo porque produce en nosotros o 
 corrobora la conciencia de que lo humano es, en todas sus direcciones, mudadizo y nada 
 concreto es en él estable. [...] Su ser consiste en progreso. Ahora bien: del hombre es 
 preciso decir, no sólo que su ser es variable, sino que su ser crece y, en este sentido, que 
 progresa.
993
 
 While "man is history" for Ortega, as clearly stated here, he (or she) is also oriented 
toward the future, as he also adds in this quote—and as we have seen throughout. So despite 
Ortega's great reliance on the past for understanding anything human, the future still plays a key 
role in our orientation and focus as well, being therefore a point of dialogue with pragmatism in 
general. However, unlike in the case of Ortega, who is clearly quite adamant about the 
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importance of our pasts and us being our histories, at times it is a bit hard to be clear as to which 
of the three elements; history, past, or future, Schiller deems most "important" though it is most 
often cited as being the future. Perhaps then we can safely say that for Schiller they are all 
simply required elements, and they are separate but inextricably linked in conceptualizing life, 
reality, the world, or history even. Again arguably most of the time there is more of an emphasis 
on the future, as he is a pragmatist, but this is not always the case. But as a point of divergence 
he was more forward looking than Ortega; "The teleological explanation, therefore, is not only a 
perfectly valid one, but the only possible one."
994
 But none of this is to say that an envisioned 
dialogue would not be possible, nonetheless, in the specific aforementioned areas. Moreover, 
Schiller has a somewhat different notion of "teleology" from the more traditional conception in 
that there is not just one fixed future, rather there are various possible futures depending on 
which ones we want to move toward (again we are free in a limited sense). And this conditions 
our presents in our actions and beliefs, and thus what will then become our histories later, 
logically. So Schiller's teleology is not deterministic in being pre-programmed or some sort of 
singular destiny, rather he is simply highlighting how as very future-oriented beings, we are 
focused on where we are going; we live (at least mostly) in view of the future, or perhaps we 
could say 'various teleologies'. And conceptualizing teleology more loosely as such is something 
Ortega would possibly converse with Schiller on. 
 In the following excerpt, while Ortega does not use the term "teleological," he does to a 
certain extent imply this, and he cites Hegel, one of the chief teleological historicists, albeit 
leading to a slightly different interpretation of this; 
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 [...] en suma, que la realidad histórica, el destino humano avanza dialécticamente, si bien 
 esa esencial dialéctica de la vida no es, como creía Hegel, una dialéctica conceptual, de 
 razón pura, sino precisamente la dialéctica de una razón mucho más amplia, honda y rica 
 que la pura —a saber, la de la vida, la de la razón viviente.  
 Pero claro es que si al reconstruir nosotros el pasado mediante la historia, hallamos que 
 cada nueva época o estadio emerge del anterior con una cierta lógica o, dicho de otro 
 modo, que a cada forma de vida sucede otra que no es cualquiera, sino precisamente una 
 que la anterior predetermina [...] que es en serio posible la profecía. [...] el profeta es 
 [también] un historiador a la inversa, un hombre que narra por anticipado el porvenir.
995
 
 So we use history to try to create possible predictions of the future. Hence again there is 
at least some degree of future orientation here in Ortega's thought as well. 
 Perhaps part of Schiller's lack of greater stress on history is because along the continuum 
it forms part of a group of "dead fixed points" because it is past. Not being "alive" in a literal 
sense we can, therefore, use it primarily for understanding our present alive situation and 
circumstance, and potential future.
996
 So again there clearly is a greater stress on being future-
oriented—but what must be clarified is that to be such in the first place requires historical 
study—an important point perhaps left out too often in Schiller's work, but logically implied. As 
we know this is what Ortega does elaborate on, however. Ortega also declares that the past is 
                                                          
995
 Ortega, Galileo, pp. 183-184. 
 
996
 As we saw, he argued, "The past is dead and done with, practically speaking; its deeds have hardened into facts, 
which are accepted, with or without enthusiasm; what it really concerns us to know is how to act with a view to the 
future. And so like life, and as befits a theory of human life, Pragmatism faces towards the future" (Schiller, Studies 
in Humanism, p. 123). 
 
 544 
 
dead, but he takes the next step in a slightly different direction by stating that history, 
nonetheless, is the discipline we have to revive to better understand our presents, and then 
continuing as Schiller would by arguing that all the while this is with an eye on hopefully also 
improving the future. In other words, history should not just remain dead, it should be revived in 
a sense. Ortega proclaims,  
 [...] hemos de ir reconstruyendo la serie de presentes que tuvo esa palabra y cuyo 
 conjunto forma su pasado; tenemos, pues, que re-presentarnos, que volver a hacerlos 
 presentes, que resucitar esos presentes fenecidos, y esto quiere decir que necesitamos 
 revivir nosotros esas formas que dejaron de vivir. Toda historia es reviviscencia de lo que 
 parecía muerto.
997
 
 And then we apply what we learn to the future, as he later continues, the historian's eye 
"[...] tiene que moverse sin cesar, oscilando constantemente del pasado al futuro, del futuro al 
pasado."
998
 But it must be noted that Ortega does not really believe that the past is literally dead, 
because the past lives in us, always, because history is what man has and is. Schiller may not 
give the history end of the continuum as much 'energy' as Ortega does, but he does recognize the 
importance of historical study, despite his also very forward-looking, teleological, functionalist, 
and instrumentalist view, as he writes,  
 It is only from a knowledge of the tendencies of things in the past that we are able to 
 predict their future: it is by the study of what has been that we discover what is to be, 
 both in the sense of what is about to, and of what ought to. [...] it is only by a careful 
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 study of the history of a thing that we can determine the direction of its development, and 
 discover the general principle which formulates its evolution. 
999 
 As with the chicken and the egg metaphor, again we somewhat need to understand this all 
as separate but connected inextricably; somewhat one and the same, because "the teleological 
method just reverses the order of historical explanation."
1000
 Again we must understand this anti-
dualistically. 
 Schiller's teleological leaning is also important in understanding specifically the role of 
the individual in all this, and that of our individual lives. As briefly noted, evolution, in one sense 
of Schiller's use of the term, can be partially understood as comprising both our nature and our 
"histories," in that, as he defines it to be  
 [...] the development of the individual in society. [...] Evolution is the process of the 
 gradual perfectioning of the individual in society, its purpose and its meaning must be the 
 adaptation of the individual to the social environment. The ultimate aim, therefore, of the 
 world-process is a harmonious society of perfect individuals.
1001
 
 The continual use of the term "Evolution" by Schiller must be noted here, as arguably we 
can assume that at least two essential characteristics of this term imply both history and nature, 
to tie in the dialogue here with Ortega in which, as has been argued, when Ortega declares that 
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man has no nature, only history, it is because history is his nature.
1002
 In reference to the 
aforementioned quote from Schiller, it must be noted that what he does not much seem to 
elaborate on in his work is on what this "perfection" means, exactly. But in part what he refers to 
is our living individually, while also in harmony with each other, within a society.  
 Why does the individual need to adapt socially and live as such harmoniously? Ortega 
succinctly explains in the following instance how 'circunstancia' also implies the social milieu, 
and this could be a possible answer on his behalf; "[...] la circunstancia no se compone sólo de 
cosas en sentido estricto, sino también de personas: la circunstancia es también sociedad 
humana, el mundo es también <<mundo>> en el sentido social."
1003
 So here we have another 
possible piece to this potential dialogue in that humans are also social animals, so we must not 
also ignore this important, key element.  
 Moreover, as we saw in Ortega's central theory on generations, which is a 'social' theory 
of course, this is one of the more defining characteristics of our historical natures, as this is how 
he divides up and categorizes that social milieu we live in. This is logical within Ortega's 
philosophy because the concept of generation will be a particularly defining characteristic since 
being closer in age means being of the same historical time period, and for Ortega what we are is 
our history. 
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 Schiller further elaborates, although in a somewhat general sense, on defining the 
aforementioned concept of "perfection" that 
 [...] the world-process will come to an end when all the spirits whom it is designed to 
 harmonize have been united in a perfect society. [...] when the individual has become a 
 perfect individual, and has been developed to the utmost of his powers, and is in perfect 
 harmony and completely adapted to the whole of his environment.
1004
 
 Schiller's view, therefore, is that we and the world are finite, headed toward a teleological 
end of individuals perfectly harmonized among each other and our environment within a society. 
So then of course we need to each 'adapt socially and live as such harmoniously.'  But can we 
really know when we reach this end?  It is so general; is this the only possible teleological end? 
Meaning, this is perhaps why, in part, Schiller does not really describe in any specific detail what 
that perfect teleological end is like other than as "individuals perfectly harmonized with each 
other and our environments in a society," because there is what we think is that situation and 
circumstance, and then there is what it really is, but we can never know for sure when and if the 
two ever coincide (i.e., anti-dualism). The following excerpt helps clarify this last point a bit: 
 [...] the fact that the world is in process contains the assurance that the end of its process 
 may be achieved. [...] though the end of the world-process is finite, yet the 
 approximations to it are infinite, and hence it will never be reached. Progress may be 
 compared to an asympote, always approaching the state of Perfect Being and never 
 attaining it. [...] And so the case is proposed; the approximations to perfection could not 
 go on indefinitely: they would sooner or later approach so nearly to perfection, that the 
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 discrepancy between the real and the ideal would be too minute to enter into 
 consciousness.
1005
  
 Perhaps further dialogue with Ortega can be envisioned in how what Ortega would agree 
on is that our perspectives may indeed be finite, but the process of the combinations and 
comprehensions of perspectives are infinite. There is no one, absolute perspective. And we can 
never gather them all, as Schiller also posits in regards to the end of the 'world-process' or 
perfection; "approximations to it are infinite, and hence it will never be reached." But the more 
we gather, the closer we get to accuracy, and in continuing with Schiller's thought process in our 
imaginary dialogue here, the closer we get to "perfection."  
 Moreover, we must take into account the anti-dualism in this in that even if we did arrive 
at perfection, there is really no way to be certain of having reached it; there is perfection, and 
there is what we think is perfection, and one cannot exist without the other though they will 
remain separate concepts because we have no way of corroborating and verifying what 
perfection really is.  
 And this notion is no different than how we need to view and study history; history can 
be contemplated as a set of perspectives in which we cannot gather them all, nor is there one, 
absolute perspective or recording of history; at best we can work to gather as many historical 
perspectives as possible to get closer to accuracy or "perfection," but we will never arrive there 
exactly. So perhaps this would be another direction in an envisioned dialogue between the two. 
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 Further, perhaps this is all simply one way to accommodate and rectify the seeming 
confusion within Schiller's philosophy about how to define the historicity of life, and why in one 
instance he directly declares that "our nature is never fully harmonised"
1006
 by saying that there is 
a historicity of life for Schiller, and which there most certainly is for Ortega, but for Schiller, this 
historicity is more so defined as a form of teleological evolution toward "perfection." This is 
because the goal is to gather as many approximations to perfection as possible, or as many 
perspectives as possible, but we will never be able to assemble them all—not to mention the anti-
dualism in this in that we cannot know when what we think is perfection coincides with what is 
really perfection since he also mentions in the aforementioned quote that at some point, in fact, 
the discrepancy becomes too blurred for us to even be conscious of it. Therefore, for Schiller this 
historicity is simply one of a number of key factors, elements, and influences to consider. Again 
Ortega does not discuss teleological ends as such. For Ortega, our history is always with us and 
the (even if there are others, this is the most important) key factor, element, and influence in our 
lives; "Pues la verdad es que el hombre lleva a cuestas siempre todo su pasado humano, incluso 
el más primitivo, es decir, lo sigue siendo y gracias a eso es hombre."
1007
 In other words, there is 
historicity of life for Schiller, but for Ortega life is historicity. 
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X. Ideas for the Study of History  
 Now that we have established a somewhat convoluted conception of history within 
Schiller's philosophy, and then with an imagined dialogue on this with Ortega who has a more 
clear conception, the next quandary to ponder is the following: how should we study history 
along these lines and limitations (to add to all that has already been proposed in the previous two 
parts of this dissertation)? Most tersely stated, perhaps we can simply add that while a study of 
history should have the main objective of illuminating some details and knowledge about our 
future, specifically this is in reference to the teleological aims that Schiller was referenced to be 
speaking of. There may not be a specific teleological end in sight for Ortega, but neither was a 
very detailed, specific one elaborated on by Schiller, so we can at least say that historical study 
can be focused on creating better futures. The following excerpt illustrates a bit of an image of 
this idea on Schiller's behalf: 
 [...] it will be from a study of history that we shall see the drift of that process, and if that 
 process should admit of, or demand, teleological interpretation, we shall thus be enabled 
 to forecast its end, and to anticipate its future, sufficiently for our purposes, even though 
 the whole nature of a thing could only be fully expressed in its whole history. The 
 attempt, on the other hand, to determine the validity of a thing apart from its history and 
 prospects would seem sheer folly.
1008
 
 This all connects to pragmatist notions on the truth, which he we can simply add 
"historical" truths, in that again at best we find only approximations.  
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 As we know Ortega gives history more importance, proclaiming that to understand 
anything human at all, one must tell its history. As we have seen, "Para comprender algo 
humano, personal, o colectivo, es preciso contar una historia. [...] La vida sólo se vuelve un poco 
transparente ante la razón histórica."
1009
 So for Ortega, history not only can help in some future 
aims, but it can help us study and clarify anything human—but again we have established that 
Ortega places greater emphasis and importance on history as a set of past points along a 
continuum. Schiller would arguably dialogue with this being the case when we view history as 
part of a larger continuum that also includes the present and the future. In other words, Ortega 
emphasizes more the set of past points along that continuum, but he would likely carry on a 
dialogue with Schiller in applying this as well more broadly to encompass the present and future, 
as was also the case with the other two pragmatists explored here. 
 Another important conclusion we can draw here, as we have seen and is also applicable 
in this third part's imaginary dialogue is that history is historical, concisely stated. For instance, 
Ortega declares, "Cualquier término histórico, para ser preciso, necesita ser fijado en función de 
toda la historia."
1010
 And for Schiller, every history is a new history, as Porrovecchio cites,  
 [...] every age demands a new history of the past." But to what end a past picture for a 
 philosopher with a forward-thinking program? A "practical desire for guidance which 
 inspires our interest in the future, as in the past." [...] All history is aided by what we 
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 recall and how we articulate it. The question is not how true the tales are, but whether 
 they will prove useful.
1011
 
 Moreover, another conclusion we can add to the methodology for the study of history is 
that it, again, should be studied as a continuum, because "we can confidently lay it down that no 
event will ever occur which will not seem intelligently connected with its antecedents after it 
[has] happened."
1012
 If "experience" is a pragmatist fundamental in all this (in adding to 
understanding what in part leads to our interpretations, knowledge, behavior, etcetera), we must 
also add that this happens in time, or history; "all our experience is in time."
1013
 This is why the 
central argument has been proposed throughout this dissertation that we can read "experience" 
and "history," understood as part of a continuum, as synonymous in specific regards. Again here 
we have the thread that experience accumulates over history. History, or the accumulation of 
experiences, is therefore a source of "guidance for the future," as well as a source of "causes 
operative in bringing about the historical processes," to use Schiller's own words as quoted in 
Porrovecchio, who adds that "The Historical Method is not merely a matter of laying out all the 
details in chronological row. For facts never simply are and are never simply enough."
1014
 Here it 
sounds very much like, as Ortega would argue, history is not just dead—because it is essentially 
"alive" in the present and the future. This is again another reason for seeing history more broadly 
as part of a continuum. It is important, therefore, to recognize that history is imperative for 
understanding not just the future, but the present as well (hence yet again the need to view it here 
                                                          
1011
 Porrovecchio, F.C.S. Schiller, p. 238. 
 
1012
Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 242. 
 
1013
Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 216. 
 
1014
 Porrovecchio, F.C.S. Schiller, pp. 258-259. 
 
 554 
 
throughout this dissertation as a continuum). As Porrovecchio further explains on behalf of 
Schiller, "[...] change and time, it would seem, more forward. We should study our history for 
clues to our present."
1015
 
 However, even though Schiller sees this continuum to have a teleological end (though not 
very clearly defined, one or more), he also as we saw somewhat paradoxically argues that this 
does not "condemn" us to "determinism." This is because key in Schiller's philosophy is his 
emphasis on our "limited freedom." Our lives, and therefore our histories (history in general 
really), is not condemned to determinism because we have the power of choice. As we saw our 
different choices can lead us down different paths, and therefore create differing histories 
depending on those choices. But for Schiller, and where he differs a bit from the other thinkers 
explored here, there is some sort of teleological end in sight, even if this may change at times, as 
a way to clarify how he can emphasize degrees of teleology and freedom simultaneously. Hence, 
as aforementioned, "there will be alternative courses of history, and a real indetermination in a 
universe which harbours a free agent."
1016
 It sounds illogical to declare 'various teloelogies,' but 
not in this sense, and when considered that this is in terms of 'possibilities,' but just one will end 
up manifesting of course. 
 Part of the importance, therefore, of this forward, functionalist and instrumentalist 
thinking is because "We want to be able to make predictions about the future behaviour of things 
for the purpose of shaping our own conduct accordingly."
1017
 Another piece, therefore, of the 
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methodology being developed here to further elaborate is that history is also a process of 
evolution and becoming because different choices can have different affects and therefore can 
play a role in shaping the course of possibly alternate histories. We are "free" in this sense to 
move toward different points in the future; therefore, we have influence over the movement of 
our continuums, but we do not have complete control over what those points are, so this freedom 
is limited in this way—just like we can choose among the circumstances that surround us, but we 
cannot control which are all those circumstances, thus being a possible area of conversation 
between the two thinkers Schiller and Ortega respectively. 
 It must also be briefly noted that in pondering how history should be studied, we must 
add here that history is selective and subjective, which is a common theme throughout this entire 
thesis as well, as few would disagree with this. While Schiller does not directly refer to 
"historical study" in this next quote, his more general indication could plausibly be understood to 
include this (along with other elements and disciplines); "our conception of the world will still 
depend on our subjective selection of what it interested us to discover in the totality of 
existence."
1018
 So as has been repeated at length, history can never be entirely objective, and 
therefore it can never be entirely accurate, and this is something we must always keep at the 
forefront for the methodology of historicism as another key in our standards for study that we are 
outlining in this section. As aforementioned, 
 [...] the great events in history are utterly unique, and turn the course of things so 
 thoroughly that they need never be repeated. [...] Hence the teleological and anti-
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 teleological interpretations of events will never decide their conflict by appealing to the 
 facts: for in the facts each finds what it wills and comes prepared to see.
1019
 
 Historical truths are no different than "truths" more broadly; as we saw they are 
approximations only. So again, what this means is that history cannot be recorded perfectly or 
objectively, logically. Again history is selective, and therefore subjective, and thus individual as 
well—these same conclusions are reached by Schiller. What is selected individually in history is 
based largely on what is considered useful for that individual in Schiller's deliberation (or in what 
we at times consider "truthful" or here "historical truths")—this is quite pragmatist as we have 
seen. As Porrovecchio concisely interprets, "If history is selective, it is because it is individual. If 
the individual is to be effective, it is because the selection accords with the most useful social 
needs."
1020
 This quote also exemplifies more clearly how Schiller can accentuate both the 
individual and the social in that at times what is useful for the individual is what is useful 
socially. We can understand history and its study similarly; at times what is useful in history for 
us individually is what is useful socially—and vice versa of course, it must be noted.  
 For Schiller a crucial part of the methodology for the study of history, therefore, is to 
consider how it is written from a useful point of view, and not necessarily, per se, how truthful it 
might possibly be; "All history is aided by what we recall and how we articulate it" explains 
Porrovecchio on Schiller, as we saw, "[...] the question is not how true the tales are, but whether 
they will prove useful.
1021
" Again, the philosophy behind this is the same; historical truths are 
like truths in general. And this relates to Schiller's general philosophy aforementioned of being 
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quite the anti-absolutist, not believing that there is any absolute or universal truths for all, or at 
all times—again this is something applicable to all thinkers analyzed here. And this emphasis on 
the usefulness of something of course is again quite the pragmatist concept. 
 Again the following important key standard needs to be reiterated: because history is 
selective, individual, subjective, and always in a state of evolution along a continuum, this also 
means that history, therefore, can neither be captured nor recorded completely; in its entirety—
something true in Schiller's philosophy as well. History is 'interpretation, it is tentative, and it is 
conjectural,' and in turn can only be captured in "snippets," proclaimed Schiller.
1022
 The 
subjectivity of history and historical records must come into the methodology for its study, for 
because it is subjective interpretation, in a sense how we study history is itself historical because 
it is subject to how we were trained and conditioned at that 'historical' point in time to think of it 
and to interpret it. In other words, it tells us more about, for example, how we are educated and 
cultured at that time; how we are children of the time we are born into—more so than the details 
that are recorded of the time in and of themselves. Moreover, perhaps this is also a way to 
understand Ortega's concept of "beliefs" and how we are installed in our beliefs subconsciously 
as we saw (until periods of crises come to question them). This proposition is, therefore, another 
example of the goal of this dialogue in general to offer additional and newly innovative ways to 
read and interpret Ortega's philosophy.  
 So again, as has been aforementioned in this thesis, arguably at times historical records 
tell us more about what people thought history was, meant, what was important, etcetera, at the 
time, rather than the history in and of itself. Moreover, at no time can we ever incorporate all the 
                                                          
1022
 See: Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
 
 558 
 
possible views, perspectives, pieces, details, etcetera of any historical moment as history is like a 
puzzle that has virtually infinite pieces. These points are revisited in each of these three parts of 
this dissertation to show how each thinker shares, at least to a certain degree, these standards, 
thereby forming the key threads interwoven throughout.  
 This important point on how 'history is historical' Schiller expounds in his essay "Plato 
and his Predecessors," as Plato and how he has been read and understood over time is a good 
example of this, since it has changed, and it has changed in part depending on the historical 
moment. Plato, being a classical philosopher, has been long studied, and long interpreted in 
multiple different ways. Interpretation, therefore, is also historical. Interpretation is embedded in 
a historical moment. So our readings of Plato have depended on our histories of the time. Once 
more, concisely stated, we can say here, as an important piece of our methodology, history is 
historical. 
 So, given, once again, how limiting this may sound, what can we really take from 
history? After all, as Schiller, writes, "In other words, we must recognize it as an intrinsic 
limitation of historical evidence that it can hardly ever be, and can never remain, scientifically 
adequate, and that therefore our evidence also can never be made scientifically cogent, so long as 
it remains historical."
1023
 By scientific, part of what we can assume is being referred to is that 
history simply cannot be entirely objective or universal (there are no absolute truths and no 
absolute perspectives). What we can take, as Porrovecchio helps elucidate here, is a greater sense 
of prediction about the future the more thorough the study of the past. Simply stated, this 
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improves our chances of having better, more foreseeable futures, and perhaps, as has been 
discussed in this dissertation, reveal some human trends of trends. 
 What can be done to cross this seeming impasse? The first thing is to recognize that 
 almost all knowledge is, in fact and origin, historical. Even if events do not repeat 
 themselves, events occur so as to establish a higher degree of probability that a law is 
 either (more probably) true or in need of revision; in short, historical events can lend 
 themselves to better attempts at prediction.
1024
 
 Again the important characteristic that we can establish and can take from history is that 
its recording helps us understand human interests and needs at the time, because our selectively 
recorded history is dependent on this. Hence again why history is historical. And in this 
endeavor, Schiller emphasizes the need for science and history to work together, something that 
Ortega on occasion stressed as well, as we saw previously. So again another piece of our 
methodology is to add the standard that historical study should become as 'scientific' as possible, 
which in general is quite the pragmatist sort of emphasis (but not of course unique to pragmatism 
only). But again this is always keeping in mind that history could never be completely scientific.  
 As Porrovecchio explains, while citing Schiller,  
 Hence, science is a matter of "prediction and control," and history's purpose is to provide 
 "the power over things that comes from knowledge of the past"; thus both "minister to the 
 need of controlling a reality that kills us if we don't." Both, then, must cooperate with 
 each other in understanding the past and working to predict the future. [...] For if science 
 is to have a basis, it must be in historical record. But it is no less true that the past is not 
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 pure. "Its history is only a hypothetical reconstruction, often highly imaginative, out of 
 utterly inadequate materials." Schiller sides with science in the end. In searching toward a 
 definitive, it grasps the threads of the historical past and does what history cannot: 
 experiments. "Hence verification is a much more potent weapon in Science than in 
 history" though no verification is to be taken as absolutely true. For Schiller, then, 
 science and history are partial reconstructions; the former just happens to be on firmer 
 ground than the latter.
1025
 
 The assumption here that for Schiller a methodology of history should strive to be as 
scientific as possible is something that Ortega explicitly calls for as well, as cited in the other 
sections of this thesis, and as further evidenced in the following quote: 
 Este principio, que espero —por lo menos, someramente— desarollar en algunas de las 
 lecciones inmediatas, me permite fundar sobre nuevas bases la metodología de la historia, 
 y esperar que esta admirable ocupación humana llamada <<historia>> deje de ser un 
 cuento o, a lo sumo, una técnica maravillosa —admirable, imprescindible, respetabilísma, 
 pero... una técnica y nada más— y llegue a convertirse de verdad en una ciencia.1026 
 In the following excerpt of Ortega's we, arguably, further find a potential dialogue with 
Schiller in this, albeit one in which that basis of science in history is stronger (meaning, there is 
more emphasis on historical study), however, for Ortega—but the link is still there, nonetheless:  
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 Creer en la ciencia, en la razón es contar con que el hombre es capaz de construir teorías 
 que dado el horizonte de los hechos en cada momento conocidos poseerán todos los 
 quilates posibles de verdad, por tanto, teorías cada vez más precisas, cada vez más 
 extensas y más firmes.
1027
 
 In another instance Ortega states that history is "la ciencia de las vidas humanas."
1028
 But 
in this he is emphasizing the importance of history rather than declaring it to be something 
objective or universal. 
 Tal es, señores, la preeminencia de la historia sobre todas las demás ciencias. La historia, 
 hable de lo que hable, está siempre hablando de nosotros mismos, los hombres actuales, 
 porque nosotros estamos hechos de pasado [...] La historia habla siempre de nosotros, de 
 te fabla narratur. La cuestión está en que nos la sepan contar y que nosotros sepamos 
 escucharla.
1029
 
 History is the "preeminent science" for Ortega because it is about humanity, human lives, 
and the evolution of our lives singularly, as well as societies and cultures; as declared at the very 
start of this dissertation, its value cannot as such be overstated since it is about us. As we saw he 
further argues, "La historia es ciencia sistemática de la realidad radical que es mi vida."
1030
 And 
while no specific methodological steps are mentioned in this more scientific endeavor, there is 
hope of establishing this at some point, as Ortega does believe that history can be systematic, to a 
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certain extent and in specific ways—hence again the connection here with science and the goal 
to make historical study as scientific as possible. But key here is to note as much as possible, as 
history can never be completely scientific. This is because Ortega thinks that "[...] es imposible 
nada que de lejos merezca llamarse ciencia histórica."
1031
 This "science" of history is not so 
much about positive reason in the form of objectivity and universality in its study and 
applications. Rather, it is about historical reason, which is more focused on perspective, notions 
of 'perspectivism,' and as argued here in this dissertation, in a novel way anti-dualism as well.  
 Again history, as the past points on the continuum, is the key and most important factor, 
element, and influence as the "preeminent science," going thus further than Schiller. For Schiller, 
on the other hand, and in a specific sense in which we cannot find as strong a possible dialogue, 
science becomes a more powerful tool than history in and of itself for understanding the world in 
general. But, we must add here, arguably science is still, nevertheless, based in history—it would 
be convenient and interesting to be able to actually ask Schiller if he agrees with this. Schiller 
may not, therefore, be much of one to emphasize specifically and solely historical study for basic 
metaphysical concepts, but he does recognize how this is the center and starting point for quite a 
lot. So in our methodology of history here, we must incorporate a cooperation, and a working 
together with science, in a goal to make history and historical study as scientific as possible. As 
noted clearly Schiller does not completely disregard history, so there is still a bit of a possible 
dialogue that we could envision, nevertheless, in this with Ortega. 
 Since Schiller is keen on choosing his own terms for concepts (as we saw with his 
"Humanism" replacing "Pragmatism") perhaps in determining a sort of vision of a methodology 
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of historical study along the lines of Schiller's philosophy, as has been briefly noted maybe it is 
best to call it "Evolutionism," or "the study of evolution." This can be surmised upon considering 
the following excerpt from Schiller:  
 [...] nowadays we can as little dispense with the explanation of things by their history as 
 with their explanation by universal 'laws.' [...] And if we regard the fact that there is a 
 development of the world in Time as the essence of Evolution, it is obvious that only a 
 theory which accepts this Time-process as an ultimate datum will be capable of yielding a 
 philosophy of Evolution and is worthy of the name Evolutionism.
1032
 
 To a certain extent one could arguably find some evolutionism in Ortega's views on the 
meaning of history; after all, the argument here is that what man has is history because man's 
nature is his history. Moreover, a leaning on biology, albeit slight, is present in Ortega's work, as 
has been explored. He writes, "El hombre, señores, es justamente el que conserva presente ese 
pasado. El hombre es un animal que lleva dentro historia, que lleva dentro toda la historia. No 
cabe definición del hombre menos <<darwiniana>>."
1033
 Here Ortega admits a somewhat 
"Darwinian" leaning, which cannot be a more clear inclination toward adding some possible 
propensity toward to evolution and evolutionism, thereby adding to a potential dialogue here that 
we could imagine with Schiller because history can include a history of genetic information 
passed on over generations as well. 
 Most importantly, as we have seen for Ortega, since history is our  nature, and therefore 
essentially fundamental in life, nothing human can be understood or clear until we study its 
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history; [...] nada pueda estar verdaderamente claro en historia mientras no está toda ella 
clara."
1034
 Of the many excerpts summarizing the broad conception of the term "history" and 
Ortega's notion of "historical reason," the following is one which perhaps most potentially 
dialogues with Schiller as it emphasizes a process of becoming:  
 La razón histórica, en cambio, no acepta nada como mero hecho, sino que fluidifica todo 
 hecho en el fieri de que proviene: ve cómo se hace el hecho. [...] muestra lo que el 
 hombre hace con esos instintos y facultades, e inclusive nos declara cómo han venido a 
 ser esos <<hechos>> —los instintos y las facultades—, que no son, claro está, más que 
 ideas —interpretaciones— que el hombre ha fabricado en una cierta coyuntura de su 
 vivir.
1035
  
 While these pieces of a possible methodology we have searched for within the 
philosophies of Ortega and Schiller are a bit general and abstract, they can be of use for the 
discipline of history as further efforts towards improving its study. To summarize these 
conclusions explored: first, we must conclude here that history has the broad "teleological" 
objective to create better futures. Next, we must wrap up that history is selective, subjective, 
individual, and varies based on choices because we each live within a limited freedom to have, 
to a certain extent, an influence over the course of history. History is a continuum, history is 
evolution, and therefore history is historical. Moreover, history can, therefore, never be fully, 
completely, or entirely accurately recorded because it depends to a great extent on what is useful 
to record at that time (not to mention that "usefulness" will vary based on the individual, the 
society of the time, the traditions of the time; the history of the times, etcetera), which is why 
                                                          
1034
 Ortega, Historia, p. 51. 
 
1035
 Ortega, Historia, pp. 59-60. 
 565 
 
again history is historical. And finally, the last set of standards that has been added is to create 
the objective to make historical study more scientific. While these are quite broad 
methodological standards, they can certainly be applied nonetheless to improve the discipline of 
history. 
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XI. Conclusions 
 As noted at the start of this third part of this dissertation, the goal was outlined to imagine 
a possible pragmatist based dialogue between Ferdinand Schiller and José Ortega y Gasset  
without drawing any specific conclusions on similarities. Rather, this section has simply been 
about, as with all the thinkers in this dissertation, where we could imagine a conversation, and 
where within they might achieve a level of coinciding some in dialogue. In other words, the 
objective has been to see how some of these coincidences and points of dialogue may permit us 
to apply another profound sense and reading to how to interpret certain areas of Ortega's work, as 
well as that of Schiller's possible responses to the concept of history, its study, and the 
philosophy of history, all in adding to better contemplating and understanding humanity in 
general as well. This is also why many areas have been revisited to see how there might be an 
arguable dialogue in Ortega's work with pragmatism in general. The hope has been to gain a 
better understanding that for Ortega arguably man has no nature, only history, because nature is 
his history as they are anti-dualistic, in an analysis of some basic metaphysical concepts, as well 
as of historicism and historiology. Again the objective has been to show not how Ortega was a 
pragmatist, but rather to demonstrate how it is arguably possible to imagine a dialogue with some 
other pragmatist thinkers as a way to not only hopefully better understand an important part of 
Ortega's philosophy, but also more broadly to improve upon the academic discipline of history. 
 One common thread that has been weaved throughout, and that is quite pragmatist, is the 
idea that so much of these metaphysical topics and the study of history are all really in a state of 
becoming and evolution along a continuum of time. Hence again we should see all of this study 
in the same way; as something not meant to be complete, but that is meant to keep us studying 
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further. Rather than establish any definitive links or truisms, the objective here, therefore, has 
been to dig deeper into philosophical quandaries, specifically within an imagined dialogue 
between Ortega and Schiller in this third and final part, that might help us better study, and help 
us continue to better study in the future, Ortega and historicism, as well as pragmatism in 
general. As Ortega once said, "Estudiar y ser estudiante es siempre, y sobre todo hoy, una 
necesidad inexorable del hombre."
1036
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General Conclusion 
 
 Ortega succinctly declared, "All historical knowledge is, in truth, the never-ending 
story."
1037
 In other words, we can summarize in part our meditations here to say that everything 
is historical as part of a continuum that proceeds ceaselessly from past to the present into the 
future. History in its details and study is historical, but again along a continuum that has no 
absolute start and finish. While there are other elements, logically, in interpreting, understanding, 
and defining notions of life, reality, truth, or history itself, there is always, nonetheless, the 
historical component (even if among others). It has been proposed here that none of the 
philosophers explored would deny this, though they might not always coincide exactly on the 
extent of it. Hence further argument for the importance of this study, and for more generally the 
philosophy of history and the discipline of history.  
 And this has been one of the main goals of this dissertation; to add to the general 
philosophy on history, and thus hopefully improve the discipline of history itself. Thus, in this 
final conclusion, what will be discussed are only the most pertinent derivations, repercussions, 
and consequences that this imagined dialogue could have on the concept of history, the study of 
history, and specifically of that within the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset and the three 
Pragmatists explored here John Dewey, William James, and Ferdinand Schiller. 
 The interpretation explored here of history in a general sense is that it exists within a 
continuum, anti-dualistically interdependent with the present and future. Therefore, history is 
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really not dead; history lives on, this is also part of why we are our histories. Thus just the same 
this study, hopefully, should live on as well, and be further pursued and explored. As noted in the 
introduction, there have been recent developments in studying how there is arguably an 
important historicist element in pragmatism, and hopefully this study will add to this growing 
area. And this is relevant because as Davaney argues well, 
 Pragmatic historicism acknowledges human historicity and its implications for all of our 
 human efforts to understand life and to endow existence with meaning and value. It 
 extends the recognition of fallibility, contingency, and partiality to our most cherished 
 beliefs and practices. It affirms that we live mediated lives, always encountering reality 
 through the particularities of bodies, cultures, languages, geographies, and histories. To 
 embrace such finitude and historicity does not lead to despair or to seeking safety in the 
 narrow confines of a self-enclosed world. It leads instead to the possibility of a risk-
 taking, life-embracing existence among our fellow humans and all those who share our 
 fragile world, grounded in who we have been and open to the possibility of new and more 
 vital ways of being.
1038
 
 As referenced throughout, Graham and his studies on Ortega and pragmatism is really the 
only major investigation attempting to link the two. However, as all scholarly revision needs to 
start somewhere, hopefully more will come in an effort to better understand Ortega's philosophy, 
his historicism, and specifically his maxim that man has no nature only history. Humanity, and 
our history, is ever so complex—so much, in fact, that it is quite doubtful of course whether we 
could ever completely understand it; the influences or motivations in our movements, behaviors, 
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reactions, decisions, words, etcetera. Hence part of the reason why James argues as referenced 
that "to a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic." Just the same, we cannot presume 
to know everything about a philosophy, or what leads a philosopher to expound upon what he or 
she does in their work.  
 Ortega is by no means strictly a pragmatist, and again to conclude it must be reiterated 
and emphasized that the objective here has not been to demonstrate him as such—the aim and 
goal here, in all three of the sections, has been to further analyze a small piece of specifically his 
historical meditations through this imagined dialogue on various metaphysical topics and 
historicism in an attempt to better understand what is a somewhat seemingly polemical dictum 
that 'man has no nature, only history.' The goal has not been to argue that Ortega's historicism is 
pragmatist, rather the purpose has been to envision a possible pragmatist dialogue—again not 
outline areas of direct parallel or similarity—in an endeavor to propose a possible better and 
more thorough reading of that maxim as 'man has no nature, only history, because history is his 
nature; history contains his nature' in an anti-dualistic sense. Every such type of analysis will 
only further add (and not necessarily be definitive of course) to the study and perhaps better 
understanding of Ortega's philosophy—just as history itself, and the study of history, is 
ceaseless, again so is this study here of a potential dialogue between Ortega and these three 
pragmatists. 
 History as a discipline is important because it is a study about ourselves and the changes 
we experience over time. Hence, it is important to better ponder the philosophy of history to help 
us further understand what history is and how to study it. Again this dissertation has been a 
development of a philosophy of history centered on how we might be able to imagine a dialogue 
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about this between Ortega and three pragmatists. And this has also been about seeing how there 
might be more historicism than previously thought in pragmatism.  More explicitly, to reiterate, 
this has been in an effort to not just broadly improve the discipline of history but more 
specifically to hopefully better understand some of Ortega's philosophy, expressly focused on his 
maxim that man has no nature, only history, adding yet again that because nature is his history in 
an anti-dualistic sense. To reiterate this central conclusion: history is simply broader and 
therefore more defining since it contains our nature, and more, and thus is what most 
appropriately defines, identifies, and characterizes us. This leads us toward not just a better study 
of history, but of ourselves, therefore as well.  
 History (in and of itself in its details, as an object of study) is our nature because it 
contains our nature (and more of course), and this is even more strongly argued as being a viable 
perception when viewed as being part of a continuum inextricably linked as well with the present 
and the future. This is where the dialogue with Ortega and pragmatism has helped us better 
understand this, because Ortega focuses on historicism and the pragmatists on the future, so a 
dialogue between the two is a way to see how this is all linked as such as really being part of a 
larger continuum. Everything is contained within this continuum anti-dualistically. There is a 
natural-social anti-dualism, and vice versa, moving between the two in both directions. But we 
can also say that there is a social-historical anti-dualism, and vice versa moving between the two 
in both directions. The past present and future are connected in the various combinations anti-
dualistically.  Nature exists and subsist along this continuum within our histories. We cannot 
speak of nature in Ortega's interpretation as a trans-historical notion, it is explicitly historical 
because it is also social and temporal, not just individual. The continuum is therefore temporal 
and pragmatic. And this has been again in an effort to also see where there might be more 
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historicist emphasis than previously studied within the philosophy of pragmatism, and in these 
three specific cases of Dewey, James, and Schiller. Again seeing how there might be more 
historicism than previously thought within pragmatism helps with the central goal of a imagining 
a pragmatist dialogue with Ortega given his great emphasis on the importance of history. And 
again pragmatist conversation with Ortega and historicist dialogue with pragmatism is quite 
innovative and novel. 
 As has been elaborated throughout, a key element in imagining this possible dialogue in 
both directions; pragmatism with Ortega, and historicism with pragmatism, is keeping at the 
forefront the concept of anti-dualism just summarized. As a general formula that we have applied 
to so many notions in this dissertation, such as the metaphysical topics of life, reality, truth, or as 
we would apply to defining, understanding, and studying history; there is what we think there is, 
there is what there really is, and we cannot ever confirm when they coincide exactly. Thus at best 
we can get closer to accuracies when keeping this (among other requisites) in mind. Here, 
therefore, we have looked at some of these ways to get closer, always remembering that we 
cannot get right on target of complete precision of absolutely comprehensive understanding of 
concepts and notions such as these of life, reality, truth, or history in its study and specific 
details. 
 And this means that our study of history and the resulting interpretations that we generate 
are subjective and incomplete, as it is impossible for them to ever be entirely objective or include 
the recording of every moment, event, person; any historical detail. This is another important 
part of our philosophy of history that we have added here in this dissertation to a methodology 
for the study of history. 
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 Further, in this endeavor we have also seen the shared belief in how seeing what we think 
we see is based on and funneled through perspective, of which there are at least seemingly 
infinite combinations and there is no one, absolute perspective. And as we live life via our 
perspectives as individuals among also social circumstances (and other types and forms of 
circumstances), time and our natures of history must be understood to exist and persist to exist 
along a continuum. This is succinctly defined as follows: while the past is the most tangible, we 
live in the present, with an eye on the future—but at each moment we are all defined by our 
pasts. Moreover, at some future point the present and the future will become part of the past; past 
points along that continuum, so what we can most tangibly study to better understand that 
continuum in general and thus ourselves, is our past, or our histories. 
 In studying history, therefore, we have seen that along with it being simply what we think 
it is, this means that in its subjectivity historical details can sometimes tell us more about the 
historian and the time the historian lived in than the actual history being recorded. For example, 
there are times and areas in which in reading a history of Ancient Greece written by a historian in 
the eighteenth century versus one written in the twentieth century, for example, perhaps can tell 
us a lot (and maybe sometimes more) about that historian and their corresponding centuries than 
their histories of Ancient Greece specifically in and of themselves. This is not to say that the 
books would be 'worthless' of course, just that we need to keep this critique in mind. We should 
then add this philosophy on how those books could also become history books on their 
corresponding time periods of writing and publication to our methodology for the study of 
history as opposed to their content material itself. We should simply remember to keep this 
important critique in mind. 
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 History in its details and study, therefore, is historical as well, as is everything else 
examined in this dissertation. We saw that in Ortega's philosophy, the truth is historical, being 
founded on and from beliefs, or what we can call "true beliefs" (as least in our perspectives) in 
part passed down and inherited via generational divisions. Truths are historical truths. Historical 
details are historical truths. And this concept of the truth is provisional as it is maintained until it 
is challenged in times of crises per Ortega's meditations; i.e., this is part of why the truth is 
historical because it depends on history corroborating its persistence and usefulness. Again, truth 
as beliefs is temporal and therefore historical. And while they are active as beliefs, or 'true 
beliefs,' being part of us latently, they add to providing and defining our sense of reality via our 
perspectives, which again survive and persist when they are pragmatically useful.  History is the 
past along that continuum, which is a set of past dates, moments, events—-that set being defined 
by simply whichever block of time we want to examine—but it exists anti-dualistically with the 
present and the future in terms of there being history and then there being that larger continuum 
that includes the present and future; they are all separate but connected interdependently along a 
continuum that is time (to clarify further, the anti-dualistic aspect here is that history is a specific 
point on that continuum as well as the larger continuum in and of itself; it is a page in a book and 
that book in its entirety—past with present, and past with future, for instance). And the set of 
past moments that are grouped together to define at least some block of history are also anti-
dualistic; the moments are separate but exist interdependently as a portion of that continuum on 
the past side (and of course more largely part of the broader continuum as well). We can take 
specific pieces of history and understand them solely as historical details, but they cannot be fully 
understood without looking at 'the bigger picture,' just as with the metaphors explored of reading 
a book in its entirety (versus a page), or watching a film in full (versus a still screen shot). We 
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need to create some sort of narration, to use Ortega's specific term, to properly study, appreciate, 
and better interpret history. 
 These ways to see and interpret history in regards to its study have been arrived at via 
imagining a dialogue between Ortega and pragmatism; between his historicism with 
instrumentalism and functionalism; and with pragmatist anti-dualism present at all times. This 
imaginary conversation has led us down some novel combinations to understand history 
pragmatically and thus new areas within the philosophy of history in regards to specifically 
Ortega and pragmatism. Again hopefully this will all just enlarge and expand further, as any 
study of humanity is of course invaluable since it is relevant and useful to us all. 
 And again, just as history is a continuum that proceeds also into the immediately present 
moment, as well as unforeseeable and unreachable future, so is our study of, in this case, 
Ortega's philosophy—or as he preferred to term his historicism, his 'meditations.' And 
"meditation" is a very proper term to apply here, as it is not something that we definitively start 
and finish; it is something that becomes part of our daily life. Meditation can be a way of life to a 
certain extent, as it is a process of thought, of reflection, and not of something meant to be a 
direct solution or resolution to a specific objective. So again our meditations on the meaning and 
study of history, therefore, should not, and will not, end. With our meditations we will only 
continue to reach further clarity, though perhaps not ever reaching absolute, pure, or definitive 
lucidity. But as the pragmatists would argue, this is not the objective either. The objective is to 
ponder and contemplate all this in smart, useful ways. Nevertheless, again these envisioned 
dialogues serve as essentially a 'period of meditation' toward further analyzing the possible 
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interpretation and meaning of Ortega's historicism, and specifically his axiom that man has no 
nature, only history, adding that this is because history is his nature. 
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